Emotions can be explained as specialized states, shaped by natural selection, that increase fitness in specific situations. The physiological, psychological, and behavioral characteristics of a specific emotion can be analyzed as possible design features that increase the ability to cope with the threats and opportunities present in the corresponding situation. This approach to understanding the evolutionary functions of emotions is illustrated by the correspondence between (a) the subtypes of fear and the different kinds of threat; (b) the attributes of (...) happiness and sadness and the changes that would be advantageous in propitious and unpropitious situations; and (c) the social emotions and the adaptive challenges of reciprocity relationships. In addition to addressing a core theoretical problem shared by evolutionary and cognitive psychology, explicit formulations of the evolutionary functions of specific emotions are of practical importance for understanding and treating emotional disorders. (shrink)

Runaway social selection resulting from partner choice may have shaped aspects of human cooperation and complex sociality that are otherwise hard to account for. Social selection is the subtype of natural selection that results from the social behaviors of other individuals. Competition to be chosen as a social partner can, like competition to be chosen as a mate, result in runaway selection that shapes extreme traits. People prefer partners who display valuable resources and bestow them selectively on close partners. The (...) resulting phenotypic covariance between displays and preferences gives fitness advantages to both, creating runaway selection that could shape a whole suite of prosocial traits including altruism, moral capacities, empathy, and theory of mind. Even though they give a net fitness benefit, traits at the endpoint of runaway social selection can have substantial deleterious effects on other traits such as viability, ability to accumulate resources, or vulnerability to mental disorders. Social selection forces arising from self-interested partner choices may be an invisible hand that shaped capacities for commitment, altruism, and other prosocial capacities of the human social brain. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that the processing of an unexpected word is costly when the initial, disconfirmed prediction was strong. This penalty was suggested to stem from commitment to the strongly predicted word, requiring its inhibition when disconfirmed. Additional studies show that comprehenders rationally adapt their predictions in different situations. In the current study, we hypothesized that since the disconfirmation of strong predictions incurs costs, it would also trigger adaptation mechanisms influencing the processing of subsequent strong predictions. In two experiments, participants (...) made speeded congruency judgments on two-word phrases in which the first word was either highly constraining or not. We manipulated the proportion of disconfirmed predictions in highly constraining contexts between participants. The results provide additional evidence of the costs associated with the disconfirmation of strong predictions. Moreover, they show a reduction in these costs when participants experience a high proportion of disconfirmed strong predictions throughout the experiment, indicating that participants adjust the strength of their predictions when strong prediction is discouraged. We formulate a Bayesian adaptation model whereby prediction failure cost is weighted by the participant’s belief about the likelihood of encountering the expected word, and show that it accounts for the trial-by-trial data. (shrink)

Game theory has progressed from analysis of one-move games between two rational agents, to iterated n-person games in which strategies evolve, and actors use prior experience to coordinate their moves. The next step in this direction is to analyse commitment strategies. An individual can influence others by announcing his or her commitment to a future act that would not be in his or her best interests. Spiteful threats can coerce others. Promises to aid someone when nothing can be reciprocated (...) can create deep relationships. Such strategies are inherently paradoxical because the maximum payoff comes from not having to follow through on the commitment, and this is made more likely by expensive signalling of commitments to outlandish threats and promises whose plausibility declines with their magnitude. Nonetheless, the fitness benefits of subjective commitment are substantial and may well have shaped human capacities for revenge and spite, as well as deep attachment and genuine morality. (shrink)

Ness, John We are now well into the second century since scientific knowledge has advanced such that a belief in a god or gods to explain the universe, life, humans and morality, is entirely unnecessary. It contradicts all evidence and is even patently absurd. Over the last 100 years, most western countries have witnessed a decline in the god belief of around 2-5% per decade from an almost 100% rate in 1900. Nevertheless the belief persists amongst all levels of (...) society although there is some correlation between higher levels of education and a lack of belief in god. There have been various attempts to explain this persistence of belief, ranging from the somewhat discredited discovery of the 'god spot' in the brain through to intergenerational influences, especially mothers on children, to the institutional power of religions and the basic human search for meaning or even religion as opium as Marx unkindly put it. (shrink)

Despite the effort on DSM-5 and ICD-11, few appear satisfied with these classification systems. We suggest that the core reason for dissatisfaction is expecting too much from them; they do not provide discrete categories that map to specific causes of disease, they describe clinical syndromes intended to guide treatment choices. Here we review work on anxiety and anxiety disorders to argue that while clinicians draw a pragmatic distinction between normal and abnormal emotions based on considerations such as severity and (...) duration, understanding the evolutionary origins and utility of the emotions, including the adaptive value of adverse emotions, is key for formulating comprehensive assessments of an individual patient’s symptoms and for providing a conceptual foundation for pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and public health. (shrink)

Acupoint Biophoton Emissions Testing (ABET), an alternative diagnostic technique used by practitioners of Traditional Chinese Medicine, illustrates a case of non-linguistic Delome-level semiosis that is understood to form an interface between endosemiotic and linguistic semiotic levels of human (bio-)communication. Performed manually, the technique employs an array of Hypoiconic and Indexical Symbols that, when used in combination, enable practitioners to “listen in” and learn with biocommunicational processes, re-embodying them in a manner that renders them available to conscious recognition and linguistic (...) representation. The Delome formations of the ABET technique afford the gradual accumulation and transformation of practitioner understanding through sign co-performances that achieve triadic relationality mediationally—prefiguring fully representational forms of learning. They demonstrate embodied capacities for pattern recognition, coordination, exploration, articulation, explication and self-governance that may have evolved in advance of representational sign formations, setting the evolutionary stage for them. (shrink)

This study, the third in a series of three, draws on a broader Norwegian research project exploring the phenomenon of support for young persons with mental health issues. The aim was to explore and explicate the sense of “nourishing communion”, as a somewhat neglected aspect of support. Fourteen Norwegian young adults, aged 18-25, were interviewed about their experiences of support. Data was analyzed using van Manen’s hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to open up possible meanings of how nourishing communion is concretely lived. Analysis (...) was supplemented by in-depth reflexive dialogues between the first and second author, which fostered a nourishing communion akin to the processes and dimensions of our phenomenon of interest. Findings highlight five intertwined existential themes: a) trusting the other to hold vulnerability safely; b) flourishing in mutual participation; c) acceptance in a felt togetherness; d) feeling found and received; and e) feeling an attuned resonance. The notion of “nourishing communion” as a significant but neglected element of support challenges current practice, suggesting the need for a different approach to collaboration with young persons and their networks. From the perspectives both of individual professional engagement and of policy making, there is a need for further exploration of how young persons might be supported to create and maintain a broader range of nourishing relationships. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Homo-Ness” and the Fear of FemininityPatrick Paul Garlinger (bio)Leo Bersani. Homos. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995.Homos is a disturbing book, in the most literal sense of the word, for Leo Bersani’s goal throughout much of his text is precisely to disturb some of the widely accepted precepts of queer theory and gender performativity. As if the title alone were not enough to signal the text’s contestatory tone, the first (...) sentence of the prologue boldly declares that “no one wants to be called a homosexual” [1]. While many scholars might disagree with such an overwhelming generalization (myself included), it nonetheless reminds us that homosexuality continues to occupy an ambiguous position within contemporary society, an ambiguity perhaps most powerfully punctuated by the recent failure of gays and lesbians to secure legal access to the institution of marriage. In the first three chapters, Bersani interrogates topics such as gay identity, AIDS, queer theory, and sadomasochism. In the final chapter, “The Gay Outlaw,” he addresses the literary representation of homosexuality through radical rereadings of Gide, Proust, and Genet. Although no one single thesis coherently unites these chapters, a healthy spirit of suspicion begs the thorny question of what it means to be gay, and in so doing, explores the tenability of identity politics. Rejecting a politics of opposition that would bind our theorizations to the very heteronormative paradigms that they are attempting to resist, Bersani argues instead for ways to “explore the links between a specific sexuality, psychic mobility, and a potentially radical politics” [56].Identity, for Bersani (and other critics following Foucault), is an operation of power, a “disciplinary project” that is a tool at the service of identification and containment [3]. 1 Seen as essentialist, universalizing, or ontological, identity has received a bad rap. Indeed, the notion of a sexual identity as a fixed category invariably fails in its performative capacity to capture the myriad array of sexual acts that a given individual may feel compelled to perform. The failure of identity, however, should not lead to its elimination from our theoretical frameworks, Bersani proposes. He claims instead that the critique of identity in feminist and queer theory is ultimately destructive rather than liberating. At the [End Page 57] source of this dismissal of identity is the fear that visibility will result in “discipline and punishment,” but Bersani argues quite convincingly that this retreat from the domain of the visible colludes with the homophobic goal of eliminating homosexuality. On the other hand, Bersani acknowledges that identity and visibility are not wholly benevolent either: “[o]nce we agreed to be seen, we agreed to be policed” [12]. Visibility allows for domination and even annihilation, a possibility that Bersani considers in his discussion of AIDS, in which visibility can be seen as providing straight America with a front-row seat at the spectacle of gay death [21]. Nevertheless, that is a risk that must be taken. While not proposing a return to regulatory identity categories, Bersani wants to return to a gay specificity to prevent gays and lesbians from “performing” themselves out of existence. Responding to David Halperin and Judith Butler, for example, he argues that the rejection of essentializing identities as a mode of resisting homophobia erases the very agent of that resistance [56]. Fearful that the attacks on the notion of identity in the academy have simply collaborated in the marginalization of homosexuality, Homos attempts to offer “homo-ness” as an “anti-identitarian identity” [101], one that risks the pitfalls of essentialism and simultaneously transcends the limits of sexual orientation.Nowhere is his desire to rethink identity more clear than in his trenchant critique of the dismantling of gender by critics such as Butler, Monique Wittig, and Michael Warner. Suspicious of their deconstructive strategies, he argues that the undoing of the categories of gender inevitably leads to the elimination of homosexuality. The critique of gender in discussions of sexuality endangers any specificity that same-sex sexuality might have. For example, he writes, “‘men’ and ‘women’ in Wittig’s radical argument are political creations designed to give a biological mandate to social arrangements in which one group of human beings oppresses another” [38]. Within the social domain of... (shrink)

Beckers & Vennekens recently proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that their definition is in fact a formalization of Wright’s famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that their definition integrates two highly influential approaches (...) to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify their definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken their difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids their problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between for-me-ness and sociality. I start by pointing out some ambiguities in claims pursued by critics that have recently pressed on the relationship between the two notions. I next articulate a question concerning for-me-ness and sociality that builds on the idea that, occasionally at least, there is something it is like ‘for us’ to have an experience. This idea has been explored in recent literature on shared experiences and collective intentionality, and (...) it gestures towards the question of the extent to which some social interactions make a difference in the phenomenal character of their participants’ experiences. Finally, I present a construal of for-us-ness that complements the received understanding of for-me-ness, by drawing on Alfred Schutz’ concept of the we-relationship, and on the idea of second-personal awareness, i.e. awareness of a ‘you’. The current proposal provides a suitable account of some basic forms of phenomenally manifest social connectedness, in a way that is cognitively undemanding and without incurring the costs of a sui generis plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (shrink)

An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature consciousness. I call this the priority of (...) state consciousness thesis (PSC). In this paper, I want to explore how the renewed centrality bestowed to phenomenology in contemporary discussions on consciousness challenges PSC and, consequently, the standard way of framing the problem of consciousness. More precisely, I examine PSC in light of a view about the structure of phenomenal character that is paradigmatic of the approach above. This is subjectivism about phenomenal character (SUBJ), according to which a mental state is conscious when it acquires the property of for-me-ness. I argue that PSC and SUBJ are incompatible because the latter implies that creature consciousness is explanatorily prior to state consciousness. Consequently, if SUBJ is true, then PSC is false, and what constitutes the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of explaining (a kind of) creature consciousness. I conclude by defending my claim from a pair of possible objections and drawing some implications for the discussion of for-me-ness and the debate on the explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper traces the tenuous relationship of prestige television, the culture industry and blackness. The opening section aims to get a hold on what is meant by prestige television. We review literature that introduces and problematizes the intuitive arguments of prestige television’s elevated status as high art and ultimately conclude with a sociopolitical argument that minimises the distinction between form and content in order to emphasise and show the hierarchy inherent in the culture industry based on legitimacy. The second (...) section introduces the idea of blackness to the conversation of prestige television by analysing the final scene of The Sopranos – a cut to the black screen – as not merely the event that officially inaugurates prestige television, but as an event that also announces the possible escape from its parameters of legitimacy. To do the latter we reflect upon “Black Bieber” as a figure of illegitimate blackness in Donald Glover’s Atlanta. In the third and concluding sections of the paper, we continue our elaboration of the uniqueness of blackness by putting into conversation Fred Moten’s conception of fugitive blackness with Theodor Adorno’s aesthetic theory. In the conclusion, we show how blackness challenges the totalizing aspect of the culture industry, totalizing aspect of the culture industry, pointing us towards something altogether new, after black(ness). (shrink)

Drawing on multimodal conversation analysis as a method, this article explores the role of embodiment and tactility in negotiating peer relations in classroom interaction. We aim at discussing how social relations between peers are locally constructed and negotiated through embodied, tactile-haptic, and spatial practices during classroom activities. The focus of the empirical analysis is on how students sequentially co-construct specific peer-to-peer touch type—sustained leaning touch—as well as how embodied two-student formations, synchronization of bodily movements and negotiation of personal space (...) serves as displaying social bonding and balancing between students’ dual role orientation. Our findings suggest that intercorporeal construction of we-ness—including exclusive and inclusive practices in relation to peer groups—is based on students’ embodied orientations during leaning touch as well as re-organized embodied choreographies, participation frameworks and spatial arrangements. Our empirical analysis on tactility, embodied consciousness and incorporeal compresence has its basis in a phenomenologically rooted understanding of intercorporeality, and therefore our article aims at building bridges between phenomenological understanding and conceptualization and detailed empirical analysis of clearly observable interactional phenomena. (shrink)

Socrates recognizes a distinction between formal and material definitional conditions. In this dissertation, I concentrate on the material conditions rather than the formal ones for two reasons: Socrates allows a great deal of syntactic flexibility, and many answers he regards as formally adequate resist classification by contemporary standards. I argue that Socrates is committed to four material adequacy conditions in answers to "what is F-ness?" He is committed to the extensional equivalence condition, that the definiens picks out all (...) and only instances of the definiendum, the property sameness condition, that the definiens is a property identical to the definiendum, the explanation condition, that the definiens explains instances of the definiendum, and the semantic completeness condition, that statements about F-nesses involving evaluative predicates do not change their truth-value, regardless of context. (shrink)

In the so-called ‘dialogues of definition,’ Socrates appears to endorse the ‘priority of definition.’ This principle states that an agent cannot know anything about F-ness (its instances, examples, properties, etc.) without knowing what F-ness is (the definition of F-ness). Not only is this principle implausible, it is also difficult to square with Socrates’ method. In employing his method, Socrates appeals to truths about the instances and properties of F-ness, even while pursuing definitional knowledge; meanwhile, he holds (...) that one cannot know those truths without already knowing the definition. Thus, there is a tension between Socrates’ principle and his method. Commentators have tried to resolve this problem in various ways, though typically without a careful examination of his ‘What is F-ness?’ question. I argue that Socrates employs the ‘What is F-ness?’ question as a way of introducing two distinct types of investigation into F-ness (conceptual and causal). With this established, the relationship between Socrates’ principle and his method comes to light, and the tension is resolved. (shrink)

Over the last fifteen years, studies on Sanskrit intellectual history between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries have produced a body of scholarship that has fundamentally reshaped our understanding of the period. Yet, despite significant advances in the understanding of the social-historical circumstances of authors and disciplines as well as success in elucidating major features of intellectual thought, a main point of difficultly has been in combining both the intellectuality and sociality of Sanskrit scholars. By examining a debate within the (...) discipline of nyāya during the seventeenth century about how one cognizes the universal property ‘Brahman-ness ’ and by connecting it with a social debate that is found in available historical documents of the period, this essay attempts to combine the sociality of the Brahman scholarly community in Vārāṇasī with their intellectuality and offer a larger analysis of nyāya intellectual history for this period. The essay concludes by considering the ways in which the social world impinged upon nyāya argumentation and nyāya argumentation upon the social world. (shrink)

This article examines Dostoevsky's "fantastic realism," which challenges the explanation of rationalism or empiricism in the need for determinate categories fixed in nature. His use of paintings by Hans Holbein, Claude Lorrain, and Raphael in terms of the sublime and beautiful exemplify an understanding of Holy Saturday and its status between death and resurrection. Julia Kristeva's reading of Dostoevsky's melancholy as exemplifying a religious ideal and William Desmond's metaxological philosophy allows us to propose a terminology that rhymes with Dostoevskian (...) between-ness, a conclusion that does not resolve the space between the beautiful and the sublime but remains open to the confessional enigmatic liminality that is Holy Saturday. (shrink)

The article deals with semiosis and its dimensions as a theoretical construct to show some elementary differences between spheres of semiotic activity. In essence, one sign will be dissected into four categories of existence to show it may have different relations depending on the dimension it happens to be in. The general framework is that of human consciousness and its two distinct states: awake cognition and asleep dreaming with emphasis on the latter. From our point of view, the concepts (...) of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ have two layers: the manifest form and the latent function, the seen and the unseen. These are used as parallels to support the central thesis of this article that human cognition has dreaming as its countepart.The main theoretical frame is drawn from the work of Greimas and Courtes with emphasis on the semiotic square. The concept of the sign is taken from Peirce, whereas ‘sign-ness’ is adopted from Pyatigorskij. By projecting the triadic sign onto the semiotic square and excluding the concept ‘sign system’ along with the syntactic aspect, the basic fourfold dimension of the sign as such will be brought to view based on the distinct sign-relations in each given dimension. In order to double the square, semiosis will be endowed with features of ‘being-able’, thus affording the initial expression of dominant modalities serving as basis for the structure(s) of the elementary function and mechanism in each of the four dimensions. This will also enable bringing into view some elementary restrictions on semiosis in each dimension. Lastly, some new terms are suggested in accordance with what has been presented.В статье рассматривается семиозис и его измерения как теоретическая конструкция, чтобы показать некоторые элементарные различия между сферами семиотического действия. По сути знак будет разделен на четыре категории существования, чтобы показать, что он может иметь разные отношения в зависимости от того, в каком измерении он находится. Основной рамкой, вместе с тем, является человеческое сознание в его двух состояниях: в состоянии бодрствования и сна со сновидениями, с акцентом на последнее. Несмотря на широкое использование универсальных понятий ‘природа’ и ‘культура’, статья не сосредоточивается на семиотических особенностях этих доменов. С нашей точки зрения ‘природа’ и ‘культура’ имеют два уровня, т.е. проявленную форму и скрытую функцию, видимое и невидимое. Они используются параллельно, поддерживая центральный тезис этой статьи о том, что человеческое познание имеет соответствие в виде сновидения.Теоретическая рамка взята из работы Греймаса и Курте с акцентом на семиотический квадрат. Понятие знака трактуется в духе Пирса, тогда как понятие ≪знаковости≫ дается по Пятигорскому. При проекции триадического знака на семиотический квадрат и исключении понятия ≪знаковой системы≫ вместе с синтаксическим аспектом, обнаруживается основное четырехкратное измерение знака, опирающаяся на определенные знаковые отношения в каждом данном измерении. Чтобы удвоить квадрат, семиозис будет наделен функцией ≪быть способным≫, таким образом обеспечивая начальное выражение доминирующих модальностей, служащих в каждом из четырых измерений основой для структуры (структур) элементарной функции и механизма. Это также даст возможность рассмотреть некоторые элементарные ограничения семиозиса в каждом из измерений. Наконец, предлагаются некоторые новые термины в соответствии с тем, что было представлено.Artikkel tegeleb semioosi ja selle mootmetega kui teoreetilise konstruktsiooniga, et demonstreerida moningaid elementaarseid erinevusi semiootilise tegevuse sfaarides. Sisuliselt lahatakse uks mark neljaks eksistentsikategooriaks, naitamaks, et sel voivad olla erinevad suhted olenevalt mootmest, milles see olema juhtub. Uldiseks raamiks on inimteadvus ja selle kaks eristuvat olekut: arkvelolek ja uni, rohuasetusega viimasel. Vaatamata universaalsete terminite nagu ‘loodus’ ja ‘kultuur’ ohtrale kasutamisele, ei tegele kaesolev artikkel nende valdkondade semiootiliste eriparadega. Meie seisukohast on ‘loodusel’ ja ‘kultuuril’ kaks kihti – manifestne vorm ja latentne funktsioon, nahtav ja nahtamatu. Neid vaadeldakse paralleelselt, et toetada kaesoleva artikli keskset teesi, et inimkognitsiooni vasteks on unenagemine.Peamine teoreetiline raam tuleneb Greimase ja Courtes’ toodest, rohuasetusega semiootilisele ruudule. Margi moiste voetakse Peirce’ilt ning “margilisus” Pjatigorskilt. Projitseerides triaadilist marki semiootilisele ruudule ning valistades ‘margisusteemi’ moiste koos suntaktilise aspektiga, tuuakse nahtavale margi neljakordne alusdimensioon, mis tugineb kindlatele margisuhetele igas antud mootmes. Et ruutu kahekordistada, antakse semioosile ‘suutlikkuse’ jooned, lubades domineerivate modaalsuste algset valjendumist, mis igas neljast dimensioonist toimivad elementaarse funktsiooni struktuuri(de) ja mehhanismi alusena. See voimaldab vaatluse alla tuua ka moned elementaarsed piirangud semioosile iga dimensioonis. Viimaks pakutakse valja moned uued terminid. (shrink)

In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon be in contact with her. (...) I argue that seeing objects as being here in a minimal sense means seeing them in the place in which the perceptual system expects the world and the body to collide. I further argue that this minimal notion of here-content gives rise to a tactile sense of presence. It provides a unique experiential access to the reality of the seen object by making us aware of its ability to have an effect on us. (shrink)

Who constitutes the public on whose behalf such an official speaks and in whose name the apology is offered? In this paper I argue that in most cases, the “public” that the official offering an apology represents and on whose behalf the apology is offered is not the general public but the public sector: those who direct, control and populate the apparatus of the state. I argue that in most cases there is not a plausible model according to which public (...) sector actors can be treated as vehicles for actions, decisions, projects and values of the general public: a public sector actor is not an avatar of the general public. This makes for a gap between public officials and the general public that must be explicitly bridged with respect to actions, decisions and attitudes named in a public apology in order for members of the general public to perceive themselves as part of either the wrongs for which apology is offered or the apology itself. Recognizing this gap does not imply that members of the general public are not or cannot be responsible for wrongs perpetrated by public sector actors. However, it does imply that the source of the responsibility will not usually be found in public officials having acted at the behest of or for the sake of the general public. (shrink)

This book examines the performance of Bauls 'folk' performers from Bengal, in the context of a rapidly globalizing Indian economy and against the backdrop of extreme nationalistic discourses. Recognizing their scope beyond the musical and cultural realm, Sukanya Chakrabarti engages in discussing the subversive and transformational potency of Bauls and their performances. In-Between Worlds argues that the Bauls through their musical, spiritual, and cultural performances offer 'joy' and 'spirituality', thus making space for what Dr. Ambedkar in his famous 1942 (...) speech had identified as 'reclamation of human personality'. Chakrabarti destabilizes the category of 'folk' as a fixed classification or an origin point, and fractures homogeneous historical representations of the Baul as a 'folk' performer and a wandering mendicant exposing the complex heterogeneity that characterizes this group. Establishing 'folk-ness' as a performance category, and 'folk festivals' as sites of performing 'folk-ness', contributing to a heritage industry that thrives on imagined and recreated nostalgia, Chakrabarti examines different sites that produce varied performative identities of Bauls, probing the limits of such categories while simultaneously advocating for polyvocality and multifocality. While this project has grounded itself firmly in performance studies, it has borrowed extensively from fields of postcolonial studies and subaltern histories, literature, ethnography and ethnomusicology, and cosmopolitan studies. (shrink)

Existential space is lived space, space permeated by our raced, gendered selves. It is representative of our very existence. The purpose of this essay is to explore the intersection between this lived space and art by analyzing the work of the Cuban‐born artist Ana Mendieta and showing how her Siluetas Series discloses a space of exile. The first section discusses existential spatiality as explained by the phenomenologists Heidegger and Watsuji and as represented in Mendieta's Siluetas. The second section analyzes (...) the space of exile as a space of in‐between‐ness and borders. Lastly, the third section discusses temporality as it relates to the space of exile. Through the analysis of Mendieta's Siluetas, and in light of phenomenological accounts of space and the works of Anzaldúa and Mignolo, Ana Mendieta herself is disclosed as well as the space characteristic of those who can no longer be said to have a “home.” My exploration through my art of the relationship between myself and nature has been a clear result of my having been torn from my homeland during my adolescence. The making of my Silueta in nature keeps (makes) the transition between my homeland and my new home. It is a way of reclaiming my roots and becoming one with nature. Although the culture in which I live is part of me, my roots and cultural identity are a result of my Cuban heritage.1 As quoted in Gloria Moure, Ana Mendieta (Barcelona: Ediciones Polígrafa, S.A., 1996), 108. Ana MendietaLiving in a state of psychic unrest, in a Borderland, is what makes poets write and artists create.2 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands La Frontera, The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), 73. Gloria Anzaldúa. (shrink)

This article develops a detailed, empirically driven analysis of the nature of the transition costs incurred in becoming disabled. Our analysis of the complex nature of these costs supports the claim that it can be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is just one way of being different. We also argue that close attention to the nature of transition costs gives us reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should determine the (...) wrongness of causing or removing disability. Non-welfare considerations also defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. The upshot of these conclusions is that closer attention to the nature of transition costs supports disabled people who strenuously contest the assumption that their well-being is lower than nondisabled people. It also suggests that, in addition, disabled people should contest their opponents’ narrow account of how we should make ethical decisions regarding causing or failing to prevent disability. (shrink)

The Human Genome Project showed that there is signifcant genetic variation within the population. Current research is accumulating large databases that may reveal genetic variations associated with disease or health risks, even if not intended as part of the study design. These incidental fnd-ings create legal, ethical, and fnancial challenges for researchers. Current federal and international guidelines are not adequate. Plans for dealing with incidental fndings need to be established in the study design and reviewed and approved by the Institutional (...) Review Board. (shrink)

Medical practice is poised to incorporate genomescale testing into treatment decisions. However, broad genome testing in laboratories may lead to discoveries not anticipated, yet highly significant to the health of the patient. Understanding the complexity of our genome and its relationship to our health is an overwhelming task. Currently, much of the effort to unravel this complexity is in the realm of research. However, researchers are often neither qualified nor prepared to deal with incidental findings of genetic abnormalities that influence (...) health and disease. These incidental observations, referred to recently by Issac Kohane et al. as the “incidentalome,” may lead to complex legal, ethical, and financial problems that may seriously complicate the role of the research community in medical genomics. Currently, most genetics researchers, while aware of the potential for incidental findings, simply do not want to deal with them. (shrink)

The first ever description of how evolutionary principles can be applied to questions of health and sickness.

The focus of social simulation on representing the social world calls for an investigation of whether its implementations are inherently value-laden. In this article, I investigate what kind of thing implementation is in social simulation and consider the extent to which it has moral significance. When the purpose of a computational artefact is simulating human institutions, designers with different value judgements may have rational reasons for developing different implementations. I provide three arguments to show that different implementations amount to taking (...) moral stands via the artefact. First, the meaning of a social simulation is not homogeneous among its users, which indicates that simulations have high interpretive malleability. I place malleability as the condition of simulation to be a metaphorical vehicle for representing the social world, allowing for different value judgements about the institutional world that the artefact is expected to simulate. Second, simulating the social world involves distinguishing between malfunction of the artefact and representation gaps, which reflect the role of meaning in simulating the social world and how meaning may or not remain coherent among the models that constitute a single implementation. Third, social simulations are akin to Kroes’ techno-symbolic artefacts, in which the artefact’s effectiveness relative to a purpose hinges not only on the functional effectiveness of the artefact’s structure, but also on the artefact’s meaning. Meaning, not just technical function, makes implementations morally appraisable relative to a purpose. I investigate Schelling’s model of ethnic residential segregation as an example, in which different implementations amount to taking different moral stands via the artefact. (shrink)

An established ethical principle of biomedical research involving human subjects stipulates that risk to subjects should be proportionate to an experiment’s potential benefits. Sometimes this principle is imprecisely stated as a requirement that ‘risks and benefits’ be balanced. First, it is noted why this language is imprecise. Second, the persistence of such language is attributed to how it functions as a rhetorical trope. Finally, an argument is made that such a trope is infelicitous because it may not achieve its intended (...) persuasive purposes. More importantly, it should be avoided because it masks the important role that chance plays in clinical research. Risk is the possibility of harm. As a precondition of harm it is unintended and undesirable in projects of biomedical research. It requires ethical vigilance. As a vehicle of chance, however, it is both intended and desirable. It requires methodological appreciation. (shrink)

Scientific cosmology raises various issues of philosophical interest. Among these is the understanding of the beginning', as it arises in normal cosmology, which seems not intelligible as an ordinary beginning (' in time'), but rather as a beginning ' of time'. Recent cosmological research that seeks to unite theories of gravity and of quantum physics is speculative; various proposals with different philosophical perspectives on time and reality co-exist. This plurality of speculative cosmological proposals reflects also a diversity of views regarding (...) the nature of explanations. ' Anthropic principles' are not fruitful as additional explanations. It is argued here, however, that any cosmological proposal will always have an open end, due to limit questions that arise in relation to the scientific research but are not answered by it. These limit questions allow for various religious interpretations, theistic, pantheistic and agnostic. /// O presente artigo parte da constatação de que a cosmologia científica contemporânea suscita questões de grande relevância e interesse filosófico. Entre estas está a compreensão do "começo", tal como ele se dá na cosmologia normal, o qual não se mostra inteligível nos termos de um começo ordinário ("no tempo"), mas sim se entendido como começo "do tempo". O artigo analisa alguns aspectos da investigação cosmológica mais recente, a qual procura sobretudo unir as teorias da gravidade e da física quântica, considerando-a como especulativa; mostra-se assim até que ponto diversas propostas científicas co-existem com diferentes perspectivas filosóficas acerca do tempo e da realidade. Por outro lado, mostra-se também até que ponto esta pluralidade de propostas cosmológicas especulativas reflecte também uma diversidade de pontos de vista acerca da natureza das explicações em si mesmas. Por exemplo, o artigo tenta demonstrar que os "Princípios antrópicos" não são fecundos enquanto que explicações adicionais. Nesse sentido, o autor do artigo defende que toda e qualquer proposta cosmoíógica terá de ser sempre aberta, e isso precisamente devido à presença de questões-íimite que brotam a partir da investigação científica, mas que não podem por esta ser respondidas. Finalmente, mostra-se ainda que estas questões-limite dão azo a uma diversidade de interpretações religiosas, entre estas se vislumbrando posições como a tetsta, a panteísta e a agnóstica. (shrink)

During the mid-1970s the extraordinarily dangerous style of free solo climbing emerged in the collective practice of a small community of “Stonemaster” climbers actively developing new climbing routes and the new “free” style of roped climbing in what is now Joshua Tree National Park, California. While its emergence might be interpreted as an affectively-driven, macho embodied social semiotic or ethnomotricity, in actuality the evolution of free soloing in the case of Stonemaster-era climbing at Joshua Tree may be more accurately understood (...) as the logical consequence of an intensive regime of practice in which climbers developed a near absolute bodily familiarity with certain climbing routes. Eventually, the reasonableness of climbing with little and even no protection on a subset of these routes became self-evident and conventional. Free soloing, in the semiotic perspective of the later Peirce, manifested as a Normal Logical Interpretant in the Joshua Tree landscape. It embodied the living definition of self-controlled conduct, and the Symbols it cultivated testified persuasively to the growth of a creative corporeal intelligence actualizing near absolute degrees of free will. (shrink)

My initial task in this essay is to identify precisely the original philosophical import of philosophical renections about religion. Next I outline their changing natures and interrelations in the works of exemplary figures from the history of Western religious thought. Finally I argue that the relative desuetude of the traditional forms of apology and speculalion is emblemalic of the present faring of philosophy as a form of cultural discourse.

My initial task in this essay is to identify precisely the original philosophical import of philosophical renections about religion. Next I outline their changing natures and interrelations in the works of exemplary figures from the history of Western religious thought. Finally I argue that the relative desuetude of the traditional forms of apology and speculalion is emblemalic of the present faring of philosophy as a form of cultural discourse.

Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.

Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.