Environmental ethicists have devoted considerable attention to discussing whether anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric arguments provide more appropriate means for defending environmental protection. This paper argues that philosophers, scientists, and policy makers should pay more attention to a particular type of anthropocentric argument. These anthropocentric indirect arguments defend actions or policies that benefit the environment, but they justify the policies based on beneficial effects on humans that are not caused by their environmental benefits. AIAs appear to have numerous appealing (...) characteristics, and their weaknesses do not provide compelling reasons to avoid them. Elucidating these arguments should inspire social scientists and philosophers to study the range of situations in which AIAs can be ethically and effectively employed and the extent to which they increase or diminish public support for environmentalism. (shrink)

I propose to show that when the most morally defensible versions of an anthropocentric environmental ethics and a nonanthropocentric ethics are laid out, they would lead us to accept the same principles of environmental justice.

Animal ethics has tended to follow an analytical approach and has focused much attention on moral reason and theory. Recently, some have argued this to be a fundamental problem. The 'paradigmatic account' claims that instead of reason and theory, ethics ought to emphasize common paradigms and meanings. Since these paradigms and meanings tend to be anthropocentric, the pro-animal arguments presented within animal ethics ought to be viewed critically. The paper explores two variants of this account: anthropocentric casuistry and (...) the Wittgensteinian approach. It is maintained that, although the importance of paradigms and meanings ought to be recognized, both of these approaches face severe difficulties that make them, without further development, an unfruitful basis for ethics concerning non-human animals. (shrink)

Anthropocentric biocentrism says that human beings ought to promote the survival of our own species above the survival of other species. But those who attack AB sometimes take it to say something much stronger: we ought to promote our species’ various desires, interests, and goals. I call the latter view AB+. I argue that AB and anti-AB+ are not only mutually compatible but in some respects mutually complementary, such that there are good prospects for combining them into a hybrid-view. (...) After all, we know that the survival of our species is deeply connected to the well being of the environment. (shrink)

People frequently see design in nature that reflects intuitive teleological thinking– that is, the order in nature that supports life suggests it was designed for that purpose. This research proposes that inferences are stronger when nature supports human life in particular. Five studies (total N = 1788) examine evidence for an anthro-teleological bias. People agreed more with design statements framed to aid humans (e.g., “trees produce oxygen so that humans can breathe”) than the same statements framed to aid other targets (...) (“trees produce oxygen so that leopards can breathe”). The bias was greatest when advantages for humans were well-known and salient (e.g., the ozone layer) and decreased when advantages for other targets were made explicit. The bias was not eliminated by highlighting the benefits for other species, however, and emerged spontaneously for novel phenomena (Jupiter’s gravity protects Earth from asteroids). We conclude that anthropocentric biases enhance existing teleological biases to see stronger design in phenomena where it enables human survival. (shrink)

I propose to show that when the most morally defensible versions of an anthropocentric environmental ethics and a nonanthropocentric ethics are laid out, they would lead us to accept the same principles of environmental justice.

Humans naturally and effortlessly use a set of cognitive tools to reason about biological entities and phenomena. Two such tools, essentialist thinking and teleological thinking, appear to be early developmental cognitive defaults, used extensively in childhood and under limited circumstances in adulthood, but prone to reemerge under time pressure or cognitive load. We examine the nature of another such tool: anthropocentric thinking. In four experiments, we examined patterns of property attribution to a wide range of living and non-living objects, (...) manipulating time pressure, response type, and property in a total of 471 participants. Results showed no tendency toward increased similarity-based attribution patterns indicative of anthropocentric thinking under time pressure. However, anthropocentric thinking was consistently observed for unfamiliar properties. These findings suggest that anthropocentric thinking is not a developmentally persistent cognitive default, but rather a cognitive strategy deliberately employed in situations of uncertainty. (shrink)

According to Cicero, “all emotions spring from the roots of error: they should not be pruned or clipped here and there, but yanked out” (Cicero 2002: 60). The Stoic enthusiasm for the extirpation of emotion is radical in two respects, both of which can be expressed with the claim that emotional responses are never appropriate. First, the Stoics held that emotions are incompatible with virtue , since the virtuous man will retain his equanimity whatever his fate. Grief is always vicious, (...) both bad and bad for you, even when directed at events commonly considered tragic, such as the loss of one’s child. (shrink)

Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In (...) order to avoid both pitfalls -- assuming that animals have mental lives just like we do, or assuming that they have no mental lives at all -- I argue for a functional methodological approach. Researchers should study animal cognition by identifying environmental inputs, the functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs. Doing so will allow for cross-species comparisons in a way that the use of folk psychological terms does not. (shrink)

The Anthropocentric Vision: Aesthetics of Effect and Terror in Poe’s ‘Hop-Frog’” develops the possible psycho-social results of emotional hegemony through a semi-anthropoid figure who avenges himself on a king desperate to assert and sustain supremacy over his subjects. This essay juxtaposes modern anthropological study and Poe’s fiction; it demonstrates that an anthropocentric study of the author’s aesthetics of terror in “Hop Frog” reveals that what we see and perceive as essential to the titular character’s poetics of revenge and (...) hatred are nothing but a reflection of our (the readers’) own anthropocentrism. This anthropocentric study provides a glimpse into how humans perceive, adapt, and conquer adversarial forces within the society. However, the collapse of the apparent rational order, effected by Hop Frog at the end, also provides a glimpse into the nether side of human consciousness and its illimitable capacity to defy comprehension. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although environmental and eco-centric efforts have been made in education, the sphere of influence and cogency of these efforts is limited by their anthropocentric framing of the environment. In order to subvert anthropocentric ideals, it is necessary to reposition humans in relation to other living and non-living forms. This study examines the anthropocentric tendencies perpetuated in environmental education efforts. The impetus of this work is to locate specific moments wherein human dominion is invoked within educational efforts (...) that purportedly champion environmentalism. I analyze the nature-based learning movement in particular, and illuminate these anthropocentric tendencies using critical discourse analysis. I take up variations of thematic, structural, and semiotic analyses in order to reveal how the environment is framed within a nature-based learning professional development webinar. This research poses implications for environmental educators broadly, nature-based learning instructors specifically, and researchers of posthumanist education as well. (shrink)

Professional environmental ethics arose directly out of the interest in the environment created by Earth Day in 1970. At that time many environmentalists, primarily because they had read Aldo Leopold’s essay, “The Land Ethic,” were convinced that the foundations of environmental problems were philosophical. Moreover, these environmentalists were dissatisfied with the instrumental arguments based on human use and benefit—which they felt compelled to invoke in defense of nature—because they thought these arguments were part of the problem. Wanting to counter instrumental (...) arguments in some way with non- or even anti-instrumental arguments, and unable to think of anything else to say, they began wistfully suggesting that perhaps nature had or ought to have rights. When professional environmental ethics came into its own in the early 1980s, rights for nature were one of the first subjects to be debated in detail. Unfortunately, however, no one could come up with a theory to support such rights attributions. Nevertheless, because rights had been invoked by environmentalists to challenge the preeminent role of instrumental value arguments, and because the field of environmental ethics developed in support of environmental concerns and arguments, environmental ethicists turned to an examination of noninstrumental or intrinsic value arguments for the preservation of nature. (shrink)

Anthropocentric indirect arguments , which call for specific policies or actions because of human benefits that are correlated with but not caused by benefits to the environment, are gaining increasing traction with those who take a pragmatic approach to environmental protection. I contend that nonanthropocentrists might remain justifiably uneasy about AIAs because such arguments fail to challenge prevailing speciesist moral attitudes. I close by considering whether Elliott can address this concern of nonanthropocentrists by appealing to the ability of AIAs (...) to engender an intrinsic concern for the environment in the people they persuade. (shrink)

The paper entitled ‘Anthropocentric teleological environmental ethics’ is quite suggestive. I have tried to pinpoint that environmental ethics is both anthropocentric and teleological. I contend that man is the sole bearer of values. Environment serves human purpose. Man gives values to environment or Mother Earth. Indians with their reverence for sacred rivers have always been close to nature. I propose integral teleological environmental ethical theory which integrates man and nature, deontological and teleological theories. It reconciles between anthropocentric (...) and non-anthropocentric views of environment. (shrink)

31 The choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 32 there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 33 unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 34 intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 35 unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 36 we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 37 our ultimate goals (...) (like prestige and pleasure), but they are conceptu- 38 ally dependent on some other goal to give them concrete form. In this 39 essay, I argue in favor of six candidates for ultimate goals. (shrink)

pThis paper examines Nishida Kitarō’s (1870–1945) late essay, “Life,” which develops the process of “world-expression” (世界表現) to situate human and nonhuman agency in ways drawing his thought closer to concerns of posthuman ideals of inter-species commensurability and biosemiotics today. Here he extends his philosophy of a site-specific matrix or basho (場所) so as to incorporate arguments from J. S. Haldane’s emThe Philosophical Basis of Biology/em (1931), which poses questions concerning the coordination of organisms and environments. Nishida finds in Haldane support (...) for his own situating of selves, even engaging questions concerning how animals count as selves./p. (shrink)

Purpose. Philosophy of culture is an extremely multifaceted field, which includes the anthropological segment as well. In particular, we can talk about the role of man in cultural progress in a particular period of development of the society. To some extent, this problem may also apply to the theory of archetypes, which is rapidly developing today, being used not only in philosophy but also in other fields, deeply penetrated into the methodology of humanities knowledge. Therefore, we used interdisciplinary tools for (...) this study. The purpose of this work is to study the influence of personality on the development of Ukrainian culture in a global, comprehensive dimension, based on the experience and works of famous figures that carried out cultural activities in a certain historical period. In this case, we can appeal to the archetype of the Wise Old Man, which contains a set of permanent features that connect its projections with both the "foretype" and at the same time the "accumulation" of experience. Theoretical basis. Based on the work of famous researchers in the field of philosophy, anthropology, analytical psychology, ethnophilosophy, the authors note the insufficient elaboration of the topic regarding the distinction of anthropological dimensions of different cultural periods of Ukraine in chronological order. Originality. The authors of the article prove that the continuity of the accumulation of anthropocentric features in individuals gives them transcendence, elevate to the archetype of the Wise Old Man, which can be perceived as a universal process against the ethnic development background. Conclusions. As a result of the study, we can say that the role of individual key figures in the development of national culture is quite noticeable. This can be traced both at the local level and at the national level, when we should talk about individuals who in a certain period of development of society and culture were leading and became a kind of embodiment of universal experience accumulated in an individual with a certain identity, which is the "personality" required in "that place" and "that time". For this reason, we turn to the archetype of the Wise Old Man as an "invariant", a "conductor", which reflects the most realized and individualized personality in a particular chronotope. (shrink)

This article has a twofold aim. First it is shown, based on Joseph Christopher Greer’s earlier analysis, that there is a close historical, and to some extent substantial, affinity between deep ecology and esotericism. Greer’s findings will be corroborated by applying three different definitions of esotericism to the question at hand. Second, based on Sean McGrath’s ecophilosophy, it will be argued that utilizing esoteric influences systematically in deep ecological context can help deep ecology to avoid some problematic aspects it is (...) often accused of. Especially the esoteric conception of living nature can help deep ecology to bridge the gulf between nature and the human being, and thereby to avoid both theoretical and practical anti-humanism. (shrink)

This paper is about the reference or denotation of the concepts and descriptions of modern physics in contrast to Galilean-Newtonian physics and some reflections therein of some widely influential misunderstandings of Einstein's empiricism.

Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For many liberals embrace anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non‐instrumental value. Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest that many parts of nature – e.g. non‐human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the biosphere ‐ often these critics also hold that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others. This (...) article suggests, however, that such inclusive environmental ethicists have a different problem. For when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for many parts of nature, it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account. Otherwise they cannot provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory, anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive environmental ethic. Although there may be something wrong with this line of thought, it at least raises a puzzle for those inclined to accept these ethics. (shrink)

Forget Aldo Leopold. Or Holmes Rolston, III, or Baird Callicott. Forget Arne Naess. I vote for Martin H. Krieger as the most influential environmental philosopher of all time. It has been over 40 y...

Concepts from evolutionary biology are conjoined with a Kantian‐ and Nietzschian‐based critique to demonstrate that our human concepts and perspectives are hopelessly ‘earthbound.’ Unless the caprice of evolutionary biology on some Earth‐like planet replicates the evolutionary history of Earth, we shall not recognise alien intelligence. To suggest that another planet is likely to produce a recognisable intelligence because its evolutionary history is similar to ours is simply absurd, but will seem absurd only to those with a knowledge of bio‐evolution, an (...) understanding of our linguistic and syntactical abilities, and concepts of space, time, and causality. This conclusion may appear heavy‐handed, even pedestrian. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that it is the search for extra‐terrestrial intelligence which is naive. (shrink)

Much anthropocentric environmental argument is limited by a narrow conception of how humans can benefit from nature. E. O. Wilson defends a more robust anthropocentric environmentalism based on a broader understanding of these benefits. At the center of his argument is the biophilia hypothesis according to which humans have an evolutionarily crafted, aesthetic and spiritual affinity for nature. However,the “biophilia hypothesis” covers a variety of claims, some modest and some more extreme. Insofar as we have significant evidence for (...) biophilia, it favors modest versions which do not support a particularly robust anthropocentric environmental ethic. A significantly more robust environmental ethic requires the most extreme version of the biophilia hypothesis, for which there is the least evidence. (shrink)

This paper examines the anthropocentric views of William Newton-Smith, Hilary Putnam, and Bas van Fraassen. It is argued in each case that the anthropocentric views in question are untenable and that the realist alternative is to be preferred.

Energy scientist Amory Lovins is fond of pointing out that in the late 19th century, it was not picketing environmentalists that saved the whales being slaughtered en masse for oil used for lightin...

Concepts from evolutionary biology are conjoined with a Kantian‐ and Nietzschian‐based critique to demonstrate that our human concepts and perspectives are hopelessly ‘earthbound.’ Unless the caprice of evolutionary biology on some Earth‐like planet replicates the evolutionary history of Earth, we shall not recognise alien intelligence. To suggest that another planet is likely to produce a recognisable intelligence because its evolutionary history is similar to ours is simply absurd, but will seem absurd only to those with a knowledge of bio‐evolution, an (...) understanding of our linguistic and syntactical abilities, and concepts of space, time, and causality. This conclusion may appear heavy‐handed, even pedestrian. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that it is the search for extra‐terrestrial intelligence which is naive. (shrink)

Ame Naess, John Rodman, George Sessions, and others, designated herein as ecosophers, propose an egalitarian anti-anthropocentric biocentrism as a basis for a new environmental ethic. I outline their “hands-off-nature” position and show it to be based on setting man apart. The ecosophic position is thus neither egalitarian nor fully biocentric. A fully egalitarian biocentric ethic would place no more restrictions on the behavior of human beings than on the behavior of any other animals. Uncontrolled human behavior might lead to (...) the destruction ofthe environment and thus to the extinction of human beings. I thus conclude that human interest in survival is the best ground on which to argue for an ecological balance which is good both for human beings and for the whole biological community. (shrink)

Virtue ethics (VE), due to its eudaimonistic character, is very anthropocentric; thus the application of VE to environmental ethics (EE) seems to be in contradiction with EE’s critical opinion of human centeredness. In the paper, I prove the claim that there is a possibility of elaborating an environmental virtue ethics (EVE) that involves others (including nonhuman beings). I prove that claim through analyzing Ronald Sandler’s EVE, especially his concept of pluralistic virtue and a pluralistic approach to the aim of (...) ethical endeavor which is not only focused on personal flourishing but also helps others (including nonhumans) to flourish. I start my analysis with a close look at the application of anthropocentrism in VE, beginning by discerning the three types of anthropocentrism that are most often used in discussion on EE and EVE, namely ontological, epistemological, and ethical. Subsequently, I analyze the concept of personal flourishing, which is responsible for the anthropocentric/egoistic nature of VE, proving that VE is anthropocentric/egoistic only formally, not in its content, and as such is only a rational theory, not a moral one. (shrink)

Dr. Elliot argues that environmental protection and climate change issues would find a larger and more supportive audience if presented in less apocalyptical terms and more in a context in which mi...

Over the past six decades, Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties have developed legal agreements to protect various aspects of the Antarctic environment. Strong anthropocentrism (e.g., unsustainable harvesting of marine living resources) is generally rejected, and stewardship (e.g., minimizing risks of contamination) is accepted while protection of nonanthropocentric values (e.g., wilderness and intrinsic values) is evoked when it furthers human interests. As one of the world’s remaining large wildernesses, Antarctica is under threat from the continuous expansion of the human footprint and is (...) in need of attention from the wider society, including the environmental ethics community. The interdependence of all life on this planet means that problems in Antarctica are not as far away and trivial as it may seem. Furthermore, Antarctica’s extreme position at the edge of civilization challenges humans as moral agents to think about where our moral duties and rights begin and end on this planet, and elsewhere in the universe. Considerations of wilderness and intrinsic values, equity, and abiotic ethics are some of the issues that environmental ethics can contribute toward the protection of the Antarctic wilderness. (shrink)

Much anthropocentric environmental argument is limited by a narrow conception of how humans can benefit from nature. E. O. Wilson defends a more robust anthropocentric environmentalism based on a broader understanding of these benefits. At the center of his argument is the biophilia hypothesis according to which humans have an evolutionarily crafted, aesthetic and spiritual affinity for nature. However,the “biophilia hypothesis” covers a variety of claims, some modest and some more extreme. Insofar as we have significant evidence for (...) biophilia, it favors modest versions which do not support a particularly robust anthropocentric environmental ethic. A significantly more robust environmental ethic requires the most extreme version of the biophilia hypothesis, for which there is the least evidence. (shrink)

Ame Naess, John Rodman, George Sessions, and others, designated herein as ecosophers, propose an egalitarian anti-anthropocentric biocentrism as a basis for a new environmental ethic. I outline their “hands-off-nature” position and show it to be based on setting man apart. The ecosophic position is thus neither egalitarian nor fully biocentric. A fully egalitarian biocentric ethic would place no more restrictions on the behavior of human beings than on the behavior of any other animals. Uncontrolled human behavior might lead to (...) the destruction ofthe environment and thus to the extinction of human beings. I thus conclude that human interest in survival is the best ground on which to argue for an ecological balance which is good both for human beings and for the whole biological community. (shrink)

SummaryThere has been an anthropocentric tendency in the doctrines of creation and redemption, especially, within the Western tradition of Christianity. In my view, contemporary theories of evolutionary and developmental biology help theology to understand how God’s creation unfolds. Meanwhile, a Trinitarian framework of creation provides meaning and purpose to the victims in evolutionary history. Furthermore, it contributes to overcoming the anthropocentric tendency in understanding the doctrine of redemption through the lens of the cosmic dimensions of Jesus’ cross and (...) resurrection. Therefore, in this article, I argue that a Trinitarian framework of creatio ex nihilo can provide meaning and purpose to evolutionary history ridden by death, pain, and suffering, while evolutionary and developmental biology provides theology with a detailed explanation of biological evolution as God’s purposeful creation of the diversity of life in different levels of complexity. In the suggested Trinitarian vision of creatio ex nihilo, God creatively, compassionately, and redemptively works through biological evolution in general and particular modes. (shrink)

In Of Spirit, Jacques Derrida claims that Heidegger's attempted deconstruction of metaphysical anthropocentrism remains anthropocentric and, as such, is inherently authoritarian. This paper takes up these charges to engage with whether Derrida is justified in coming to this conclusion. To do so, it briefly outlines Heidegger's critique of anthropocentrism and subsequent re-thinking of human being in line with the question of being, before suggesting that Derrida is correct to suggest that Heidegger's thinking remains anthropocentric. It then engages with (...) whether Heidegger's defence of this continued anthropocentrism is authoritarian by engaging with the nature of what it is to be authoritarian. By engaging with three senses of authoritarianism, termed authoritarian in the sense of the author, sovereign, and dogmatic, it suggests that, while Heidegger can indeed be thought of as being authoritarian in the senses of the author and sovereign so too can Derrida, and, indeed, by pointing to passages whereby Derrida links the sovereign author to democracy, I show that, on Derrida's terms, it is possible to conclude that Heidegger's thinking is inherently democratic. I then engage with the third sense of authoritarian, authoritarian in the sense of the dogmatic, and by discussing the relationship between being and time, the nature of provisionality in Heidegger's thinking, highlighting a number of statements he makes on animality that confirm this provisionality, and pointing to the openness inherent to meditative thinking, conclude that, while Derrida is correct to maintain that Heidegger's thinking is anthropocentric and can be thought of as being authoritarian in the senses of authorship and sovereignty, it is not authoritarian in the sense of the dogmatic. (shrink)