Physical laws are strikingly simple, although there is no a priori reason they must be so. I propose that nomic realists of all types (Humeans and non-Humeans) should accept that simplicity is a fundamental epistemic guide for discovering and evaluating candidate physical laws. This principle of simplicity clarifies and addresses several problems of nomic realism and simplicity. A consequence is that the oft-cited epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism disappears, undercutting an influential epistemological argument for Humeanism. Moreover, simplicity is shown (...) to be more tightly connected to lawhood than to mere truth. (shrink)

This paper connects the following four topics: a class of generalized graphs whose relations do not have fixed arities called hypergraphs, a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom, an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, and the classical group knowledge modality of ‘someone knows’. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs (...) and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity and positive introspection, and upon adding a single combinatorial axiom, it is also the logic of ‘someone knows’ for a fixed finite number of positively introspective agents. At the core of all these completeness results is a new canonical neighborhood model construction for monotone modal logics that is capable of dealing with all these diverse cases. We also provide an axiomatization for the logic of all non-n-colorable hypergraphs based on a filtration argument that also shows the decidability of the logics of hypergraphs we study. (shrink)

This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.

In "A Problem in Possible-World Semantics," David Kaplan presented a consistent and intelligible modal principle that cannot be validated by any possible world frame (in the terminology of modal logic, any neighborhood frame). However, Kaplan's problem is tempered by the fact that his principle is stated in a language with propositional quantification, so possible world semantics for the basic modal language without propositional quantifiers is not directly affected, and the fact that on careful inspection his principle does not target the (...) world part of possible world semantics—the atomicity of the algebra of propositions—but rather the idea of propositional quantification over a complete Boolean algebra of propositions. By contrast, in this paper we present a simple and intelligible modal principle, without propositional quantifiers, that cannot be validated by any possible world frame precisely because of their assumption of atomicity (i.e., the principle also cannot be validated by any atomic Boolean algebra expansion). It follows from a theorem of David Lewis that our logic is as simple as possible in terms of modal nesting depth (two). We prove the consistency of the logic using a generalization of possible world semantics known as possibility semantics. We also prove the completeness of the logic (and two other relevant logics) with respect to possibility semantics. Finally, we observe that the logic we identify naturally arises in the study of Peano Arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper investigates the principles that one must add to Boolean algebra to capture reasoning not only about intersection, union, and complementation of sets, but also about the relative size of sets. We completely axiomatize such reasoning under the Cantorian definition of relative size in terms of injections.

Scroggs's theorem on the extensions of S5 is an early landmark in the modern mathematical studies of modal logics. From it, we know that the lattice of normal extensions of S5 is isomorphic to the inverse order of the natural numbers with infinity and that all extensions of S5 are in fact normal. In this paper, we consider extending Scroggs's theorem to modal logics with propositional quantifiers governed by the axioms and rules analogous to the usual ones for ordinary quantifiers. (...) We call them Π-logics. Taking S5Π, the smallest normal Π-logic extending S5, as the natural counterpart to S5 in Scroggs's theorem, we show that all normal Π-logics extending S5Π are complete with respect to their complete simple S5 algebras, that they form a lattice that is isomorphic to the lattice of the open sets of the disjoint union of two copies of the one-point compactification of N, that they have arbitrarily high Turing-degrees, and that there are non-normal Π-logics extending S5Π. (shrink)

We consider extending the modal logic KD45, commonly taken as the baseline system for belief, with propositional quantifiers that can be used to formalize natural language sentences such as “everything I believe is true” or “there is something that I neither believe nor disbelieve.” Our main results are axiomatizations of the logics with propositional quantifiers of natural classes of complete Boolean algebras with an operator validating KD45. Among them is the class of complete, atomic, and completely multiplicative BAOs validating KD45. (...) Hence, by duality, we also cover the usual method of adding propositional quantifiers to normal modal logics by considering their classes of Kripke frames. In addition, we obtain decidability for all the concrete logics we discuss. (shrink)

This paper connects the following three apparently unrelated topics: an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, a class of generalized graphs without the arities of relations, and a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity (...) and positive introspection. The logics studied are shown to be decidable based on a filtration construction. (shrink)

本书旨在对文学翻译的本质进行探讨,论述文学语言与翻译、文学翻译的过程、文学翻译的策略,及翻译的文化差异等。.

Why is education in the open society not open? Why is this option not even considered in the debate over which education is most suited for the open society? Many consider such an option irresponsible. What, then, are the minimal responsibilities of education? The present volume raises these questions and many more. It is a book we have been waiting for. It offers a rare combination of two seemingly opposite, unyielding attitudes: critical and friendly. Dr. Yehezkely applies a rigorous fallibilist-critical (...) approach to issues regarding contemporary education. His diagnosis is that the source of our trouble is the closed undemocratic character of education, which causes education to become, in effect, a fifth column in the open democratic society. Following Popper, he concedes that democracy is every bit as flawed and as problematic as its enemies accuse it of being, particularly in education; still it is our only hope, since open responsible debate of vital problems cannot do without it. Democracy is risky: yet its absence guarantees failure, especially in closed undemocratic education, even when inspired by the most progressive ideas extant, charged with tremendous good will, and executed with selfless love and devotion. Kibbutz education is a case in point. (shrink)

Realism about quantum theory naturally leads to realism about the quantum state of the universe. It leaves open whether it is a pure state represented by a wave function, or an impure one represented by a density matrix. I characterize and elaborate on Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the universal quantum state is objective but can be impure. To clarify the thesis, I compare it with Wave Function Realism, explain the conditions under which they are empirically equivalent, consider two (...) generalizations of Density Matrix Realism, and answer some frequently asked questions. I end by highlighting an implication for scientific realism. (shrink)

In most modal logics, atomic propositional symbols are directly representing the meaning of sentences (such as sets of possible worlds). In other words, they use only rigid propositional designators. This means they are not able to handle uncertainty in meaning directly at the sentential level. In this paper, we offer a modal language involving non-rigid propositional designators which can also carefully distinguish de re and de dicto use of these designators. Then, we axiomatize the logics in this language with respect (...) to all Kripke models with multiple modalities and with respect to S5 Kripke models with a single modality. (shrink)

Deconstruction is decidedly unsettling in that it destabilizes the otherwise comfortably assumed understanding of the nature of translation. What is also controversial is that it may make translation impossible, considering that it explicitly acknowledges the impossibility of translation. Yet Derrida emphasizes the necessity of translation as well, thus foregrounding the need to negotiate with the non-negotiable, and for this reason, to translate the untranslatable. Deconstruction captures and elucidates the complexity of translation in relation to the variability and complexity of its (...) nature and practice. Despite the disconcerting observation of his devastatingly relativist overtone and open-endedness, Derrida does not uphold complete free play, as is repeatedly pointed out by himself and other scholars. This paper argues that the context of translation plays a regulating role and intends to unravel what he calls translation as both possible and impossible, both respectful and abusive. Inspired by Derrida's profound contention that translation is in a way more about ‘what is not there’ than ‘what is there’, this paper will map some of the multiple implications of meaning and various modes of representation in translation, in which different meanings can be played with so as to give rise to spaces for exploring and expanding the range of translation strategies and methods. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.

本书主要内容包括:新人本主义的“人一自然”观,关于人与自然关系的哲学伦理学思考,文明生态视角下的“人一自然”观,关于人与自然关系的宗教伦理学思考等.

Despite its apparent complexity, our world seems to be governed by simple laws of physics. This volume provides a philosophical introduction to such laws. I explain how they are connected to some of the central issues in philosophy, such as ontology, possibility, explanation, induction, counterfactuals, time, determinism, and fundamentality. I suggest that laws are fundamental facts that govern the world by constraining its physical possibilities. I examine three hallmarks of laws-simplicity, exactness, and objectivity-and discuss whether and how they may be (...) associated with laws of physics. (shrink)

Background: Losing one’s only child may lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, of which re-experiencing is the core symptom. However, neuroimaging studies of sex differences in re-experiencing in the context of the trauma of losing one’s only child and PTSD are scarce; comparisons of the functional networks from the hippocampal subfields to the thalamus might clarify the neural basis.Methods: Thirty couples without any psychiatric disorder who lost their only child, 55 patients with PTSD, and 50 normal controls underwent resting-state functional magnetic (...) resonance imaging. The functional connectivity from the hippocampal subregions to the thalamus and the correlations of FC with re-experiencing symptoms were analyzed within and between the sexes.Results: Compared with husbands without PTSD, wives without PTSD had higher re-experiencing symptoms and weaker FC between the right hippocampal cornu ammonis 3 and the right thalamus. Moreover, only the correlation between the RCA3-RT FC and re-experiencing in wives without PTSD was significant. Among the three groups, only the RCA3-RT FC in female subjects was markedly different. Additionally, the RCA3-RT FC in wives without PTSD was remarkably lower relative to female patients with PTSD.Conclusion: Wives without PTSD who lost their only child had worse re-experiencing symptoms relative to their husbands, which was associated with the FC alteration between the hippocampal subregions and the thalamus. Importantly, the low level of the RCA3-RT FC may play a potentially protective role against the development of PTSD in wives who have lost their only child. (shrink)

This article adopts a minimal definition of biological usage to demonstrate that the debate over biological function encompasses two distinct dimensions: descriptive and prescriptive. In the descriptive dimension, biological usage serves as the final arbiter for evaluating different accounts of biological function. Conversely, in the prescriptive dimension, accounts are formulated despite biological usage. The main thesis of this article is that the descriptive/prescriptive distinction helps make better sense of the biological function debate from a novel perspective. This is elucidated by (...) meticulously analyzing the two dimensions and subsequently providing a global overview of the debate. (shrink)

A large part of Hilary Putnam’s latest work is spent on disagreeing with John McDowell’s conceptualist view of perception which has been expressed in Mind and World and the McDowellian disjunctivism. Nevertheless, Putnam does not articulate which specific aspects of McDowell’s view he disagrees with. This paper endeavours to: first, clarify what Putnam’s disagreement with McDowell precisely is based on an investigation of the views held by each of the two philosophers regarding the problem of the mind and perception, as (...) well as their attitudes toward the relevant sciences; and second, examine Putnam’s argument against McDowell, then reconstruct it in its most plausible form. Before diving into Putnam’s exact disagreement with McDowell in §3, I consider it important to first clarify the common stance that the two philosophers share, namely the stance which opposes reductionism and eliminativism about the mind. Following that, I will explicate the views held by each of the two philosophers as well as point out where they diverge or disagree on. We will see that Putnam has appreciated the virtue in McDowell’s conceptualist view of doxastic perception. Nevertheless, Putnam argues that perceptual experience is not exhausted by what must be put under the actualisation of the perceiving subject’s conceptual capacities, and there is the dimension of ‘sense impression’, together with the possibility for science’s intervention to our discussion on perception, that has been neglected by McDowell. Finally, in §4, I will discuss some problems I have found in Putnam’s argument and give my own solutions in the hope of contributing to today’s current debates. I argue that ‘sense impression’, though it exceeds the perceiver’s acquired conceptual capacities, must in principle be conceptual insofar as it can be intelligible to us. Putnam’s criticism of McDowell only stands if McDowell’s conceptualist view is understood as a static first-order metaphysical picture of human perception. Meanwhile, Putnam’s proposal for science’s intervention should be taken not as aiming at a better substitutive picture to McDowell’s, but as advocating a certain attitude towards our enterprise of studying human perception which is always open to possible collaborations between different disciplines as well as to possible critiques from future reflections. (shrink)

Human behavior depends on the ability to effectively introspect about our performance. For simple perceptual decisions, this introspective or metacognitive ability varies substantially across individuals and is correlated with the structure of focal areas in prefrontal cortex. This raises the possibility that the ability to introspect about different perceptual decisions might be mediated by a common cognitive process. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability were correlated across two different perceptual tasks where individuals made judgments (...) about different and unrelated visual stimulus properties. We found that inter-individual differences were strongly correlated between the two tasks for metacognitive ability but not objective performance. Such stability of an individual’s metacognitive ability across different perceptual tasks indicates a general mechanism supporting metacognition independent of the specific task. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.

Reputation detection in traditional distributed systems relies heavily on the factor of interaction reputation, which can be derived from direct interactions between agents through bidirectional relationships. However, in the current information diffusion in social network systems, the characteristic of the unidirectional relationship between agents and the decay property of diffusion will result in lacking direct interactions; therefore, interaction reputations will be difficult to be obtained by agents in a distributed manner. To solve this problem, a novel distributed reputation detection model (...) following the pattern “from path to individual” is proposed, which can provide a new reputation factor as an alternative to interaction reputation in such environments. The main idea is that the positive observation of an information diffusion process increases the belief of the corresponding diffusion path, which further increases the reputation of each involved agent. Thus, the reputation of a target agent can be assessed by the superimposition of reputations of multiple paths on which this agent has participated in past information diffusion processes. Furthermore, being aware of agent’s limited capacity for reputation detection in SNS, we then propose the enhanced FPTI model, which simplifies the detection source to reduce detection costs and achieve the approximate performance as FPTI. Theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our models and also show several properties of the models, for example, the robustness for dynamic environments. (shrink)

In this paper, I will identify two problems of trust in an AI-relevant context: a theoretical problem and a practical one. I will identify and address a number of skeptical challenges to an AI-relevant theory of trust. In addition, I will identify what I shall term the ‘scope challenge’, which I take to hold for any AI-relevant theory of trust that purports to be representationally adequate to the multifarious forms of trust and AI. Thereafter, I will suggest how trust-engineering, a (...) position that is intermediate between the modified pure rational-choice account and an account that gives rise to trustworthy AI, might allow us to address the practical problem of trust, before identifying and critically evaluating two candidate trust-engineering approaches. (shrink)

An exhaustive work on Confucius' pedagogic thinking by Chen Jingpan, who is among modern China's first group of scholars with a doctoral degree in education. He started his research into Confucius' teachings on education as early as the 1930s, and the present book, written in English, is the fruit of his long years of study. Chapters: the importance of a scientific study of Confucius; the place of Confucius in Chinese civilization; honors, titles, and ranks conferred upon Confucius throughout Chinese (...) history; modern attitudes towards Confucius; the objective of this study of the philosophy of Confucius, to show the place of Confucius as a teacher, and his contribution as a teacher. (shrink)

This study attempts to answer the question why Confucianism, the dominant “teaching” among the Three Teachings, is not a religion in contemporary China, unlike the other two “teachings,” Buddhism and Daoism. By examining this phenomenon in the social-historical context, this study finds its origin in Orientalism. The Orientalist conceptualization of religion became part of the New Culture discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. While China has undergone tremendous social changes over the past century, the old discourse remains.

The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about (...) what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like Box_a Box_b Box_a p but not formulas like Box_a Box_a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any new agent-alternating formulas—in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas. (shrink)

Retrospect and prospect for contemporary Chinese thought -- Resolving the tension between tradition and modernity : reflections on the May Fourth cultural tide -- The May Fourth tide and modernity -- Radicalism in the cultural movement of the twentieth century -- Modern Chinese culture and the difficulties of Confucian learning -- Liang Shuming's early view of Oriental and Western culture -- The establishment and development of Feng Youlan's view of culture -- A reflection on the new school of principle and (...) thoughts on modernity -- Confucian thought and the world of modern East Asia -- Confucian ethics and China's modernisation -- East Asian tradition according to modernisation theory -- A sense of predicament and inter-dependency -- Liang Shuming and Max Weber on Chinese culture -- Values, authority, tradition and Chinese philosophy -- The difficulty of undertaking national studies research in the nineties : the problem of the national studies fever and research into traditional culture -- The value and status of traditional Chinese culture. (shrink)

In the fifth year of the reign of Shaoxi [in the Song dynasty]—in other words, in the year 1194 A.D.—Zhu Xi was returning to his home province after he had been relieved of his position at court as daizhi shijiang when, in the eleventh month of that year he came to Yushan county in Jiangxi Province. The governor of the district invited Master Zhu to give a number of lectures at the local county school, and Master Zhu complied, discoursing on (...) essential teachings in response to the questions that were raised by the students as well as in response to the lectures given by other scholars. At one point, the record says, the scholar Cheng Gong1 rose to ask the question: "Philosophers prior to the Three Ages only spoke about zhong and ji ; how come, then, that when it came to the time of the dialogues of those in the school of Confucius, everything seemed to revolve around the word ren ?" Master Zhu replied: "The discussions of zhong and of ji have often tended to make people misunderstand the meaning of what they were actually saying; alas, we do not ourselves have the leisure here to discuss all of that in detail.". (shrink)

There are two problematic assumptions in Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism. Assumption 1 is that the referential relation of a name to an object is only an objective or metaphysical relation between language and the world; it has nothing to do with the understanding of the name by our linguistic community. Assumption 2 is that descriptivism has to hold that, if name a has its meaning and the meaning is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, the description (...) should supply a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining what a designates; and that it is possible for us to find out such a setof conditions. Emphasizing the sociality, intentionality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning, this paper rejects Assumption 1, and argues that Assumption 2 is an unfair interpretation of descriptivism, and it is not necessary for descriptivists to hold Assumption 2. This paper finally concludes that Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism fails. (shrink)