An academic anthology on Jewish studies and education in memory of dr. Avraham Zalkin.

On sayings and teachings of 11th century Fatimid Caliph.

Miqdādī Iṣfahānī, ʻAlī - Correspondence ; Islamic ethics ; Sufi poetry, Persian.

La búsqueda de la perfección humana como un afán de mejora constante es compartida tanto por la tradición ética de la virtud de la ley natural tomista como por el movimiento transhumanista. Sin embargo, nociones divergentes de la naturaleza humana y de su telos diferencian profundamente ambos esfuerzos por transformar positivamente la humanidad. El presente trabajo aclara el significado de la tradición de la ley moral natural y la distingue de los malentendidos que podrían surgir de una reducción de la (...) naturaleza a procesos biológicos no racionales. A continuación, el artículo examina cómo una noción adecuada de la naturaleza humana y de los bienes que satisfacen dicha naturaleza pueden orientar un debate constructivo sobre qué tipos de mejora biomédica han de aceptarse como útiles para el florecimiento humano y cuáles deben ser dejados de lado por ser perjudiciales para el auténtico crecimiento. Sin una norma objetiva de la naturaleza humana con la cual juzgar las propuestas de mejora, los cambios biotécnicos ya no pueden distinguirse en categorías de mejora o disminución. El texto muestra por qué tanto los críticos bioconservadores de la mejora humana como los defensores transhumanistas de las alteraciones biotecnológicas radicales presentan visiones empobrecidas de las capacidades de transformación y perfección de la naturaleza humana. En contraste, el tomismo tiene los recursos intelectuales para superar las nociones estáticas de la naturaleza humana y puede corregir las imprecisiones filosóficas del discurso transhumanista contemporáneo sobre la posthumanidad. Este trabajo, por tanto, proporciona los fundamentos antropológicos necesarios para explorar el papel que las virtudes pueden desempeñar en el cumplimiento de la orientación dinámica de la naturaleza humana hacia la perfección. (shrink)

1. Fī fikrinā al-muʻāṣir -- [2] Fī fikr al-Gharbī al-muʻāṣir.

Le cycle antique.--Le cycle Moderne.--Leibniz et l'Europe.

The Kuzari: In Defense of the Despised Faith is the first new translation into English of The Kuzari since 1905, annotated and explained based on the classic commentaries. Written by Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi of Spain over a period of twenty years and completed in 1140, The Kuzari has enthralled generations of Jews and non-Jews alike with its clear-cut presentation on Judaism, and its polemics against Greek philosophy, Christianity, Islam, and Karaism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Theologian's Doubts:Natural Philosophy and the Skeptical Games of GhazālīLeor HaleviIn the history of skeptical thought, which normally leaps from the Pyrrhonists to the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus in the sixteenth century, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) figures as a medieval curiosity. Skeptical enough to merit passing acknowledgment, he has proven too baffling to be treated fully alongside pagan, atheist, or materialist philosophers. As a theologian defending certain Muslim (...) dogmas, Ghazālī has not met what historians consider the mark of the true skeptic, a mind doubting the possibility of all systems of knowledge. But what is fascinating about him is that he brought into practical operation the tools of what I call "functional skepticism."1He denied the claims to truth of Aristotelian physics—whose basis he showed to rest on groundless belief—then turned and argued for the possibility of the Resurrection tooth and nail. The scholarly debate on The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa) has concentrated on the extent to which Ghazālī qua Ashcarite theologian was seduced into Aristotelian philosophy despite himself.2 In my view this debate has been misguided in the attempt to distill the [End Page 19] essence of Ghazālī from the book's eclectic theology; I will argue for a different view of Ghazālī on the basis of a close reading of key passages. In the unusual sections where Ghazālī applies Aristotelian language to a world not following the ordinary laws of physics, some have found Ghazālī slipping, unconsciously perhaps, into an Aristotelian frame of mind. I will show that, as a skeptical theologian with a dialogic imagination, he was rather deconstructing Aristotelian discourse while playing a Wittgensteinian sort of language game.Natural Philosopher or Speculative Theologian?The disagreement about the extent to which philosophy infected Ghazālī is ancient. Ghazālī might have studied philosophy only in order to refute it. He himself defended his philosophizing with the claim that one cannot deconstruct a system of thought until one has understood it so deeply as to elaborate upon its fundamental principles.3 His Maqāṣid al-falāsifa was in fact received, especially in trans-Pyrenean Europe, as a philosopher's genuine summary of the object of philosophy.4 The book strikes me as suspiciously creative in its representation of philosophical discourse, but it appears in any case as an expert and surprisingly unbiased treatment.5 Arabic readers knew that Ghazālī had also written a polemical treatise against philosophy, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, but they still wondered about his engagement with the ideas he challenged. Abū Bakr Ibn al-cArabī, for example, commented that Ghazālī had been unable to extricate himself from philosophy.6 Other philosophers pondered whether or not he had been a closeted member of their charmed circle and sought in his writings traces of esoteric philosophy.7Averroës's own sober sense of distance between philosophy and theology was partially a reaction to what he perceived as Ghazālī's dangerous and carefree mixture of the two sciences.8 He attacked Ghazālī's book in The Incoherence [End Page 20] of the Incoherence to restore philosophy's sense of purity, an aim he sought to accomplish by separating religious concerns from the philosopher's field of inquiry.9 Ironically, such a separation is precisely what Ghazālī might have wished to provoke by crisscrossing and blurring the line between religion and philosophy.The modern debate on chapter 17 of Tahāfut al-falāsifa has concentrated on defining Ghazālī as either a natural philosopher or an occasionalist theologian. In his defense of the possibility of miracles Ghazālī presented two theories of causation, one denying the logical basis of Aristotelian notions of natural causality, and the other more or less adopting these notions. Jointly, the two theories have seemed incompatible, and for this reason scholars have attempted to sort Ghazālī out of the apparent confusion. In 1978 L. E. Goodman argued persuasively that Ghazālī exploited rather than denied the philosophers' ideas of causality. In two articles Michael Marmura challenged Goodman, contending... (shrink)

This paper distinguishes four major types of futility (physiological, imminent demise, lethal condition, and qualitative) that have been advocated in the literature either in a patient dependent or a patient independent fashion. It proposes five criteria (precision, prospective, social acceptability, significant number, and non-agreement) that any definition of futility must satisfy if it is to serve as the basis for unilaterally limiting futile care. It then argues that none of the definitions that have been advocated meet the criteria, primarily because (...) their proponents have not paid sufficient attention to the problematic nature of the data supporting the use of their definitions. (shrink)

Research papers on social and religious philosophy of Vedathiri Maharishi, presented at the international seminar, jointly organised by International Institute of Tamil Studies and Ulaka Camutāya Cēvā Caṅka Ar̲iñar Kul̲u, during Nov. 26-27, 2005, at Madras.