In this paper, I propose the concept of the “animated persona,” a soundless voice that says, “I am here” and appears on the surface of someone or something. This concept can bring clarity to the experience of perceiving a kind of personhood on a corpse, a wooden mask, or even a tree. In the first half of this paper, I will examine some Japanese literature and a work of Viktor Frankl’s that discuss these phenomena. In the second half, I will (...) analyze the concept of animated persona from five perspectives: (1) a compelling power, (2) surface-ness, (3) religious experience, (4) universality, and (5) the meaning of “I.” Lastly, I will discuss the relationship among the three layers of biological object, animated persona, and self-conscious being. My aim is to shed new light on the meaning of the encounter between the living and the dead. (shrink)

The Japanese Transplantation Law is unique among others in that it allows us to choose between "brain death" and "traditional death" as our death. In every country 20 to 40 % of the popularion doubts the idea of brain death. This paper reconsiders the concept, and reports the ongoing rivision process of the current law. Published in Hastings Center Report, 2001.

Witnessing after the “end of philosophy,” in the sense in which Heidegger mentions it in his famous lecture on “The end of philosophy and the task of thinking”—what does this mean for us and our world today? As a preparation for an answer to this question, the present study proposes to elaborate a radical hermeneutics of testimony, by invoking French philosophers who can be qualified as “post-Heideggerian”—Lévinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, among others—whose thoughts on testimony were developed through the essential critique on (...) Heideggerian idea of attestation and the creative reactivation of the semantic resources historically preserved by terms such as “witness” and “testimony”. (shrink)

1960年代以後、日本の思想・哲学に大きな影響力をもった廣松渉(1933‐94)。この独自な哲学者の人と思想と時代と影響関係の全体を思想史上に位置づけ、その思考過程を精密に追跡した、気鋭の書。.

We sometimes feel the presence of a person-like something on a non-biological object, such as a memento from a deceased family member or a well-engineered, human-shaped robot. This feeling—the sense of someone appearing there—has not been extensively investigated by philosophers. In this paper, I employ examples from previous studies, my own experiences, and thought experiments to conduct a philosophical analysis of the mechanism of the emergence of this person-like something by using the concept of an animated persona. This animation process (...) works not only in cases of deceased people and non-biological objects but also in cases of a living, conscious human being. This suggests that the appearance of the other mind on a human body is not necessarily a reflection of that human’s inner self-consciousness but can be considered a personhood that appears, animated by various surrounding factors. I also propose the concept of “the supremacy of surface-ness over behind-ness”. Finally, I categorize the appearance of an animated persona on a human body or an object into eight patterns and compare their characteristics. (shrink)

Japan has been holding a nationwide debate over the nature of death for nearly twenty years. That debate led eventually to a law that gives citizens the opportunity to choose which of two views of death will apply to their own death. That law is now up for revision, and the debate is revving up.

Behind the phase of cognition analysed by Husserl, there is a phase of affection. In this phase, there are significant mental disorders occurring. Similar to the way in which the phase of cognition is divided into reference, meaning (referent), and representation of words (classification according to Husserl's theory of meaning), the phase of affection is also divided into reference, “meaning,” and figure as sphere of “meaning”. The situation as a reference can allow various predications to form different explanations, i.e. different (...) states of affairs. From the point of view of affection, this reference has another role. The affection of a situation obliges us to produce bodily “meanings,” which is a sign of health. Mental disorders can be described as some distortion in the phase of affection. Healing in this regard occurs through the restoration of creativity for “meanings” which assume the situation. (shrink)

The “phenomenological” method according to Emmanuel Lévinas consists of two steps: first, reducing the said (le dit) to the saying (le dire); and second, “hyperbole” in his own words. Reducing the said to the saying, in itself, means in this context of the methodology a method to escape from ontology and cognitive philosophy, and to discover the dimension of inter-human facticity. In the second step of “hyperbole”, Lévinas outlines the horizon of this inter-human facticity as that of affectivity. In this (...) horizon (of ethics), the self is defined as phenomena containing the affectivity related to the two extreme situations: personal (physical and mental) suffering and that of the other. Ultimately, the death of the other person and a person’s own possible death limit the internal structure of this horizon. (shrink)

The present article is based on a interview with a Japanese experienced caregiver who specializes in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which generally leads to the locked-in syndrome. Professional caregivers for ALS patients with ventilator experience two particular temporalities in their practice. First, they must monitor the patient continuously during a seven-hour stay. Because a single problem in the ventilator can have fatal consequences, the care of an ALS patient with a ventilator requires long periods of sustained concentration. Second, trying (...) to understand the signs of a patient with a ventilator sometimes requires three hours to go through ten alphabets. In addition to the huge effort that such communication requires, caregivers must complete the meaning of the signs with their imagination: the ten alphabets are not sufficient to understand what the patient really wants to say. This imaginative capacity, however, is based on a long relationship, which started when the patient was still able to speak and move. That is why, as this article will show, even when a patient has entered total LIS, the caregiver can continue to realize his or her wishes. (shrink)

La disociación, surgida a raíz del acontecimiento traumático, pone de manifiesto algunos caracteres fenomenológicos propios del cuerpo. En primer lugar, la destrucción de la esquematización propia del cuerpo es lo que genera el estado hipnótico. En segundo lugar, sólo si entendemos la facultad de esquematización como relacionada con la auto-conciencia podemos comprender el extraño fenómeno del sí-mismo despegado que se da en el estado de disociación. En tercer lugar, este desmoronamiento de la capacidad esquematizante tiene su origen en la destrucción (...) de un tipo muy especial y fundamental de intersubjetividad (se trata, por así decirlo, de la �phantasia �perceptiva� intersubjetiva�). (shrink)

We explore the connections between Dickson’s lemma and weak Ramsey theory. We show that a weak version of the Paris–Harrington principle for pairs in c colors and miniaturized Dickson’s lemma for c-tuples are equivalent over \. Furthermore, we look at a cascade of consequences for several variants of weak Ramsey’s theorem.

In this review, I argue that Chōmei’s hermitism can be another realistic strategy to respond to Nagasawa's argument that only transcendentalism can constitute a potentially successful response to the problem of impermanence. Chōmei lived in a small house in the remote mountains and interacted with the surrounding nature. His lifestyle is considered a good example of reconciling one’s finite life with the impermanence of the world and human sufferings. I conclude that Nagasawa’s interpretation of hermitism might be one-sided.

A short essay that discusses whether it is possible for AI to do philosophy in its true sense of the word.

Let H be a proof system for quantified propositional calculus (QPC). We define the Σqj-witnessing problem for H to be: given a prenex Σqj-formula A, an H-proof of A, and a truth assignment to the free variables in A, find a witness for the outermost existential quantifiers in A. We point out that the Σq1-witnessing problems for the systems G*1and G1 are complete for polynomial time and PLS (polynomial local search), respectively. We introduce and study the systems G*0 and G0, (...) in which cuts are restricted to quantifier-free formulas, and prove that the Σqj-witnessing problem for each is complete for NC1. Our proof involves proving a polynomial time version of Gentzen’s midsequent theorem for G*0 and proving that G0-proofs are TC0-recognizable. We also introduce QPC systems for TC0 and prove witnessing theorems for them. We introduce a finitely axiomatizable second-order system VNC1 of bounded arithmetic which we prove isomorphic to Arai’s first order theory AID + Σb0-CA for uniform NC1. We describe simple translations of VNC1 proofs of all bounded theorems to polynomial size families of G*0 proofs. From this and the above theorem we get alternative proofs of the NC1 witnessing theorems for VNC1 and AID. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to argue that brain-dead small children have a natural right not to be invaded by other people even if their organs can save the lives of other suffering patients. My basic idea is that growing human beings have the right to grow in the form of wholeness, and dying human beings also have the right to die in the form of wholeness; in other words, they have the right to be protected from outside invasion, (...) unless they have declared their wish to abandon that right beforehand. I call this the principle of wholeness. Natural rights, which were discussed by Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century, have to be extended to include the right to grow and die in the form of wholeness in the age of scientific civilization, where peripheral human lives are being threatened by aggressive biomedicine and other advanced technologies. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an overview of today’s philosophical approaches to the problem of “intelligence” in the field of artificial intelligence by examining several important papers on phenomenology and the philosophy of biology such as those on Heideggerian AI, Jonas's metabolism model, and slime mold type intelligence.

In this paper, I make two arguments: 1) There is a solipsistic layer in meaning in life, which I call the “heart of meaning in life” (HML). The bearer of the heart of meaning in life is the solipsistic being. The heart of meaning in life cannot be compared with anything else whatsoever. 2) The heart of meaning in life can be dynamically incorporated into the affirmation of having been born into this world, which I call “birth affirmation.” There can (...) be two interpretations of birth affirmation, the anti-anti-natalistic interpretation and the possible world interpretation. Birth affirmation can be an alternative to anti-natalism, which is destined to be frustrated in this universe. (shrink)

This paper seeks to demonstrate the structural difference in communication of schizophrenia and autism. For a normal adult, spontaneous communication is nothing but the transmission of phantasía (thought) by means of perceptual objects or language. This transmission is first observed in a make-believe play of child. Husserl named this function “perceptual phantasía,” and this function presupposes as its basis the “internalized affection of contact” (which functions empirically in eye contact, body contact, or voice calling me). Regarding autism, because of the (...) innate lack of affection of contact, intersubjective perceptual phantasía does not occur spontaneously. Consequently, autistics do not engage in make-believe play but in stereotyped and solipsistic play. Without the formation of perceptual phantasía, there is no differentiation between phantasía and perception. For this reason, people with Asperger's syndrome consider conversation not an immediate communication of thought but a logical transmission of concepts. Schizophrenia is characterized by a distortion in the internalized affection of contact, resulting in a disturbance of perceptual phantasía, and this later is covered by various symptoms—for example, delusion as a pathological kind of communication of thought. This delusion is based on the pathological internalized affection of contact represented by a terrifying Other. (shrink)

Why would a philosopher choose to convey his ideas in the form of Manga? This discussion between Masahiro Morioka, author of Manga Introduction to Philosophy, and the translator of its French edition, Pierre Bonneels, shows how philosopher and artist Morioka became acquainted, through images, with fundamental abstract notions. After a short historical analysis of the aesthetic advantages of Manga, consideration is given to this unique way of provoking thought. On this basis, theoretical aspects of “time” and the “I” (...) proposed by Ōmori Shōzō are compared with Morioka’s Manga presentation. Although the questions raised are universal, the authors note that the use of Japanese metaphors enables these two thinkers to draw on a concrete understanding of notions like temporality and identity. (shrink)

Le silence et le sommeil constituent la base sur laquelle la cure psychothérapeutique et la créativité humaine se produisent. Or c’est avec le concept de sens latéral que Merleau-Ponty a esquissé la structure phénomé­nologique de la créativité humaine. Du point de vue du sens latéral qui surgit au creux de l’articulation intentionnelle du monde, le corps vivant apparaît comme style qui canalise la production du sens. Chaque surgissement du sens latéral est précédé par un silence qui suspend momentanément l’intention­nalité thématisante (...) et articulante. Le corps comme style n’est pas le corps réel mais le corps imaginaire qui se situe au centre du monde imaginaire en le fabriquant et en le déformant. Le corps imaginaire engendre la « déforma­tion » par rapport à l’articulation objective du monde et cette déformation constitue l’essence de la créativité. La création artistique, la cure dans la psychothérapie et le rêve sont les exemples éminents de cette créativité. Par contre, dans le silence et le sommeil qui précèdent la création et le rêve, non seulement l’articulation intentionnelle mais aussi celle du corps imaginaire sont suspendues. Le silence et le sommeil désignent le degré zéro du corps imaginaire en deçà du sens latéral. (shrink)

The concept of antinatalism is now becoming popular on the Internet. Many online newspaper articles deal with this topic, and numerous academic papers on antinatalism have been published over the past ten years in the fields of philosophy and ethics. The word “antinatalism” was first used in the current meaning in 2006, when the two books that justify the universal negation of procreation were published: one by David Benatar and the other by Théophile de Giraud. However, we can find various (...) prototypes of antinatalistic thoughts in ancient Greece, ancient India, and modern Europe. You might recall the name Schopenhauer. In this paper, I briefly summarize the history of antinatalistic thoughts and propose a set of categories on antinatalism and related thoughts. (shrink)

This is the translation of the so-called Morioka&Sugimoto proposal on brain death and transplantation. We proposed that the prior declaration of a brain dead child should be respected, and that when the child does not have a donor card the organ removal should be prohibited. A material for understanding an unprecedented bioethics debate now occurring in Japan.

From 2008 to 2009, “herbivore men (sôshoku danshi or sôshoku-kei danshi in Japanese)” became a trendy, widely used term in Japanese. It flourished in all sorts of media, including TV, the Internet, newspapers and magazines, and could even occasionally be heard in everyday conversation. As it became more popular its original meaning was diversified, and people began to use it with a variety of different nuances. In December of 2009 it made the top ten list of nominees for the “Buzzword (...) of the Year” contest sponsored by U-CAN. By 2010 it had become a standard noun, and right now, in 2011, people do not seem particularly interested in it. Buzzwords have a short lifespan, so there is a high probability that it will soon fall out of use. The fact remains, however, that the appearance of this term has radically changed the way people look at young men. It can perhaps even be described as an epochal event in the history of the male gender in Japan. (shrink)

L’acte de la philosophie japonaise est celui d’un évidement de soi: acte d’accueil des traditions philosophiques du monde, acte en résonance, créateur d’une terminologie, d’une logique, d’une conceptualité originales, s’alimentant aux sources d’une pensée mythique jamais tarie. Les textes présentés ici en feront sentir l’inclassable nouveauté: cette philosophie n’est ni purement shintoïste, bouddhique, chrétienne, néoconfucianiste ; elle n’est ni « orientale » ni « occidentale », mais proprement japonaise.

In the Essay Locke argues abstract ideas within the framework of the descriptivist theory of reference. For him, abstract ideas are, in many cases, conceptual ideas that play the role of “descriptions” or “descriptive contents,” determining general terms’ referents. In contrast, in the introduction of the Principles, Berkeley denies Lockean abstract ideas adamantly from an imagistic point of view, and he offers his own theory of reference seemingly consisting of referring expressions and their referents alone. However, interestingly, he mentions a (...) general term’s “definition” and suggests that it determines the scope of the term’s referents. For example, he takes up the definition of a triangle as “a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines” and suggests that just as Locke’s general idea of a triangle does, the definition determines the referents of the general term “triangle.” His definition reminds us of the fact that as Descartes grasps the content of the general idea of a triangle as “a figure enclosed by three lines,” so Locke grasps the abstract idea of a triangle as “a Figure including a Space between three Lines,” and so on. That is, since Berkeley is an imagist, he does not acknowledge Locke’s conceptual abstract ideas as “ideas,” but although he verbally denies “abstract ideas,” his theory of reference also actually has the same descriptivist framework consisting of referring expressions, their descriptive contents, and their referents. Thus, we understand the real reason why Berkeley’s criticism of Locke seems beside the point. (shrink)

In spite of his clear and deliberate distinction between philosophical and religious discourse, Ricoeur lets these two aspects of his thought interweave with respect to the deep "conviction" motiving it. The idea of “attestation”, considered as the "password" granting access to his last "hermeneutics of the self", testifies to this in particular. This term, while containing a religious connotation, refers to what Heidegger calls Fundamentalontologie , in which attestation ( Bezeugung ) is totally de-theologized to indicate how Dasein assumes its (...) own death. But Ricoeur only incorporates this notion into his thought by making it undergo a profound modification. Ricoeur replaces “being–toward–death” with “remaining alive until…”, which allows him to recognize “the religious in common.” How can we develop a conception of the philosophy of religion from this winding process? This article marks a first step toward answering that question. (shrink)

The French Introduction to a special issue on Ricoeur and Theology.

According to Kant, the division of the categories “is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at haphazard,” but is derived from the “complete” classification of judgments developed by traditional logic. However, the sorts of judgments that he enumerates in his table of judgments are not all ones that traditional logic has dealt with; consequently, we must say that he chose the sorts of judgments in question with a certain intention. Besides, we know that his choice of (...) judgments and categories is strongly influenced by certain views of natural science that he fully accepts. For this reason, his argumentations are sometimes seriously inconsistent. As to Kant’s argumentations of categories, many problems have already been pointed out, but in this paper, I take up the categories of quantity and quality once more, and make clear his argumentations’ hidden logic and its distortion from the point of view of the history of logic and natural science. First, I confirm that there are non-negligible problems in his explanation to the effect that his derivation of the categories of quantity and quality is based on the quantity and quality of judgments. Next, I reconsider the meaning of his treating the categories of quantity and quality as pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, I conclude that by having recourse to the categories of quantity and quality Kant tried unjustly to apriorize the distinction between the “extensive magnitude” and “intensive magnitude” that has a long formational history since Aristotle. (shrink)