In this article, I offer a politico-philosophical perspective to reassess the much-contested role of truth in politics to put forth a principle of political action that will make sense of a “right to unmanipulated factual information,” which Hannah Arendt understands as crucial for establishing freedom of opinion. In developing a principle of epistemic responsibility, I will show that “factual truth” plays a key role in Arendt’s account of political action and provides a normative order that can extricate her account from (...) charges of immoralism. The article will be divided into three sections: section 1 deals with the distinction between rational truths and factual truths, and the question of their validity, section 2 deals with what a principle of political action is, and lastly, section 3 proposes a principle of “epistemic responsibility” that becomes action-guiding in the political sphere, in order to shed new light on the 2013 Gezi Park protest, one of the recent democratic uprisings of our century. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's (1906-1975) writings, both in public magazines and in her important books, are still widely studied today. She made original contributions in political thinking that still astound readers and critics alike. The subject of several films and numerous books, colloquia, and newspaper articles, Arendt remains a touchstone in innumerable debates about the use of violence in politics, the responsibility one has under dictatorships and totalitarianism, and how to combat the repetition of the horrors of the past. The Bloomsbury Companion (...) to Arendt offers the definitive guide to her writings and ideas, her influences and commentators, as well as the reasons for her lasting significance, with 66 original essays taking up in accessible terms the myriad ways in which one can take up her work and her continuing importance. These essays, written by an international set of her best readers and commentators, provides a comprehensive coverage of her life and the contexts in which her works were written. Special sections take up chapters on each of her key writings, the reception of her work, and key ways she interpreted those who influenced her. If one has come to Arendt from one of her essays on freedom, or from yet another bombastic account of her writings on Adolph Eichmann, or as as student or professor working in the field of Arendt studies, this book provides the ideal tool for thinking with and rediscovering one of the most important intellectuals of the past century. But just as importantly, contributors advance the study of Arendt into neglected areas, such as on science and ecology, to demonstrate her importance not just to debates in which she was well known, but those touched off only after her death. Arendt's approaches as well as her concrete claims about the political have much to offer given the current ecological and refugee crises, among others. In sum, then, the Companion provides a tool for thinking with Arendt, but also for showing just where those thinking with her can take her work today. (shrink)

In light of the recent political events, it is clear that democracy itself has come to be contested and modified in a plethora of democratic practices that have expanded the very articulation of equal citizenship. My argument in this article is twofold: first, I rearticulate Arendt’s conception of “revolution” found in her On Revolution by insisting on its “beginning” and “founding” dimensions for the appearance of freedom. Coupled with Jean-Luc Nancy’s insight into a “spirit of democracy” that does not reside (...) in its “form, institution, regime,” I then develop a principle of democratic responsibility that consists in opening up a revolutionary space that enjoins us to become a demos. Such revolutionary space does not necessarily entail a “successful revolution,” but more so an attitude towards our existence together.À la lumière des événements politiques récents, il est clair que la démocratie elle-même en est venue à être contestée et modifiée en une myriade de pratiques démocratiques qui étendent l’articulation de la citoyenneté égalitaire. Mon argument dans cet article est double. Premièrement, je réarticule la conception arendtienne de « révolution » telle qu’on la retrouve dans De la révolution en insistant sur ses dimensions de « commencement » et de « fondation » pour l’apparition de la liberté. À l’aide de l’idée, articulée par Jean-Luc Nancy, d’un « esprit de la démocratie » qui ne réside pas dans une « forme, institution, ou régime », je développe, dans un deuxième temps, un principe de responsabilité démocratique qui consiste à ouvrir un espace révolutionnaire dans lequel nous sommes appelés à devenir un demos. Un tel espace n’implique en rien le « succès » de la révolution mais plutôt une attitude envers notre existence en commun. (shrink)

Working with Hannah Arendt’s implicit argument about place and visibility, this article develops an account of recognition in order to rethink the nature of community. I argue for an Arendtian recognitive politics, a two-tiered account of recognition, which takes into account social identities as the condition of possibility for the free political action that so animated Arendt. If we require a place to act freely, in other words, we are visible to another in that place. Claims such as Arendt’s “right (...) to have rights” consequently understate the vital conditions of visibility and the role such visibility plays in the political sphere where agents are recognized as equals. The two-tiered account of recognition developed in this article allows me to argue that (1) the performance of visibility in relation to the recognition of one’s social identity is what in turn allows for (2) the possibility of recognizing one’s unique political identity in the political space. (shrink)

Working with Hannah Arendt’s implicit argument about place and visibility, this article develops an account of recognition in order to rethink the nature of community. I argue for an Arendtian recognitive politics, a two-tiered account of recognition, which takes into account social identities as the condition of possibility for the free political action that so animated Arendt. If we require a place to act freely, in other words, we are visible to another in that place. Claims such as Arendt’s “right (...) to have rights” consequently understate the vital conditions of visibility and the role such visibility plays in the political sphere where agents are recognized as equals. The two-tiered account of recognition developed in this article allows me to argue that the performance of visibility in relation to the recognition of one’s social identity is what in turn allows for the possibility of recognizing one’s unique political identity in the political space. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I undertake a critical analysis of the conception of community at work in what is termed “identity-based politics.” Working with Hannah Arendt’s implicit argument about place and visibility, I develop a theory of recognition in order to rethink the nature of community. The ultimate aim of my project develops a recognitive politics, a two-tiered theory of recognition, which takes into account social identities as the condition of possibility for the free political action that so animated Arendt. If (...) we require a place to act freely, in other words, we are visible to one another in that place. My theory of recognition aims to illustrate that traditional philosophical accounts of self-disclosure in political action (including those of Hegel, Marx, and Arendt) do not aim to offer a pure political agency stripped of social identities. Such an understanding of the political as the self-disclosure of our unique identities is possible only if social identities are granted visibility and the possibility of being heard in the first place. Claims such as Arendt’s “right to have rights” consequently understate this vital condition of visibility. In turn, I argue that the condition of “artificial equality” arises from its spatial aspect. The link between visibility and the “right to have rights” is crucial in establishing the conditions of a non-violent and non-identity-based politics. On my view, ‘recognitive politics’ is based on epistemic responsibility in political judgment, which becomes a reflection of our responsibility to affirm plural human existence in the world. (shrink)

This article argues that Arendt’s rich account of the political necessarily involves an implicit, but never fully worked out, phenomenological articulation of justice in her work. Arendt’s unique articulation of the role of judgment in political action provides us with the outline of an Arendtian principle of justice that relieves the tension between idealist and realist theories of justice. Building on this role of judgment, I aim to emphasize the phenomenological premise of identifying the conditions for the possibility of the (...) political in empirico-historical events rooted in her ideas of plurality and freedom. By showing that, for Arendt, justice is a phenomenon like power and equality, we can make progress on an implicit account of justice in her work. Taking seriously Arendt’s articulation of freedom-manifesting and principled political action, I will show that a principle of justice guides political action based on political judgment that is affectively oriented to the world. (shrink)