Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican revolution, (...) the discovery of nuclear fission, and an elaboration of Kuhn's famous 'ducks and geese' example of concept learning, this volume, first published in 2006, offers accounts of the nature of normal and revolutionary science, the function of anomalies, and the nature of incommensurability. (shrink)

To correct the misconception that incommensurability implies incomparability, Kuhn lately develops a new interpretation of incommensurability. This includes a linguistic theory of scientific revolutions (the theory of kinds), a cognitive exploration of the language learning process (the analogy of bilingualism), and an epistemological discussion on the rationality of scientific development (the evolutionary epistemology). My focus in this paper is to review Kuhn's effort in eliminating relativism, highlighting both the insights and the difficulties of his new version of incommensurability . Finally (...) I suggest that some of Kuhn's difficulties can be overcome by adopting a concept of rationality that filly appreciates the important role of instruments in the development of science. (shrink)

Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...) to accepting Kuhn's position, as many philosophers of science still believe. Rather it becomes a natural consequence of cognitive structures that appear in all human beings. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...) not always abrupt. When concepts are represented by frames, the transformation from one taxonomy to another can be achieved in a piecemeal fashion not preconditioned by a crisis stage, and a new taxonomy can arise naturally out of the old frame instead of emerging separately from the existing conceptual system. This cognitive mechanism of continuous change demonstrates the constructive roles of anomaly and incommensurability in promoting the progress of science. (shrink)

In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...) cognitive models of concept representation. We provide new support for Kuhn 's mature views that incommensurability can be caused by changes in only a few concepts, that even incommensurable conceptual systems can be rationally compared, and that scientific change of the most radical sort—the type labeled revolutionary in earlier studies—does not have to occur holistically and abruptly, but can be achieved by a historically more plausible accumulation of smaller changes. We go on to suggest that the parallel accounts of concepts found in Kuhn and in cognitive science lead to a new understanding of the nature of normal science, of the transition from normal science to crisis, and of scientific revolutions. The same account enables us to understand how scientific communities split to create groups supporting new paradigms, and to resolve various outstanding problems. In particular, we can identify the kind of change needed to create a revolution rather precisely. This new analysis also suggests reasons for the unidirectionality of scientific change. (shrink)

This paper offers a solution to a problem in Herschel studies by drawing on the dynamic frame model for concept representation offered by cognitive psychology. Applying the frame model to represent the conceptual frameworks of the particle and wave theories, this paper shows that discontinuity between the particle and wave frameworks consists mainly in the transition from a particle notion ‘side’ to a wave notion ‘phase difference’. By illustrating intraconceptual relations within concepts, the frame representations reveal the ontological differences between (...) these two concepts. ‘Side’ is an object concept built on spatial relations, but ‘phase difference’ is an event concept built on temporal relations. The conceptual analyses display a possible cognitive source of Herschel’s misconception of polarization. Limited by his experimental works and his philosophical beliefs, Herschel comprehended polarization solely in terms of spatial relations, which prevented him from replacing the object concept ‘side’ with the event concept ‘phase difference’, and eventually resulted in his failure to understand the wave account of polarization.Author Keywords: Herschel; Polarization; Object concept; Event concept; Frame; Cognitive psychology. (shrink)

In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object (...) and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of nineteenth‐century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability. (shrink)

I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...) processes from objects until the age of 7, but they have already developed a core system of object knowledge as early as 4 months of age. The persistence of this core system is responsible for the object bias among mature adults, i.e., the tendency to apply knowledge of physical objects to temporal processes. In light of the distinction between physical objects and temporal processes, I redraw the picture of the Copernican revolution. Rather than seeing it as a taxonomic shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric cosmology, we should understand it as a transformation from a conceptual system that was built around an object concept to one that was built around a process concept. (shrink)

In this article I explain why scientists cannot always resolve their disagreements about experiments even if they do not hold conflicting theoretical assumptions, and how incommensurability in experiments can occur even if experiments are not deeply encumbered by theoretical assumptions. On the basis of recent discoveries in cognitive psychology and an extended analysis of a historical case, I explore a cognitive mechanism that may generate incommensurability in experiment appraisal. I find that, because of the involvement of goal-derived categories, incommensurability in (...) experiments may result from the conflict of goals that scientists pursue in their researches, from the differences of goal-derived classification schemata that they employ in analyzing experiments, and from discrepancies between skills that they have developed in their practices. This account differs from the conventional interpretation of Kuhn’s thesis, which attributes the cause of incommensurability solely to theoretical differences. In the conclusion, I further discuss the implications of this new account of incommensurability for both philosophical and historical studies of science. (shrink)

Facial expression recognition plays a significant part in artificial intelligence and computer vision. However, most of facial expression recognition methods have not obtained satisfactory results based on low-level features. The existed methods used in facial expression recognition encountered the major issues of linear inseparability, large computational burden, and data redundancy. To obtain satisfactory results, we propose an innovative deep learning model using the kernel entropy component analysis network and directed acyclic graph support vector machine. We use the KECANet in the (...) feature extraction stage. In the stage of output, binary hashing and blockwise histograms are adopted. We sent the final output features to the DAGSVM classifier for expression recognition. We test the performance of our proposed method on three databases of CK+, JAFFE, and CMU Multi-PIE. According to the experiment results, the proposed method can learn high-level features and provide more recognition information in the stage of training, obtaining a higher recognition rate. (shrink)

: This paper offers a preliminary analysis of conceptual change between event concepts. It begins with a brief review of the major findings of cognitive studies on event knowledge. The script model proposed by Schank and Abelson was the first attempt to represent event knowledge. Subsequent cognitive studies indicated that event knowledge is organized in the form of dimensional organizations in which temporally successive actions are related causally. This paper proposes a frame representation to capture and outline the internal structure (...) of event concepts, in particular, their causal connections. The frame representation offers an effective method to analyze the relations between event concepts, and to expose the unique cognitive mechanisms behind conceptual change involved event concepts. Finally this paper shows that the frame representation of event concepts is instrumental to understanding an important historical episode of conceptual change in the context of nineteenth-century optics. (shrink)

Kuhn regards local incommensurability as an unavoidable result of changes in worldview, but his account fails to explain both historical cases in which rivals with different paradigms obtained consensus, and psychological experiments in which people with different cultural backgrounds accurately presented other points of view. Although the conditions required to generate local incommensurability were present in the dispute between Brewster and Herschel on light absorption, they succeeded in communicating. Ultimately Brewster understood his opponent's position, in the same way that subjects (...) in Barsalou's recent psychological experiments proved able to comprehend alien conceptual structures. Building upon recent cognitive theories of graded conceptual structures, I offer a new account of incommensurability, which accommodates these historical cases and psychological results. By correcting and extending Kuhn's account I show that local incommensurability may be a matter of degree. (shrink)

I propose a new perspective with which to understand scientific revolutions. This is a conversion from an object-only perspective to one that properly treats object and process concepts as distinct kinds. I begin with a re-examination of the Copernican revolution. Recent findings from the history of astronomy suggest that the Copernican revolution was a move from a conceptual framework built around an object concept to one built around a process concept. Drawing from studies in the cognitive sciences, I then show (...) that process concepts are independent of object concepts, grounded in specific regions of the brain and involving unique representational mechanisms. There are cognitive obstacles to the transformation from object to process concepts, and an object bias—a tendency to treat processes as objects—makes this kind of conceptual change difficult. Consequently, transformation from object to process concepts is disruptive and revolutionary. Finally, I explore the implications of this new perspective on scientific revolutions for both the history and philosophy of science.Keywords: Scientific revolutions; Process concepts; Object concepts; Object bias; Copernican revolution. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...) not always abrupt. When concepts are represented by frames, the transformation from one taxonomy to another can be achieved in a piecemeal fashion not preconditioned by a crisis stage, and a new taxonomy can arise naturally out of the old frame instead of emerging separately from the existing conceptual system. This cognitive mechanism of continuous change demonstrates the constructive roles of anomaly and incommensurability in promoting the progress of science. (shrink)

Previous studies of the history of optics reveal that the confrontation between the emission theory of light and the undulatory theory of light in Britain occupied a considerable period during the early nineteenth century. After the majority of British physicists accepted the undulatory theory in the mid-1830s a few emissionists in Britain did not immediately surrender. They continued to fight a rear-guard action against the undulatory theory, hoping that someday they could reinstate their theory.’ The longevity of the confrontation between (...) the emission and the undulatory theory is consistent with recent philosophical and sociological accounts of science, which expect scientific controversy to last a considerable time. Lakatos’s philosophical account, for example, holds that a degenerating theory does not disappear immediately and may revive at any time through a burst of ‘heuristic power’. But this account only allows one universal standard-the verification of excess empirical content-as the basis for both the generation and the closure of scientific controversies.’ On the other hand, sociological accounts such as actor-network theory have also done much to dispel the impression that rapid closure is inevitable in scientific controversies. But perhaps they risk a new orthodoxy: that controversy itself is inevitable. (shrink)

According to Lakatos's theory of scientific change, the victory of the wave theory in the nineteenth-century optical revolution was due to its empirical successes. However, historical facts do not support this opinion. Based on Laudan's theory of scientific change, this paper presents a different orientation to reconstruct the optical revolution. By comparing the conceptual problems that both optical theories had, this paper argues that it was the inferior status of the corpuscular theory in dealing with conceptual problems that constituted the (...) primary cause of the optical revolution. (shrink)

Tradition wireless sensor networks transmit data by single or multiple hops. However, some sensor nodes close to a static base station forward data more frequently than others, which results in the problem of energy holes and makes networks fragile. One promising solution is to use a mobile node as a mobile sink, which is especially useful in energy-constrained networks. In these applications, the tour planning of MS is a key to guarantee the network performance. In this paper, a novel strategy (...) is proposed to reduce the latency of mobile data gathering in a WSN while the routing strategies and tour planning of MS are jointly optimized. First, the issue of network coverage is discussed before the appropriate number of clusters being calculated. A dynamic clustering scheme is then developed where a virtual cluster center is defined as the MS sojourn for data collection. Afterwards, a tour planning of MS based on prediction is proposed subject to minimizing the traveling distance to collect data. The proposed method is simulated in a MATLAB platform to show the overall performance of the developed system. Furthermore, the physical tests on a test rig are also carried out where a small WSN based on an unmanned aerial vehicle is developed in our laboratory. The test results validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the method proposed. (shrink)

Transfer learning can improve the robustness of deep learning in the case of small samples. However, when the semantic difference between the source domain data and the target domain data is large, transfer learning easily introduces redundant features and leads to negative transfer. According the mechanism of the human brain focusing on effective features while ignoring redundant features in recognition tasks, a brain-like classification method based on adaptive feature matching dual-source domain heterogeneous transfer learning is proposed for the preoperative aided (...) diagnosis of lung granuloma and lung adenocarcinoma for patients with solitary pulmonary solid nodule in the case of small samples. The method includes two parts: (1) feature extraction and (2) feature classification. In the feature extraction part, first, By simulating the feature selection mechanism of the human brain in the process of drawing inferences about other cases from one instance, an adaptive selected-based dual-source domain feature matching network is proposed to determine the matching weight of each pair of feature maps and each pair of convolution layers between the two source networks and the target network, respectively. These two weights can, respectively, adaptive select the features in the source network that are conducive to the learning of the target task, and the destination of feature transfer to improve the robustness of the target network. Meanwhile, a target network based on diverse branch block is proposed, which made the target network have different receptive fields and complex paths to further improve the feature expression ability of the target network. Second, the convolution kernel of the target network is used as the feature extractor to extract features. In the feature classification part, an ensemble classifier based on sparse Bayesian extreme learning machine is proposed that can automatically decide how to combine the output of base classifiers to improve the classification performance. Finally, the experimental results (the AUCs were 0.9542 and 0.9356, respectively) on the data of two center data show that this method can provide a better diagnostic reference for doctors. (shrink)

The follow-up research of Aristotle’s syllogism has different approaches. The traditional syllogism follows Aristotle’s conceptual system and hopes to make improvements within Aristotle’s theory. Mathematical logic proposes a new conceptual system to accurately interpret Aristotle’s syllogism. Lei Ma puts forward an extended syllogism whose conceptual system is different from Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic. He thinks that Aristotle’s syllogism and traditional syllogism have tedious figures, moods, and reasoning rules, which are difficult for us to memorize. It is a theoretical conclusion (...) of the human reasoning process but does not conform to the actual human thinking process. Ma’s syllogism is called substitution logic, which mainly concerns the substitution characteristics of a human thinking process, and summarizes the substitution rules in the reasoning process. Substitution logic appropriately describes the actual human reasoning process, thus inspiring us to establish a unified scientific theory of thinking and carry out normative research on the unity of abstract thinking and imaginative thinking. Substitution logic may be applied to the field of artificial intelligence, making artificial intelligence closer to the reality of human thinking. It seems that the research direction of substitution logic will give birth to human-like AI systems and promote the revolutionary transformation of AI research. (shrink)

Emotional design is an important development trend of interaction design. Emotional design in products plays a key role in enhancing user experience and inducing user emotional resonance. In recent years, based on the user's emotional experience, the design concept of strengthening product emotional design has become a new direction for most designers to improve their design thinking. In the emotional interaction design, the machine needs to capture the user's key information in real time, recognize the user's emotional state, and use (...) a variety of clues to finally determine the appropriate user model. Based on this background, this research uses a deep learning mechanism for more accurate and effective emotion recognition, thereby optimizing the design of the interactive system and improving the user experience. First of all, this research discusses how to use user characteristics such as speech, facial expression, video, heartbeat, etc., to make machines more accurately recognize human emotions. Through the analysis of various characteristics, the speech is selected as the experimental material. Second, a speech-based emotion recognition method is proposed. The mel-Frequency cepstral coefficient of the speech signal is used as the input of the improved long and short-term memory network. To ensure the integrity of the information and the accuracy of the output at the next moment, ILSTM makes peephole connections in the forget gate and input gate of LSTM, and adds the unit state as input data to the threshold layer. The emotional features obtained by ILSTM are input into the attention layer, and the self-attention mechanism is used to calculate the weight of each frame of speech signal. The speech features with higher weights are used to distinguish different emotions and complete the emotion recognition of the speech signal. Experiments on the EMO-DB and CASIA datasets verify the effectiveness of the model for emotion recognition. Finally, the feasibility of emotional interaction system design is discussed. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on a debate over dispersion in the second half of the 1830s, in which both sides utilized the same set of experimental data to test a proposed wave account of dispersion, but could not agree on how these data should be used. The conflict regarding experimental data was caused by differences in instruments. In the debate, optical instruments in many ways functioned like paradigms, shaping scientists' opinions. Instruments also led the debate into an impasse, because no apparatus (...) was available for the necessary experimental replication. Because of unreconcilable differences regarding experimental evidence, the wave theory's failure in explaining dispersion did not become an obstacle to its acceptance. (shrink)

One of the most controversial ideas in recent philosophy of science is the incommensurability of scientific theories. For Kuhn, the claim that two theories are incommensurable is the claim that there is no common language within which both theories could be fully expressed (Kuhn 1977, p. 301). In others words, two theories are incommensurable if and only if they are articulated in languages that are not mutually translatable or communicable without loss. This type of incommensurability, according to Kuhn, is the (...) result of changes in worldview. The proponents of different paradigms practice their researches in different worlds (Kuhn 1970, p. 150). They may have different classifications of objects in the world due to their different cultures. For example, the astronomers who belonged to Ptolemy’s paradigm grouped the sun, moon, and Mars into the same set, while the astronomers who belonged to Copernicus’s paradigm classified them into three different categories. (shrink)

This paper mainly explores the effect of naive independent directors on firm performance. Using hand-collected data on Chinese listed companies, this study finds that the proportion of naive independent directors is positively associated with firm performance, and an increased proportion of naive independent directors reduce the probability of tunneling of controlling shareholders and financial distress. The findings are robust after using alternative explanatory variables and retro-causality tests. Furthermore, the relation between naive independent directors and firm performance mainly existed in firms (...) with lower shareholdings of the largest shareholder and firms with lower financial leverage. Moreover, this paper finds that firm size, corporate ownership type, and equity balance degree are important factors affecting the appointment of naive independent directors. This paper offers further empirical evidence to the existing research related to naive independent directors and provides an effective way to improve corporate board governance. (shrink)

Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural levels. This paper introduces Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols and explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background beliefs. The analogous nature of (...) perceptual symbols and the spatial nature of intraconceptual relations impose new constraints on attribute selection. These constraints help people with different background beliefs select compatible attributes, which constitute a common "platform" for taxonomy comparison. (shrink)

The optical revolution, that is, the replacement of corpuscular optics by wave optics at the beginning of the nineteenth century, has attracted the attention of philosophers of science for a long time. For a long period the cause of the optical revolution was attributed to “crucial experiments” such as Foucault’s experiment on the velocity of light (Sabra 1954, pp.149-51). Later Frankel argued that social and political factors were necessary for the victory of the wave theory (Frankel 1976, p.142). These accounts, (...) however, were severely criticized by recent theorists of scientific change, especially Lakatos and Laudan. Lakatos calls the opinion that accounted for the optical revolution solely by “crucial experiments” naive “instant rationality” (Lakatos 1978, p.68 & 72n). Laudan also regards the attempt to explain scientific revolution mainly by social and political elements as “jumping to a premature conclusion” (Laudan 1977, p.4). (shrink)

This dissertation is an interdisciplinary study of scientific change. The undulatory theory of light replaced the emission theory of light in the early nineteenth century, triggering an "optical revolution" and vigorous debates among physicists in Britain from the 1830s to the 1850s. In this study I give the first full account of this extended episode of scientific change, drawing on methods and concepts from history, sociology and philosophy of science. The interdisciplinary account of the episode provides a basis for criticizing (...) the existing models of scientific change in the philosophy of science. ;Previous historical studies of the "optical revolution" pay little attention to the period after the 1830s. Because the cognitive superiority of the undulatory theory had become obvious in the early 1830s, some historians have implicitly assumed that any controversy would soon come to a natural end. I, however, document that intensive debates continued from the 1830s until the end of the 1850s, and that emissionists even enjoyed temporary victories in their fights with undulationists. The narrative reveals the historical complexities of this episode: the debates extended long after the cognitive superiority of the undulatory theory should have become apparent by modern standard, the results of the debates did not necessarily coincide with modern cognitive judgements, and individual agents played decisive roles in determining how long a debate lasted and how it would end. ;On the basis of the historical narrative, I provide a philosophical analysis of the practices of theory appraisal and experiment appraisal that constituted the main theme of the controversy. Instead of merely identifying the criteria of evaluation employed in this episode, I pay special attention to how individual agents actually applied these criteria in concrete situations, what kinds of strategies or tactics they employed for the applications of these criteria, and how they created favorable conditions, both cognitive and social, for successfully applying these criteria. Individual agents' efforts in selecting application strategies and in creating favorable conditions made the practices of appraisal complicated, exhibiting various features that are incomprehensible if we limit ourselves merely to studying the criteria of evaluation. ;I finally discuss a different approach to scientific change. The existing philosophical models of scientific change merely analyze the final product of science--scientific theories, and ignore the impact of social factors and the role of individual agents. I suggest we concentrate on the process of knowledge production, and pay attention to individual agents's practices in this process, as well as to the relevant cognitive and social factors that influence individual agents. Following this new approach, scientific change is understood as an evolution that involves interactions among three elements: theory, experiment, and human agent. (shrink)

: Armed with a photometer originally designed for evaluating telescopes, Richard Potter in the early 1830s measured the re(integral)ective power of metallic and glass mirrors. Because he found significant discrepancies between his measurements and Fresnel's predictions, Potter developed doubts concerning the wave theory. However, Potter's measurements were colored by a peculiar procedure. In order to protect the sensitivity of the eye, Potter made certain approximations in the measuring process, which exaggerated the discrepancies between the theory and the data. Potter's measurements (...) received strong criticisms from wave theorists, not because they felt they needed to defend their theory, but because they believed that Potter was wrong in using the eye as an essential apparatus in the experiments. Potter's photometric measurements and the subsequent debate reveal the existence of two incompatible sets of measuring procedures, each of which consisted of a body of practices concerning how photometric instruments should be used properly. In the debate, the differences regarding measuring procedures shaped the participant's judgments of experimental evidence and eventually their evaluations of the optical theories. (shrink)

Surveys of public opinions on climate change found that a majority of American respondents regarded global warming as a critical or an important threat . Given this consensus, one might expect that a majority of Americans are ready to take immediate action to deal with the environmental crisis. However, when they were asked whether we should begin taking steps now, only 43% of American respondents said yes; 54% of them chose either the option “until we are sure that global warming (...) is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs,” or the option “global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem .. (shrink)