This essay draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work to argue for a practice-oriented concept of expertise. We propose that conceptualizing types of expertise as having a family resemblance, relative to the problems such expertise addresses, escapes certain limitations of defining expertise as primarily epistemic. Recognizing the pragmatic purchase on actual problems a Wittgensteinian approach provides to discussions of expertise, we seek to understand the nature of expertise in situations where the people who need to make a difficult decision do not possess (...) or have access to the epistemic status that traditionally confers expertise. These are situations where people need to answer difficult questions that, while they may be informed by expertise in the epistemic register, are ultimately decided by expertise that weighs certified knowledge against the intractable characteristics of a particular situation. We suggest that there is not—even deep down on a conceptual level—only one kind of expertise, but multiple kinds of expertise that resonate with diverse kinds of problems. (shrink)

Examines the nature of rhetorical theory and criticism, the rhetoric of science, and the impact of poststructuralism and postmodernism on contemporary accounts of rhetoric.

I should say at the outset that I actually like this book a lot, but I am not sure how comfortable I am with liking it. It is the sort of innovative, exciting, exasperating, infuriating, and provocative book that's good even when it's bad, because it sets everyone to talking and arguing about all kinds of things. Initially, I will give a brief gloss of the main points of the book and of its virtues. Then I would like to single (...) out two issues for brief discussion: Fuller 's conception of rhetoric and in what sense he is still a philosopher, in both his case studies and curriculum, despite advertising to the contrary. (shrink)

The move to Postmodernism in argumentation is often predicated on the rejection of the formal basis of argument in logic. While this rejection may be justified, and is widely discussed in the literature, the loss of logic creates problems that a Postmodern theory of argument must address without recourse to logic and its attendant modernist assumptions. This essay argues that conceiving of argument in terms ofpractices will address the key problematics of Postmodernism without abandoning those features of argumentation that make (...) it an important social, cultural and political practice. Implications for both theory and pedagogy are discussed. (shrink)

One way of understanding how to intervene in dysfunctional public discourse is to attend to the ways that we teach argument. This article contends that argument pedagogy would benefit from consideration of the process of argumentation, in which participants are prepared to enter into deliberation by attending to relationality. To ground their discussion, the authors present rhetorical praxis taught in two university sites and one public site.

This article addresses the problem of expertise in a democratic political system: the tension between the authority of expertise and the democratic values that guide political life. We argue that for certain problems, expertise needs to be understood as a dialogical process, and we conceptualize an understanding of expertise through and as argument that positions expertise as constituted by and a function of democratic values and practices, rather than in the possession of, acquisition of, or relationship to epistemic materials. Conceptualizing (...) expertise through argument leads us to see expertise as a kind of phronetic practice, oriented toward judgments and problems, characterized by its ability to provide inventional capacities for selecting the best possible resolution of a particular problem vis-à-vis particular expectations regarding the resolution of a problem. At its core, expertise thus comes to exist in reference not to epistemic but to dialogical, deliberative, democratic practice. (shrink)

Rhetorical scholars have become increasingly interested in the persuasive tactics and strategies that arise out of the communication that occurs in the course of doing science. Philosophically, two primary ways of approaching this intrinsic rhetoric of science, and the practice of science itself, have emerged. One is to look at the Community and practice of science as relatively stable, a progressive vision of scientists gradually making discoveries and weeding out error, passing along their knowledge and techniques to students. But a (...) second approach, made popular by Thomas Kuhn and his followers, holds that periods of stability are temporary and fragile and the history of science is less like steady progress than like a series of revolutions (twists and turns), where old facts, and the theories that permit them, are simply replaced by new ones, and students are trained to ignore the old structures or consider them 'wrong'. (shrink)