Octavio Paz fue un lúcido intérprete de su siglo. Este trabajo explora aspectos decisivos de su propia definición como poeta y ensayista, así como de su trayectoria creativa y crítica, altamente representativa de las transformaciones del artista y el escritor contemporáneos. Los ecos de sus experiencias, prácticas de sociabilidad y lecturas, unidos a su sensibilidad y lucidez, hicieron que ya desde sus primeros textos en prosa Octavio Paz contribuyera a la reconfiguración del ensayo como género. Proponemos leer algunos textos del (...) escritor mexicano en diálogo con las reflexiones de varios de los grandes refundadores del ensayo y la crítica en el siglo XX. Su búsqueda de una comunicación profunda entre poesía e historia, su esfuerzo por repensar críticamente la tradición, su exigencia de autenticidad y libertad en el quehacer del escritor, son algunos de los elementos que dieron lugar en sus ensayos a una nueva poética del pensar y a una nueva relación entre conciencia y transparencia. (shrink)

_El espejo enterrado_ (1992) ocupa un lugar clave en la producción ensayística del escritor mexicano Carlos Fuentes y lo confirma como uno de los más notables intelectuales de nuestro tiempo. La obra y la serie documental a ella vinculada se reprodujeron ampliamente para contribuir a la reflexión en torno al significado de los quinientos años del primer viaje de Colón a través del Océano Atlántico, así como también para pensar la posibilidad de una comunidad iberoamericana apoyada en una historia, una (...) lengua, una tradición cultural y un imaginario compartidos. Este ensayo de interpretación de la vida de América y España se piensa a su vez como una biografía de nuestra cultura y una autobiografía intelectual del propio autor. Fuentes encontró en un año tan significativo como 1992 una oportunidad dorada para escribir la biografía de una cultura que consideró unida por el que llamó “Territorio de la Mancha”, repensar la relación entre España y América y emprender una nueva valoración de su perfil, su destino y su aporte al concierto de las naciones en una nueva etapa del orden mundial. (shrink)

Weinberg's 1972 work, in his description, had two purposes. The first was practical to bring together and assess the wealth of data provided over the previous decade while realizing that newer data would come in even as the book was being printed. He hoped the comprehensive picture would prepare the reader and himself to that new data as it emerged. The second was to produce a textbook about general relativity in which geometric ideas were not given a starring role (...) for (in his words) too great an emphasis on geometry can only obscure the deep connections between gravitation and the rest of physics. (shrink)

A common strategy for simplifying complex systems involves partitioning them into subsystems whose behaviors are roughly independent of one another at shorter timescales. Dynamic causal models clarify how doing so reveals a system’s nonequilibrium causal relationships. Here I use these models to elucidate the idealizations and abstractions involved in representing a system at a timescale. The models reveal that key features of causal representations—such as which variables are exogenous—may vary with the timescale at which a system is considered. This has (...) implications for debates regarding which systems can be represented causally. (shrink)

Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's sources of evidence, (...) but also its inferential resources, are in great need of closer examination. (shrink)

Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ do play an explanatory role. Studying causal intermediaries linking variables Xand Y provides knowledge of the (...) counterfactual conditions under which X will continue to bring about Y. This explanatory role does not depend on whether intermediate variables count as components. The question of whether there are distinctively mechanistic explanations remains open. (shrink)

In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...) still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions that we have been conducting. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. In Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we’ll consider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing might reply to our challenge. Our goal, in all of this, is not to offer a conclusive argument demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself of the shared vulnerability to risks (...) and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

This paper investigates connections between procreative ethics and the ethics of suicide and euthanasia. While there are good reasons for distinguishing between lives worth starting and lives worth continuing, I argue that those reasons provide no reason for denying that there is a relationship between procreative and end of life ethics. Regarding euthanasia/assisted suicide, we might think it too demanding to ask parents to help euthanize their terminally ill, suffering child, but had the parents not procreated, thereby exposing their child (...) to life's risks, their child wouldn't need euthanizing. If you need help killing yourself, shouldn't your parents, who got you into life in the first place – without your consent – help you out of it? Yet knowing that your parents would help you kill yourself may increase your desire to die. A conundrum. Regarding suicide, the fact that we are forced into life should bolster the right to suicide, even for reasons that others might find wanting. The ways in which we are brought into life have moral implications for the ways in which we are entitled to get out of it. (shrink)

The larger philosophical world has on the whole turned from a mix of averted gaze and outright antipathy toward x‐phi, to a mix of grudging acceptance and enthusiastic embrace. This chapter explains that the experimental philosophy is relevant, and that it is dangerous, and explains some ways that people can do more to remain both. Experimental philosophy's semi‐official sigil of the burning armchair has advertised its dangerousness for the past decade and a half as well. The chapter explains that it (...) is a threat that is every bit as potently present in positive program x‐phi as it is in negative program work. To explore the idea that experimental philosophy's positive contributions will still be primarily negative in nature, the chapter interrogates the passage from Timothy Williamson. It focuses on the wheat‐from‐chaff project of separating signal from noise in the evidence produced by intuitions and the like. (shrink)

Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, and justice implies that most such acts are (...) not supererogatory, but wrong. Many will find that conclusion unattractive, but rejecting the common view that implies it raises problems, too. (shrink)

A recent report from the UN makes the case for “global data literacy” in order to realise the opportunities afforded by the “data revolution”. Here and in many other contexts, data literacy is characterised in terms of a combination of numerical, statistical and technical capacities. In this article, we argue for an expansion of the concept to include not just competencies in reading and working with datasets but also the ability to account for, intervene around and participate in the wider (...) socio-technical infrastructures through which data is created, stored and analysed – which we call “data infrastructure literacy”. We illustrate this notion with examples of “inventive data practice” from previous and ongoing research on open data, online platforms, data journalism and data activism. Drawing on these perspectives, we argue that data literacy initiatives might cultivate sensibilities not only for data science but also for data sociology, data politics as well as wider public engagement with digital data infrastructures. The proposed notion of data infrastructure literacy is intended to make space for collective inquiry, experimentation, imagination and intervention around data in educational programmes and beyond, including how data infrastructures can be challenged, contested, reshaped and repurposed to align with interests and publics other than those originally intended. (shrink)

Cyclin‐dependent kinases are Ser/Thr protein kinases best known for their cell cycle roles, where CDK1 triggers mitotic onset in all eukaryotes. CDKs are also involved in various other cellular processes, some of which, such as transcription and centrosome duplication, are coupled to cell cycle progression. A new study suggests that the mitotic CDK network is active at low levels in non‐dividing, differentiating precursors of multiciliated cells, and that it drives ciliogenesis. Manipulating the activity of CDK1 or PLK1 altered transitions between (...) the amplification, growth, and disengagement phases, in a manner analogous to the control of passage through different phases of mitosis. How the dynamics of the mitotic kinase network are controlled in these post‐mitotic cells, and whether other cell cycle regulators are also involved, remains unknown. In the present mini‐review we suggest that the redeployment of cell cycle regulators to control steps of differentiation in non‐dividing cells might be a more general, hitherto under‐recognized, feature of cell regulation. (shrink)

Defining a class of sets to be uniform Δ02 if it is derived from a binary {0,1}{0,1}-valued function f≤TKf≤TK, we show that, for any C⊆DeC⊆De induced by such a class, there exists a high Δ02 degree c which is incomparable with every degree b ϵ Ce \ {0e, 0'e}. We show how this result can be applied to quite general subclasses of the Ershov Hierarchy and we also prove, as a direct corollary, that every nonzero low degree caps with both (...) a high and a nonzero low Δ02 degree. (shrink)

This article aims at a reflection on the Marxist concept of Ideology as an attempt to understand the transposition from the conscience level to the physical corporality level accomplished by Michel Foucault, as a form of instituting disciplinary power over the individual and also as a means of domination which is more effective than conscience itself.Este artigo objetiva uma reflexão sobre o conceito marxista de ideologia, ao mesmo tempo em que busca entender a transposição do nível da consciência para o (...) nível da corporalidade física, feita por Michel Foucault, como forma de instituição do poder disciplinar sobre os indivíduos, como meio de dominação muito mais eficaz do que a própria consciência. (shrink)

Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we find ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of unresolvable (...) disputes between such communities, but only so long as there is a sufficient amount of fruitful exchange between them as well. I close with some speculation about when it is or is not legitimate to make an “appeal to discipline”: responding to another’s argument by saying something like, “we should do it this way, because we are philosophers (/linguists/psychologists/…), and that’s just what we do”. (shrink)

We show that every nonzero Δ20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^{0}_{2}}$$\end{document} enumeration degree bounds the enumeration degree of a 1-generic set. We also point out that the enumeration degrees of 1-generic sets, below the first jump, are not downwards closed, thus answering a question of Cooper.

The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space (...) and colour appearances. (shrink)

Involutive Stone algebras were introduced by R. Cignoli and M. Sagastume in connection to the theory of $n$-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this work we focus on the logic that preserves degrees of truth associated to S-algebras named Six. This follows a very general pattern that can be considered for any class of truth structure endowed with an ordering relation, and which intends to exploit many-valuedness focusing on the notion of inference that results from preserving lower bounds of truth values, and (...) hence not only preserving the value $1$. Among other things, we prove that Six is a many-valued logic that can be determined by a finite number of matrices. Besides, we show that Six is a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we prove that it is a genuine Logic of Formal Inconsistency with a consistency operator that can be defined in terms of the original set of connectives. Finally, we study the proof theory of Six providing a Gentzen calculus for it, which is sound and complete with respect to the logic. (shrink)

Maurice Chappaz’s work, a monumental one under many aspects, offers the scholar a rich field for reading the landscape. For Chappaz, the Valais - his birthplace represents everything: landscape and spirituality, affectivity, source of life and of writing, engagement, recognition of the sense of the divine in the human being, in space and in the future, the first and supreme sense of becoming, source of life and of writing, ‘the vine and the bread of any existence’. Sedentary or homo viator, (...) the individual remains essentially linked to a place, to space. A relationship of mutual nourishing, of determination, even of transubstantiation is being created between the human being and space. The space is the man, it comes to life within the man who can only live in relationship with his native land, the matrix-space, equally ‘kingdom of God’ and work accomplished by men. (shrink)