The paper examines Walter Chatton’s rejection of final causality. At the core of Chatton’s theory lies the claim that there are four kinds of cause, but only three kinds of causality, because final causality should in a sense be reduced to efficient causality. The author begins by situating Chatton’s theory in the context of the fourteenth-century discussions concerning the problematic status of ends as causes. After that, the paper reconstructs Chatton’s rejection of the opinio communis (...) of his time, according to which both final causes and final causality must be posited. The author claims that Chatton’s objections employ three main arguments, based on ontological parsimony, possible non-existence of ends, and the efficient character of love and desire. Then, Chatton’s own theory is presented. The author’s exposition is focused on Chatton’s thesis that final causes are said to be causes only in a metaphorical sense. The final part of the article examines William of Ockham’s reaction to Chatton’s theory. Arguing against Chatton’s teleology, Ockham wants to prove that we have good reasons to retain both final causes and final causality. (shrink)

In Walter Chatton on Future Contingents, Jon Bornholdt presents the first full-length translation, commentary, and analysis of the various attempts by Chatton (14th century C.E.) to solve the ancient problem of the status and significance of statements about the future. At issue is the danger of so-called logical determinism: if it is true now that a human will perform a given action tomorrow, is that human truly free to perform or refrain from performing that action? Bornholdt shows (...) that Chatton constructed an original (though problematic) formal analysis that enabled him to canvass various approaches to the problem at different stages of his career, at all times showing an unusual sensitivity to the tension between formalist and metaphysical types of solution. (shrink)

The present paper examines the trinitarian theology of Adam Wodeham and Walter Chatton through an examination of the filioque, i.e., the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. The paper argues that the strong emphasis on divine simplicity that emerged in the early fourteenth century had a subtle influence on how Wodeham and Chatton understood the intra-trinitarian distinctions between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

_ Source: _Page Count 24 Although the fourteenth-century Franciscan theologian Walter Chatton did not comment on Aristotle’s _Categories_, he discussed a number of issues relating to categories in his _Lectura_ on the _Sentences_. The author examines his response to the question ‘How many categories are there?’ He gives three methods by which we can arrive at the number of the categories, the last two of which seem to meet his approval. Chatton advocates a strong isomorphism between ontology (...) and semantics: the number of the categories is determined by and equal to the number of classes of things. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 24 Although the fourteenth-century Franciscan theologian Walter Chatton did not comment on Aristotle’s _Categories_, he discussed a number of issues relating to categories in his _Lectura_ on the _Sentences_. The author examines his response to the question ‘How many categories are there?’ He gives three methods by which we can arrive at the number of the categories, the last two of which seem to meet his approval. Chatton advocates a strong isomorphism between ontology (...) and semantics: the number of the categories is determined by and equal to the number of classes of things. (shrink)

This article studies Walter Chatton 's account of the connection of the virtues and its relation to the teaching of Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. Chatton 's position with regard to the connection of temperance, fortitude, and justice is influenced by Henry and yet importantly different from him. Chatton 's teaching on the connection between prudence and the moral virtues closely follows Scotus's view. Both Franciscans frame this problem in terms of the connection between (...) intellect and will. They both deny that having prudence implies possessing the moral virtues on account of the freedom of the will. Furthermore, they deny that prudence presupposes the moral virtues, because they consider it impossible that the will induce the intellect to err. (shrink)

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led (...) Auriol to allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to scepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to scepticism than his critics. (shrink)

Rondo Keele makes a foray into what he calls 'applied logic', investigating a complex argument strategy employed against Ockham by his greatest contemporary opponent, Walter Chatton. Chatton conceives a two-part strategy which attempts to force a kind of iteration of conceptual analysis, together with an infinite explanatory regress, in order to establish that one particular philosophical analysis is ultimately dependent on another. Chatton uses this strategy against Ockham in order to show that the latter's reductionist metaphysics (...) depends ultimately upon a deeper level of realist assumptions that he can neither evade nor explain away. Keele then shows how, earlier in his career, Chatton found himself on the receiving end of this same strategy, defending his own highly original solution to the problem of future contingents from the very iteration-regress attack he would subsequently use on Ockham. Keele concludes with an examination of Chatton's attempts to avoid the consequences of his own strategy, and draws some connections between this argument strategy and modal collapse in modern logics. (shrink)

This light revision of Bornholdt's doctoral thesis (Würzburg, 2015) is effectively a medievally-oriented follow-up to Richard Gaskin’s 'The Sea Battle and the Master Argument' (1995). The book is stimulating from a philosophical point of view, but the exegesis is disappointingly unreliable.

This paper examines Walter Chatton’s discussion of the problem of prophesied future contingents in his Lectura super Sententias. Faced with the challenge of reconciling the supposedly veridical character of divine prophecy with human freedom to do otherwise, Chatton casts the relation of prophecy to event in the form of a logical consequentia and formulates two rules which depend on the character of the antecedent in question. In the case of antecedents involving divine knowledge and related phenomena, the (...) freedom of the wayfarer to do otherwise is secured by the assumption that the consequence is necessary but the antecedent is semantically contingent. In the case of concrete utterances and phenomena, on the other hand, the wayfarer’s freedom is secured by the assumption that the consequence itself is contingent. Chatton’s treatment, while analytically subtle and rigorous, leaves a number of important questions unanswered, most notably that of the ontological openness or closure of the future. Nevertheless, it is interesting both in its own right and insofar as it provides a clarifying source for Chatton’s later discussion of the same topic in his Quodlibet. (shrink)

En el siglo XIV se propusieron dos teorías principales para explicar el aumento y la reducción de las cualidades, entendidas éstas como formas accidentales. Quienes defendían alguna de estas dos teorías sostenían que una cualidad aumenta o se reduce debido a que se añaden o se substraen partes de sí misma, o bien, que una cualidad aumenta o se reduce debido a que una nueva forma más o menos perfecta sustituye a la forma ya inherente en una cierta substancia. Ockham (...) defendió la primera teoría con respecto a los estados mentales, entendidos como cualidades. Chatton defendió en sus primeros escritos ambas teorías y después sólo defendió la segunda. Las teorías de Ockham y Chatton están basadas en dos perspectivas distintas sobre la naturaleza del cambio o el movimiento. Ambas teorías, además, implican mecanismos distintos para regular la mayor o menor perfección de un estado mental. (shrink)

This article focuses on one aspect of the late mediaeval debate over divine power, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). Chatton and Ockham would have agreed, for example, that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso, but they would not agree over wheher it violates God's omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made, for example, the painting Guernica, (...) without using Picasso himself as an intermediate cause. The context of their dispute was a larger debate regarding the ontological status of relations. This article (1) explains how these two issues, omnipotence and relations, became so interestingly tangled together, (2) tries to see which of the two men mentioned above got the better of their exchange, and finally (3) draws out some important consequences for fourteenth-century discussions of causality, occasionalism, and omnipotence. (shrink)

According to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and reflexivity always occurs. Brentano’s way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of and is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two (...) medieval thinkers, namely, Walter Chatton and Durand of Saint-Pourçain, are presented. The repeated conjunction of and paves the way for a more general distinction than that between subjectivist and objectivist theories of reflexivity, namely, one between automatic theories of reflexivity and apperceptive theories of reflexivity. (shrink)

Complexe significabilia are the significate of whole sentences, irreducible to what is signified by categorematic sub-sentential components. It has been propounded firstly by Adam Wodeham. Wodeham construes his argument for the postulation of complexe significabilia as a middle way between William of Ockham and Walter Chatton. According to Wodeham, Ockham’s view implies a reflexive theory of mental acts, which goes against the phenomenology of the act of assent. Moreover, it leads to an anti-realist epistemology. We need therefore things (...) outside the mind to be object of the act of assent, which is also the conclusion reached by Chatton. However, against Chatton, Wodeham argues that things signified by the categorematic component of sentences cannot be the object of assent. In effect, sentences with different syncategorematic structures, but with the same categorematic components, would correspond to the same propositional attitude in Chatton’s framework, which is an unwelcome consequence. The result is that we need to postulate that the objects of assent are outside the mind, contra Ockham, that are not signified by sentential categorematic components, contra Chatton, but are irreducibly signified by the whole sentences. (shrink)

In one of his Quodlibeta, William of Ockham entertains two concepts of God, one theological and the other philosophical. He argues that conclusions involving a theological concept of God are believable and can only be established in theology where recourse to faith is permissible. By contrast, conclusions involving a philosophical concept of God are knowable and can be proved in philosophy and theology. The source of these two concepts lies in the Sentences commentary of his confrère Walter Chatton,1 (...) who explores how different descriptions of God affect the provability of theological conclusions about God. Chatton himself is reacting to Ockham’s earlier Sentences commentary where Ockham suggests that a... (shrink)

Intellective intuitive cognition plays a key role in William of Ockham’s philosophy. On many occasions, Walter Chatton argues that this kind of cognition is unnecessary. Chatton has two main arguments for his point. First, he raises doubts about the possibility of distinguishing intellective intuitive cognition from sensory intuitive cognition. The former always arises with the latter, and whatever we can explain through the former, we can explain equally well through the latter. Second, he argues that we cannot (...) separate the intellective intuitive cognition of a singular thing from the cognition of the species of that thing. We cannot intuitively and intellectively cognize a thing without recognizing that thing as a thing of a certain kind. Chatton’s conclusion is that since we can never experience an act of intellective intuitive cognition in itself, it is superfluous to posit this act of cognition. We can explain the singular cognition of an extramental singular simply by making the cognition of its species and the sensory intuitive cognition of it interact with each other. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) (...) cognize its own states via higher-order (or “reflexive”) representational states? Their debate is representative both because it highlights the central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally and because it showcases the two main types of approach to consciousness one finds in the later medieval period, namely, those that explain consciousness in terms of intentionality (typically, higher-order intentionality), and those that understand consciousness as a non-intentional, sui-generis mode of awareness. (shrink)

This article introduces and defends the “pathological complexity thesis” as a hypothesis about the evolutionary origins of minimal consciousness, or sentience, that connects the study of animal consciousness closely with work in behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology. I argue that consciousness is an adaptive solution to a design problem that led to the extinction of complex multicellular animal life following the Avalon explosion and that was subsequently solved during the Cambrian explosion. This is the economic trade-off problem of having to (...) deal with a complex body with high degrees of freedom, what I call “pathological complexity.” By modeling the explosion of this computational complexity using the resources of state-based behavioral and life history theory we will be able to provide an evolutionary bottom-up framework to make sense of subjective experience and its function in nature by paying close attention to the ecological lifestyles of different animals. (shrink)

There has been much criticism of the idea that Friston's free-energy principle can unite the life and mind sciences. Here, we argue that perhaps the greatest problem for the totalizing ambitions of its proponents is a failure to recognize the importance of evolutionary dynamics and to provide a convincing adaptive story relating free-energy minimization to organismal fitness.

This paper constitutes a radical departure from the existing philosophical literature on models, modeling-practices, and model-based science. I argue that the various entities and practices called 'models' and 'modeling-practices' are too diverse, too context-sensitive, and serve too many scientific purposes and roles, as to allow for a general philosophical analysis. From this recognition an alternative view emerges that I shall dub model anarchism.

An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...) the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

This paper presents the outlines of a phenomenological theory of foundational or non-inferential knowledge according to which the facts or states of affairs towards which our beliefs are intentionally directed can sometimes serve as reasons or evidence for what we believe. This occurs in acts of fulfillment, in which an object or state of affairs is given as it is thought to be. Hopp further argues that the sorts of empirical facts that can serve as reasons for noninferentially justified beliefs (...) are not confined to facts about one’s own occurrent mental states, but include facts about the physical world as well. In the course of defending the view against objections, Hopp argues that we should be internalists about the reasons in virtue of which what we believe is justified but externalists about the factors in virtue of which our states of believing have the status of being justified. He also argues against the claim that mental states, such as perceptual experiences, constitute our evidence for empirical beliefs. (shrink)

Introduction: the advance of governmentality -- Foucault, power, and governmentality: introduction; what is governmentality?; beyond the microphysics of power?; from theory of the state to genealogy of the state; history of the art of government; pastoral power; raison d'état; liberal governmentality; five propositions on foucault and governmentality -- Governmentality 3.4.7.: introduction; governmentality after Foucault; governmentality and the political sciences; some problems in governmentality -- Foucault effect redux? some notes on international governmentality studies: constellation; a few preliminary observations; problems and debates (...) in international governmentality studies -- Reconnecting governmentality and genealogy: introduction; genealogy and governmentality; pluralizing genealogy; practicing genealogy; lines of descent: the family tree of power?; counter-memory and re-serialization; the retrieval of forgotten struggles and subjugated knowledges -- Conclusion: encountering governmentality: governmentality as a new cartography of power; from mapping to encountering; governmentality and politics. (shrink)

Renaissance logician, philosopher, humanist, and teacher, Peter Ramus (1515-72) is best known for his attack on Aristotelian logic, his radical pedagogical theories, and his new interpretation for the canon of rhetoric. His work, published in Latin and translated into many languages, has influenced the study of Renaissance literature, rhetoric, education, logic, and--more recently--media studies. Considered the most important work of Walter Ong's career, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue is an elegant review of the history of Ramist scholarship (...) and Ramus's quarrels with Aristotle. A key influence on Marshall McLuhan, with whom Ong enjoys the status of honorary guru among technophiles, this challenging study remains the most detailed account of Ramus's method ever published. Out of print for more than a decade, this book--with a new foreword by Adrian Johns--is a canonical text for enthusiasts of media, Renaissance literature, and intellectual history. (shrink)

This article canvases the main areas of controversy: the nature of Lockean signification and his position on propositions and particles.

Teachers in many countries complain that their pedagogic work is impeded by unreasonable bureaucratic demands by government agencies. This paper suggests that historical, institutional and cultural perspectives are needed to understand the processes at work. It draws on Weber’s classic study of bureaucracy, but also makes reference to claims that traditional bureaucracies have been modified in ways that ameliorate their authoritarian character. The central part of the paper examines the attempts of one country (Scotland) to address complaints about excessive bureaucracy: (...) it is argued that they show a limited understanding of the nature of institutional power. In the discussion that follows, a number of critical interpretations are considered: that bureaucracies are, by their very nature, anti-educational; that they undermine ethical consciousness and cause psychological damage; and that enhanced professionalism can serve as a counterweight to bureaucratic tendencies. The paper ends by suggesting that the powerful pragmatic argument that mass, state-run educational systems cannot function without complex administrative structures, should not be used to disguise the fact that they have unintended consequences, some of which tend to subvert their stated aims. (shrink)

On a currently popular reading of Locke, an idea represents its cause, or what God intended to be its cause. Against Martha Bolton and my former self (among others), I argue that Locke cannot hold such a view, since it sins against his epistemology and theory of abstraction. I argue that Locke is committed to a resemblance theory of representation, with the result that ideas of secondary qualities are not representations.

Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...) and ultimately unworkable -- attempt to solve this riddle. Most commentators claim that Malebranche defends an adverbial theory of sensation, according to which a sensation is merely a way in which an act of sensing happens. The adverbial reading is wrong, or so I argue. Once we arrive at a more accurate reading, we shall see that his position is much more strange than is currently thought. Nevertheless, Malebranche’s view is similar to the adverbial theory in one respect, albeit it at a very high level of generality. His view thus inherits two of the main problems that afflict adverbial theories. Although Malebranche fails to solve them, his ingenious attempts to do so are instructive. (shrink)

The conditions animals experience during the early developmental stages of their lives can have critical ongoing effects on their future health, welfare, and proper development. In this paper we draw on evolutionary theory to improve our understanding of the processes of developmental programming, particularly Predictive Adaptive Responses (PAR) that serve to match offspring phenotype with predicted future environmental conditions. When these predictions fail, a mismatch occurs between offspring phenotype and the environment, which can have long-lasting health and welfare effects. Examples (...) include metabolic diseases resulting from maternal nutrition and behavioral changes from maternal stress. An understanding of these processes and their evolutionary origins will help in identifying and providing appropriate developmental conditions to optimize offspring welfare. This serves as an example of the benefits of using evolutionary thinking within veterinary science and we suggest that in the same way that evolutionary medicine has helped our understanding of human health, the implementation of evolutionary veterinary science (EvoVetSci) could be a useful way forward for research in animal health and welfare. (shrink)

Walter Chatton (ca. 1290–1343) is not exactly a household name—even among historians of medieval philosophy. Indeed, to the extent that he is known to scholars, it is more for his role as a critic of William of Ockham (d. 1347) than for any particular philosophical contribution of his own. Part of the reason for this owes to Chatton's own philosophical style: he uses his objections to Ockham's (and, to a lesser extent, to Peter Aureol's) views as a (...) foil for developing his own. Another, larger part of the explanation, however, is that the bulk of Chatton's philosophical writings have not been accessible for research and study. Thanks to the efforts of the late Joseph Wey and Girard Etzkorn, this is no longer the .. (shrink)

Alongside the rapid global advances in neuroscientific research, neuroethics has been one of the fastest growing sub-fields within bioethics. With this rapid expansion, bioethicists struggle to kee...

Are demands for equality motivated by envy? Nietzsche, Freud, Hayek, and Nozick all thought so. Call this the Envy Objection. For egalitarians, the Envy Objection is meant to sting. Many egalitarians have tried to evade the Envy Objection.. But should egalitarians be worried about envy? In this paper, I argue that egalitarians should stop worrying and learn to love envy. I argue that the persistent unwillingness to embrace the Envy Objection is rooted in a common misunderstanding of the nature of (...) the charge, what it reveals, and what can be said in response to it. I develop what Bernard Williams might call a vindicatory genealogy of envy, thereby allowing us to see that envy, rather than undermining egalitarian intuitions, can in fact play a distinct justificatory role (when it is fitting), which undermines the Envy Objection. (shrink)