According to a prominent approach in contemporary formal semantics, the truth of moral assertions depends on a normative perspective imposed on the facts of the world. The implementation of this approach known as indexical contextualism treats the dependence of moral truth on the corresponding moral perspective in analogy with the contextual dependence characteristic of sentences containing indexical terms. Alternatively, the moral perspective is seen as configuring the circumstances of evaluation in which the content expressed by the occurrence of a moral (...) sentence is evaluated as true or false. The moderate version of this alternative view (non-indexical contextualism) considers that the truth of the occurrence of a moral sentence in a context of use is determined by the evaluation of its content in “the circumstance of the context”: the circumstance of evaluation represented by the same indexed set that represents the context of use. The radical version (assessment relativism), in turn, makes the truth of the occurrence of a moral sentence in a context depend essentially on the value of the normative standard in another context, from which the original utterance is assessed. Taking the judgment on the moral status of polygamous marriage as an illustration, the present work examines the competing merits of contextualist and relativist accounts of the use of moral language, especially in situations of disagreement and debate. The paper argues that, while indexical contextualism coupled with adequate pragmatic considerations can explain some relevant disagreement data, the alternative explanation of these data given by non-indexical contextualism is preferable, because it is simpler and more economical. It is also argued that relativism of assessment is better situated than non-indexical contextualism to explain the relevant phenomena of obligatory retraction and therefore to accommodate some discursive possibilities that play a central role in moral debates. (shrink)

We defend J. Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion from a recent criticism advanced by A Marras. We show that the principle follows from a less controversial principle of causal exclusion together with the assumption that claims of explanation are factual. We resolve the tension produced by Marras' argument by drawing a distinction between causal and explanatory relevance. In cross-level explanations (mental-to-physical and physical-to-mental) the explanans property is not causally but explanatorily relevant to the explanandum. This calls for an account of (...) how explanatorily relevant properties are grounded in causally relevant properties which in turn ultimately depend on causally efficacious properties. A. (shrink)

It is argued that the theories of the modern cognitive psychology of perception and recognition show, under rigorous logical analysis, the same problems which arise in the philosophical theories of knowledge of Descartes and Locke and lead to relativistic and solipsistic consequences. Through examination of the approachs of D. Sanders, E. B. Goldstein and J. Fodor it is shown that the perceptible world in these theories dissolves in internal representations so that despite its realistic starting-point modern cognitive psychology runs into (...) epistemological idealism or solipsism. (shrink)

A ideia intuitivamente plausível de que pelo menos alguns de nossos estados mentais teriam aspectos fenomenais qualitativos aos quais nós teríamos um acesso cognitivo privilegiado é considerada por muitos filósofos como incompatível com a ontologia fisicista. Alguns defensores radicais do fisicismo preferem simplesmente negar a existência de aspectos qualitativos, ao passo que outros materialistas procuram reinterpretar a cognição do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência do mundo como a aquisição de uma habilidade, isto é, como uma forma de know-how , em (...) oposição à aquisição de informação ( know-that ). O presente trabalho expõe e examina criticamente algumas tentativas recentes de compatibilização da natureza sui generis da apreensão cognitiva do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência com a tese materialista de que o conteúdo proposicional dessa cognição é constituído exclusivamente por fatos físicos. doi: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p415. (shrink)

The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort (...) of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information. The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts. (shrink)

De acordo com a concepção dominante de causação, eventos espácio-temporalmente localizáveis que podem ser designados por termos singulares e descrições definidas são os únicos relata genuínos da relação causal. Isto dá apoio e é apoiado pela dicotomia aceita entre a explicação causal, concebida como uma relação intensional entre fatos ou verdades, e a relação natural e extensional da causação. O ensaio questiona este modo de ver e argumenta pela legitimidade da noção de causação por fatos: os relata de muitas relações (...) expressas pelo conector sentencial ‘(O fato) C causa (o fato) E’ podem ser causas e efeitos genuínos (I). Esta visão expandida da causação é então aplicada ao problema da causação mental. Assumindo a verdade do realizacionismo físico, o ensaio explora a conexão entre eficácia causal e relevância contrafactual de propriedades. Mostra-se que, pelo menos em muitos casos, as ligações contrafactuais corretas, requeridas pela causação, podem ser encontradas somente no nível dos fatos realizados, não no nível mais básico dos fatos realizadores (II). Finalmente, dadas as similaridades entre a defesa do fisicismo não-reducionista esboçada aqui e as tentativas menos modestas de justificação científica das pretensões do materialismo metafísico, justamente criticadas por van Fraassen como manifestações da ‘falsa consciência’, considera-se se e como a argumento principal do ensaio pode evitar o juízo crítico de van Fraassen (III). (shrink)

L'auteur distingue, dans les.travaux sur l'intelligence artifi- cielle, deux approches : l'approche technologique et l'approche cognitiviste. Il montre que les rapprochements faits, dans l'approche cognitiviste, entre l'intelligence humaine et l'intelligence artificielle, ne vont pas de soi, et que les thèses sur l'intelligence artificielle sont largement tributaires de certaines spéculations rationalistes et empi- ristes de la philosophie classique. Il expose la principale difficulté que rencontre alors une compréhension de l'intelligence humaine à partir de l'approche cognitiviste, à savoir la nécessité d'oblitérer la (...) dimension sémantique et de professer un solipsisme radical, et il plaide en faveur d'une compréhension de l'intelligence humaine selon ce qu'elle est dans la culture plutôt que dans les machines.In the literature on artificial intelligence, the author distinguishes two approaches : the technological approach and the cognitivist approach. He shows that the parallels made between human intelligence and artificial intelligence within the cognitivist approach do not go without saying, and that the theses on artificial intelligence are largely dependent upon certain rationalist and empiricist speculations of classical philosophy. He exposes the principal problem that then encounters an understanding of human intelligence in the light of the cognitivist approach, namely the necessity to obliterate the semantic dimension and to profess a radical solipsism, and he pleads for an understanding of human intelligence commensurable with what it is in culture rather than in machines. (shrink)

It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate (...) the notion of supervenient causation in a nonreductive framework fails. The upshot of this examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect in question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher level would allow establishing such connections. The paper closes with a discussion of how this view of autonomous causation at the higher-level can coexist with the notion of a complete specification of the causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms. (shrink)

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about (...) phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. (shrink)

Die Kritik des späten Wittgenstein am logizistischen Programm zur Begründung der Mathematik, vor allem im Blick auf die Definition der Zahl als Klasse von Klassen, und die darauf gegründete Explikation des Sinnes arithmetischer Sätze wird systematisch rekonstruiert. Entgegen einer verbreiteten Auffassung zeigen die Analysen Wittgensteins, daß Frege und Russell den Zahlbegriff nicht auf den „grundlegenderen" Begriff der eineindeutigen Zuordnung „reduzieren". Entsprechend sind Zahlen nicht mehr als durch Abstraktion erreichbare, echte Eigenschaften von Klassen zu verstehen, sondern als Formen oder Möglicfikeiten, die (...) die Beschreibung der Erfahrungswelt a priori bestimmen. Femer wird die wesentliche Selbständigkeit mathematischer Techniken gegenüber Techniken der Logistik durch einige Betrachtungen deutlich, welche die für den Fall größerer Zahlen unvermeidbare Benutzung vertrauter Bündelungssysteme, etwa der Dezimalnotation, bei Beweisen im Russellschen System zum Thema haben. (shrink)

Die Kritik des späten Wittgenstein am logizistischen Programm zur Begründung der Mathematik, vor allem im Blick auf die Definition der Zahl als Klasse von Klassen, und die darauf gegründete Explikation des Sinnes arithmetischer Sätze wird systematisch rekonstruiert. Entgegen einer verbreiteten Auffassung zeigen die Analysen Wittgensteins, daß Frege und Russell den Zahlbegriff nicht auf den „grundlegenderen" Begriff der eineindeutigen Zuordnung „reduzieren". Entsprechend sind Zahlen nicht mehr als durch Abstraktion erreichbare, echte Eigenschaften von Klassen zu verstehen, sondern als Formen oder Möglicfikeiten, die (...) die Beschreibung der Erfahrungswelt a priori bestimmen. Femer wird die wesentliche Selbständigkeit mathematischer Techniken gegenüber Techniken der Logistik durch einige Betrachtungen deutlich, welche die für den Fall größerer Zahlen unvermeidbare Benutzung vertrauter Bündelungssysteme, etwa der Dezimalnotation, bei Beweisen im Russellschen System zum Thema haben. (shrink)

Summary After having given an account of the current methodological debates about psychology I discuss Ryle's arguments which play an important role in this debate. Following Jerry Fodor's formulation of the cognitive psychology's programme I assess critically his claims from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Contrary to the interpretation of some Wittgensteinians it turns out that this programme contains a justifiable core.

This paper takes issue with a widely accepted view of mental causation. This is the view that mental causation is either reducible to physical causation or ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal completeness of physics The paper examines, first, why recent attempts to save the phenomena of mental causation by way of the notion of supervenient causation fail The result of t/us examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a (...) causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect m question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher-level would allow establishing such connections. The paper doses with a discussion of how the view of autonomous higher-level causation grounded on counterfactual relations can be made compatible with the physicalistic commitment to a complete specification of the particular causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms. (shrink)