Many authors in the field of Environmental Philosophy have claimed to be inspired by Spinoza's monism, which has traditionally been considered a form of pantheism because nature and God coincide. This idea has deep normative implications, as some environmental ethicists claim that wounding nature is the same as wounding God, which implies a resacralization of nature. In particular, we will focus on Arne Næss's Ecosophy (or Deep Ecology) to offer a current relevant example of the pantheist (or panentheist) worldview. However, (...) a new demarcation distinguishes pantheism from panentheism; in the latter, nature and God belong together but do not fully coincide, as in pantheism. Nevertheless, whether Spinoza is a panentheist, pantheist, or neither has yet to be fully determined, as well as whether his doctrine serves as a proper foundation for an ecology that attempts the aforementioned resacralization of nature. This article attempts to clarify these issues. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the relevance of adequate decision making at both public health and healthcare levels. A bioethical response to the demand for medical care, supplies and access to critical care is needed. Ethically sound strategies are required for the allocation of increasingly scarce resources, such as rationing critical care beds. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the so-called ‘last bed dilemma’. In this paper, we examine this dilemma, pointing out the main criteria used to solve it and (...) argue that we cannot face these ethical issues as though they are only a dilemma. A more complex ethical view regarding the care of COVID-19 patients that is focused on proportional and ordinary treatments is required. Furthermore, discussions and forward planning are essential because deliberation becomes extremely complex during an emergency and the physicians’ sense of responsibility may be increased if it is faced only as a moral dilemma. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss Næss’s concept of ecological self in light of the process of identification and the idea of self-realization, in order to understand the asymmetrical relationship among human beings and nature. In this regard, our hypothesis is that Næss does not use the concept of the ecological self to justify ontology of processes, or definitively overcome the idea of individual entities in view of a transpersonal ecology, as Fox argues. Quite the opposite: Næss’s ecological self is nothing (...) but an echo of the theme of the home and of belonging to a place, and, therefore, it deals with a positive relationship of the individual with its environment. This allows us to reshape environmental ethics starting from environmental ontology, and recalling the primacy of the latter on the former: the very theoretic background of an ethical view might only be a suitable interpretation of human nature and properties, starting from a relational viewpoint that may help understanding us our asymmetrical relationships with the world. (shrink)

La sostenibilidad, por sí misma, no es un criterio útil para evaluar la adecuación y moralidad de un acto, dado que se trata de un concepto abierto, necesitado de conexión con diversos elementos heterogéneos. Por su parte, el concepto de desarrollo sostenible carece de concreción, pues se define en términos de necesidades futuras de muy difícil predicción. Como guía de nuestras acciones será más útil el concepto de desarrollo humano sostenible, formulado en términos de capacidades, fundamentado filosóficamente en un enfoque (...) aristotélico. Dicho enfoque nos permite definir una teoría política del bien común, centrada en la persona, con toda su integridad y complejidad. (shrink)

El desarrollo actual de la ecología ha abierto nuevos desafíos para la reflexión filosófica contemporánea. En este sentido, ya no es posible interpretar la naturaleza humana a partir de una reflexión sobre el hombre como un ser aislado de su ambiente. El paradigma de ecología humana que se presenta aquí quiere heredar la reflexión sobre la filosofía de la naturaleza (y también sobre la filosofía de la naturaleza humana), proponiendo la cuestión ecológica actual como un tema eminentemente antropológico: el lugar (...) del hombre en el cosmos indica asimismo su esencia. Esta tarea nos obliga a replantear la especificidad del ser humano en relación con el mundo a través del tema del habitar, que nos invita a reflexionar sobre las actividades del custodiar y del construir la casa. Se hace así posible replantear el tema ecológico actual como una crisis predominantemente antropológica: para sanar la herida del ecosistema, primero hay que curar la fractura dentro del hombre. (shrink)

Environmental ethics is often seen as a branch of applied ethics whose task is to offer solutions to emerging ethical dilemmas in the context of ecology. In this paper, we challenge this assumption, showing how the object of environmental ethics raises questions that go beyond that of applied ethics. We explore how the environmental issues bring up the need to inquire into the ontological status of Nature and the place of human beings in it, raising more general and far-reaching questions (...) that do not get entrapped in the mere application. In this regard, it appears that “dwelling”, in its ontological sense, is at the bottom of these questions, creating a bridge between the ontological and the practical realm. Finally, we review classical environmental ethics’ paradigms highlighting the elements that go beyond applied ethics. And so, taking into account the different environmental ethics paradigms, we have two options: reducing the scope of the discipline and exclude the models that exceed it, or reconsidering it as an environmental philosophy tout court. (shrink)

La biodiversidad suele reconocerse en diferentes disciplinas como un valor universal. Ésta apunta a la heterogeneidad de las propiedades que caracterizan al mundo biológico. Sin embargo, a pesar de su uso común, el análisis crítico de la literatura filosófica pone en evidencia cierta dificultad a conceptualizar la biodiversidad, dada una aparente dicotomía entre los elementos normativos y descriptivos del término mismo. En este artículo se sostiene que es necesario considerar el aspecto relacional de la biodiversidad con el n de resolver (...) esta dicotomía. Esto significa que para ser un valor, cualquier diferencia en el mundo natural que sea definida en términos de biodiversidad implicará, a nivel conceptual y explicativo, la relación intrínseca entre lo que tenga en común con las entidades y lo que sea específico de éstas. De esta manera la biodiversidad será un concepto explicativo por sí mismo. Una visión relacional de la biodiversidad también hace reconocer el carácter multidimensional de dicha noción, lo que ha probado ser realmente útil en diferentes contextos, pudiéndose caracterizar propiamente en términos de “riqueza” implicada por el concepto de la biodiversidad. (shrink)

IntroductionThe idea of video recording in the operating room with panoramic cameras and microphones is a new concept that is changing the approach to medical activities in the OR. However, VR in the OR has brought up many concerns regarding patient privacy and has highlighted legal and ethical issues that were never previously exposed.AimTo review the literature concerning these aspects and provide a better ethical and legal understanding of the new challenges concerning VR in the OR.ConclusionsThere is a disparity between (...) the two main legal models concerning VR in the OR, namely the European legal system ) and the American legal framework ). This difference mainly deals with two distinct bioethical paradigms: GDPR places a strong emphasis on protecting patients’ privacy to improve the public health system, whereas HIPAA indicates the need to generate protocols to safeguard the risks connected to medical activity and patient privacy. Following from this point, we may argue that, at the ethical and bioethical level, GDPR and HIPAA depend mainly on two different ethical models: a perspective based on moral acquaintances and weak proceduralism, respectively. It is worth noting the importance of developing additional guidelines concerning different world regions to avoid the ethical problems that may emerge when simply applying a foreign paradigm to a very different culture. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to focus on the idea of depth developed by Arne Næss, which is related both to his research methodology and some of its anthropological/cosmological implications. Far from being purely a psychological dimension, in Næss’s perspective, the subject of depth is a methodological and ontological issue that underpins and lays the framework for the deep ecology movement. We cannot interpret the question of “depth” without considering the “relational ontology” that he himself has developed in which (...) the “ecological self” is viewed as a “relational union within the total field.” Based on this point of view, I propose that we are able to reinterpret the history of the deep ecology movement and its future, while rereading its politics, from the issue of depth. (shrink)

Resumen Repensar la naturaleza en la época actual significa enfrentar las nuevas perspectivas desarrolladas por la ética ambiental, es decir, las respuestas a la crisis ecológica contemporánea. Los dos paradigmas ambientales principales, biocentrismo y antropocentrismo, antes que ser paradigmas éticos son dos visiones antropológicas desarrolladas a partir de una cierta idea del puesto del ser humano en el cosmos. En este sentido, el objeto de este artículo es destacar el hecho de que la ecología es una antropología y, debido a (...) esto, para repensar la naturaleza tenemos que reformular nuestra visión antropológica, dada la insuficiencia a nivel teórico de los principales paradigmas ambientales.Rethinking nature nowadays means to face the new perspectives developed by environmental ethics, i.e., the responses to the contemporary ecological crisis. The two main environmental paradigms, biocentrism and anthropocentrism, even before being ethical paradigms, are two anthropological visions developed from a certain idea of the position of human beings in the cosmos. In this sense, the purpose of this article is to highlight the fact the ecology is rooted in anthropology. In order to rethink the idea of nature, then, we have to reformulate our anthropological view, given the failure of the two main environmental paradigms at this theoretic level. (shrink)

Ha sido usual criticar el posthumanismo por ser una especulación puramente hipotética sin conexión con nuestras posibilidades técnicas y científicas. Se argumenta aquí, sin embargo, que los desarrollos recientes para la producción de diferentes tipos de híbridos —como híbridos de cerdohombre— abren posibilidades reales para el programa posthumanista. El posthumanismo debe ser tomado en serio. En este trabajo presentamos las líneas centrales de la ontología y la ética posthumanistas, y también algunas razones para resistir su programa de transformación social y (...) política. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es enfocarse en la idea de profundidad desarrollada por Arne Næss, que tiene que ver con su metodología de investigación y con algunas de sus implicaciones antropológicas/cosmológicas. Lejos de ser una dimensión meramente psicológica (como sostiene Warwick Fox), el tema de la profundidad es, en la filosofía de, un tema metodológico y ontológico, que fundamenta y constituye el marco teórico del Movimiento de la Ecología Profunda. No podemos interpretar el tema de la “profundidad” sin tener (...) en cuenta la “ontología relacional” que el mismo Næss ha desarrollado, en la que el “self ecológico” constituye una “unión relacional dentro del campo total”. A partir de este punto de vista, entonces, podemos interpretar la historia del Movimiento de la Ecología Profunda (y su futuro), ilustrando su política a la luz del tema de la profundidad. (shrink)

El impacto de las nuevas tecnologías en la acción humana es un tema de fundamental importancia en la filosofía contemporánea. En el presente artículo se subrayarán algunas de las principales cuestiones metafísicas y éticas relacionadas con esta revolución tecnológica en continuo desarrollo, destacando un importante cambio de paradigma del pensamiento: la cuestión metafísica parece ser ahora hija de los interrogantes de pertinencia de la ética. Las posibilidades tecnológicas contemporáneas proceden en la dirección no tanto de exaltar el sujeto humano, cuanto (...) de aniquilarlo: el ser humano se considera «anticuado», profundamente afectado por sus límitaciones, y por esto ha de ser superado. La categoría de la dependencia se sustituye así con la de la auto-póiesis, orientando la reflexión hacia una búsqueda de la perfección que elimine radicalmente todo límite. Al revés, se pondrá de relieve que el concepto de límite puede ser un buen punto de partida para reconstruir una ontología de la diferencia y de la identidad: es precisamente el límite lo que nos permite reconocer la identidad. En cambio, en el ecologismo contemporáneo podemos observar la tendencia opuesta: todo individuo —el ser humano también es funcional para la conservación de la vida del ecosistema, y puede, así, ser sacrificado. En este sentido la superación de la naturaleza humana puede coincidir con la victoria de la Naturaleza, es decir de la Vida: la vida es un bien que hay que salvaguardar, siempre y en cualquier caso, tanto en lo humano como en otras especies. Las principales razones de este hecho radican en una concepción ingenua de Naturaleza y en la consideración del ser humano como amenaza; la conciencia de haber conseguido un gran poder destructivo, no puede ser un motivo suficiente para reducir el ser humano a cáncer del planeta. Si se desea restablecer una correcta relación del hombre consigo mismo y con el mundo, aparece pues necesario elaborar una antropología adecuada, que tenga en cuenta la dimensión natural y espiritual de la persona humana, su límite y sus límites. (shrink)

La cuestión ecológica se encuentra en el centro de muchos debates contemporáneos y, últimamente, ha sido acogida dentro del ámbito de lo “religioso”, ya que la crisis ecológica actual interroga nuestras visiones del mundo, obligando a preguntarnos sobre nuestra “posición metafísica en el cosmos”. Entre los otros paradigmas, la Ecología Profunda de Næss parece mantener una posición privilegiada, ya que ha sabido destacar con extrema claridad cuáles son los fundamentos religiosos de tal perspectiva: la visión del mundo budista, la ética (...) de Gandhi, y una cosmología inmanente inspirada en la filosofía de Spinoza. Por todas estas razones, será interesante considerarla como “un paradigma privilegiado” en el vínculo entre ecología y religión. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to focus on Arne Nass’s phenomenological method and some of its anthropological and cosmological implications. Nass’s Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, in fact, can be fruitfully read as an example of phenomenological inquiry, in which the notion of “spontaneous experience” plays a fundamental role. This method leads Nass to develop a “relational ontology,” in which the “ecological self” is seen as a “relational junction within the total field.” In addition, I show how Tymieniecka’s philosophical thought (...) can offer us the proper eco-phenomenological perspective to better understand Nass’s Ecosophy T. (shrink)

The hegemonic discourse of sustainable development adopted as an international alternative solution to the socio-ecological crisis has implied a progression of the modern utopian project and most importantly, an intrinsic contradiction and omission that positions sustainable development as something that is not in any place. To understand, discuss, and transcend this oxymoron, we first review the modern utopian project and analyze its paradigmatic and ontological assumptions about knowledge, time, and space. Second, we show that sustainable development just re-adapted the founding (...) premises of the modern utopias. Third, to transcend the modern utopian facet of sustainable development, we suggest an understanding of sustainability that stems from a topographical way of thinking. We suggest this approach allows us to seek alternatives to the modern epistemology and ontology that have shaped the current dominant vision of sustainable development. Finally, we propose to move from the modern utopia of sustainable development to the praxis of topographical sustainabilities to trigger a more comprehensive and relational praxis of sustainability. (shrink)

We argue that, given that the act of eating is rational and relational, it should also be an educational issue dealing with society and environment, politics and health, tastes and trends, as well as genetic and epigenetic factors. This hypothesis arises from a particular theory of the human act and an anthropological approach based on the philosophical speculations of MacIntyre and Aristotle. We argue that eating choices are “hybrids of freedom,” rationality, and unconscious and environmental elements. Finally, we suggest that (...) people have to change their habits in order to transform the human way of acting, since every human act can change the human essence and vice versa. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess a case report in the field of gynecology, starting from an ethical paradigm that relates primarily to the so-called “sources of morality”. In order to do so, we first will present four ethical paradigms for the evaluation of clinical cases. After introducing the main aspects of these paradigms and pointing out that what matters in an ethical evaluation is not so much the final judgement, but rather the argument that leads to it, (...) we will assess the case report in light of the chosen paradigm. Lastly, we will outline a possible solution to the problem, starting from the previous ethical evaluation. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.6. (shrink)

Riassunto: Nel presente articolo si analizzerà come, a fronte del paradigma transumanista che opera per una progressiva inclusione dell’uomo nel suo stesso processo di ‘miglioramento’ del mondo, è sempre più pressante la domanda sulla dinamica tra verità (truth) e fiducia (trust) nella relazione uomo-macchina e nella riflessione etica degli enti che orientano gli odierni processi di innovazione bio-tecnologica. Le visioni che emergono – frutto rispettivamente del paradigma transumanista e di un’ecologia umana che restituisce all’uomo il senso della sua storia e (...) del suo vivere in relazione – non sono banalmente antitetiche: poggiano su due visioni dell’uomo scientifico profondamente diverse. Si propone quindi che un modo costruttivo per coniugare verità e fiducia nella nostra società contemporanea, dipenderà sempre più dall’idea di uomo che con la scienza vogliamo servire, coniugando il progresso bio-tecnologico con l’incompletezza biologica che caratterizza l’uomo. Parole chiave: Transumanesimo; Estraneità; Dignità; Verità; Fiducia. Resumen: Analizaremos cómo, ante el paradigma transhumanista, que intenta incluir al ser humano en el proceso de “mejora” del mundo, es cada vez más apremiante la pregunta por la relación entre la verdad (truth) y la confianza (trust). Nos referimos a la relación entre una narrativa verdadera sobre la tecnología y la confianza que en dicha tecnología podemos depositar. Esta pregunta se plantea en el ámbito de la relación hombre-máquina, así como en la reflexión ética sobre la innovación biotecnológica. Emergen aquí dos visiones, que no son simplemente antitéticas: la propia del paradigma transhumanista y la propia de una ecología humana que nos devuelve el sentido histórico y social de nuestra vida. Estas dos visiones se corresponden también con dos concepciones profundamente diferentes del ser humano. Entendemos, pues, que una forma constructiva de combinar la verdad y la confianza en nuestra sociedad contemporánea dependerá cada vez más de la idea de ser humano a la que la ciencia pretenda servir. Para servir realmente al ser humano, la ciencia habrá de combinar el progreso biotecnológico con la incompletitud biológica que nos caracteriza. Palabras clave: transhumanismo; extrañeza; dignidad; verdad; confianza. (shrink)

This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg’s claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the (...) most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the “fuzzy area” between a healthy organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper—a relatively late stage of decomposition—to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return. (shrink)

Supernumerary robotic limbs are innovative devices in the field of wearable robotics which can provide humans with unprecedented sensorimotor abilities. However, scholars have raised awareness of the ethical issues that would arise from the large adoption of technologies for human augmentation in society. Most negative attitudes towards such technologies seem to rely on an allegedly clear distinction between therapy and enhancement in the use of technological devices. Based on such distinction, people tend to accept technologies when used for therapeutic purposes (...) (e.g., prostheses), but tend to raise issues when similar devices are used for upgrading a physical or cognitive ability (e.g., supernumerary robotics limbs). However, as many scholars have pointed out, the distinction between therapy and enhancement might be theoretically flawed. In this paper, we present an alternative approach to the ethics of supernumerary limbs which is based on two related claims. First, we propose to conceive supernumerary limbs as tools that necessarily modify our psychological and bodily identity. At the same time, we stress that such a modification is not ethically bad in itself; on the contrary, it drives human interaction with the environment. Second, by comparing our view with the extended mind thesis, we claim that the mediation through tools is crucial for the formation of novel meanings and skills that constitute human interaction with the world. We will relate the latter claim to enactivism as a helpful theoretical perspective to frame issues related to artificial limbs and, more in general, to technologies for augmentation. Based on this approach, we finally sketch some suggestions for future directions in the ethics of supernumerary limbs. (shrink)

La ética ambiental nació como justa contestación a los excesos del antropocentrismo. Sin embargo, un énfasis obsesivo en lo ético y en lo ambiental, con el consiguiente olvido de lo antropológico, puede estar dañando la vida humana, la libertad de las personas y la vida en general. Abogamos aquí por la construcción de una ecología humana que vaya más allá y más al fondo que las éticas ambientales al uso. Defendemos que el humanismo es perfectamente compatible con el reconocimiento del (...) valor inherente de todos los seres naturales. Lo hacemos basándonos principalmente en algunas ideas de Hans Jonas, aunque rechazamos su heurística catastrofista. De él retomamos la idea de que existe una responsabilidad moral hacia los demás seres vivos, empezando por los más próximos en el tiempo y en el espacio, y hacia el libre florecimiento de las personas actuales. Con ello, también, se rebaja el peso de lo ético sobre nuestra acción ecológica. Esta ha de atender principalmente a criterios experienciales, antropológicos, científicos y de sentido común. Por último, defendemos que la política, la educación y la comunicación ambiental deben orientarse directamente hacia la libertad y el desarrollo virtuoso de las personas actuales, y no hacia el control de las mismas por culpabilización. El tránsito desde la ética ambiental hacia la ecología humana —concluimos— puede ser beneficioso tanto para las personas como para la naturaleza. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to review and critically discuss the philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Given that estimates of seismic hazard are typically riddled with uncertainty, diferent epistemic values (related to the pursuit of scientifc knowledge) compete in the selection of seismic hazard models, in a context infuenced by non-epistemic values (related to practical goals and aims) as well. We frst distinguish between the diferent types of uncertainty in PSHA. We claim that epistemic and nonepistemic (...) considerations are closely related in the selection of the appropriate estimate of seismic hazard by the experts. Finally, we argue that the division of scientifc responsibility among the experts can lead to responsibility gaps. This raises a problem for the ownership of the results (“no one’s model” problem) similar to the “problem of many hands” in the ethics of technology. We conclude with a plea for a close collaboration between philosophy and engineering. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can (...) be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education. (shrink)

This book discusses Aristotle’s notions of essence and substance as they are developed in Metaphysics ZH. I examine Aristotle's argument at length and defends an unorthodox interpretation according to which his motivation is to provide an answer against a conflation between criteria for existential priority (delivering substances as primary beings) and criteria for explanatory priority (delivering essences as primary principles).

Translation of Aristotle's Physics I-II into Portuguese, with commentaries. Tradução para o português dos livros I e II da Física de Aristóteles, com comentários.

This is an introductory handbook for some of the main themes around the notion of predication in Aristotle. It does not aim at being exhaustive, but only sketches some important lines about the subject; it contains an introductory essay, besides the translation (into Portuguese) and commentary of basic texts (such as Posterior Analytics I-22, Categories 1-5, Interpretation 1-6 etc.).

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2003/4, was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IV and VI, with notes. The translation is preliminary and intended as a provisional teaching tool to be also used in seminars and discussions with peers in order to reach a more elaborated version.

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2002 (with a new printing in 2004), was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

This book uses mathematical models of language to explain why there are certain gaps in language: things that we might expect to be able to say but can't. For instance, why can we say I ran for five minutes but not *I ran to the store for five minutes? Why is five pounds of books acceptable, but *five pounds of book not acceptable? What prevents us from saying *sixty degrees of water to express the temperature of the water in a (...) swimming pool when sixty inches of water can express its depth? And why can we not say *all the ants in my kitchen are numerous? The constraints on these constructions involve concepts that are generally studied separately: aspect, plural and mass reference, measurement, and distributivity. In this book, Lucas Champollion provides a unified perspective on these domains, connects them formally within the framework of algebraic semantics and mereology, and uses this connection to transfer insights across unrelated bodies of literature and formulate a single constraint that explains each of the judgments above. (shrink)

This note reproduces a brief article by Thomas Nixon Carver, a leading Progressive Era American economist on what was then called the ‘Negro Question’. This virtually unknown piece represents a striking in-stance of blaming the victim for her/his condition which is to be found in the economic literature of the period.

Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and X (Theta & Iota) into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2004, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

In this monograph we contrast two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE), more recent and currently dominant in most school systems of the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of school systems of Northern Europe. CBE interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD, which approach education from the perspective of the human capital theory. BOE instead characterises learning holistically as aimed at the (...) progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Emerged in Northern Europe under the influence of the ideals of the Enlightenment and Neo-Humanism of individual and collective autonomy and responsibility, BOE was subsequently enriched with a hermeneutical approach to teaching and socio-political objectives of emancipation and solidarity originating within Critical Theory. We argue that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, CBE is internally incoherent and unreliable, contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, fosters social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need as both human beings and citizens of our complex post-industrial societies. We also defend BOE from objections made by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers, and argue that it is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, and can help heal social pathologies. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy (...) because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics V.1-8 with a few notes.

Tradução preliminar em pré-print. A Tradução definitiva é a de 2009.

In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast (...) and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein's feeling of wonder stems from perceiving the existence of the world as an absolute miracle, that is, as a fact that is in principle beyond explanation. Based on this analysis, I will suggest that Wittgenstein's experience is akin to what has been described by other authors such as Coleridge, Pessoa, Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, and Hadot, (...) among many others. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein and Coleridge on the experience of existence, I shall highlight some core features of this experience, chief among them the use of the notion of nothingness in clarifying what is understood in the experience, the role of intuition, and the presence of a specific pathos. As a whole, this paper aims to provide a contribution to the project of a phenomenology of the experience of existence and intends to create a bridge for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition on the enigma of existence. (shrink)

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has (...) some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices. This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its antisceptical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.

We present epistemic multilateral logic, a general logical framework for reasoning involving epistemic modality. Standard bilateral systems use propositional formulae marked with signs for assertion and rejection. Epistemic multilateral logic extends standard bilateral systems with a sign for the speech act of weak assertion (Incurvati and Schlöder 2019) and an operator for epistemic modality. We prove that epistemic multilateral logic is sound and complete with respect to the modal logic S5 modulo an appropriate translation. The logical framework developed provides the (...) basis for a novel, proof-theoretic approach to the study of epistemic modality. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the approach, we show how the framework allows us to reconcile classical logic with the contradictoriness of so-called Yalcin sentences and to distinguish between various inference patterns on the basis of the epistemic properties they preserve. (shrink)