The concept of free will is fraught with controversy, as readers of this volume likely know. Philosophers disagree about what free will is, whether we have it, what mitigates or destroys it, and what it's good for. Indeed, philosophers even disagree about how to fix the referent of the term 'free will' for purposes of describing and exploring these disagreements. What one person considers a reasonably neutral working definition of 'free will' is often considered question-begging or otherwise misguided by another. (...) Such disputes make it difficult to summarize the problem of free will, roughly the debate over the nature and existence of free will, in a clear and uncontentious way. In generic terms, however, the two basic solutions to the problem of free will are free-willism, the view that we have free will, and free-will denialism, i.e. the view that we do not have free will. As stated here, neither denialism nor free-willism constitutes a complete solution to the problem of free will; to be complete, a proposed solution must also tell us a convincing story about what free will is and that, as it turns out, is a very difficult task indeed. One historically popular way of approaching the problem of free will is to ask about the relationship between free will and determinism: "Does free will stand in relation R to determinism: yes or no?" This is just a template for a question, of course. To transform this template-question into a substantive question with a clear meaning, we need to flesh out the template's free-will relatum, its determinism relatum, and give a precise value to relation R. There is, however, no uncontroversial way to do this. In addition to the standard difficulties raised by fixing the referent of 'free will', philosophers hold radically different views about what is-or should be-meant by 'determinism', Shabo ), and they identify relations which are as substantively different as correlation and causation when characterizing relation R. In practical terms, then, it may be best to think of the problem of determinism as a loose collection of disagreements about how to best spell out and answer the template-question, and how asking and answering such questions would help us to solve the problem of free will. (shrink)

"We wish this volume to be a sure companion to the study of free will, broadly construed to include action theory, moral and legal responsibility, and cohort studies feathering off into adjacent fields in the liberal arts and sciences. In addition to general coverage of the discipline, this volume attempts a more challenging and complementary accompaniment to many familiar narratives about free will. In order to map out some directions such accompaniment will take, in this introduction we anchor the thirty (...) contributions to this volume in some common history from which they arise, and attempt to indicate where future work in free will and moral responsibility will–and has already begun to–depart from that history." -Excerpt from Introduction. ... ... To read full introduction, (1) download attached file or (2) follow wiley_dot_com link below, click "Read An Excerpt", then click :Excerpt 3:(pdf)". (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was first and foremost a Christian theologian. Yet he was also one of the greatest philosophers of the Middle Ages. Drawing on classical authors, and incorporating ideas from Jewish and Arab sources, he came to offer a rounded and lasting account of the origin of the universe and of the things to be found within it, especially human beings.

Of course you know the movie, just by cultural assimilation if not by having seen it. There’s this young elephant, Dumbo, who has laughably big ears and has been pitiably separated from his mom. He’s aided by a friendly talking mouse[ii] into translating those otherwise hapless ears into the power of flight, which he eventually uses to rescue his mom and live happily ever after. The way the wily mouse gets Dumbo to believe that he could fly is to give (...) him a “magic feather” which, held in his trunk, demonstrably imparts the gift of flight. Naturally the mouse believes throughout all this that Dumbo can fly anyway, but he also knows that Dumbo needs the feather as a confidence-builder to do so. At the critical juncture of the tale Dumbo loses the feather after being pushed off a precipice, and he thus plummets perilously towards earth—only to find at the last moment that he can indeed fly on his own. (shrink)

This thesis is an examination of Alfred North Whitehead's epochal theory of time. Two necessary conditions for Whitehead's epochal theory are analyzed. First, Whitehead's requirement that events "become" is examined, with the result that becoming is found not to be an objective, physical feature of events in Whitehead's theory as is commonly thought. Second, the requirement that events be discrete is examined, with the result that this requirement is found to be incompatible with contemporary quantum theory, contrary to Whitehead's claim (...) that it is compatible. (shrink)

All right, first off I need to disappoint some people who despise reading the fine print on things or just plain love to speed-read only large fonts: this is not only not my last lecture, I m not even retiring anytime soon. So sorry to those of you poised to shout Good riddance to bad rubbish! at the end of this soliloquy. You re going to have to be patient a while longer.

Of course you know the movie, just by cultural assimilation if not by having seen it. There’s this young elephant, Dumbo, who has laughably big ears and has been pitiably separated from his mom. He’s aided by a friendly talking mouse2 into translating those otherwise hapless ears into the power of flight, which he eventually uses to rescue his mom and live happily ever after. The way the wily mouse gets Dumbo to believe that he could fly is to give (...) him a “magic feather” which, held in his trunk, demonstrably imparts the gift of flight. Naturally the mouse believes throughout all this that Dumbo can fly anyway, but he also knows that Dumbo needs the feather as a confidence-builder to do so. At the critical juncture of the tale Dumbo loses the feather after being pushed off a precipice, and he thus plummets perilously towards earth—only to find at the last moment that he can indeed fly on his own. (shrink)

After learning about the concept of determinism, a natural tendency is to conclude that if anyone actually believed in the determinism of human nature, then all future human actions are "set out for us" or "cut and dried" and, in some sense, utterly unavoidable. Another way of referring to such inevitability is that human action appears to be..

“Men can never be free, because they’re weak, corrupt, worthless and restless. The people believe in authority; they’ve grown tired of waiting for miracle or mystery. Science is their religion; no greater explanation exists for them.” (Cigarette Smoking Man, "Talitha Cumi" The X-Files 3X24).

Harry Frankfurt's famous examples of overdetermined moral agents who are nevertheless responsible for their actions and omissions have long been hailed as proofs that the ability and/or opportunity to do otherwise is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In this paper I use recent clarifications of some of these examples by Frankfurt himself to show that their force relies in part on tacit ceteris paribus assumptions concealing a reliance on PAP that concerns matters of fairness in assessing moral responsibility.

Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts).

This book examines the meaning of some of the most basic terms we use in both confessional and secular discussion about morality and religion. Is there any credible and distinctive meaning in what we refer to as "right and wrong" and "God"? What do we even mean by meaning itself? Outside specialist academic discourse these terms are rarely examined in depth. Here they are probed with as much rigor as possible, but also accessibly. Literary, philosophical, and theological sources are all (...) widely drawn on in the discussion. Experiences of ordinary life help illustrate the issue and arguments at stake. As a collection of essays each section is freestanding. But there is also a clear overall connecting argument. It demonstrates a common trajectory towards "ultimacy" or "transcendence" in the meaning of these terms. It argues that the meaning of morality, of God, and of meaning itself, is not just an individual or social construction. It is grounded in what lies beyond us. In this way it offers an alternative to reductionist views, and advances a thesis about transcendence which connects across a wide range of both religious and non-religious experience. (shrink)

It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow argued that presentism does not deserve the attribution of this defect because it may well be that Einstein’s account of the relativity of simultaneity is defective, leaving it open to establishing a view of absolutist simultaneity friendlier to presentism. Specifically Brogaard and Marlow present an argument against one of (...) Einstein’s most famous accounts of the relativity of simultaneity, and moreover raise doubts about whether Einstein availed himself of absolutist frames in some of his explanations of relativity. I will dismiss both of these charges, and thus argue that the complaint against presentism from SR stands. (shrink)

Hud Hudson has argued that with a few assumptions one can prove that superluminal objects exist. I argue that even if the assumptions are true that his argument, if sound, leads to a proliferation of movers packing given spaces. I further argue that his argument as it stands cannot in fact entail that objects moving at any speed exist.

Routledge is now re-issuing this prestigious series of 204 volumes originally published between 1910 and 1965. The titles include works by key figures such asC.G. Jung, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Otto Rank, James Hillman, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and Susan Isaacs. Each volume is available on its own, as part of a themed mini-set, or as part of a specially-priced 204-volume set. A brochure listing each title in the "International Library of Psychology" series is available upon request.

The author examines the single topic approach to the construction of introductory philosophy courses. The author considers the single topic approach to be an alternative to more historically- and topically-based approaches. The traditional approach to philosophy is often broad and difficult for students to engage with in classroom discussion. A narrow and detailed treatment of a standard area or topic facilitates classroom discussion and allows students to transfer insights and skills in areas of their own disciplines. The author outlines a (...) methodology that treats philosophical texts in an interdisciplinary context, which emphasizes to students that philosophy is not a detached field of study. (shrink)

Within this essay, I seek to understand how the patriarchy impacts the concept of body memory and creates gendered bodily behaviors. I first explain and define the relationship between one’s incorporative memory and affective framing. Given this relationship, I explore what male validation is and how it becomes embodied. I argue that the formation of the incorporative memory and affective framing under the patriarchy creates an embodied experience of male validation. As women begin to understand gender roles, they shift how (...) they move their bodies, and continue to display this gendered movement because men validate it. (shrink)

"If" and "then," wrapped around enough content to form at least two propositions that seem to be conditionally assertible together as antecedent and consequent, are, of course, the key denizens of this very deep work. It's a commonplace among philosophers that what so innocently malingers in indicative language as, "If Bennett didn't write this excellent Guide, then someone else did," can rapidly morph by a little fancy into the eyebrow-arching subjunctive/counterfactual, "If Bennett hadn't written this marvelous work, then someone else (...) would have." The hulking literature on the logic and semantics of conditionals is cunning and daunting, and few thinkers on the world stage are equipped to corral and tame the beast as Bennett has. Even given his nontruth-functional stance on indicative conditionals, one might still rightly call Bennett "The Horseshoe Whisperer.". (shrink)