A plurality or plural object is a single object that is also many, and pluralitism is the thesis that there is such an object. This paper argues that pluralitism and closely related theses (e.g., the many-one identity thesis and the composition as identity thesis) violate logic. To do so, it formulates an approach to the logic and semantics of plural constructions that results in plural logic and relates treatments of plural constructions to accounts of natural number. And it gives a (...) critical examination of Frege’s views of numbers and plural constructions, and sketches the view of plural constructions as devices for talking about the many (as such), and an account of natural numbers as properties of a special kind, plural properties. (shrink)

고난과 시련의 역사가 만든 유대인 성공하고 싶다면 유태인의 방식으로 살아라 페이스북의 창시자 마크 저커버그, 세계 최고의 영화감독이자 제작자로 일컬어지는 스티븐 스필버그, 20세기 최고의 천재 물리학자 아인슈타인, 세계 인구 비율의 0.2%, 미국 억만장자의 40%, 역대 노벨상의 30%. 이들의 공통점은 바로 '유대인'이라는 것이다. 그 밖에도 퓰리처, 마이클 델, 하워드 슐츠, 마르크스, 앨빈 토플러, 노엄 촘스키, 프로이트, 샤갈, 캘빈 클라인, 폴 뉴먼, 더스틴 호프만 등 각 분야에서 최고로 불리며 시대와 역사를 이끌어온 유태인들은 무수히 많다. 유태인의 뛰어난 비즈니스 감각에 숨겨진 역사적 배경에서부터 전 세계 (...) 부를 지배한 금전관리 능력, 세계 최강의 인재들로 키워내는 자녀교육, 지혜의 보고 탈무드에서 배우는 성공철학에 이르기까지, 영원한 이방인에서 세상의 주인이 될 수밖에 없었던 유태인들의 흥미로운 이야기들을 바탕으로 유태인들에게서 우리가 배워야 할 78가지 지혜를 이야기하고 있다. 또한 유태인들이 5천 년 동안 간직한 삶의 지혜를 통해 지금 이 시대를 살아가는 우리가 가야 할 길을 명확하게 제시한다. 저자는 굳이 우리가 유태인의 신앙을 따르지 않더라도 유태인의 성공을 반면교사로 삼아 내 안의 나를 향해 최선을 다할 수밖에 없는 이유를 스스로 만들어봄으로써 인생을 새롭게 경영할 수 있는 기회를 마련할 수 있을 것이라고 이야기한다. 이 책을 통해 독자들은 유태인들의 독특한 생활방식을 배우는 것에 그치는 것이 아니라, 우리만의 새로운 방식을 찾을 수 있는 계기를 마련할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Nominalism about attributes has serious difficulties in accounting for truths involving abstract nouns. Prominent among such truths are statements of comparative similarity among attributes. This paper argues that one cannot account for the truth of such statements without invoking attributes.

Contemporary accounts of logic and language cannot give proper treatments of plural constructions of natural languages. They assume that plural constructions are redundant devices used to abbreviate singular constructions. This paper and its sequel, "The logic and meaning of plurals, II", aim to develop an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To do so, the papers present natural accounts of the logic and meaning of plural constructions that result (...) from the view that plural constructions are, by and large, devices for talking about many things (as such). The account of logic presented in the papers surpasses contemporary Fregean accounts in its scope. This extension of the scope of logic results from extending the range of languages that logic can directly relate to. Underlying the view of language that makes room for this is a perspective on reality that locates in the world what plural constructions can relate to. The papers suggest that reflections on plural constructions point to a broader framework for understanding logic, language, and reality that can replace the contemporary Fregean framework as this has replaced its Aristotelian ancestor. (shrink)

In this sequel to "The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I", I continue to present an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions of natural languages and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To this end, I present a non-reductive account of plural constructions that results from the conception of plurals as devices for talking about the many. In this paper, I give an informal semantics of plurals, formulate a formal characterization of truth for the (...) regimented languages that results from augmenting elementary languages with refinements of basic plural constructions of natural languages, and account for the logic of plural constructions by characterizing the logic of those regimented languages. (shrink)

Say that some things compose something, if the latter is a whole, fusion, or mereological sum of the former. Then the thesis that composition is identity holds that the composition relation is a kind of identity relation, a plural cousin of singular identity. On this thesis, any things that compose a whole are identical with the whole. This article argues that the thesis is incoherent. To do so, the article formulates the thesis in a plural language, a symbolic language that (...) includes counterparts of plural constructions of natural languages, and shows that it implies that nothing has a proper part. Then the article argues that the thesis, as its proponents take it, is incoherent because they take it to imply or presuppose that some things have proper parts. (shrink)

This article examines the traditional and modern doctrines of categorical propositions and argues that both doctrines have serious problems. While the doctrines disagree about existential imports...

In developing resemblance nominalism, Rodriguez-Pereyra attempts to meet the challenge that truths involving abstract nouns pose to the doctrine. He holds that one can render sentences containing abstract nouns without invoking attributes and defends this view by giving nominalistic sentences that express the truthmakers of two such sentences: ‘Scarlet is a colour’ and ‘Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French blue.’ This article argues that his renderings have serious problems and fall far short of meeting the challenge posed by (...) truths involving abstract nouns. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize John Bigelow's account of number and present my own account that results from the criticism. In doing so, I argue that proper understanding of the nature of number requires a radical departure from the standard conception of language and reality and outline the alternative conception that underlies my account of number. I argue that Bigelow's account of number rests on an incorrect analysis of the plural constructions underlying the talk of number and propound an analysis (...) of numerical sentences, such as "Quine and Goodman are two", that conforms to the natural understanding of the plural constructions. The analysis leads to the account of number according to which natural numbers are properties, i.e., one-place relations: the number two, for example, is the property indicated by "to be two", which, I argue, is a one-place predicate that can combine with plural terms like "Quine and Goodman". (shrink)

Plausible principles on truth seem to yield contradictory conclusions about paradoxical sentences such as the Strengthened Liar. Those who take the contextualist approach, such as Parsons and Burge, attempt to justify the seemingly contradictory conclusions by arguing that the natural reasoning that leads to them involves some kind of contextual shift that makes them compatible. This paper argues that one cannot take this approach to give a proper treatment of infinite descending chains of semantic attributions. It also examines a related (...) approach taken by Gaifman and argues that it has the same problem. (shrink)

C onsider two contrary conditionals 1 about two envelopes, Ali and Baba: (a) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the amounts in them is $5. (b) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the amounts in them is $10. Can these both be true? The answer is a resounding yes on the standard account of conditionals, which identifies indicative con- ditionals with material conditionals. It is not the same with many other contemporary accounts (...) of c onditionals. They yield a quali- fied negative answer: (a) and (b) are not compatible 2 unless their common antecedent cannot be true. I think this is a wrong answer. The conditionals can both be true while their antecedent states a possibility. This is what I aim to show in this paper. In doing so, I present a solution to Raymond Smullyan’s intriguing version of the two-envelope paradox. (shrink)