Abstract
C
onsider two contrary conditionals
1
about two envelopes, Ali
and Baba:
(a) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the
amounts in them is $5.
(b) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the
amounts in them is $10.
Can these both be true? The answer is a resounding yes on the
standard account of conditionals,
which identifies indicative con-
ditionals with material conditionals. It is not the same with many
other contemporary accounts of c
onditionals. They yield a quali-
fied negative answer: (a) and (b) are not compatible
2
unless their
common antecedent cannot be true. I think this is a wrong answer.
The conditionals can both be true while their antecedent states a
possibility. This is what I aim to show in this paper. In doing so, I present a solution to Raymond Smullyan’s intriguing version of the two-envelope paradox.