Since the Korean Philosophy of Education Society was established in 1964, the question regarding the nature of Philosophy of Education as a modern discipline has always been a vexing question to mo...

The COVID-19 pandemic has witnessed an increase and amplification of anti-Asian racism and violence across the globe. Stop AAPI Hate1 in the United States and the COVID-19 Racism Incident Report2 i...

Alternative splicing is a well‐characterized mechanism by which multiple transcripts are generated from a single mRNA precursor. By allowing production of several protein isoforms from one pre‐mRNA, alternative splicing contributes to proteomic diversity. But what do we know about the origin of this mechanism? Do the same evolutionary forces apply to alternatively and constitutively splice exons? Do similar forces act on all types of alternative splicing? Are the products generated by alternative splicing functional? Why is “improper” recognition of exons and (...) introns allowed by the splicing machinery? In this review, we summarize the current knowledge regarding these issues from an evolutionary perspective. BioEssays 30:38–47, 2008. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

원로.중견 학자 및 종교인 9인이 젊은이들에게 주는 철학적 사색의 글들이다.

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...) small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life. Key Words: altruism; cooperation; cross-cultural research; experimental economics; game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; self-interest. (shrink)

We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient (...) to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators. (shrink)