In this paper, we establish the first-order definability of sequents with consistent variable occurrence on bi-approximation semantics by means of the Sahlqvist–van Benthem algorithm. Then together with the canonicity results in Suzuki (2011), this allows us to establish a Sahlqvist theorem for substructural logic. Our result is not limited to substructural logic but is also easily applicable to other lattice-based logics.

In this paper, we extend the canonicity methodology in Ghilardi & Meloni (1997) to arbitrary lattice expansions, and syntactically describe canonical inequalities for lattice expansions consisting of -meet preserving operations, -multiplicative operations, adjoint pairs, and constants. This approach gives us a uniform account of canonicity for substructural and lattice-based logics. Our method not only covers existing results, but also systematically accounts for many canonical inequalities containing nonsmooth additive and multiplicative uniform operations. Furthermore, we compare our technique with the approach in (...) Dunn et al. (2005) and Gehrke et al. (2005). (shrink)

In this paper, we give a possible characterization of the distributivity on bi-approximation semantics. To this end, we introduce new notions of special elements on polarities and show that the distributivity is first-order definable on bi-approximation semantics. In addition, we investigate the dual representation of those structures and compare them with bi-approximation semantics for intuitionistic logic. We also discuss that two different methods to validate the distributivity—by the splitters and by the adjointness—can be explicated with the help of the axiom (...) of choice as well. (shrink)

In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects upon (...) attitudes and actions of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering so-called “deontic explosion”. (shrink)

Although it seems intuitively clear that acts of requesting are different from acts of commanding, it is not very easy to sate their differences precisely in dynamic terms. In this paper we show that it becomes possible to characterize, at least partially, the effects of acts of requesting and compare them with the effects of acts of commanding by combining dynamified deontic logic with epistemic logic. One interesting result is the following: each act of requesting is appropriately differentiated from an (...) act of commanding with the same content, but for each act of requesting, there is another act of commanding with much more complex content which updates models in exactly the same way as it does. We will also consider an application of our characterization of acts of requesting to acts of asking yes-no questions. It yields a straightforward formalization of the view of acts of asking questions as requests for information. (shrink)

In nature, cells face a variety of stresses that cause physical damage to the plasma membrane and cell wall. It is well established that evolutionarily conserved cell cycle checkpoints monitor various cellular perturbations, including DNA damage and spindle misalignment. However, the ability of these cell cycle checkpoints to sense a damaged plasma membrane/cell wall is poorly understood. To the best of our knowledge, our recent paper described the first example of such a checkpoint, using budding yeast as a model. In (...) this review, we will discuss this important question as well as provide hypothetical explanations to be tested in the future. (shrink)

Correct chromosome segregation in mitosis relies on chromosome biorientation, in which sister kinetochores attach to microtubules from opposite spindle poles prior to segregation. To establish biorientation, aberrant kinetochore–microtubule interactions must be resolved through the error correction process. During error correction, kinetochore–microtubule interactions are exchanged (swapped) if aberrant, but the exchange must stop when biorientation is established. In this article, we discuss recent findings in budding yeast, which have revealed fundamental molecular mechanisms promoting this “swap and stop” process for error correction. (...) Where relevant, we also compare the findings in budding yeast with mechanisms in higher eukaryotes. Evidence suggests that Aurora B kinase differentially regulates kinetochore attachments to the microtubule end and its lateral side and switches relative strength of the two kinetochore–microtubule attachment modes, which drives the exchange of kinetochore–microtubule interactions to resolve aberrant interactions. However, Aurora B kinase, recruited to centromeres and inner kinetochores, cannot reach its targets at kinetochore–microtubule interface when tension causes kinetochore stretching, which stops the kinetochore–microtubule exchange once biorientation is established. (shrink)

The number of competing-brands changes by new product's entry. The new product introduction is endemic among consumer packaged goods firm and is an integral component of their marketing strategy. As a new product's entry affects markets, there is a pressing need to develop market response model that can adapt to such changes. In this paper, we develop a dynamic model that capture the underlying evolution of the buying behavior associated with the new product. This extends an application of a dynamic (...) linear model, which is used by a number of time series analyses, by allowing the observed dimension to change at some point in time. Our model copes with a problem that dynamic environments entail: changes in parameter over time and changes in the observed dimension. We formulate the model with framework of a state space model. We realize an estimation of the model using modified Kalman filter/fixed interval smoother. We find that new product's entry (1) decreases brand differentiation for existing brands, as indicated by decreasing difference between cross-price elasticities; (2) decreases commodity power for existing brands, as indicated by decreasing trend; and (3) decreases the effect of discount for existing brands, as indicated by a decrease in the magnitude of own-brand price elasticities. The proposed framework is directly applicable to other fields in which the observed dimension might be change, such as economic, bioinformatics, and so forth. (shrink)

Since the realisation that the antigen‐binding regions of antibodies, the variable (V) regions, can be uncoupled from the rest of the molecule to create fragments that recognise and abrogate particular protein functions in cells, the use of antibody fragments inside cells has become an important tool in bioscience. Diverse libraries of antibody fragments plus in vivo screening can be used to isolate single chain variable fragments comprising VH and VL segments or single V‐region domains. Some of these are interfering antibody (...) fragments that compete with protein‐protein interactions, providing lead molecules for drug interactions that until now have been considered difficult or undruggable. It may be possible to deliver or express antibody fragments in target cells as macrodrugs per se. In future incarnations of intracellular antibodies, however, the structural information of the interaction interface of target and antibody fragment should facilitate development of binding site mimics as small drug‐like molecules. This is a new dawn for intracellular antibody fragments both as macrodrugs and as precursors of drugs to treat human diseases and should finally lead to the removal of the epithet of the ‘undruggable’ protein‐protein interactions. (shrink)

The paper is based on a review of research on media selection and related topics on the one hand and on an explorative pilot survey on the other. In summarising the review, the authors propose that the factors explaining media choice be grouped into five categories: (1) the properties of the media itself affect its choice, (2) properties of the user affect media choice, (3) the communication situation plays an important role, (4) macro factors explain media choice, and (5) media (...) choice can be explained as the outcome of a dynamic multiparty negotiation process. The pilot survey compares Japanese and Finnish students’ preference of media in various communication situations. The survey results encourage reserving, local macro factors or culture, a certain amount of explanatory force in explaining media choice. (shrink)

In the past four decades, the notion of quantum polynomial-time computability has been mathematically modeled by quantum Turing machines as well as quantum circuits. This paper seeks the third model, which is a quantum analogue of the schematic definition of recursive functions. For quantum functions mapping finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces to themselves, we present such a schematic definition, composed of a small set of initial quantum functions and a few construction rules that dictate how to build a new quantum function from (...) the existing ones. We prove that our schematic definition precisely characterizes all functions that can be computable with high success probabilities on well-formed quantum Turing machines in polynomial time, or equivalently uniform families of polynomial-size quantum circuits. Our new, schematic definition is quite simple and intuitive and, more importantly, it avoids the cumbersome introduction of the well-formedness condition imposed on a quantum Turing machine model as well as of the uniformity condition necessary for a quantum circuit model. Our new approach can further open a door to the descriptional complexity of quantum functions, to the theory of higher-type quantum functionals, to the development of new first-order theories for quantum computing, and to the designing of programming languages for real-life quantum computer. (shrink)

SOCREAL 2007: International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2007-03-09/10. Session 2: Logical Dynamics of Social Interaction.

If the notion of speech acts is to be taken seriously, it must be possible to treat speech acts as acts. The development of systems of DEL (dynamic epistemic logic) in the last two decades suggests an interesting possibility. These systems are developed on the basis of static epistemic logics by introducing model updating operations to interpret various kinds of speech acts including public announcements as well as private information transmissions as what update epistemic states of agents involved. The methods (...) used in developing DEL can be used to develop logics that deal with a much wider variety of speech acts. For example, in ECL (Eliminative Command Logic) of Yamada (2007a) and ECL II of Yamada (2007b), similar model updating operations are introduced tointerpret acts of commanding as what update deontic aspects of the situations in which agents are involved. In Yamada (2008a), ECL II is further extended so as to model acts of promising along with acts of commanding. Moreover, in Yamada (2008b), ECL II is combined with a modified version of DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) introduced in van Benthem & Liu (2007). In the resulting logic DDPL (dynamic deontic preference logic), illocutionary acts of commanding are differentiated from preference upgrading perlocutionary acts. The development of these logics suggests a recipe for developing logics that deal with various specific speech acts: first, carefully identify the aspects affected by the speech acts you want to study; second, find the modal logic that characterizes the aspects in question; and finally, add dynamic modalities that stand for the types of the speech acts being studied and define model updating operation that interprets these speech acts as what update the very aspects. (shrink)

SOCREAL 2013 : 3rd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality 2013. Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, 25-27 October 2013. Session 4 : Agency, Responsibility, and Intentionality.

Two-player, zero-sum, non-cooperative, blindfold games in extensive form with incomplete information are considered in this paper. Any information about past moves which players played is stored in a database, and each player can access the database. A polynomial game is a game in which, at each step, all players withdraw at most a polynomial amount of previous information from the database. We show resource-bounded determinacy of some kinds of finite, zero-sum, polynomial games whose pay-off sets are computable by non-deterministic polynomial-time (...) function-oracle Turing machines. We call a pay-off set -determined if, for any polynomial game G associated with the given pay-off set, either player has a winning strategy which is in for any subgames of G. We show that there exists an FP-strongly-determined pay-off set which is computed by an exponential-time oracle Turing machine, where FP is the set of polynomial-time computable functions. We also discuss several relationships between the determinacy of polynomial games and recursion-theoretic properties for the classes co-NP and co-NEXP. We show that the polynomial version of the axiom of choice holds under some assumption of polynomial determinacy for a pay-off set which is polynomial-time computable with parallel queries. This principle of choice implies that co-NP has the separation property. (shrink)

SOCREAL 2010: 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2010-03-27/28. Keynote Lecture 3.

Personnalité et irrationalité chez Merleau-PontyUne personnalité est l’ensemble des traits et des qualités propres à une personne spécifique. Il s’agit d’un être humain concret, considéré dans sa totalité et distinct des autres individus. Merleau-Ponty s’est peu intéressé au concept de “personnalité”. Mais il fait référence au concept de totalité pour un individu lorsqu’il parle d’ “existence” ou d’ “être humain”. Grâce à la clarification du concept merleau-pontien de personnalité, je voudrais démontrer ce qui suit : la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la (...) structure caractérise la personnalité humaine comme un tout. Cette idée est héritée du “personnalisme” de la psychologie française inauguré par Ribot. La personnalité ainsi définie possède une rationalité téléologique (un objet visé). Cependant, lorsque Merleau-Ponty propose plus tard le concept d’“institution”, il souligne que toute signification de l’expérience humaine se fonde sur une expérience particulière et sur un point de vue concret ayant valeur de dimension, de niveau, ou encore sur un critère qui donne un sens à l’expérience suivante. S’il en est ainsi, les êtres humains doivent posséder une irrationalité fondamentale au coeur de leur personnalité ; irrationalité désigne une attitude attachée à une expérience particulière ou à un point de vue singulier. Les hommes peuvent “ré-instituer” leur expérience, c’est-à-dire abolir et transformer une dimension, un niveau ou un critère de l’expérience en y intégrant d’autres points de vue à travers leurs relations intersubjectives. Ils gagnent ainsi en nuance et en objectivité. Cependant, ils ne parviennent jamais à une rationalité totale si celle-ci se définit par une pensée totalement objective, universelle et non située, capable de voir le monde de nulle part. La ré-institution pourrait aussi entraîner une rupture dans la personnalité de quelqu’un et la rendre complexe et multiple, sans être pathologique pour autant.Personalità e irrazionalità in Merleau-PontyLa personalità è l’insieme delle qualità e dei tratti peculiari di una certa persona. È un essere umano concreto, preso nella sua interezza e distinto dagli altri individui. Merleau-Ponty non si è mai occupato molto del concetto di “personalità”. Ma si è riferito a tale concetto di totalità di un individuo sotto i nomi di “esistenza” o “essere umano”. Chiarendo la concezione merleau-pontiana della “personalità”, intendo sostenere che la filosofia della struttura di Merleau-Ponty caratterizza la personalità umana come un tutto unificato. Quest’idea è un’eredità del “personalismo” della psicologia francese inaugurata da Ribot. La personalità definita come tale ha una razionalità teleologica (orientata ad un obiettivo). Tuttavia, quando Merleau-Ponty propose più tardi il concetto di “istituzione”, sottolineò più di quanto avesse fatto precedentemente che perché ogni esperienza umana abbia un significato occore stabilire una particolare esperienza ed un punto di vista concreto quale dimensione, livello, o criterio che dia significato all’esperienza successiva. Se così è, gli esseri umani devono avere una fondamentale irrazionalità nel profondo della loro personalità, intendendo con irrazionalità un atteggiamento che è legato ad una particolare esperienza o punto di vista. Gli esseri umani possono “re-istituire” la loro esperienza, ovvero, riconsiderare una dimensione, un livello, o un criterio dell’esperienza attraverso l’integrazione degli altri punti di vista grazie alle loro relazioni intersoggettive. Guadagnano, così, sfumature e obiettività. Tuttavia, non possono mai realizzare la razionalità completa se per razionalità s’intende il pensiero completamente oggettivo, universale, imparziale, che guarda il mondo da nessun luogo. E la re-istituzione potrebbe creare una fessura decisiva nell’identità personale di un uomo, e rendere tale personalità complessa e “multipla,” anche se non necessariamente patologica. (shrink)

Personnalité et irrationalité chez Merleau-PontyUne personnalité est l’ensemble des traits et des qualités propres à une personne spécifique. Il s’agit d’un être humain concret, considéré dans sa totalité et distinct des autres individus. Merleau-Ponty s’est peu intéressé au concept de “personnalité”. Mais il fait référence au concept de totalité pour un individu lorsqu’il parle d’ “existence” ou d’ “être humain”. Grâce à la clarification du concept merleau-pontien de personnalité, je voudrais démontrer ce qui suit : la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la (...) structure caractérise la personnalité humaine comme un tout. Cette idée est héritée du “personnalisme” de la psychologie française inauguré par Ribot. La personnalité ainsi définie possède une rationalité téléologique (un objet visé). Cependant, lorsque Merleau-Ponty propose plus tard le concept d’“institution”, il souligne que toute signification de l’expérience humaine se fonde sur une expérience particulière et sur un point de vue concret ayant valeur de dimension, de niveau, ou encore sur un critère qui donne un sens à l’expérience suivante. S’il en est ainsi, les êtres humains doivent posséder une irrationalité fondamentale au coeur de leur personnalité ; irrationalité désigne une attitude attachée à une expérience particulière ou à un point de vue singulier. Les hommes peuvent “ré-instituer” leur expérience, c’est-à-dire abolir et transformer une dimension, un niveau ou un critère de l’expérience en y intégrant d’autres points de vue à travers leurs relations intersubjectives. Ils gagnent ainsi en nuance et en objectivité. Cependant, ils ne parviennent jamais à une rationalité totale si celle-ci se définit par une pensée totalement objective, universelle et non située, capable de voir le monde de nulle part. La ré-institution pourrait aussi entraîner une rupture dans la personnalité de quelqu’un et la rendre complexe et multiple, sans être pathologique pour autant.Personalità e irrazionalità in Merleau-PontyLa personalità è l’insieme delle qualità e dei tratti peculiari di una certa persona. È un essere umano concreto, preso nella sua interezza e distinto dagli altri individui. Merleau-Ponty non si è mai occupato molto del concetto di “personalità”. Ma si è riferito a tale concetto di totalità di un individuo sotto i nomi di “esistenza” o “essere umano”. Chiarendo la concezione merleau-pontiana della “personalità”, intendo sostenere che la filosofia della struttura di Merleau-Ponty caratterizza la personalità umana come un tutto unificato. Quest’idea è un’eredità del “personalismo” della psicologia francese inaugurata da Ribot. La personalità definita come tale ha una razionalità teleologica (orientata ad un obiettivo). Tuttavia, quando Merleau-Ponty propose più tardi il concetto di “istituzione”, sottolineò più di quanto avesse fatto precedentemente che perché ogni esperienza umana abbia un significato occore stabilire una particolare esperienza ed un punto di vista concreto quale dimensione, livello, o criterio che dia significato all’esperienza successiva. Se così è, gli esseri umani devono avere una fondamentale irrazionalità nel profondo della loro personalità, intendendo con irrazionalità un atteggiamento che è legato ad una particolare esperienza o punto di vista. Gli esseri umani possono “re-istituire” la loro esperienza, ovvero, riconsiderare una dimensione, un livello, o un criterio dell’esperienza attraverso l’integrazione degli altri punti di vista grazie alle loro relazioni intersoggettive. Guadagnano, così, sfumature e obiettività. Tuttavia, non possono mai realizzare la razionalità completa se per razionalità s’intende il pensiero completamente oggettivo, universale, imparziale, che guarda il mondo da nessun luogo. E la re-istituzione potrebbe creare una fessura decisiva nell’identità personale di un uomo, e rendere tale personalità complessa e “multipla,” anche se non necessariamente patologica. (shrink)

The lifeworld is, according to Husserl, the horizon of all our experiences, in the sense that it is the background environment of human being’s competences, practices, and attitudes. The lifeworld is the intersubjective, pre-given in the ontic sense, and immediately perceived world of everyday life. Although Husserl has distinguished the lifeworld from the objective world that natural science describes with mathematical methods, we cannot divide the world on the practical level into the perceived world of ordinary life and the scientific (...) world. The characteristic of human beings is that they live in the environment which they have enormously changed. Modern science has accelerated this tendency: the contemporary world is constructed so deeply scientifically and technologically. Accordingly, as Ulrich Beck pointed out, the risk of the technologically constructed world is often invisible/unperceivable. The disaster at Fukushima nuclear power plants is a terrible testament of this kind of risk. In order for a land to become the lifeworld of meaningful human interactions, the land should be first of all safe and livable for all of us. The risk calculation made by Tokyo Electric Power Company was shown to be sloppy and deceptive. The contemporary techno-science should be democratically governed and watched by all kinds of stakeholders, and never be left it to the specialists of science. For re-establishing the livable and sustainable lifeworld, safety, resilience, and vulnerability should be the fundamental values. And, the autonomy of the local residents, including the most vulnerable people, through the democratization of the techno-science must be the fundamental value to establish and protect such a safe environment. (shrink)

ObjectiveNoisy galvanic vestibular stimulation (nGVS) is often used to improve postural stability in disorders, such as neurorehabilitation montage. For the safe use of nGVS, we investigated whether arterial pressure (AP) and heart rate vary during static supine and slow whole-body tilt with random nGVS (0.4 mA, 0.1–640 Hz, gaussian distribution) in a healthy elderly population.MethodsThis study was conducted with a double-blind, sham-controlled, cross-over design. Seventeen healthy older adults were recruited. They were asked to maintain a static supine position on a (...) bed for 10 min, and the bed was tilted up (TU) to 70 degrees within 30 s. After maintaining this position for 3 min, the bed was passively tilted down (TD) within 30 s. Real-nGVS or sham-nGVS was applied from 4 to 15 min. The time course of mean arterial pressure (MAP) and RR interval variability (RRIV) were analyzed to estimate the autonomic nervous activity.ResultnGVS and/or time, including pre-/post-event (nGVS-start, TU, and TD), had no impact on MAP and RRIV-related parameters. Further, there was no evidence supporting the argument that nGVS induces pain, vertigo/dizziness, and uncomfortable feeling.ConclusionnGVS may not affect the AP and RRIV during static position and whole-body tilting or cause pain, vertigo/dizziness, and discomfort in the elderly. (shrink)

This survey on biotechnology and bioethics was carried out on national random samples of the public and scientists in November 2000-January 2000 throughout Japan, and attendees at the Novartis Life Science Forum held on 29 September, 1999 in Tokyo. The sample size was 297, 370, and 74 respectively. While there is better awareness of GMOs in 2000 compared to 1991; the trend shows an increase in the perceived risks of GMOs followed by growing resistance in Japan. While a majority of (...) persons believed genetic engineering would make life better over the next twenty years, the proportion of respondents who thought genetic engineering would make life worse over the next twenty years doubled from 1997 to 2000. Respondents were asked whether they had heard about applications in several areas and the order of familiarity was: pest-resistant crops, human genes in bacteria, mouse to develop cancer, food and drinks, pigs with human hearts and pre-implantation diagnosis. A divide of opinion can be seen when the results on benefit, risk and moral acceptability of applications of biotechnology by the public are compared to the forum and scientist samples.A significant change in the acceptance of the public occurred in 2000 where only 22% agreed on the moral acceptability of GM food compared to 41% in 1997. In 2000 fewer people said they are willing to buy genetically modified fruits that taste better compared to 1997. The results show less public support for use of gene therapy than 1993 and twice as many scientists rejected gene therapy than they did in 1991.When asked whom is best placed to regulate modern biotechnology, the respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of international regulatory bodies, such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization, rather than national bodies. The comparison between scientists and public is interesting, however the more enthusastic sample were participants from the Novartis Life Science Forum with its mixed occupations. (shrink)