This essay presents a careful interpretation of Adorno’s classical text The Essay as Form, published in 1958 as the introduction to his Notes on Literature. Since it thickly condenses many of Adorno’s general views, the Essay poses great hermeneutic challenges to readers. The paper, first, elaborates on the essay more broadly as a genre and identifies a spectrum between science and art each individual essay draws from to forge its particular hybridity. Second, the example is discussed as an epistemologically potent (...) trope oscillating between subsumption and singularity. This internal tension renders the example particularly qualified to serve as the conceptual basis on which interpretative themes in the essay can be discovered. Three lines of interpretation are suggested: poetological for the essay/ Essay’s definition, goal, and method; critical/dialectical for its treatment of concepts and in relation to content; and epistemic for the modern separation of art and science. The conclusion comes back to the issue of exemplarity. (shrink)

Why does the language of art commentary often seem so theoretically sophisticated while jargonistically empty? Introducing the puzzle of a computer generated artistic biography, this essay uses the sociological aesthetics of German theorist Arnold Gehlen to answer this question and account for the ‘algorithmic example.’ Since art commentary deals with the translation of images into words, the first section discusses the tradition of ekphrasis and isolates three developments – professionalization, marketization, abstraction – in its conditions of production. Emphasizing the ‘crisis (...) of ekphrasis,’ set off by non-representational art, the essay continues with its key witness Arnold Gehlen. Adumbrating his approach of ‘philosophical anthropology,’ the article connects (t)his wider circle of thought to his aesthetic theory with the idea of modern and contemporary art’s “Kommentarbedürftigkeit” (need of commentary) in the center. The conclusion uses this concept, combines it with a linguistic argument concerning International Art English, and thus offers a critical explanation for and a pessimistic diagnosis of the language of art commentary today. (shrink)

The present essay discusses a notorious rhetoric means familiar to all scholars in the social sciences and humanities including philosophy: name-dropping. Defined as the excessive over-use of authoritative names, I argue that it is a pernicious practice leading to collective disorientation in spoken discourse. First, I discuss name-dropping in terms of informal logic as an ad verecundiam-type fallacy. Insofar this perspective proves to lack contextual sensitivity, name-dropping is portrayed in Goffman’s terms as a more general social practice. By narrowing down (...) the focus to social science and the humanities, the essay emphasizes its function of discursive legitimation. This view, I argue, is incomplete because it overlooks the basic mechanism beneath. Names not only provide legitimation of but also orientation in discourse. Consequently, two tipping points—detour and disorientation—are proposed as benchmarks for it to become problematic. The conclusion re-widens the argument’s scope by suggesting questions for future inquiries. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2013 Heft: 1 Seiten: 71-106.