Abstract:In this paper I will explore the contribution of philosophical anthropology to music education research which, over recent years, has been showing an increasing interest in the human body. In order to do this I will especially be drawing on the ideas of one of its pioneers, Helmuth Plessner. Plessner’s philosophy should be understood as an effort to overcome the Cartesian dualism ‘mind/body’ and to highlight the unity of a human being and her/his relation to her/his environment. With his central (...) theory of “eccentric positionality,” Plessner draws on a human’s relation to her/his body because a human is able to acknowledge that “I am body” and “I have body” while at the same time being able to realize her/his own situation and reflect upon it. Plessner grounds his thinking about music on his phenomenological observation about sound. He remarks that sound, which can be at the same time far and near, has voluminosity, impulsivity, an undeviating relation to human expressivity, is organized in vertical and horizontal arrangement, and tends towards sequentially. Because of all this, sound is compliant with a human body. His philosophy and especially his writings about music and sound could be fruitful for music educational theory and praxis. Some crucial aspects of his theory are embodiment in music, the relation between the meaning of music and body movements, the relation between the conduct of music and conduct of a human and the formation of culture as an open process. In this theoretical terrain concrete proposals and more general suggestions for an efficient and successful music education practice can be located. (shrink)

Marx avoided elaborating an ethical theory and criticized utopian socialism. Although Marx’s attitude towards these two issues is discussed separately in the literature, we will argue that they stem from the same ground in Marx. It is Marx’s devotion to scientific socialism that grounds his criticisms. We will first discuss the opposition between utopian and scientific socialism as Marx understood it. After elaborating some Marxist approaches in this debate, we will argue that any attempt at reconciling Marxism with ethics must (...) be utopian in nature. Finally, we will give some Nietzschean arguments for explaining why a conception of utopia is indispensable for developing a Marxist theory of ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a thesis in philosophical anthropology that aims to explain the relevance of emotions in ethical discourse. I introduce the concept of Gönül which, in Turkish language, stands primarily for the faculty of love and, generally, for that of emotions. In my analysis, I rely on the etymological connections between certain concepts in Turkish so as to understand the relevance of love in particular and emotions in general for ethical discourse. I argue that it is not (...) the faculty of mind but that of Gönül which distinguishes humans from animals. Based on the distinction between “to understand” and “to know” in Turkish and their etymological relations with other concepts, I argue that understanding pertains to subjects, while knowledge pertains to objects. In other words, I claim that although we can understand subjects, we cannot know them, and that although we can know objects, we cannot understand them. Furthermore, given the familiar distinction between mechanical causation and teleological causation, I propose that “to know” is “to know how something works in terms of mechanical reasons” and that “to understand” is “to understand why someone acts in terms of teleological reasons.” Accordingly, based on the distinction between knowledge and understanding, the distinction between mind and Gönül can be rephrased: through mind we know how an object works based on mechanical reasons and through Gönül we understand why a subject acts based on teleological reasons. This means that we can understand a subject’s reasons for action only if we can sympathise with her emotions. I conclude that the realm of ethical discourse involves understanding through emotions, which is the task of the capacity of Gönül. In this sense, Gönül is a higher capacity than mind, for it presupposes the knowledge of objects but also requires understanding through emotions. (shrink)

L’industrie de la culture qui est apparue en parallèle avec l’affaiblissement du dipôle travail social – art contemporain, a en même temps affaibli la possibilité des avant‐gardes de constituer une activité purement intellectuelle et artistique. C’est clair que l’apparition de cette culture de masse vient se lier avec l’évincement de l’art moderne authentique et la disparition quasi-totale de la culture populaire. Je pense que c’est indispensable de mentionner les points de vue des philosophes allemands, Theodor Adorno et Walter Benjamin car (...) je considère que malgré leurs limites historiques, ils exercent une influence déterminante sur la pensée contemporaine qui se relate à l’art dans le cadre de la société moderne postindustrielle. (shrink)