Our romantic lives are influenced, to a large extent, by our perceptions of physical attractiveness – and the societal beauty standards that shape them. But what if we could free our desires from this fixation on looks? Science fiction writer Ted Chiang has explored this possibility in a fascinating short story – and scientific developments might, in the future, move it beyond the realm of fiction. In this paper, I lay out the prudential case for using “attraction-expanding technology,” and then (...) consider it from a moral point of view. Using the technology would, in one respect, be morally good: it would benefit those whom prevailing beauty standards marginalize. But attraction-expanding technology also raises a moral concern – one that can be cast in non-harm-based and harm-based terms. I argue that the non-harm-based objection should be rejected, because it is incompatible with a moral principle central to queer rights. And the harm-based objection, I argue, is outweighed by the benefits of attraction-expanding technology, and undermined by the prerogative you have over your personal romantic choices. I conclude by considering whether, from the perspective of society, the development of attraction-expanding technology would be desirable. (shrink)

In fascinating recent work, some philosophers have argued that it would be morally permissible and prudentially rational to sign up for cryonics—if you can afford the price tag of the procedure. In this paper I ask: why not share the elixir of extended life with everyone? Should governments financially support, positively encourage, or even require people to undergo cryonics? From a general principle of beneficence, I construct a formal argument for cryonics promotion policies. I consider the objection that a subset (...) of these policies would violate autonomy, but I argue that—to the contrary—considerations of autonomy weigh in their favour. I then consider objections based on cost and population, but argue that neither is fatal. Finally, I raise the objection that I believe poses the most serious challenge: that those who revive the cryonically preserved might inflict suffering upon them. (shrink)

A philosophical argument for more TikTok dancing.

Athletes who flout doping bans are generally thought to have gained an unfair advantage. In this paper, I critically examine this view. I begin by defending an effort-based account of desert in sport, explaining why it is preferable to the hybrid account that is favoured in the literature. Drawing on the effort-based account, I construct the Unfair Advantage Argument formally, in what I take to be its most plausible form. I then argue that the Unfair Advantage Argument should be rejected, (...) for two main reasons. First, I challenge its assumption that dopers have put in less effort than their opponents. Second, I explain why, even if dopers have put in less effort, they have still exerted a sufficient amount. Though doping is problematic from an institutional perspective, it is not – from a pre-institutional perspective – cause for moral concern. (shrink)