Abstract.The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “legal norm” is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) (...) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “systemic legal validity” is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity. (shrink)

A fines de 2017, Gustavo Zagrebelky, lanza un ataque radicalmente duro a los derechos fundamentales y plantea la pregunta desorientadora: “si las injusticias y los males del mundo son una violación o una consecuencia de los derechos”. A partir de aquí y de su solicitación para “una jurisprudencia que [ponga] en relación las reivindicaciones de los derechos con el problema de la justicia”, este trabajo se enfoca en las dificultades específicas que hoy condicionan la conjugación de derecho y justicia dentro (...) de las coordenadas de los principios del constitucionalismo nacional y, en particular, de su principio fundante de la tutela y implementación de los derechos fundamentales. En particular, para aclarar y justificar la respuesta que se dará en conclusión a la “pregunta desorientadora” de Zagrebelsky, primero se especificará en que sentido es plausible afirmar que el proyecto político y jurídico del constitucionalismo nacional identifica los términos para una conjugación inédita de justicia y derecho, y luego se dirigirá la atención a las dificultades con las cuales la jurisdicción nacional se enfrenta cuando quiere atenerse al principio fundante del constitucionalismo nacional de la tutela y implementación de los derechos fundamentales. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to supply a contribution to the semantics of “constitutive,” as confined to the scope of judicial reasoning. More precisely, the aim of the paper is to inquire what links the use of “constitutive” in three distinct (seemingly unrelated) issues on adjudication, namely: (a) the procedural classification of different sorts of judicial decisions, (b) the epistemological debate on the very nature of judicial decisions, and (c) a logical query on the import constitutive rules might be (...) taken to have in affecting the sort and/or the nature of judicial decisions in which they might occur as the legal premiss, grounding the solution of the case. The attempt to fix some markers towards the semantics of “constitutive” in judicial reasoning will have Alchourrón and Bulygin's analyses as a main point of reference. (shrink)