This title examines the fields of value theory, normative and applied ethics on the issue of killing animals. It addresses a number of questions: Can painless killing harm or benefit an animal and, if so, why and under what conditions? Can coming into existence harm or benefit an animal? Is killing animals morally acceptable? Should animals have the legal right to life? In addressing these questions, animal rights and animal welfare positions are articulated and debated by some of the foremost (...) thinkers on these issues, with a distinction made between rights-based and utilitarian approaches. (shrink)

To systematically compare welfare across species, it is first necessary to explore whether welfare subjects of different species have the same or rather a different capacity for welfare. According to what seems to be the dominant philosophical view, welfare subjects with higher cognitive capacities have a greater capacity for welfare and are generally much better off than those with lower cognitive capacities. Višak carefully explores and rejects this view and argues instead that welfare subjects of different species have the same (...) capacity for welfare despite different cognitive capacities. This book prepares the philosophical ground for comparisons of welfare across species. It will inform and inspire ethicists and animal welfare scientists alike, as well as a broader readership interested in wellbeing, animals, and ethics. (shrink)

The many well-publicized food scandals in recent years have resulted in a general state of vulnerable trust. As a result, building consumer trust has become an important goal in agri-food policy. In their efforts to protect trust in the agricultural and food sector, governments and industries have tended to consider the problem of trust as merely a matter of informing consumers on risks. In this article, we argue that the food sector better addresses the problem of trust from the perspective (...) of the trustworthiness of the food sector itself. This broad idea for changing the focus of trust is the assumption that if you want to be trusted, you should be trustworthy. To provide a clear understanding of what being trustworthy means within the food sector, we elaborate on both the concept of trust and of responsibility. In this way we show that policy focused on enhancing transparency and providing information to consumers is crucial, but not sufficient for dealing with the problem of consumer trust in the current agri-food context. (shrink)

Vanessa Carbonell argues that sacrifices of self, unlike most other sacrifices, cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. For this reason, Carbonell considers sacrifices of self as posing a problem for the wellbeing theory of sacrifice and for discussions about the demandingness of morality. In this paper I take issue with Carbonell’s claim that sacrifices of self cannot be captured as prudential harms. First, I explain why Carbonell considers sacrifices of self particularly problematic. In order to determine whether some (...) state of affairs is harmful for someone, it is necessary to assume a particular account of welfare. In this paper, I assume the self-fulfillment account of welfare. I introduce this theory and show that it can account for the harm of sacrifices of self. (shrink)

Driven by concern about the suffering of animals in nature, Christopher Belshaw argued that if we were exclusively concerned with these animals’ good, we should reduce the number of free-living animals. We should prevent free-living animals from coming into existence and, if this is not possible, we should painlessly end their lives as soon as we can. This holds, according to Belshaw, even if the future lives of these animals would contain much more enjoyment than suffering. Belshaw’s argument rests on (...) two premises. First, he assumes that death does not harm an animal in a way that matters. Second, he takes it that most free-living animals lead a life of uncompensated suffering because the enjoyments in an animal’s life, even if more predominant, cannot outweigh the animal’s suffering. Therefore, since uncompensated suffering exists in about every animal’s life and matters morally and killing the animal does not harm the animal in a way that matters, killing the animal is an appropriate intervention with the aim of preventing its suffering. This article criticizes both assumptions of Belshaw’s argument and shows that his conclusion is insufficiently supported. (shrink)

As a member of the British Oxford Group, psychologist Richard Ryder marked the beginning of the modern animal rights and animal welfare movement in the seventies. By introducing the concept “speciesism.” Ryder contributed importantly to the expansion of this movement. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Ryder’s moral theory, “painism”, that aims to resolve the conflict between the two predominant rival theories in animal ethics, the deontological of Tom Regan and the utilitarian of Peter Singer. First, this paper examines (...) the kernel and historical sources of Ryder’s painist theory, linking it to the work of John Rawls and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, it examines Ryder’s critique of utilitarianism. It is argued that his critique of Singer’s use of the word “sentience” is unconvincing and that his critique of utilitarian aggregation as not taking a full account of the metaphysical separateness of persons, has already been countered and dealt with. Finally this paper looks at some of the counterintuitive implications of Ryder’s theory and argues that utilitarianism might have more resources for dealing with its own alleged counterintuitive implications than Ryder acknowledges. (shrink)

Das in der Tierethik sehr prominente Argument der Grenzfälle beruht auf dem in der Ethik recht allgemeinen Problem der Grenzfälle. In der Ethik wird häufig argumentiert, dass Menschen aufgrund bestimmter Eigenschaften moralisch zu berücksichtigen seien. Immanuel Kant beispielsweise wird im Allgemeinen so verstanden, dass er die Moralfähigkeit für die relevante Eigenschaft hält, aufgrund derer Menschen eine Würde und damit moralischer Stellenwert zukommt. Nun geht es in solchen Argumenten zur Begründung des moralischen Stellenwerts von Menschen allerdings oft um Eigenschaften, die nicht (...) alle Menschen haben. Es gibt zum Beispiel Menschen, die nicht moralfähig sind, weil sie dafür noch zu jung sind, oder weil ihnen aufgrund von schweren kognitiven Behinderungen die dafür notwendigen Fähigkeiten fehlen. Das Problem der Grenzfälle bezieht sich auf die Herausforderung, vor der viele Theorien stehen, nämlich aufzuzeigen ob und, wenn ja, aufgrund wovon auch solchen Menschen, welche die genannten Eigenschaften nicht haben, ein moralischer Stellenwert zukommt. (shrink)

In his paper “Eating Animals the Nice Way” McMahan : 66–76, 2008) explores whether there are ways of routinely using non-human animals for human consumption that are morally acceptable. He dismisses a practice of benign animal husbandry, in which animals are killed prematurely and believes that a practice in which animals were engineered to drop down dead instantaneously at the same age would be equally wrong, even though it would not involve killing. Yet, McMahan considers his intuition that both practices (...) are equally wrong with regard to our duties towards the involved animals hard to justify. This paper explains in more detail why this commonsensical intuition is indeed hard to justify and explores what it would take to justify it. It takes nothing less than a yet-to-be-specified plausible theory in population ethics and an account of welfare that deals in a plausible way with non-identity cases involving species- or breed-related differences in life expectancy. (shrink)

Im FolgendenKonsumvon Tieren soll das Nutzen von nicht-menschlichen Tieren sowie deren Produkte, Körperteile und Fähigkeiten durch uns Menschen zwecks Nahrungsmittel und Konsumgut aus ethischer Perspektive betrachtet werden. Die Ethik kann in drei Bereiche eingeteilt werden wovon zwei für das vorliegende Thema wichtig sind. Erstens kann mithilfe der Werttheorie gefragt werden, wie es bei der Nutzung um das tierische Wohlergehen gestellt ist. Zweitens kann im Rahmen der Frage nach normativen Handlungsgründen untersucht werden ob es gerechtfertigt ist Tiere zu nutzen. Im Folgenden (...) sollen gängige Positionen zu beiden Fragen angerissen werden. (Die Metaethik, als dritter Bereich der Ethik, soll hier außen vor bleiben.). (shrink)

Jedes Jahr werden weltweit mehr als 65 Milliarden Landtiere für den menschlichen Verzehr getötet. Für einen durchschnittlichen amerikanischen Fleischkonsumenten sind das jährlich etwa 25 Landtiere, vor allem Hühner. Hinzu kommen etwa 12 Fische und 137 andere Meerestiere. Nicht nur für Fleisch werden Tiere getötet. Auch die Milch- und Eierproduktion geht mit dem Töten von Tieren einher. So werden zum Melken verwendete Kühe meist nach wenigen Lebensjahren wegen abnehmender Produktivität getötet, und deren männliche Kälber enden direkt in der Fleischindustrie. Ohne jährlich (...) geschwängert zu werden, geben die Kühe nämlich keine Milch, und die Hälfte der Kälber ist männlich und daher zur Milchproduktion ungeeignet. Auch die männlichen Küken der Legehennen werden direkt geschreddert oder vergast, da sie keine Eier legen und sich für die Fleischproduktion nicht eignen. Auch in anderen Kontexten töten Menschen Tiere, sowohl direkt – z. B. im Rahmen von Tierversuchen oder Automobilität – als auch indirekt, z. B. durch Umweltverschmutzung, den Klimawandel und die Vernichtung von natürlichen Lebensräumen. Unsere Essgewohnheiten gehen einher mit massiven, routinemäßigen und intentionalen Tötungen. Da es sich bei der Ernährung mit tierlichen Produkten meist nicht um eine Notwendigkeit handelt, sondern vielmehr Gewohnheit und geschmackliche Vorzüge eine Rolle spielen, und da den betroffenen Tieren im Allgemeinen ein moralischer Stellenwert zugesprochen wird, drängt sich die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung dieses Tötungszwecks auf. (shrink)