The present study takes Confucian entrepreneurs as an entry point to portray the dynamics and problems involved in the process of putting moral precepts into practice, a central issue in business ethics. Confucian entrepreneurs are defined as the owners of manufacturing or business firms who harbor the moral values of Confucianism. Other than a brief account of their historical background, 41 subjects from various parts of Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were selected for in-depth interviews. By (...) studying the moral choices they made in the market, it was discovered that, contrary to the prevalent mode of inquiry in economics either to reduce all social phenomena to rational calculations or to consider moral actions in terms of utilitarian values, their economic action cannot be accounted for by the postulate of utility maximization, and that the efforts to do business according to their moral principles can be very costly. The study also attempts to document how these Confucian entrepreneurs reconciled the conflict between the moral values they cherished and the instrumental goals they pursued, and will seek to uncover how they responded when faced with this dilemma. (shrink)

In Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick presents what he calls ‘the model of possible worlds’ (307) to examine the formal properties of utopia, defined as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (298). The basic idea is that each person is given the power to create any possible world and its inhabitants by imagining them. Two definitions of stability have been proposed: (a) the non-circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if (...) nobody can imagine a better world and (b) the circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world that is also stable. In this paper, we prove four theorems (namely, the indeterminacy theorem, the stable dystopia theorem, the nobody’s utopia theorem and the redundancy theorem) that provide us with decisive reasons to reject the circular definition and opt for the non-circular definition of stability to analyse Nozick’s theory of utopia. (shrink)

I CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES ii Introductory Remarks The value of linguistics as a cognitive science lies largely in its potential for providing insights ...

The implications of the repugnant conclusion for consequentialist theories, such as total utilitarianism, have been extensively discussed since the work of Derek Parfit. These discussions make the paradoxes of population ethics depend on welfarist conditions, like the dominance condition (or the Pareto Principle). Thus, one might think that the repugnant conclusion is not a practical problem for deontologists, who deny that we always ought to do what produces the most aggregate welfare. In this study, we offer two impossibility results using (...) what we call the limit aggregation property. This states that when welfaristic and non-welfaristic considerations conflict, there is a threshold number of persons such that the former can override the latter as long as more people than the threshold number can enjoy increases in well-being levels. We argue that this property should be accepted even by deontologists, insofar as they do not commit themselves to the implausible absolutist position that fails to assign any moral weight to aggregate welfare. Our results therefore state that any normative population theory that is not absolutist entails (a variant of) the repugnant conclusion or some other implausible conclusion. Therefore, the repugnant conclusion must be taken seriously even by non-absolutist deontologists, not just consequentialists. (shrink)

L’imposition est l’un des principaux sujets de la théorie de la propriété des droits, mais il a pourtant été assez négligé jusque récemment. La communauté académique des philosophes avance de nos jours des arguments pour discuter avec ardeur des types d’imposition qui sont légitimes, s’il en est, et l’on doit beaucoup en ce domaine à l’ouvrage de Liam Murphy et Thomas Nagel The Myth of Ownership. Dans leur ouvrage polémique, les auteurs soutiennent qu’il n’existe pas de droit légitime permettant d’imposer (...) par préemption ni la propriété ni les droits naturels à la propriété et que le processus d’imposition n’empiète certes jamais sur les droits de propriété, qui sont le fruit d’une institution par décret gouvernemental. Murphy et Nagel prennent pour cible principale Richard Epstein qui prône une vue libertarienne ou « libérale classique » contraire à ce propos. Epstein compare l’imposition à une expropriation publique et argumente en faveur de l’impôt sur le revenu. Nous discutons ici la thèse d’Epstein sur la propriété privée, avec laquelle nous nous trouvons en accord quoique moyennant des nuances notables. Nous examinons la théorie étatiste de la propriété de Murphy et Nagel et nous soutenons que leur égalitarisme est surtout le fait d’un présupposé. Nous concluons que l’impôt sur la propriété foncière est la forme d’imposition la plus apte à être légitimée à partir de la perspective libertarienne sur les droits naturels, plus en tous cas que l’impôt sur le revenu et que la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, formes d’impôt qui sont les plus habituelles. Surtout, nous soutenons qu’il y a là une forme d’imposition que la Constitution du Japon autorise. (shrink)

慶応義塾大学法学部のゼミナール「伊東乾民事訴訟法研究会」の卒業生の会「乾会」による論文集。今回はテーマを民事訴訟法に限ることなく、現在関心を持っている法律分野について執筆した。.

The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study found that even though children from all East Asian countries outperformed American children, American students reported higher self-evaluation of their math and science abilities than did students from East Asian countries such as China, Korea, and Japan (Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez, & Chrostowski, 2004). Such cross-cultural differences in self-appraisal fit the stereotype of the modest East Asian and contribute to the received view that East Asians have less positive self-concepts than Americans. This view (...) was summarized recently by Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) as follows: ‘‘The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture’’ (p. 766; but cf. Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 445-452, May 2022.

The present study takes Confucian entrepreneurs as an entry point to portray the dynamics and problems involved in the process of putting moral precepts into practice, a central issue in business ethics. Confucian entrepreneurs are defined as the owners of manufacturing or business firms who harbor the moral values of Confucianism. Other than a brief account of their historical background, 41 subjects from various parts of Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were selected for in-depth interviews. By (...) studying the moral choices they made in the market, it was discovered that, contrary to the prevalent mode of inquiry in economics either to reduce all social phenomena to rational calculations or to consider moral actions in terms of utilitarian values, their economic action cannot be accounted for by the postulate of utility maximization, and that the efforts to do business according to their moral principles can be very costly. The study also attempts to document how these Confucian entrepreneurs reconciled the conflict between the moral values they cherished and the instrumental goals they pursued, and will seek to uncover how they responded when faced with this dilemma. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of ‘tsunami-tendenko,’ a guideline suggesting that individuals prioritise their own safety over aiding others during large-scale disasters. Kodama defends tsunami-tendenko against accusations of egoism by arguing that the principle can be justified ethically on consequentialist (or more precisely, utilitarian) grounds. Kodama asserts that attempting to assist others during such disasters heightens the risk of ‘tomo-daore,’ where both the rescuer and the victim may perish. He claims that having people focus solely on saving themselves can maximise (...) the overall number of lives saved. However, we challenge Kodama’s assertion that utilitarianism inherently favours tsunami-tendenko over mutual assistance during disasters. Instead, this paper proposes an alternative ethical foundation for tsunami-tendenko grounded in the ‘antiextinction principle,’ which prioritises minimising the potential for catastrophic outcomes. When considering the ethics of responding to disaster, it is important to distinguish between maximising the number of lives saved (utilitarianism) and minimising the risk of tomo-daore (antiextinction principle). This distinction may be overlooked if the distribution of probabilities is not considered. We conclude that the antiextinction principle aligns more naturally with tsunami-tendenko, emphasising the avoidance of catastrophic outcomes—a concern not always addressed by utilitarianism. Therefore, tsunami-tendenko should be regarded as a societal guideline aimed at preserving community sustainability by averting total destruction. (shrink)

Adults without the capacity to make their own medical decisions have their rights protected under the Mental Capacity Act in the UK. The underlying principle of the court's decisions is the best interests test, and the evaluation of best interests is a welfare appraisal. Although the House of Lords in the well-known case of Bland held that the decision to withhold treatment for patients in a persistent vegetative state should not be based on their best interests, judges in recent cases (...) have still held that the best interests of persistently vegetative patients demand that the right to die with dignity prevails over society's interest to preserve life. The basis of suggesting that it is in the best interests for one who is alive in peace to die in peace is weak. Even if it may not be in their best interests to live on, it may not be so to die either. The phrase ‘the right to dignity/to die with dignity’ has been misused as a trump card to justify the speculation that a vegetative patient would necessarily refuse to live on machines. Without disrespect to the court's decision, we argue that the use of the best interests test to authorise withdrawing/withholding treatment from persistently vegetative patients without an advance directive is problematic. We propose that the court could have reached the same decision by considering only the futility of treatment without working through the controversial best interests of the patient. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship among the weak Pareto principle, the strong Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness in the context of voting. First, it is shown that under a mild domain condition, if an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule (CCR) is complete and transitive, then the weak Pareto principle and the strong Pareto principle are equivalent. Next, it is shown that under another mild domain condition, if a neutral CCR is transitive, then the strong Pareto principle and positive responsiveness (...) are equivalent. By applying these results, we obtain a new characterization of the method of majority decision. (shrink)

This paper proposes a sufficientarian theory with an interval of sufficiency levels. I assume that there are upper and lower bounds of sufficiency and that all well-being levels in between can be considered sufficiency levels. This interval reflects the vagueness of the concept of sufficiency. According to the proposed principle, a distribution is morally better than another if and only if, for each threshold within the interval, the headcount of those below the threshold under the former distribution is smaller than (...) that under the latter distribution. This necessarily leads to incommensurability in moral relations. I argue that such incommensurability makes sufficientarian principles invulnerable to some fundamental objections. (shrink)

This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence is introduced to clarify an informational requirement of binary independence which is usually imposed in the Arrovian framework. We characterize the implication of binary independence.

仏教には本来、社会倫理的な実践が大きな要素として備わっていた。近代的な宗教観のもとで見落とされがちだった日本仏教の倫理性・社会性の側面が、現代社会の中で再び顕わになりつつある。本書は、「正法」理念に着 目しながら、日本仏教の実践思想の系譜を捉え直し、宗派主義の枠を超えた新しい日本仏教史像を描く試みである。.

本巻は、「他者」とされた異教・女性・被差別民の問題と、「境界」に位置した北海道・沖縄という異文化に焦点をあて、宗教との関価を論じる。.