Sebbene non abbiano commentato l'Etica a Nicomaco, sia Ockham sia Duns Scoto discussero argomenti di matrice aristotelica: scopo del saggio è la ricostruzione del concetto di «azione akratica» nel contesto della loro posizione volontaristica. Dopo una breve ricognizione terminologica, l'indagine è rivolta all'opera di Ockham , e si concentra su due punti principali: l'azione akratica come azione contraria alla retta ragione e l'interrogativo relativo alla presenza, nella volontà stessa, di qualcosa da cui scaturisca l'«azione akratica»; l'ultima parte dello studio prende (...) in esame la posizione di Scoto. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to AquinasTaina M. HolopainenM.V. Dougherty. Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. x + 226. Cloth, $90.00.In this book, M.V. Dougherty challenges the assumption that the medieval period of Western ethical thought has little to say concerning the question of moral dilemmas (while [End Page 138] understanding a moral dilemma generally as (...) “any situation in which an agent cannot fulfill all genuine impending moral obligations” [3]). He aims to show that this is not the case by examining debates on the subject of moral dilemma from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. According to medieval terminology, an agent in a moral dilemma is considered to be perplexed (perplexus) or to be suffering from perplexity (perplexitas). Dougherty emphasizes the importance to his study of the ontological and objective sense of perplexitas: an agent is said to be confused in the presence of a genuinely dilemmatic situation. The book deals with the topic through a selection of prominent thinkers from the major schools of the period (e.g. Franciscan, Dominican, and Thomistic).Canon law was the first discipline in which systematic discussion of moral dilemmas took place. Accordingly, in chapter 1 Dougherty discusses two opposing views from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that were equally authoritative and conveyed the canon law tradition to later medieval thinkers. Gratian asserts, in his Decretum, the existence of genuine moral dilemmas (through conflicts within natural law itself) and counsels agents in those situations to choose the lesser of two evils. Gratian’s views were commented on by many glossators who argued against him in the Glossa ordinaria, contending that moral agents can fulfill all moral obligations, as the well-known maxim “ought implies can” asserts, and so avoid moral wrongdoing. If an agent finds himself in a perplexed state, it is due to his own culpable negligence, never the result of the disordered moral order.In addition to canon law there were other forums for discussions of moral perplexitas. In chapter 2, Dougherty expands the theme to two influential thirteenth-century summaries of theology: the Summa aurea, authored by William of Auxerre, and the Summa Halesiana, associated with Alexander of Hales. In these, Dougherty thoroughly examines a number of dilemma cases and shows both works concluding that moral agents can find themselves trapped in such situations, with some degree of moral wrongdoing being inescapable. The maxim “ought but cannot” is evident, then, in these works. Further, their concrete advice for agents in a moral dilemma is to apply the principle of choosing the lesser evil, or, as William of Auxerre specifies in certain cases, “what obliges more greatly is to be done”; however, his connection between these two principles seems not so clear: why would the choice of that which obliges more be identified with the choice of a lesser evil?Chapter 3 is one of the book’s highlights. It presents the distinctive medieval moral dilemma position of Raymond Lull (ca. 1232–1316) through an analysis of four of Lull’s own dilemmas in his autobiographical work, Vita coaetanea. Dougherty argues that Lull is opposed to the traditional solution of medieval commentators on Lombard, since Lull did not claim that a judgment of conscience, which dictates something contrary to natural law or a command of God, had to be in error. Lull thinks that the world truly is such a place where agents find themselves in dilemmatic situations from which they are unable to escape by their own powers and therefore are in need of divine intervention (“the Divine Intervention resolution”). Dougherty also argues that Lull implicitly appeals to “the Lesser Evil resolution” in one dilemma case.In chapter 4, Dougherty considers passages from Aquinas’s texts in which agents appear to be perplexed. The aim is to confirm Alan Donagan’s interpretation of Aquinas and to reveal the misinterpretations by contemporary theorists who have claimed that Aquinas accepted the view that innocent agents could find themselves in situations of genuine moral dilemmas. According to Aquinas, all real moral dilemmas are generated by some prior moral failure (past misdeed) on... (shrink)