In this paper, I propose a possible reinterpretation of phenomenology using a newly defined concept of ‘mediation.’ First, I address the question: What are the ‘things themselves’ that are given as the result of the phenomenological epoché? I would answer that they are neither material objects nor merely subjective experiences, but rather specific occurrences of ‘mediations.’ Second, under the influence of the Japanese philosopher Hajime Tanabe, I will define ‘mediation’ as a non-separable occurrence of differentiating and connecting. Third, I shall (...) claim that the concept of ‘phenomenon’ itself should be reinterpreted in terms of its character of mediation. Then, I will discuss central issues in phenomenology such as intentionality, time, and intersubjectivity in order to test the applicability of the proposed concept of mediation. To conclude, I shall summarize the potential of the idea that phenomenology can be reinterpreted using the concept of mediation. (shrink)

Transcendental reflection does not simply withdraw from natural life and go somewhere else. On the contrary, it is a self-elucidation of natural life performed within this life itself. However, natural life has an inherent automatic system for concealing itself. Therefore, in order to make manifest the truly natural state of natural life, we need a deliberate method of outfoxing the natural attitude as it constantly tries to trick us. If so, the transcendental perspective is closely related to Husserl’s perplexing concept (...) of “primal I”. It expresses a primitive perspective of our experience that cannot be identified with the first-person perspective. Phenomenology is not merely an investigation of experience from the first-person point of view, but a philosophical thinking from a “zero person” perspective that makes it possible for us to understand the relativity of our own first-person experience, and how it is related to other first-person experiences and the third-person perspective. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction is often explained by a radicalchange of attitude. Such an explanation is useful but sometimes misleading. TheIdea of Phenomenology clearly shows that the original idea of the reduction wasachieved through a radicalized critique of evidence. Although Husserl’s appealto evidence has often been criticized as an unjustified limitation of philosophicalthinking, a close examination of Husserl’s lectures reveals that the very ‘limitation’ to the phenomenological evidence breaks our naturalinclination toward objective identities and liberates our thinking from (...) the naturalbut misleading division between ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence.’ Thus, thephenomenological reduction can be interpreted as a transition from the thinkingwithout regard to evidence to the philosophizing intrinsically mediatedby evidence, which can secure access for intuitive analysis to every conceivabletype of givenness insofar as it manifests itself. (shrink)