Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by (...) the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis. (shrink)

Praca poświęcona jest problematyce wartości ideowo-znaczeniowych i estetyczno-przestrzennych w procesie kształtowania architektury. Pole badawcze skoncentrowano na wybranych dziełach Adama Lisika związanych z architekturą sakralną. Praca ma charakter rozważań natury teologiczno-estetycznej, stanowi _resumé _i wyraz głębokiego szacunku dla wieloletniego, bogatego dorobku twórczego Adama Lisika oraz swoistego rodzaju przekaz dla architektów poszukujących własnych ścieżek wiodących do rozwiązywania problemów związanych z kształtowaniem warstwy znaczeniowej przestrzeni architektury sakralnej. Intencją autora niniejszej wypowiedzi jest także zwrócenie uwagi na powiązania architektury z człowiekiem w subtelnej materii jego (...) odczuć i refleksji. Wszak człowiek to nie tylko zbiór atomów i związków chemicznych, to również obdarzona psychiką, poszukująca transcendentalnych wartości swego życia istota duchowa. Ze względu na objętość praca została podzielona na dwie części. Część I zawiera wprowadzenie, opis metody badań, tezę, stan badań oraz opis jednego z przykładów obiektów architektury sakralnej Adama Lisika stanowiący zapowiedź do dalszych rozważań, zamieszczonych w części II pracy, w której zawarto także podsumowanie przeprowadzonych rozważań, wnioski oraz bibliografię. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

This is a new edition of the manual published in 1974 and 1984. Compared with those earlier editions it is revised, enlarged and more precise in its argumentation. In its beginnings the manual aimed at meeting the didactic needs to present students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the ATK a complete handling of Christian ethics. The author, who wrote his manual in difficult times of communist ideology, decided to include in one work, besides a positive exposition of Christian (...) ethics, a critical discussion with other ethical systems as well as his own explicit theory on Augustinian and Thomistic ethics, which he endeavoured to develop. Thus the work interlocked the didactic objectives and the process of growth and justification of the Author's views, Krakow 2001, p. 308). (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

Artykuł omawia postać Jerzego Grobickiego, który służył jako oficer armii cesarsko-królewskiej i został pułkownikiem Wojska Polskiego w II RP. Brał udział w I i II wojnie światowej, a po wojnie wyemigrował do Kanady.

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

L’autodeterminazione è una categoria fondamentale nella visione personalistica di K. Wojtyła. Essa è una relazione entro la volontà. Una relazione di cui si potrebbe dire: la volontà si rivela come proprietà della persona e la persona come realtà che, riguardo al suo dinamismo, è constituita propriamente dalla volontà. L’autodeterminazione non è un atto chiuso entro se stesso, preché essenziale è il momento della verità e nella verità.

This paper criticizes non-constructive uses of set theory in formal economics. The main focus is on results on preference aggregation and Arrow’s theorem for infinite electorates, but the present analysis would apply as well, e.g., to analogous results in intergenerational social choice. To separate justified and unjustified uses of infinite populations in social choice, I suggest a principle which may be called the Hildenbrand criterion and argue that results based on unrestricted axiom of choice do not meet this criterion. The (...) technically novel part of this paper is a proposal to use a set-theoretic principle known as the axiom of determinacy ), not as a replacement for Choice, but simply to eliminate applications of set theory violating the Hildenbrand criterion. A particularly appealing aspect of \ from the point of view of the research area in question is its game-theoretic character. (shrink)

The author of the article argues against some of Stanisław Pyszka's views presented in the article Ewolucja katolickiej nauki społecznej [Evolution of the Catholic social teaching], published in: „Forum Philosophicum", 8: 2003. T. Ślipko reproaches S. Pyszka for considering the views on social problems expressed in the encyclical letter „Kerum novarum" „dogmatic", as influenced in part by the Thomistic philosophy. Pyszka opposes them to a pastoral perspective of the encyclical letters written by Pope John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul (...) II. Ślipko states that Catholic social teaching develops, taking into consideration historical circumstances in which human social groups are placed, but the moral principles are unchanged. (shrink)

Father Marian Morawski was born on the fifteenth of August 1845 in Gräfenberg. He joined the order of the Jesuits in 1863 in Stara Wieś. He began his philosophical studies there in 1866, which he finished in Cracow in 1868. Next he studied theology there during the years 1868-1872. In 1870 he was ordained in Śrem. So educated, he lectured philosophy to young Jesuits at Stara Wieś College. It was at that time, that he prepared and published the work by (...) the titile: Filozofia i jej zadanie [Philosophy and its task]. When, at the request of the editor Edward Podolski, the Jesuits took over the periodical "Przegląd Lwowski" and from 1884 began to publish it by the new title of "Przegląd Powszechny", Morawski became its first editor and published many of his own articles in it concerning science and religion. In this way he created a new breed of theological literature, known as „world-view literature". As a typical example, Wieczory nad Lemanem [Evenings on Leman] as well as the thesis Celowość w przyrodzie. Studium przyrodniczo-filozoficzne [Finality in the nature. A natural-philosophical study] were published multiple times and in many languages. From 1887 to 1899 Morawski was a professor at the Jagiellonian University, and during the years 1894-1895 he was the Dean of the Theology Department. He died in Cracow on the sixth of May 1901. (shrink)

The paper presents a brief outline of Michał Heller’s programme of theology of science, with specific attention to its collocation and critical role with respect to both theology and science. The former consideration is based on a third domain of truths (Hans Urs von Balthasar), while the latter is inspired by Józef Tischner’s presentation of religious thinking. Theology of science as such will be described with reference to Larry Laudan’s approach, considered here as a very useful and pragmatic tool for (...) the description of basic concepts of this theology. (shrink)

A set-theoretical proof of Gowers’ Dichotomy Theorem is presented together with its application to another dichotomy concerning asymptotic l 2 basic sequences.