Sankaran examines the cultural and social matrix in which Carnatic music was cultivated and consumed in mid-twentieth century India, including the ways that musicians negotiated caste politics and the double standard for male and female musicians. Sankaran's memoir is interwoven with passages from Daniel M. Neuman's work on music in North India, which inspired Sankaran's project, and interviews with Sankaran by Matthew Allen.

“Structural Injustice” refers to injustices that can't be attributed to particular actions by bad actors. This article surveys Iris Marion Young's influential account of structural injustice; lays out some considerations related to the concept's use as an analytical tool; and critically surveys Young's account of individual responsibility for structural injustice.

I argue that contemporary accounts of ideology critique—paradigmatically those advanced by Haslanger, Jaeggi, Celikates, and Stanley—are either inadequate or redundant. The Marxian concept of ideology—a collective epistemic distortion or irrationality that helps maintain bad social arrangements—has recently returned to the forefront of debates in contemporary analytic social philosophy. Ideology critique has similarly emerged as a technique for combating such social ills by remedying those collective epistemic distortions. Ideologies are sets of social meanings or shared understandings. I argue in this paper (...) that because agents must coordinate on them to be mutually intelligible, ideologies, on the fashionable contemporary account, are conventions. They are equilibrium solutions to a particular kind of social coordination problem. The worry is that changing pernicious conventions requires more than the epistemic remedy contemporary critical social theorists prescribe. It also requires overcoming strategic impediments like high first-mover costs. Thus contemporary proponents of ideology critique—the “new ideology critics,” as I’ll call them—face a dilemma. Either their account of social change fails to account for important strategic impediments to social change, in which case it is inadequate, or it incorporates a theory of strategic behavior, and thus merely reinvents the wheel, poorly. It adds nothing to prominent convention-based accounts of social change in the social sciences. More generally, this is an example of a pernicious trend in contemporary critical social theory. Contemporary critical social theorists have abandoned their predecessors’ commitment to engaging with social science, thereby undermining their efforts. (shrink)

The article seeks to answer the question: Why should I be ethical? For an answer, it examines Mahabharata, the ancient Indian epic. It seeks to explore the complex ethical issues posed by Mahabharata, how they are relevant to us as individuals and to us as managers and teachers of management in business schools and enables us to understand how possibly we could use the insights to better our lives and of those around us. Mahabharata’s central message, concludes the article, is (...) that ethics is not for convincing anyone; it is about convincing oneself. Mahabharata tells us that ethics is what makes life meaningful, at the individual level, group level and at the level of society, and cannot be justified in a consequentialist framework. (shrink)

The Feferman–Vaught theorem provides a way of evaluating a first order sentence \(\varphi \) on a disjoint union of structures by producing a decomposition of \(\varphi \) into sentences which can be evaluated on the individual structures and the results of these evaluations combined using a propositional formula. This decomposition can in general be non-elementarily larger than \(\varphi \). We introduce a “tree” generalization of the prenex normal form (PNF) for first order sentences, and show that for an input sentence (...) in this form having a fixed number of quantifier alternations, a Feferman–Vaught decomposition can be obtained in time elementary in the size of the sentence. The sentences in the decomposition are also in tree PNF, and further have the same number of quantifier alternations and the same quantifier rank as the input sentence. We extend this result by considering binary operations other than disjoint union, in particular sum-like operations such as join, ordered sum and NLC-sum, that are definable using quantifier-free translation schemes. (shrink)

The historiography of immunology since 1999 is reviewed, in part as a response to claims by historians such as Thomas Söderqvist the field was still immature at the time. First addressed are the difficulties, past and present, surrounding the disciplinary definition of immunology, which is followed by a commentary on the recent scholarship devoted to the concept of the immune self. The new literature on broad immunological topics is examined and assessed, and specific charges leveled against the paucity of certain (...) types of histories, e.g. biographical and institutional histories, are evaluated. In conclusion, there are compelling indications that the history of immunology has moved past the initial tentative stages identified in the earlier reviews to become a bustling, pluripotent discipline, much like the subject of its scrutiny, and that it continues to develop in many new and exciting directions. (shrink)

This paper examines the vital role played by electron microscopy toward the modern definition of viruses, as formulated in the late 1950s. Before the 1930s viruses could neither be visualized by available technologies nor grown in artificial media. As such they were usually identified by their ability to cause diseases in their hosts and defined in such negative terms as “ultramicroscopic” or invisible infectious agents that could not be cultivated outside living cells. The invention of the electron microscope, with magnification (...) and resolution powers several orders of magnitude better than that of optical instruments, opened up possibilities for biological applications. The hitherto invisible viruses lent themselves especially well to investigation with this new instrument. We first offer a historical consideration of the development of the instrument and, more significantly, advances in techniques for preparing and observing specimens that turned the electron microscope into a routine biological tool. We then describe the ways in which the electron microscopic images, or micrographs, functioned as forms of new knowledge about viruses and resulted in a paradigm shift in the very definition of these entities. Micrographs were not mere illustrations since they did the work for the electron microscopists. Drawing extensively on primary publications, we adduce the role of the new instrument in understanding the so-called eclipse phase in virus multiplication and the unexpected spinoffs of data from electron microscopy in naming and classifying viruses. Thus, we show that electron microscopy functioned not only to provide evidence, but also arguments in facilitating a reordering of the world that it brought into the visual realm. (shrink)

The Australian scientist Frank Macfarlane Burnet—winner of the Nobel Prize in 1960 for his contributions to the understanding of immunological tolerance—is perhaps best recognized as one of the formulators of the clonal selection theory of antibody production, widely regarded as the ‘central dogma’ of modern immunology. His work in studies in animal virology, particularly the influenza virus, and rickettsial diseases is also well known. Somewhat less known and publicized is Burnet’s research on bacteriophages, which he conducted in the first decade (...) of his research career, immediately after completing medical school. For his part, Burnet made valuable contributions to the understanding of the nature of bacteriophages, a matter of considerable debate at the time he began his work. Reciprocally, it was while working on the phages that Burnet developed the scientific styles, the habits of mind and laboratory techniques and practices that characterized him for the rest of his career. Using evidence from Burnet’s published work, as well as personal papers from the period he worked on the phages, this paper demonstrates the direct impact that his experiments with phages had on the development of his characteristic scientific style and approaches, which manifested themselves in his later career and theories, and especially in his thinking regarding various immunological problems. (shrink)

In 1936, Frank Macfarlane Burnet published a paper entitled "Induced lysogenicity and the mutation of bacteriophage within lysogenic bacteria," in which he demonstrated that the introduction of a specific bacteriophage into a bacterial strain consistently and repeatedly imparted a specific property – namely the resistance to a different phage – to the bacterial strain that was originally susceptible to lysis by that second phage. Burnet's explanation for this change was that the first phage was causing a mutation in the bacterium (...) which rendered it and its successive generations of offspring resistant to lysogenicity. At the time, this idea was a novel one that needed compelling evidence to be accepted. While it is difficult for us today to conceive of mutations and genes outside the context of DNA as the physico-chemical basis of genes, in the mid 1930s, when this paper was published, DNA's role as the carrier of hereditary information had not yet been discovered and genes and mutations were yet to acquire physical and chemical forms. Also, during that time genes were considered to exist only in organisms capable of sexual modes of replication and the status of bacteria and viruses as organisms capable of containing genes and manifesting mutations was still in question. Burnet's paper counts among those pieces of work that helped dispel the notion that genes, inheritance and mutations were tied to an organism's sexual status. In this paper, I analyze the implications of Burnet's paper for the understanding of various concepts – such as "mutation," and "gene," – at the time it was published, and how those understandings shaped the development of the meanings of these terms and our modern conceptions thereof. (shrink)

This paper examines the vital role played by electron microscopy toward the modern definition of viruses, as formulated in the late 1950s. Before the 1930s viruses could neither be visualized by available technologies nor grown in artificial media. As such they were usually identified by their ability to cause diseases in their hosts and defined in such negative terms as “ultramicroscopic” or invisible infectious agents that could not be cultivated outside living cells. The invention of the electron microscope, with magnification (...) and resolution powers several orders of magnitude better than that of optical instruments, opened up possibilities for biological applications. The hitherto invisible viruses lent themselves especially well to investigation with this new instrument. We first offer a historical consideration of the development of the instrument and, more significantly, advances in techniques for preparing and observing specimens that turned the electron microscope into a routine biological tool. We then describe the ways in which the electron microscopic images, or micrographs, functioned as forms of new knowledge about viruses and resulted in a paradigm shift in the very definition of these entities. Micrographs were not mere illustrations since they did the work for the electron microscopists. Drawing extensively on primary publications, we adduce the role of the new instrument in understanding the so-called eclipse phase in virus multiplication and the unexpected spinoffs of data from electron microscopy in naming and classifying viruses. Thus, we show that electron microscopy functioned not only to provide evidence, but also arguments in facilitating a reordering of the world that it brought into the visual realm. (shrink)

In 1936, Frank Macfarlane Burnet published a paper entitled “Induced lysogenicity and the mutation of bacteriophage within lysogenic bacteria,” in which he demonstrated that the introduction of a specific bacteriophage into a bacterial strain consistently and repeatedly imparted a specific property – namely the resistance to a different phage – to the bacterial strain that was originally susceptible to lysis by that second phage. Burnet’s explanation for this change was that the first phage was causing a mutation in the bacterium (...) which rendered it and its successive generations of offspring resistant to lysogenicity. At the time, this idea was a novel one that needed compelling evidence to be accepted. While it is difficult for us today to conceive of mutations and genes outside the context of DNA as the physico-chemical basis of genes, in the mid 1930s, when this paper was published, DNA’s role as the carrier of hereditary information had not yet been discovered and genes and mutations were yet to acquire physical and chemical forms. Also, during that time genes were considered to exist only in organisms capable of sexual modes of replication and the status of bacteria and viruses as organisms capable of containing genes and manifesting mutations was still in question. Burnet’s paper counts among those pieces of work that helped dispel the notion that genes, inheritance and mutations were tied to an organism’s sexual status. In this paper, I analyze the implications of Burnet’s paper for the understanding of various concepts – such as “mutation,” and “gene,” – at the time it was published, and how those understandings shaped the development of the meanings of these terms and our modern conceptions thereof. (shrink)

Some factors which are of great importance in most human affairs seem to play relatively little role in mathematics. We give some examples and suggest reasons why this might be expected to be the case.

This paper considers the foundational role of the contagium vivum fluidum—first proposed by the Dutch microbiologist Martinus Beijerinck in 1898—in the history of virology, particularly in shaping the modern virus concept, defined in the 1950s. Investigating the cause of mosaic disease of tobacco, previously shown to be an invisible and filterable entity, Beijerinck concluded that it was neither particulate like the bacteria implicated in certain infectious diseases, nor soluble like the toxins and enzymes responsible for symptoms in others. He offered (...) a completely new explanation, proposing that the agent was a “living infectious fluid” whose reproduction was intimately linked to that of its host cell. Difficult to test at the time, the contagium vivum fluidum languished in obscurity for more than three decades. Subsequent advances in technologies prompted virus researchers of the 1930s and 1940s—the first to separate themselves from bacteriologists—to revive the idea. They found in it both the seeds for their emerging virus concept and a way to bring hitherto opposing thought styles about the nature of viruses and life together in consensus. Thus, they resurrected Beijerinck as the founding father, and contagium vivum fluidum as the core concept of their discipline. (shrink)

What features of structural injustice distinguish it from mere collections of injustices committed by individuals? I argue that the standard model of moral judgment that centers agents and actions fails to adequately articulate what’s gone wrong in cases of structural injustice. It fails because features of the social world that arise only at large scale are normatively salient, but unaccounted for by the standard model. I illustrate these features with historical examples of normatively-different outcomes driven by institutional structure rather, holding (...) fixed characteristics of agents’ motivations. I then defend the view from reductionist objections. (shrink)

In 1871, the Swiss physiological chemist Friedrich Miescher published the results of a detailed chemical analysis of pus cells, in which he showed that the nuclei of these cells contained a hitherto unknown phosphorus-rich chemical which he named ‘nuclein’ for its specific localisation. Published in German, ‘Ueber Die Chemische Zusammensetzung Der Eiterzellen’, [On the Chemical Composition of Pus Cells]Medicinisch-Chemische Untersuchungen(1871) 4: 441–60, was the first publication to describe DNA, and yet remains relatively obscure. We therefore undertook a translation of the (...) paper into English, which, together with the original article, can be accessed via the following linkhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S000708742000062X. In this paper, we offer some intellectual context for its publication and immediate reception. (shrink)

[Przekład] W artykule dokonano przeglądu historiografii immunologii od 1999 roku, co w pewnym stopniu jest odpowiedzią na stanowisko takich historyków jak Thomas Söderqvist, którzy twierdzili, że to pole badawcze nie było wówczas dość rozwinięte (Söderqvist i Stillwell). Najpierw wskazano przeszłe i teraźniejsze problemy, które historiografia ma ze zdefiniowaniem immunologii, a następnie skomentowano ostatnie studia nad pojęciem immunologicznego „ja”. W dalszym toku przeglądu przeanalizowano i oceniono nowe publikacje poświęcone zróżnicowanym zagadnieniom immunologii oraz niektóre charakterystyczne oskarżenia formułowane wobec niedostatku pewnych dziedzin historii, (...) na przykład historii biograficznych i historii instytucji. W podsumowaniu przedstawiono konkurujące ze sobą kierunki, w których rozwinęła się historia immunologii, wychodząc poza wstępne, tymczasowe stadia uchwycone w poprzednim przeglądzie, i stając się wielogłosową, pluripotencjalną dyscypliną, podobną do przedmiotu jej badań. Pokazano też, że historia immunologii nadal rozwija się na wiele nowych i ekscytujących sposobów. (shrink)

In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some decades later, (...) Diderot articulates a very similar determinism, which seeks to recognize the existence of “causes proper to man” (as he says in the Réfutation d’Helvétius). The difference with Collins is that now biological factors are being taken into account. Obviously both the ‘volitional’ and the ‘biological’ forms of determinism are noteworthy inasmuch as they change our picture of the nature of determinism itself, but my interest here is to compare these two determinist arguments, both of which are broadly Spinozist in nature – and as such belong to what Jonathan Israel called in his recent book “the radical Enlightenment,” i.e. a kind of underground Enlightenment constituted by Spinozism – and to see how Collins’ specifically psychological vision and Diderot’s specifically biological vision correspond to their two separate national contexts: determinism in France in the mid-1750s was a much more medico-biological affair than English determinism, which appears to be on a ‘path’ leading to Mill and associationist psychology. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)