Celem artykułu jest porównanie szczególnej odmiany teorii spiskowych, tzw. globalnej teorii spiskowej do sławnego eksperymentu myślowego autorstwa H. Putnama o mózgach w naczyniu. Uznanie istnienia złowrogiego spisku światowego stawia wierzącą weń osobę w podobnej sytuacji do tej, w której znajduje się człowiek próbujący rozstrzygnąć, czy jest mózgiem w naczyniu. Dzieje się tak, ponieważ conspiratio maligna ma niczym nieograniczoną moc wywierania wpływu, kontrolowania, a nawet tworzenia dowolnych aspektów naszego społecznego, politycznego i ekonomicznego życia. Wszechmoc tej tajemniczej organizacji jest powodem, dla którego (...) jej ofiary nie mogą nikomu ufać, ani rządowi, ani naukowcom, a nawet innym wyznawcom teorii spiskowych. Wszystkich – ludzi i instytucje – podejrzewa się o to, że są przekupieni, kontrolowani lub zastraszeni przez spisek. Zachować sceptycyzm wobec wszystkiego, to jedyne wyjście z tej sytuacji. (shrink)

This paper’s primary purpose is to show that there is a peculiar alternative to scientism whose central thesis is not about sources of knowledge or the existence of various objects, but it aims at setting out a strategy to help decide which of the two mutually exclusive beliefs is the better one to adopt. Scientophilia, to coin a term, recommends preferring, without any discussion, a position consistent with the consensus of credible and reliable experts in a given domain. In case (...) there is no such agreement, mainly because peers disagree with each other, or experts are difficult to identify, it is recommended for a scientophile to suspend judgment. Scientophilia is not a position on science or human knowledge boundaries, but it deals with the practical side of belief change. Verdicts made by this approach are partially similar to those offered by mild scientism, as scientophilia puts scientific knowledge as one of the most reliable sources. However, it is also consistent with mild antiscientism, as in some particular cases (for example, Moorean truths), it assigns reliable expertise to non-scientific experts. Therefore it is a third way. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to compare the role played by logical analysis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Russell’s On Denoting. Whereas in Russell’s work it is an important element of his argument in support of description theory, in his pupil’s it does not function this way. Russell, while analysing various propositions, including descriptions translates them into formal language, indicating that those propositions, despite the appearances, in fact do not denote. Logical analysis shall be a tool decisive in favour (...) of Russell’s thesis. Wittgenstein similarly analyses some troublesome propositions and claims that they are meaningless. The difference is that Russell’s final conclusion is derived from logical analysis, whereas Wittgenstein’s from pure speculation. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus logical analysis is not a method thanks to which the author gets certain result, just as it was the case with his teacher and his On Denoting. In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy logical analysis concerns just a few technical problems connected only to some ideas from Principia mathematica, and not to the main subject of his work, which is the analysis of philosophical theses. (shrink)

In one of his papers, Moti Mizrahi argues that arguments from an expert opinion are weak arguments. His thesis may seem controversial due to the consensus on this topic in the field of informal logic. I argue that its controversy is framework-dependent, and if translated into a different framework, it appears to be a correct, however trivial, claim. I will use a framework based on Douglas Walton’s argumentation scheme theory and his conception of examination dialogue to demonstrate that it is (...) so. It appears that Mizrahi’s idiosyncratic framework provides an excessively restrictive conception of an argument from expert opinion than Walton’s scheme does. There is no quarrel between both frameworks, as they yield analogous, almost identical, outcomes of argument evaluation. The actual and crucial disagreement is on the topic of argument classification. Mizrahi’s conception of arguments from an expert opinion imposes exact conditions that such argument must fulfil: an expert’s opinion o truth-value must be unknown; o must be unsupported by any evidence; an expert’s peers neither accept o nor reject it. These exclude, by definition, every possible strong, in Walton’s terms, variant of such an argument. Therefore, if rephrased with the notions of the examination dialogue framework, Mizrahi’s thesis sounds as follows: weak arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. (shrink)

The paper discusses the relation of philosophy and meta-philosophy. With the use of Jerzy Perzanowski’s notion of characteristics of science and Jan Woleński’s meta-methodological typology, the author aims at presenting meta-philosophy as part of philosophy itself. Seen along such lines, meta-philosophy is part of methodology of philosophy which relates classical problems of epistemology to philosophy, just as philosophy of science does it for science. The author argues that the problems of meta-philosophy are in fact philosophical problems and sketches possible meta-philosophical (...) positions analogous to the standpoints in methodology already given. Obviously, this way of presenting meta-philosophy is only one of its possible programs. Yet, the benefit of it is an already given conceptual framework taken from philosophy of science. (shrink)