This article shows how institutionalism, a theory in organisational social science, provides a model for diagnosing organisational challenges that influence the ethical practices and integration in the Norwegian Army. Institutionalism provides tools for analysing the differences between expressed values and actual practices and for understanding the organisational dynamics that unfold at the crossroads of the organisation's formal structure, informal culture and stakeholder relations. In this article we present and discuss such differences and dynamics in the Norwegian Army based on findings (...) from a survey and a number of workshops. We also provide some suggestions for effective implementation of strategies for strengthening ethics in such an organisation. We argue that the perspective taken in this project is also relevant for other highly professionalised complex organisations and that such interdisciplinary research will strengthen practical ethics' potential for real impact. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to clarify how IT managers' decision styles affect their evaluation of information technology. Design/methodology/approach – Four different decision styles were assessed in a leadership test directed towards IT managers. Each style included two dimensions: confidence judgment ability and decision heuristic usage. Participants belonging to each style were interviewed and their answers analysed with regard to their reasoning about central areas of IT management. Findings – Results suggest that a decision style combining intuitive (...) and analytical capabilities lead to better evaluations of information technology. Originality/value – The results of the present study are valuable for the understanding of how decision styles impact on IT management in everyday life. (shrink)

The welfare of farmed fish is often regarded with less concern than the welfare of other husbandry animals, as fish are not universally classified as sentient beings. In Norway, farmed fish and other husbandry animals are legally protected under the same laws. Additionally, the legislature has defined a number of aquaculture-specific amendments, including mandatory welfare courses for fish farmers who have a key role in securing animal welfare, also with regards to noting welfare challenges in the production process. This article (...) uses fish welfare courses as a site from which to inquire about the common-sense understanding of fish welfare in Norwegian fish farming. The focus is specifically on fish farm employees, their experiences of welfare-related issues and contradictions in their daily work, and the struggle to act responsibly in aquaculture settings. Through participant observation at welfare courses, as well as interviews and conversations with fish farm workers, the article details how challenges are experienced ‘on the ground’, and suggests how fish farm workers’ own experiential knowledge might be mobilized to improve the general welfare of farmed fish. (shrink)

This paper analyses Steven Vogel's claim that his account of a post-natural environmental philosophy solves the dualism problem within the field. Through what I will call a novel critique of social constructionism, this paper examines whether Vogel's attempt succeeds or whether it reinforces the problem he wants to solve. Could the ontological foundations of social constructivism themselves be in conflict with Vogel's stated aim of overcoming the human/nature dualism? The last part of the paper focuses on the significance and role (...) of a post-natural environmental philosophy for the field of environmental philosophy in general. (shrink)

Change can be difficult to achieve, and system inertia may be considered relevant. There is a tendency for dynamic systems to enter into specific states characterized by stabilizing factors. The present work attempts to define inertia processes and explores these with regard to pro-environmental behaviour and decision-making. Inertia processes can be considered both within an organizational context and from the level of the individual, and may involve a number of psychological processes and aspects of the decision-making process. A few suggestions (...) for research are also presented. (shrink)

This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how variation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation. Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a negative relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited that risk would increase the importance (...) participants place on benevolence and integrity. A fourth hypothesis suggested that risk would have a positive and moderating influence on the effect of out-of-role behavior when presented after role-conformant in-role behavior. Findings are presented and discussed and practical implications suggested. (shrink)

In Transcendence and Sensoriness , scholars of theology, philosophy, art, music, and architecture, discuss questions of transcendence, the human senses, and the arts through case studies considered in a broad theological framework of religious aesthetics of the arts.

Artificial intelligence receives attention in media as well as in academe and business. In media coverage and reporting, AI is predominantly described in contrasted terms, either as the ultimate solution to all human problems or the ultimate threat to all human existence. In academe, the focus of computer scientists is on developing systems that function, whereas philosophy scholars theorize about the implications of this functionality for human life. In the interface between technology and philosophy there is, however, one imperative aspect (...) of AI yet to be articulated: how do intelligent systems make inferences? We use the overarching concept “Artificial Intelligent Behaviour” which would include both cognition/processing and judgment/behaviour. We argue that due to the complexity and opacity of artificial inference, one needs to initiate systematic empirical studies of artificial intelligent behavior similar to what has previously been done to study human cognition, judgment and decision making. This will provide valid knowledge, outside of what current computer science methods can offer, about the judgments and decisions made by intelligent systems. Moreover, outside academe—in the public as well as the private sector—expertise in epistemology, critical thinking and reasoning are crucial to ensure human oversight of the artificial intelligent judgments and decisions that are made, because only competent human insight into AI-inference processes will ensure accountability. Such insights require systematic studies of AI-behaviour founded on the natural sciences and philosophy, as well as the employment of methodologies from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

In 1968, an antisemitic campaign, launched by the Polish government, caused around 13,000 Jews to leave Poland. About 2500 of these refugees came to Denmark, while only about 25 ended up in Norway. The migration to Norway could potentially have reached low hundreds, but as oral-history sources indicate, the Jewish congregation in Oslo turned down a government initiative in 1969. Based on written and oral sources, and secondary literature, I argue that there was an equally important factor differentiating the two (...) countries. Comparing the Danish and Norwegian refugee reception policies, the article finds that Danish authorities and their NGO partners at decisive stages in the process were more proactive than their Norwegian counterparts in their efforts to persuade Polish Jews to come. The most critical point was in June 1969, when Denmark’s embassy in Warsaw started issuing Jews with automatic visas, while Norway retained its existing application process. (shrink)

The similarities between virtuality and play are obvious, beginning with, for instance, the ubiquitous character of both. This paper deals with how insights from research on play can be used to enlighten our understanding of the ethical dimensions of activities in cyberspace, and vice versa. In particular, a central claim that play is beyond vice and virtue is debated and contested.

This article discusses fundamental problems in "rational choice theory," as outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of why institutions may not be said to act shows his fundamental presupposition that only "monolithic," unitary entities are capable of action. This is, for him, a reason why only individual human beings may be said to act. Furthermore, human beings may be said to act only insofar as they "maximize" (their "utility") on the basis of a unitary, complete, consistent "preference structure." All action (...) that is not maximization in this sense is for Elster not really human action, but rather instances of "pure causality." Elster distinguishes between the "real," intentional person, who "maximizes," and "purely causal forces" within the person. This article tries to show that this radical, sharp dichotomy between "intentionality," in this narrow sense, and "pure causality" is inadequate as a basis for understanding human action. This radical dichotomy is central to important arguments made by Elster more generally. (shrink)

This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU’s role (...) is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyse experiences of moral concerns in intensive care nursing. The theoretical perspective of the study is based on relational ethics, also referred to as ethics of care. The participants were 36 intensive care nurses from 10 general, neonatal and thoracic intensive care units. The structural characteristics of the units were similar: a high working pace, advanced technology, budget restrictions, recent reorganization, and shortage of experienced nurses. The data consisted of the participants’ examples of (...) ethical situations they had experienced in their intensive care unit. A qualitative content analysis identified five themes: believing in a good death; knowing the course of events; feelings of distress; reasoning about physicians’ ‘doings’ and tensions in expressing moral awareness. A main theme was formulated as caring about - caring for: moral obligations and work responsibilities. Moral obligations and work responsibilities are assumed to be complementary dimensions in nursing, yet they were found not to be in balance for intensive care nurses. In conclusion there is a need to support nurses in difficult intensive care situations, for example, by mentoring, as a step towards developing moral action knowledge in the context of intensive care nursing. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

What is the connection between dispositions and ethics? Some might think very little and those who are interested in dispositions tend to be metaphysicians whose interests are far from value. However, we argue in this paper that dispositions and dispositionality are central to ethics, indeed a precondition. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in nature or involve real dispositions or powers at work. We argue for a dispositional account of value that offers an alternative to (...) the traditional fact-value dichotomy. We explain the place of value within a structure that explains the possibility of ethics. Elsewhere in this structure, we argue that moral responsibility is a precondition for ethics and that it is a dispositional notion depending critically on what Mumford and Anjum have called the dispositional modality. Moral responsibility in turn depends on there being both agency and normativity. We argue that intentionality and agency are preconditions for agency and that value is a precondition of normativity. All these notions are dispositional and make best sense if there are real dispositions or causal powers of agents. (shrink)

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart'sThe Concept of Lawand Alf Ross'sOn Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken.The Concept of Lawdoes not go beyondOn Law and Justicein so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived (...) by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward inThe Concept of LawandOn Law and Justiceare very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue that trust can be better understood in relation to people’s attempts to deal with vulnerability in social interactions. Different situations afford different forms of adaptation that correspond to different forms of trust. We describe three forms of trust: trust as a decision, trust as a performance and trust as an uncontrollable force. We show how these different types of trust differ with respect to assumptions about trust, trustworthiness and agency as well as with respect to (...) the accompanying emotions and outline a tentative process model of trust. We conclude the chapter by reviewing the contribution of the suggested framework as well as indicating questions for further research. (shrink)

I introduce the concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition.’ I demonstrate that and how this concept has a basis in reality in lawyers' propositions de lege lata, and I point out that and why we do not find fused modality in language qua language, morals and the relationship between parents and children. The concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition’ is of interest in a number of contexts, inter alia in relation to law, cf. the debate about the status (...) of lawyers' propositions de lege lata (“exactly what kind of propositions are lawyers' propositions about what is the law?”), and in relation to philosophy, cf. the debate about the relationship between ‘the is‘ and ‘the ought.’ As a consequence of the reality basis and interest of this concept, I see the concepts of ‘descriptive proposition’ and ‘normative proposition’ as the extreme points on a graduated dimension, from the purely descriptive to the purely normative. (shrink)

Nanoscale objects are presented by ever more sophisticated pictures. There is a need to reflect on the status of such nano images, because the “seeing” involved is of a highly indirect kind. The aim of this paper is to complement existing philosophical critique of nano images with a scientific practitioner's perspective. First, we show some reasons to consider seeing and imaging as complex endeavours not only on the micro and nano scale, but also on the macro level. Secondly, we argue (...) that practising scientists are not only accustomed to interpret pictures and other graphical presentations of data as being partial and simplified, but that simplification is deliberate and internal. Rather than requiring that “true” images have to be representational, the paper advocates for the fruitfulness of understanding and judging images by the amount and nature of the information they convey. Scientific literacy could be improved by creative development of visualization techniques, but also by improved public understanding of images and their correct and cautious interpretation. (shrink)

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared (...) understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach. (shrink)

This introduction describes the background and reasons why the Mercator-Hondius atlas analysed in this issue became part of the library collection of the Donner Institute.

This paper argues against Jon Elster's contention that there is a fundamentalincompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on theother hand, adaptation to conditions of one's existence in the sense that one'sdesires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While thefirst part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster's discussion ofthese ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the conceptof rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is (...) claimed that Elster's conclusionsconcerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conceptionof human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that thesedefects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally. (shrink)

This article argues against Jon Elster’s contention that there is a fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, autonomy and rationality, and, on the other hand, adaptation to the conditions of one’s existence in the sense that one’s desires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. It is claimed that Elster’s conclusions are premised on a defective conception of human faculties and powers, including a defective conception of human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made (...) that these defects are also characteristic of “rational choice theory” more generally. (shrink)

On several levels, there is now a debate whether the concept of God can be made compatible with modern science. In an attempt to elucidate this debate, I give an account of my own experiences from writing a book on the foundation of quantum mechanics. In my opinion, one can give two independent arguments for the existence of God by taking as departure an epistemic (knowledge-based) interpretation of quantum theory. However, I also argue that any religious belief should be the (...) result of an existential choice governed by each person’s own context (history and culture). In particular, I give my account of Christianity as a religion connected to our western culture, how one as a scientist can relate to the relevant dogmas. (shrink)

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and (...) non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions of a mirror neuron system is considered. (shrink)

This chapter draws on Ayn Rand's esthetic discourse, especially her essay collection The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature and her lecture course on fiction‐writing, edited and published as The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers. First, it looks briefly at Romanticism in its historical context. Next, the chapter discusses how plot enables a writer to show the events of a story as following logically from the values and premises of the characters, and how this method implies (...) a specific approach to characterization. Then, the chapter looks at plot in relation to a story's theme; to the author's projection of his/her own unique values and personality; and to the distinctive use of imagination typical of Romantic art. Finally, it addresses the question of how Rand's advocacy of plot relates to her concept of objectivity. (shrink)