This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.

The current transatlantic debate over multilateralism reveals that the traditional understanding of liberal internationalism is being transcended in favor of “globalism.” The latter is a doctrine that goes well beyond favoring international cooperation among states; in fact, the new globalism is intrinsically hostile to the sovereignty of the nation-state. Thus it runs counter to the basic liberal understanding of the nature of the political order, as reflected in the American Declaration of Independence and, on a more philosophical level, in the (...) political teaching of John Locke. The Declaration and the Lockean teaching proclaim universal principles, but hold that the implementation of these principles should be the business not of some international authority but of democratically elected and accountable national. (shrink)

A Paramecium cell has a stereotypically patterned surface, with regularly arranged cilia, dense‐core secretory vesicles and subplasmalemmal calcium stores. Less strikingly, there is also a patterning of molecules; for instance, some ion channels are restricted to certain regions of the cell surface. This design may explain very effective and selective responses, such as that to Ca2+ upon stimulation. It enables the cell to respond to a Ca2+ signal precisely secretion (exocytosis) or by changing its ciliary activity. These responses depend on (...) the location and/or type of signal, even though these two target structures co‐exist side‐by‐side, and normally only limited overlap occurs between the different functions. Furthermore, the patterning of exocytotic sites and the possibility of synchronous exocytosis induction in the sub‐second time range have considerably facilitated analyses, and thus led to new concepts of exocytotic membrane fusion. It has been possible to dissect complicated events like overlapping Ca2+ fluxes produced from external sources and from internal stores. Since molecular genetic approaches have become available for Paramecium, many different gene products have been identified only some of which are known from “higher” eukaryotes. Although a variety of basic cellular functions are briefly addressed to demonstrate the uniqueness of this unicellular organism, this article focuses on exocytosis regulation. BioEssays 24:649–658, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin is heralded as one of the great thinkers of the 20th century and this editied work by a group of distinguished scholars is an examination of an Humean liberal intellectual. Isaiah Berlin's legacy still excites intense scholarly debate.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

Might time be multi‐dimensional? In exploring this question, this paper uses a thought‐experiment about dimensionality, H. G. Wells' ‘The Plattner Story’. Plattner has his left and right sides transposed after a trip through a fourth spatial dimension, a change with independent empirical consequences. This example is then generalised to reversals of the directions of time and entropy. Finally, this thought‐experiment is related to relativistic theories of time and the possibility of preserving causality in a temporally multi‐dimensional framework.

His paper deals with the concept of Śūnyapuruṣa propounded by Mahima Swami, Bhima Bhoi, and Pañcasakhas. This concept has been compared and contrasted with the concept of quantum reality. It is also contented that comparison with Buddhist conception of reality also may not be apt.

Vaishnava philosophical work, in verse; critically edited.

The book deals with expounding the nature of Reality as it is understood in contemporary times in Quantum Physics. It also explains the classical Indian theory of Śūnya in its diverse facets. Thereafter it undertakes comparison between the two which is an area of great topical interest. It is a cross-disciplinary study by erudite Indian and western scholars between traditional Indian knowledge system and contemporary researches in Physical sciences. It points out how the theory of ‘Śūnyatā has many seminal ideas (...) and theories in common with contemporary Quantum Physics. The learned authors have tried to dissolve the “mysteries” of Quantum Physics and resolved its “weird paradoxes” with the help of theory of Śūnyatā. The issue of non-separability or entanglement has been approached with the help of the Buddhist theory of Pratītyasamutpāda. The paradoxical situation of “wave-particle duality” has been explained with the help of Upaniṣadic theory of complementarity of the two opposites. The measurement problem represented by “Schrodinger’s cat” has been dealt with by resorting to two forms of the calculation of probabilities. Some writers have argued for Śūnyatā-like non-essentialist position to understand quantum reality. To make sense of quantum theory some papers provide a happy symbiosis of technical understanding and personal meditative experience by drawing multifarious parallels. This book will be of interest to philosophically inclined physicists and philosophers with interest in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at seminar.

Nature and civilization are often regarded in opposition to each other. However, civilization employs technologies and is based on laws of nature. Also, the historical world is a result of the development of the natural world. An “anti-nature” must thus be contained somewhere within nature. The idea of “ anti-nature ” is neither alien to the Eastern nor to the Western traditional concepts of nature. The philosophy of Lao Zi never embraces mere naturalism. Lao Zi has observed that things in (...) the world are not always “ so on their own ” but rather in the mode of anti-nature. A nti-nature in nature itself does not become expressive until Christian theology, in which the origin of evil is reflected upon. The last part of the paper begins with one Buddhist thought expressed in the Diamond Sutra: “The world is not the world that is named the world.” Through naming of a thing, this thing is objectified or substantialized, and an objectified thing is not the thing itself. This self is “ śūnya ”, a non-world, which is what the world is. This non-world (as well nature) is first and foremost concealed by ego-consciousness that tends to objectify the things. E go-consciousness as this anti-nature tends to conceal this non-nature, and begins to act in the form of technology. The radical way of solving the problems caused by this “anti-nature” must begin with gaining an insight into the nature of ourselves as well as the nature of technology. (shrink)

Written by the preeminent democratic theorist of our time, this book explains the nature, value, and mechanics of democracy. In a new introduction to this Veritas edition, Ian Shapiro considers how Dahl would respond to the ongoing challenges democracy faces in the modern world. “Within the liberal democratic camp there is considerable controversy about exactly how to define democracy. Probably the most influential voice among contemporary political scientists in this debate has been that of Robert Dahl.”—Marc Plattner, _New York (...) Times_ “An excellent introduction for novices, as well as a trusty handbook for experts and political science mavens.”—_Publishers Weekly_. (shrink)

The view that everything is empty (śūnya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It has often been the focus of objections. Perhaps the most important of these is that it in effect entails a nihilism: nothing exists. This objection, in turn, is denied by Mahāyāna theorists, such as Nāgārjuna. One of the things that makes the debate difficult is that the precise import of the view that everything is empty is unclear. The object of this essay is to (...) put the debate in a new light. It does so by proposing a mathematical characterization of Emptiness—that is, the totality of empty things—showing that, whatever it is, it has a definite structure and is not, therefore, to be identified with nothingness. (shrink)

Sengzhao (c.374–414) was a Chinese Neo-Daoist who converted to Mahāyāna Buddhism, and few people doubt his influence on Chinese Buddhist philosophy. In this article, provided his Neo-Daoism (xuanxue) and Madhyamaka Buddhism, I will present how Sengzhao featured a symbolic meaning of ‘void’ (śūnya) as rooted originally in Daoism. The Daoist contradictions, in particular between ‘being’ (you) and ‘nothing [non-being]’ (wu), are essential to the development of his doctrine of ‘no ultimate void’ (不真空論, Buzhenkonglun). To understand what Sengzhao meant by ‘void’, (...) which is in denial about the ultimate reality, I broach a notion of nihil (‘nothing’ but also ‘no value’) that bears on his discursive practice. In this light, I formulate a Daoist argument for contradictions and ECN (ex contradictione nihil—nothing follows from contradictions) from Laozi’s Daodejing. Furthermore, I elaborate on Sengzhao’s defence of ECN in his Buzhenkonglun. Reconstructing his negative approach to contradictions within the scope of the four-valued expressions (catuṣkoṭi) in the Madhyamaka tradition from Nāgārjuna, I consider a likely objection that a fifth value such as the ineffable may be inferred as void. Instead of subsuming the ineffable value under his discourse, I finally endorse Sengzhao’s purpose of linguistic and conventional approximation to the ultimate reality as silence. As such, I conclude the significance of void in Sengzhao’s denials via contradictions (ECN), i.e. an early philosophical peak of Chinese Buddhism from Daoism. (shrink)

This book explores the bizarre but fascinating world of infinity in different disciplines of knowledge; mathematics, science, philosophy and religion. It projects the views of eastern as well as western scholars. This world is not only mysterious but also treacherous and conceals many conundrums such as a multitude of infinities, the mystic's experience of the infinite, conception of God as absolute infinity. The author also discusses many paradoxes relating to space and time. It is interesting to discover that some eastern (...) philosophies try to reconcile two opposite concepts of sunya (zero) and Ananta (the infinite). The author also ventures to address a difficult question: Does infinity exist as a physical reality? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Doctrine of PratītyasamutpādaEwing ChinnIt seems fitting that the very last verse of Nāgārjuna's challenging work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way), would present the reader with what seems to be a riddle: "I prostrate to Gautama, who through compassion, taught the true doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views" (27 :30). This should be read with an earlier verse (13 : 8): "The victorious (...) ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whomever emptiness is a view, that one will accomplish nothing."1 Since the last chapter deals with questions about the self and the world, it is understandable that so many commentators would assume that the "true doctrine" of which Nāgārjuna speaks is the doctrine of śūnyatā, but that gives a paradoxical character to these verses. Gautama recommends to us a doctrine that all this (we and all that we experience of the world) is śūnya, that is, empty of essence and thus of inherent, independent existence. And does this anti-realist, anti-essentialist view of things (as some would interpret śūnyatā) make possible and even constitute the relinquishing of all views, including his own? It cannot simply be the trivial and disingenuous claim that to accept the truth of śūnyatā is to relinquish all other wrong views. So is Nāgārjuna mysteriously refuting himself? Or is he uttering a paradox?I will argue that there is no paradox or problem of self-refutation, because the true doctrine that Nāgārjuna refers to is not śūnyatā but the doctrine of pratītyasa-mutpāda (dependent arising or origination). And what the verses assert is that if we understand and accept this doctrine, we will no longer have the need or inclination to hold any view about the nature of things, including the inclination to construct a view out of the declaration that "all this is śūnya." How this is possible, how accepting the doctrine makes possible the "relinquishing of all views," certainly depends on what kind of doctrine this is and how it is to be distinguished from a "view." Part of my argument, of course, is that neither pratītyasamutpāda nor the assertion that "all this is śūnya" should be taken as even implying any metaphysical views—either nihilism, absolutism, or anti-realism (the most common metaphysical interpretations). There is no doubt that a major target of Nāgārjuna's philosophical criticism is metaphysical realism. But this does not mean that the critic must hold some alternative metaphysical view.The logical place to begin is chapter 1, "Examination of Conditions," where the subject of discussion is the concept of pratītyasamutpāda, but it is not clear at all what Nāgārjuna is trying to establish about this concept. Jay Garfield, in his recent translation of and commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā titled The Fundamental Wisdom of the MiddleWay, offers a unique interpretation of the point of this chapter, [End Page 54] and I will follow him to some extent in his analysis of the text.2 However, we will part ways at a crucial point in the chapter with regard to what Nāgārjuna is about.On the Nature and Significance of PratītyasamutpādaIn this first chapter, Garfield notes that "Nāgārjuna distinguishes two possible views of dependent origination or the causal process—one according to which causes bring about their effects in virtue of causal powers and one according to which causal relations simply amount to explanatorily useful regularities—and defends the latter."3 That is to say, according to Garfield, Nāgārjuna defends pratītyasamutpāda as a regularity or Humean theory of causation against an essentialist or realist interpretation. The latter contends that while we may cite one or more factors or events as the causal condition of some effect, it is the force or power in these conditions that is actually the cause of the effect. Nāgārjuna's basic criticism of this realist view is summarized in the fourth verse:Power to act does not have conditions. There... (shrink)

Perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar, Mark Siderits has illuminated the deep connections between ontology, explanation, epistemology, and philosophy of language in Indian Buddhist philosophy. His ground-breaking interpretations of Abhidharma and Madhyamaka—particularly concerning reductionism, emptiness, and the two truths—have largely set the terms of debate in Anglophone Buddhist philosophy. This chapter is very much in the spirit of Siderits’ work, though it will reach conclusions somewhat at odds with his own. The first part of the chapter will examine the (...) ontological and explanatory reductionism of much Abhidharma thought. The thorough-going reductionism of Abhidharma yields a two-tiered ontology of ultimately real and (merely) conventionally real entities, and a correspondingly two-tiered account of ultimate and conventional truth. The second part of the chapter will take up the Madhyamaka critique of Buddhist reductionism and the philosophical consequences of the view that all things are empty (śūnya) of inherent existence (svabhāva). If all things are empty, then arguably Abhidharma reductionism is undermined. That is, if everything is empty of inherent existence, then the project of reducing things to that which exists inherently is doomed. Moreover, as Sidertis has so forcefully argued, the Madhyamaka view of emptiness undermines the Abhidharma distinction between two truths. As he provocatively puts it, for the Mādhyamika, “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, p. 273). Hence, if all things are empty, all real entities are conventionally real, and all truths are conventionally true. Yet, as discussed in part three of the chapter, this raises the specter of the ‘dismal slough’—a pernicious ontological and epistemic flattening that threatens to undermine the critical and revisionist force Buddhist philosophy. How might a Mādhyamika avoid the dismal slough? One approach, explored in Siderits’ more recent work, is to, as it were, transpose Buddhist reductionism into a Mādhyamika key. Here the strategy is to show that while Buddhist reductionism cannot provide an account of ultimate reality, it still offers the best account of conventional reality. It will be argued that recent work in the philosophy of science gives reasons to doubt this approach. Finally, section four of the chapter will explore an alternative, post-reductionist strategy for avoiding the dismal slough. This alternative is based on three key ideas. (shrink)

This paper includes seven chapters. The first chapter discusses the purport and the structure of Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra. Its purport is inconceivable liberation-development and liberation of living beings-purification of Buddha-fields. These three items are one essentially, the inconceivable liberation being the essence of its purport and the development and liberation of living beings and the purification of Buddha-fields being the function of it. Essence and function are identical. This sutra has a structure that goes forward step by step and arranges (...) in a crisscross pattern. The second chapter discusses the thought of sunya. On one hand, this sutra follows and develops the thought of sunya in the Prajn~a^pa^ramita^-su^tra while paying much emphasis on the middle-way sunya, on the other hand, it is characterized by two points in the way of its thought of sunya: all things standing on the root which is baseless and surpassing it within e qu-sunya. The third chapter argues the thought of middle way and non-discrimination. The domain of the bodhisattva embodies the thought of middle way. The thought of middle way of this sutra influenced greatly Na^ga^rjuna who claimed eight-not middle way. Jizang and Zhiyi followed and developed the thought of his. Nonduality is without discrimination. The dharma of nonduality is middle way dharmata^. The theory of dharmata^ is profound and abstruse, being without any form and beyond speech. Entering-the Dharma-door of nonduality has three layers of meaning. Nonduality is inconceivable and entering-the Dharma-door of nonduality is inconceivable liberation. The idea of nonduality of this sutra had a profound impact on Huineng’s Tanjing and Jizang’s thought of nonduality in four-layer two truths. The theory of sunya, middle way and non-discrimination discussed in the above two chapters, is the way of thinking of this sutra which is named as the negative affirming. Without the way of thinking of this kind, no sentient beings were gifted with the great compassion and skill in liberative technique.Without it, there were no developing and liberating living beings and purifying Buddha-fields. The fourth chapter discusses the thought of inconceivable liberation. In general, the Inconceivable is that which is beyond contemplation or conceptualization, beyond linguistic expression. In this sutra, apart from the above significance, the Inconceivable is equal to Liberation. The essence of inconceivable liberation is developing and liberating living beings and purifying Buddha-fields, is being released in liberation without abandoning the passions that are the province of the world, is following the way to attain the qualities of the Buddha, is neither destroying the compounded nor resting in the uncompounded, is being beyond the world without abandoning it. The fifth chapter argues the probability and method of developing and liberating sentient beings, that is, the thought of the Buddha-qualities and skill in liberative technique. The family of the Tathagatas', being constituted by all passions, is different from the true mind, the pure mind, the tatha^gatagarbha or the Buddha-nature. So it is certain that the thought of the Buddha-qualities would develop into the idea which insists on all sentient beings having the Buddha-nature. Zhiyi’s theory of evil-nature was evolved from the thought of the family of the Tathagatas'. The skill in liberative technique has many meanings: (1) A method, a means, a device for saving sentient beings; "expedient means" (upa^ya). "Excellent method for converting beings" (upa^ya-kau/salya). The wisdom of being able to save sentient beings by knowing discriminated phenomena. A temporary teaching established in order to lead sentient beings to the true teaching. This is a subject of primary importance in the Lotus Sutra. (2) A plan, scheme, design (a^rambha). (3) Usage of metaphor in teaching. (4) Chinese Buddhists utilized the doctrine of expedient means to help deal with the hermeneutical problem of reconciling the disparities among the different teachings attributed to the Buddha-to explain that the differences in the teachings of the Buddha delivered in his forty-nine year ministry were the result of the different audiences he addressed. The sixth chapter discusses how to purify the Buddha-fields. When we say that the purity of the Buddha-field reflecting the purity of one’s own mind, the mind is not the transcendental pure one, but the empirical one after arousing the thought of intention to achieve enlightenment. The purity of one’s own mind leading to the purity of the Buddha-field, means that the pure Buddha-field are constructed not only by purifying his own mind but also by purifying all living beings’ minds. Huineng’s idea of “one’s own mind is Buddha immediately” and the argument of “one’s own mind is pure Buddha-field immediately” are greatly different from the thought of the purity of one’s own mind leading to the purity of the Buddha-field. The seventh chapter discusses the relation between this sutra and householder-Buddhism and the secularization of Buddhism. This sutra doesn’t gives theoretical arguments for the householder-Buddhism and the secularization of Buddhism. (shrink)

The recent research of Helena Rosenblatt, Hilail Gildin, Arthur Meltzer, and John Scott calls for a reconsideration of Rousseau's stance towards and effect on the natural public law tradition. This reconsideration is especially called for given the persuasive evidence and arguments that these scholars marshal to demonstrate the positive contribution of Rousseau to that tradition and to suggest that his pre-Kantian rational law teaching in the Social Contract is rooted in his post-Hobbesian stance towards natural law, especially in the Second (...) Discourse. The work of these scholars builds upon others, especially on Leo Strauss, Victor Gourevitch, Jean Starobinski, Marc Plattner, Roger Masters and John Charvet, as well as Asher Horowitz, R. A. Leigh, Franz Haymann, and Robert Derathe, and completes the full range of alternative answers to our question. Their contributions are an invaluable scaffolding for fully grasping the issue and for proposing theses that could resolve it. Given the great debt owed to these scholars, the present inquiry begins with an overview and general assessment of their opinions on the issue, which is then followed by a close analysis of the relevant texts of Rousseau, especially the “Preface” to the Second Discourse. (shrink)

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (śūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, (...) nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism. (shrink)

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (śūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, (...) nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism. (shrink)

How the universe came to be what it is now is a key philosophical question. The hypothesis that it came from nothing or śūnya proves to be dissembling, since the quantum vacuum can hardly be considered a void. In modern science, it is generally assumed that matter existed before the universe came to be. Modern science hypothesizes that the manifestation of life on earth is nothing but a mere increment in the complexity of matter – and hence is an outcome (...) of evolution of matter following the Big Bang. After the manifestation of life, modern science believed that chemical evolution transformed itself into biological evolution, which then had caused the entire biodiversity on our planet. In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics, and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms, and so on. However, advancement in various fields of biology has repeatedly given rise to questions against such a denial and has supplied more and more evidence against the completely misleading ideological imposition that living entities are particular states of matter. In the recent past, however, the realization has arisen that cognitive nature of life at all levels has begun presenting significant challenges to the views of materialism in biology and has created a more receptive environment for the soul hypothesis :e1085138, 2015). Therefore, instead of adjudicating different aprioristic claims, the development of an authentic theory of origin of life and universe needs both proper scientific knowledge and the appropriate tools of philosophical analysis of life. This talk will highlight the uniqueness of biological systems that offers a considerable challenge to the mainstream materialism and proposes the Vedāntic philosophical view as a viable alternative for development of a theory worthy of origin of life and universe. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna’s “middle path” charts a course between two extremes: Nihilism, and Absolutism, not unlike earlier Buddhism. However, as early Buddhists countinanced constituents of reality as characterizable by essences while macroscopic objects lack such essences, Nāgārjuna argues that all things lack what he calls svabhāva – “own being” – the Sanskrit term for essence. Since everything lacks an essence, it is Empty (śūnya). To lack an essence is to lack autonomy. The corollary of this is that all things are interrelated. The (...) Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) school of Buddhist thought draws heavily on this insight: if all things are related, individualism has to give way to inclusivity. According to Nāgārjuna, the key to understanding his Middle path philosophy is dharma: ethics. It is only by a prior commitment to ethics that we can properly understand the Buddha's philosophy as teaching no doctrine of reality, for it is not a teaching of metaphysics, but of ethics, which is to say, Dharma. At the center of Dharma is a kind of Contractualism of the Buddhist community (saṅga). A failure to approach emptiness via ethics is like trying to hold a snake dangerously. However, approaching the emptiness of reality via ethics is grounds for optimism: nothing is stuck by essence, and we have reason to believe in positive change made possible by prudent ethical choice. In this module I consider some objections to Nāgārjuna's position from Vedic positions, and Yoga, and identify responses available to Nāgārjuna. (shrink)

The Book Makes A Fascinating Study Of The Unique Philosophical Tradition Revolving Around The Concept Of The Sunya Purusa The Ineffable, Indescribable And Non-Dual Reality That Originated In Medieval Orissa. Examining A Range Of Philosophies, It Throws Light On The Theories Of This Rare School Of Vaisnavism That Was Vaisnavite In Form But Buddhistic In Essence.

The general thesis of this small, well written, but somewhat austere, volume is that Rousseau’s concept of the state of nature is the core of his theoretical teaching. While this is not a particularly surprising thesis, Plattner does show the extent to which Rousseau radicalized the notion of the state of nature. Since Hobbes it had been almost impossible to begin a political discourse without reference to the state of nature as the point of departure. Rousseau, in effect, destroyed (...) this tradition by arguing that history rather than nature provided the true point of departure, and that natural right or natural law consequently provided no ground for political obligation. (shrink)

The so-called paradoxes of quantum physics are easily disposed of as soon as one accepts that there are no such things as intrinsically existing particles and their intrinsic properties, but that both particles and properties are relational “observables.” Accordingly, quantum physics does not offer a “description of the outer world,” but rather a prescription about how to make probabilistic predictions within a participatory environment. The latter view looks quite radical with respect to standard Western Aristotelian ontology; but it looks natural (...) in the context of the Indian-Buddhist concept of Pratītyasamutpāda which underpins Śūnyatā. Special attention will then be devoted to the quantum feature of non-separability, which displays remarkable similarities with Pratītyasamutpāda. Finally, the meaning of such twofold parallel between quantum physics and Śūnyatā will be discussed. This parallel will be related to the similarity of epistemological situation between knowing a world from which we are not entirely separated and knowing oneself. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experience: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). While people (...) well versed in Indian philosophy will not find that statement problematic, it is still controversial in the analytic tradition. Luckily for us, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subject—an SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, thoughts etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particle—a SelfOn—which coalesces out of physical fields, persists for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint (specified by a similarity metric) that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the various no-go theorems in most versions of quantum field theory and discuss their impact on the existence of selfons. Finally, we argue that the time is ripe for a rejuvenated Indian philosophy to begin tackling the three-way relationship between SoEs (which may become equivalent to jivas in certain Indian frameworks), phenomenal content and the physical world. With analytic philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the complex worlds of quantum field theory and with the relative inexperience of the western world in arguing the jiva-world relation, there is a clear and present opportunity for Indian philosophy to make a worldcentric contribution to the hard problem of experience. (shrink)