While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival (since giving a wrong answer to the king’s question amounts to losing their life). Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit (implicitly) (...) purposive it is, however, without (explicit) purpose (something akin to Kant’s aesthetic judgement). Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘telos’ in its connection with Platonic ‘paideia’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose (we compete to excel or persuade and win) or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)

The discrete Deffuant model and its alternatives is a family of stochastic spatial models for the dynamics of binary opinions on f issues. Another parameter is also incorporated that prevents interaction between two agents whenever their opinion profiles are at a Hamming distance greater than the confidence threshold θ. By numerical simulations, it was conjectured in (Adamopoulos and Scarlatos, Complexity 2012, 17, 43) that one‐dimensional models exhibit a phase transition at a critical value θ critical approximately equal to f/2. We (...) report on recent mathematical results on this problem that originates from the community of complex systems. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 21: 437–439, 2016. (shrink)

Although Hegel'sLectures on the History of Philosophywas teaching material intended for students and published posthumously, it would be wrong to regard this work as irrelevant to his philosophical project. In his introduction to theLectures, Hegel emphasised that the history of philosophy should not be treated as a mere accumulation of opinions, or as a random collection of correct and incorrect views according to some later standards. The history of philosophy, just like art, religion andRecht, reflects the necessary logical determinations of (...) the Idea, and in this sense it should be studied with the intent of revealing those determinations. Hegel, of course, intended his project to be sufficiently established through thePhenomenologyand theLogicwithout the need to resort to any historical manifestations of culture. However, his interpretation of the history of philosophy does reveal his own philosophical agenda more straightforwardly than the ahistorical complex accounts of his other major works.Hegel's intention was to present the development of the history of philosophy as a reflection of the development of the Idea. Therefore, one would assume that the further we go back in time, we would find philosophers whose doctrines were less mature and more distant from Hegel's own conception of philosophy. However, Hegel seems to have singled out a few favourite philosophers, to whom he did not hesitate to attribute insights that could not possibly have been developed at the time, according to his pre-conceived pattern of development. One famous example was Aristotle, whom he credited with the conception of a Reason that becomes its own object, i.e., Reason which is ‘in and for-itself.’ A philosopher belonging to the ‘objective’ stage of the spirit could not normally have achieved such a conception. (shrink)

In this article I aim to show how the sensus communis grounds – with the use of its maxims – the possibility of reflection, endowing the subject with a duty, that of becoming human, where becoming human presupposes self-education. Self-education entails on one hand overcoming one’s self interest or private feelings – that is what an aesthetic judgment demands: To love something other than one-self; on the other hand, and more fundamentally, self-education entails to place one-self under the indeterminate idea (...) of humanity. Like all ideas and ideals of reason, the idea of humanity places an unrealizable demand upon the subject, to become part of an idea, in this case, that of humanity; this demand can never be met. Nevertheless, it is the strive to meat such a demand that motivates the human being to become human. To do so the subject will need to reflect appropriating thus the world through the exercise of its judgment. (shrink)

In the paper that follows I examine the concept of logical egoism as presented in Kant’s Anthropology, from a pragmatic point of view. In the light of Kant’s understanding of what it means to be a logical egoist, I will compare Kant’s egoist with Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus. I will claim that early Wittgenstein was a logical egoist. My purpose, however, is not to re-write Wittgenstein’s biography taking into account that egoism is an anthropological category, but rather (...) to compare the shift from egoism to pluralism as analogous to the shift from dogmatism to criticism. As a result of the above shift, and in the light of Kant’s Anthropology, I propose reading Wittgenstein’s later thought from a practical standpoint that, I believe, is consistent with Kant’s concept of being a citizen of the world. I conclude that both thinkers contribute to an understanding of critical philosophy as a way of living. (shrink)

While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival. Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit purposive it is, however, without purpose. Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘'telos'’ in its (...) connection with Platonic ‘'paideia'’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)

Philosophy for/with children continues to face the suspicion that children—especially of relatively young ages—cannot philosophize because they are unable to think in abstract terms. In what follows we will try to establish that thinking abstractly should not be confused with thinking in general terms: All the concepts and ideas that pertain to philosophy and are abstract in nature, namely, beauty, friendship, justice, fairness etc. are, first of all, contestable and ambivalent; second, they endure throughout history, constantly resurfacing occupying a locus (...) of interest—common to both, adults and children—and, finally, they seem to be already operative, embodied within children’s lives. Thus, the question that we need to pose refers to the meaning of the term ‘abstract’. We will try to establish that to think about abstract concepts it suffices to be able to acknowledge the ambivalent character of the aforementioned ideas: and being ambivalent means that there is no consensus regarding their meaning; thus, to think about abstract concepts might mean to be able to acknowledge and think from different standpoints; something akin to Kant’s sensus communis. (shrink)

In what follows, I will try to show how the sublime reveals a fundamental aspect of the subject as a human being: a striving to comprehend the absolute. Although at first this striving appears to lead to a futile pursuit – we cannot represent the absolute – we ultimately succeed in presenting it, thus re-affirming the fundamental role of intuition for the human being: the need to make our notions, concepts and ideas tangible. The sublime thus appears to be in (...) close relation to an aesthetic idea, symbols and art, manifesting a profound kinship between reason and the imagination. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 2 Seiten: 343-368.

Greek translation of Immanuel Kant's 1766 short treatise: Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik.

Translation of Kant's 1768 short treatise: Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raum (Περί του πρώτου θεμέλιου λόγου της διάκρισης των διευθύνσεων στον χώρο). Athens: PRiNTA-Ροές (2024).

We investigate the one-dimensional dynamics of alternatives of the Axelrod model (ξ(t)), where t is the time, with k binary features and confidence parameter ε = 0, 1,…, k. Simultaneously, the simple Axelrod model is also critically examined. Specifically, for small and large ε, simulations suggest that the convergent model (ξ(t)) is emulated by a corresponding attractive model (η(t)) with the same parameters (conditional on bounded confidence). (η(t)) is more mathematically tractable than (ξ(t)), and the very definitions of the two (...) qualitative behaviors of cyclic particle systems (fluctuation and fixation) are applicable in special cases. Moreover, we observe a complementarity: for not too small k and equation image, (η(t)) fixates (each site has a final type independent of the possibly infinite size of the lattice), whereas (ξ(t)) fluctuates (each site changes type at arbitrarily larger times t as the size of the lattice increases). (shrink)

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade‐offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals (“tree‐huggers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others (“human‐lovers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup (...) members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero‐sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree‐huggers and human‐lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree‐huggers and human‐lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one‐third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree‐huggers and human‐lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree‐huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members—thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds. (shrink)

According to LAMPAKIS (L.), the main purpose of this book is to offer a detailed biography of Georgios Pachymeres as well as an assessment of his works (p. 9). Unfortunately, it falls far short of achieving either of these objectives. First, the choice of wording – “Introductory essay” – in the title is somewhat infelicitous. The meaning of “essay” in modern Greek is vague, to say the least, and few would apply this term to a book which, in essence, is (...) an unnecessarily long compilation of the known facts about Pachymeres' life and works. Only an attempt by the author to interpret the thought of Pachymeres or to place his work in the broader historical context of his times would have convincingly justified the term “essay” for this particular monograph. (shrink)

The present contribution engages with two representative examples of middle-Byzantine ekphraseis, Photios’ description of the Virgin of the Pharos and Leo VI’s account of the church founded by Stylianos Zautzes. It aims at showing how these texts suggest modes of viewing the sacred space and decoration that pose, more than settle, questions about images and pictures, their intended function, significance and impact within their specific cultural frames of reference. Far from being neutral and disengaged, these verbal representations have a (...) specific agenda, which inflects the audience’s perception and interpretation of the decorated church space. Comparisons with coeval monumental evidence are also offered, in order to analyze textual and visual developments in parallel. (shrink)