Weak states and ineffective economic policies are assumed to mediate the constraints of the world system and to prevent upward mobility among peripheral countries. This article tests the effects of state strength and economic policy on world system mobility in the period 1970–85 on a sample of 162 countries. World system role and mobility were operationalized using role equivalence based network measures. Countries with effective neoorthodox policies experience significantly higher mobility, even after controlling for economic performance, as do countries (...) with states that have high despotic capacity. No effect, direct or indirect, was found for infrastructural state capacity. (shrink)

This article analyzes the evolution of state capacity in Peru during the recent commodity boom. Peru’s economic growth happened in a context in which inclusive democratic institutions were at play for the longest period ever registered in the country and at a time when political elites decided to invest considerable resources in developing state capacity. This case illustrates how boom-led economic growth can lead to the institutional strengthening of a weak state. However, state (...) class='Hi'>capacity continues to be low in Peru. The causal mechanism that yields such continuity differs from those entertained in classic path-dependent explanations of state capacity in Latin America. The article identifies a novel mechanism that helped reproduce the Peruvian path intertemporally. This relational mechanism suggests that state capacity remains low because of the relatively enhanced capacities of state challengers to locally fend off and contest an otherwise much stronger state apparatus. The article argues, on that basis, the need to employ a relational analysis that gauges net state strength with respect to the power acquired by relevant non-state actors who might challenge state authority across different local arenas. Classic conceptualizations of state capacity are indeed relational, but conventional applications are predominantly unilateral and, thus, misleading. Unilateral notions of state capacity are those that focus on either state efforts and investments to assert state capacity or, alternatively, on the presence of challenges that curtail the levels of actually observed state capacity. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to (...) eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to (...) eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

When should we expect compliance with international human rights norms? Previous literature on the causal mechanisms underlying compliance have focused independently on the roles of state willingness, thought of as the preferences of the regime leadership, and on state capacity, in improving human rights practices within a state. We build an argument that neither of these factors are sufficient on their own to improve compliance with human rights norms. Instead, improved human rights practices require both “the (...) will and the way.” Our central hypothesis is that capacities and willingness, acting jointly, are key determinants of improvements in compliance with international human rights norms. The paper confirms this proposition using two-staged and single-stage regression models and a time-series cross-sectional approach at the country-year level. A highly capable bureaucracy and a state that has signaled its willingness through the acceptance of individual complaint and inquiry procedures in the UN treaty regime are jointly necessary for improved human rights practices. (shrink)

Does state weakness lead to representation via taxation? A distinguished body of scholarship assumes that fiscal need forced weak states to grant rights and build institutions. The logic is traced to pre-modern Europe. However, the literature has misunderstood the link between state strength and the origins of representation. Representation emerged where the state was already strong. In pre-modern Europe, representation originally was a legal obligation, not a right. It became the organizing principle of central institutions where rulers (...) could oblige communities to send representatives authorized to commit to decisions taken at the center. Representation thus presupposed strong state capacity, especially to tax. The revision amends our understanding of the historical paradigms guiding the literature, as well as the application of these paradigms to policies in the developing world. It suggests that societal demands for accountability and better governance are more likely to emerge in response to taxation already effectively applied. (shrink)

Environmental regulation in middle-income and developing countries is often viewed with high degrees of pessimism. Although many countries have adopted protective laws, violations are widespread and institutions are weak. This paper analyzes the puzzle of shifting patterns of environmental regulation in Argentina, a country with widespread institutional weakness. Most regulators in Argentina take a firefighting approach, acting only when skirmishes emerge between communities and firms. Amidst regulatory chaos, improvements in the environmental performance of firms are few, and noncompliance remains the (...) norm. However, in the province of Tucumán, the pattern of regulation shifted, and officials began to systematically enforce regulations. This paper traces shifts in patterns of enforcement back to broad pressures that provoked industry and environmentalists to support increases in the internal and external components of state regulatory capacity. The analysis uncovers political dynamics that can contribute to strengthening the institutions necessary for sustainable development. (shrink)

En 1945, 51 países firmaron la Carta de San Francisco, que dio nacimiento a las Naciones Unidas. Veinte eran latinoamericanos; catorce, europeos. En 2022, la ONU se ha expandido hasta abarcar a 193 miembros. Veinte son latinoamericanos, los mismos que en la fundación, pero hoy 51 son europeos. Este libro monumental pretende explicar, entre otras cosas, por qué los estados europeos viven fusionándose y dividiéndose mientras los latinoamericanos, una vez consolidados, duran para siempre – pero funcionan peor. Las causas, se (...) aduce, hay que buscarlas un siglo y medio atrás…. (shrink)

Analysis starts from Rawls’s disposition that in a liberal society autonomous persons should have two moral powers – the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to establish, pursue and revise the concept of the good. Political or neutral liberalism advocates the justification of state intervention to improve the first type of capacity while declaring the interference with the second capacity illegitimate. The critique of this disposition is done by analysing the perspectives of (...) Jonathan Quong and Martha Nussbaum, showing that they lead to allowing irrational and authoritarian perspectives in education, that is, neglecting the development of valuable capacities. Although institutional influence can be biased and paternalistic, in some cases it may be legitimate for the institution to create conditions that enhance people’s ability to evaluate, reevaluate, and revise their conceptions of the good. (shrink)

Despite their importance in the history of philosophy and in particular in the work of Aristotle and Kant, mental capacities have been neglected in recent philosophical work. By contrast, the notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain sciences. Driven by the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity it does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is standard to appeal to capacities in cognitive psychology. The main benefit of (...) invoking capacities in an account of the mind is that it allows for an elegant counterfactual analysis of mental states: it allows us to analyze mental states on three distinct yet interrelated levels. A first level of analysis pertains to the function of mental capacities. A second level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, irrespective of the context in which they are employed. A third level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, taking into account the context in which they are employed. This paper develops an account of perceptual capacities. This account involves an analysis of their function, their individuation and possession conditions, the relation between perceptual capacities and their employment, as well as their informational and neural base conditions. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are so called ceteris paribus laws, i.e., roughly speaking, laws with exceptions. Yet, the ceteris paribus clause of these laws is problematic. Amongst the more infamous difficulties is the danger that 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, ceteris paribus' may state no more than a tautology: 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, unless not'. One of the major attempts to avoid this problem (and others (...) concerning ceteris paribus laws) is to claim that the subject matter of laws are ascriptions of dispositions, powers, capacities etc., and not the regular behaviour we find in nature. That we do not know whether the cetera are paria in a specific situation does not matter to the dispositionalist because the objects have the disposition regardless of the circumstances. The defence of the latter claim is that dispositions can be instantiated without being manifested. Hence, the laws that ascribe dispositions are strict and it looks as if they do not face the above mentioned problems of ceteris paribus laws. In this essay I attempt to show that these assumptions are wrong. I hope to illustrate that not only does the ceteris paribus clause reoccur inside the dispositions, moreover, there are laws—laws about non-fundamental entities with instable dispositions—which bear a ceteris paribus clause that cannot be hidden in a disposition. (shrink)

Despite existing federal and state law and regulation, new human subjects research scandals involving “vulnerable” populations continue to surface. Although existing oversight mechanisms were enacted to ensure voluntary informed consent for participants and institutional review board oversight of HSR, these laws and regulations do not provide any special oversight mechanisms or protections to ensure the ethical and safe inclusion of cognitively impaired adults. The absence of rules to ensure consistently ethical conduct of research involving adults who lack consent (...) class='Hi'>capacity may either lead to exploitation of this vulnerable population or the dearth of important research into the broad range of diseases that impair cognition. In other words, while some institutions and investigators are conducting research with this group without guidance, others are taking an extremely conservative approach and are excluding these individuals from research. Without safeguards that are adequate and robust but not overly burdensome, conducting research involving this population is ethically and legally challenging. (shrink)

Until recently, philosophers debating the rationality of time-biases have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. First, there is evidence that our third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about whom we know nothing; given access to some information about the preference target, third-person (...) preferences mirror first-person preferences. As a result, the simulation hypothesis has been proposed, according to which third-person preferences will mirror first-person preferences when we can simulate the mental states of the preference target. Second, there is evidence that we prefer negative hedonic events to be in our past (we are first-person negatively hedonically future-biased) only when we view future events as fixed and in no way under our control. By contrast, when we perceive it to be within our power to mitigate the badness of future events, we are first-person negatively hedonically past-biased. This is the mitigation hypothesis. We distinguish two versions of the mitigation hypothesis, the squirrelling version and the heuristic version. We ran a study which tested the simulation hypothesis, and which aimed to determine whether the squirrelling or the heuristic version of the mitigation hypothesis enjoys more empirical support. We found support for the heuristic version of the hypothesis, but no support for the squirrelling version. (shrink)

American history has been rife with human subjects research scandals, particularly those that involve “vulnerable” populations. State and federal laws and regulations often do not provide any special oversight mechanisms or protections to ensure the ethical and safe inclusion of cognitively impaired adults in research. At the New York State level, repeated efforts have been made to regulate research involving individuals who lack consent capacity. In January 2014, the New York State Task Force on Life and (...) the Law released its Report and Recommendations for Research with Human Subjects Who Lack Consent Capacity, which represents the most recent step in a decades-long process in the state to develop oversight mechanisms that are appropriately sensitive to the fine line between protecting a vulnerable population and impeding the advancement of research. These recommendations may serve as a model for research policy in other states and at the federal level, particularly in light of shifting societal concerns and changing political winds. (shrink)

When a patient lacks decision-making capacity, then according to standard clinical ethics practice in the United States, the health care team should seek guidance from a surrogate decision-maker, either previously selected by the patient or appointed by the courts. If there are no surrogates willing or able to exercise substituted judgment, then the team is to choose interventions that promote a patient’s best interests. We argue that, even when there is input from a surrogate, patient preferences should be an (...) additional source of guidance for decisions about patients who lack decision-making capacity. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are so called ceteris paribus laws, i.e. roughly speaking, laws with exceptions. Yet, the ceteris paribus clause of these laws is problematic. Amongst the more infamous difficulties is the danger that ‘For all x: Fx then Gx, ceteris paribus’ may state no more than a tautology: ‘For all x: Fx then Gx, unless not’. One of the major attempts to avoid this problem (and others (...) concerning ceteris paribus laws) is to claim that the subject matter of laws are ascriptions of dispositions, powers, capacities etc., and not the regular behaviour we find in nature. That we do not know whether the cetera are paria in a specific situation does not matter to the dispositionalist because the objects have the disposition regardless of the circumstances. The defence of the latter claim is that dispositions can be instantiated without being manifested. Hence, the laws that ascribe dispositions are strict and it looks as if they do not face the above mentioned problems of ceteris paribus laws. In this chapter I attempt to show that these assumptions are wrong. I hope to illustrate that not only does the ceteris paribus clause reoccur inside the dispositions, moreover, there are laws – laws about non-fundamental entities with instable dispositions – which bear a ceteris paribus clause that cannot be hidden in a disposition. (shrink)

Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often controversial: if a human’s capacities are the basis of its moral status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? (...) This book answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about situations involving "temporary incapacitation"—where a human organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacity—this book argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy, bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy. (shrink)

In “Conscientious of the Conscious: Interactive Capacity as a Threshold Marker for Consciousness” (2013), Fischer and Truog argue that recent studies showing that some patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state are in fact in a minimally conscious state raise various ethical questions for clinicians and family members. I argue that these findings raise a further ethical dilemma about how and whether to seek the involvement of the minimally conscious person herself in decisions about her care. (...) There may be a conflict between doing what is believed to accord with the patient’s prior stated wishes and/or her best interests, on the one hand, and respecting her own potential decision-making capacity and epistemic authority, on the other. (shrink)

According to Schellenberg’s capacitism, perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out particulars, including objects, events and property instances. To say that perception is so constituted, for her, is to say that perceptual states have the content, phenomenal character, and evidential force they do in virtue of the fact that they are yielded by employing perceptual capacities.1 1.

The model for capacity assessment in the United States and much of the Western world relies upon the demonstration of four skills including the ability to communicate a clear, consistent choice. Yet such assessments often occur at only one moment in time, which may result in the patient expressing a choice to the evaluator that is highly inconsistent with the patient’s underlying values and goals, especially if a short-term factor (such as frustration with the hospital staff) distorts the patient’s (...) preferences momentarily. These challenges are particularly concerning in cases, which arise frequently in hospital settings, in which patients demand immediate self-discharge, often during off-hours, while faced with life-threatening risks. This paper examines the distinctive elements that shape such cases and explores their ethical implications, ultimately offering a model for such situations that can be operationalized. (shrink)

What is the root cause of ethical failure? Why is preoccupation with ethics more a part of the problem than a part of the solution? What makes ethical conduct a natural expression of who we are? What enables us to be ourselves in our relations with others? Ethical failure has become a significant concern in public life, in organizations and in educational institutions. The Capacity for Ethical Conduct explores how qualities of character and personality either make ethical conduct possible (...) for the individual or foster ethical failure. David Levine discusses how ethical conduct is a special way of relating to others, one that secures respect for their integrity by assuring that what they do can express who they are. He argues that this special way of relating to others results not from knowledge of, or a stated commitment to, rules, norms and values, but from the way we experience ourselves, especially from our ability to make a positive emotional investment in being and having a self. Traditionally, emphasis on the importance of values and ethics in shaping conduct tends to be connected to the need to find fault in self and others, fostering an atmosphere where the self is put at risk in its relations to others. This means that an excessive emphasis on ethics, rather than assuring ethical conduct, tends instead to create interpersonal settings marked by emotional assault. Because of this, talk about ethics often expresses ambivalence about ethical conduct, which makes the familiar combination of preoccupation with ethics and ethical failure unsurprising. The Capacity for Ethical Conduct explores the ways in which the interpersonal world of work either fosters a feeling of safety or encourages various forms of emotional assault. Presenting case studes and applying psychoanalytic object relation theory and self psychology, this book explores the factors underlying ethical failure and the capacity for ethical conduct. It will be of interest to scholars and practioners in the fields of psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy, sociology, organizational dynamics, management and public administration. (shrink)

In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context of decisional (...) capacity assessments, the difficulties to reconcile 1) and 2) with 3) which they at the same time seem to imply. Having clarified the centrality of a cogent notion of mental disorder for addressing these difficulties, I comment on three promising lines of inquiry about the nature and scope of autonomy that emerge from the following chapters. (shrink)

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned it to something that is his own, and (...) thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by his labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, section 27. (shrink)

A diagnosis of schizophrenia is often taken to denote a state of global irrationality within the psychiatric paradigm, wherein psychotic phenomena are seen to equate with a lack of mental capacity. However, the little research that has been undertaken on mental capacity in psychiatric patients shows that people with schizophrenia are more likely to experience isolated, rather than constitutive, irrationality and are therefore not necessarily globally incapacitated. Rational suicide has not been accepted as a valid choice for (...) people with schizophrenia due in part to a belief that characteristic irrationality prevents autonomous decision-making. Since people with schizophrenia are often seen to lack insight into the nature of their disorder, both psychiatric and ethical perspectives generally presume that suicidal acts result directly from mental illness itself and not from second-order desires. In this article, I challenge notions of global irrationality conferred by a diagnosis of schizophrenia and argue that, where delusional beliefs are unifocal, schizophrenia does not necessarily lead to a state of mental incapacity. I then attempt to show that people with schizophrenia can sometimes be rational with regard to suicide, where this decision stems from a realistic appraisal of psychological suffering. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a theory of perceptual capacities: perceptual capacities must be individuated at least partly in terms of their place in a hierarchy of capacities, where these capacities include the senses (...) themselves; an adequate account of perceptual capacities must be sensitive to empirical considerations; and an adequate account should accommodate the nature of the capacity to perceive. I arrive at these constraints by considering how Schellenberg’s view fails, before defending and developing my alternative in line with the constraints. I defend a view on which there are few, coarse-grained perceptual capacities which can fulfil complex explanatory roles because they are evaluatively gradable on many axes. Finally, on my view, perceptual capacities bear a particularly close relation to the sensory modalities themselves. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent is a key element of ethical clinical research. Addicted population may be at risk for impaired consent capacity. However, very little research has focused on their comprehension of consent forms. The aim of this study is to assess the capacity of addicted individuals to provide consent to research.Methods53 subjects with DSM-5 diagnoses of a Substance Use Disorder and 50 non psychiatric comparison subjects participated in the survey from December 2014 to March 2015. This cross-sectional study was (...) carried out at a community-based Outpatient Treatment Center and at an urban-located Health Centre in Spain. A binary judgment of capacity/incapacity was made guided by the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research and a clinical interview. Demographics and clinical characteristics were assessed by cases notes and the Mini-Mental State Examination, the Global Assessment Functional Scale and the Clinical Global Impression Scale.ResultsNPCs performed the best on the MacCAT–CR, and patients with SUD had the worst performance, particularly on the Understanding and Appreciation subscales. 32.7 % SUD people lacked research-related decisional capacity. There were no statistically significant differences between the groups in terms of capacity to consent to research.ConclusionsThe findings of our study provide evidence that a large proportion of individuals with SUD had decisional capacity for consent to research. It is therefore inappropriate to draw conclusions about capacity to make research decisions on the basis of a SUD diagnosis. In the absence of advanced cognitive impairment, acute withdrawal or intoxication, we should assume that addicted persons possess decision-making capacity. Thus, the view that people with SUD would ipso facto lose decision-making power for research consent is flawed and stigmatizing. (shrink)

A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding (...) intentional ascription from paper clips. Fodor (1986) has defended RTM against this slippery slope objection. He distinguishes between the kinds of creatures that exhibit selective responses to nomic properties of stimuli (for example, psychophysical properties) and the kinds of creatures that also respond selectively to nonnomic properties of stimuli (for example, being a crumpled shirt). The distinction marks the differences between two kinds of "primal scenes" in which lawful relations are said to hold between an organism's behavior, representational state, and stimulus property. The arguments for the distinction are provocative but counter-examples show them to be inconclusive. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to develop and propose a general model of the state space of AI. Given the breathtaking progress in AI research and technologies in recent years, such conceptual work is of substantial theoretical interest. The present AI hype is mainly driven by the triumph of deep learning neural networks. As the distinguishing feature of such networks is the ability to self-learn, self-learning is identified as one important dimension of the AI state space. Another (...) dimension is recognized as generalization, the possibility to go over from specific to more general types of problems. A third dimension is semantic grounding. Our overall analysis connects to a number of known foundational issues in the philosophy of mind and cognition: the blockhead objection, the Turing test, the symbol grounding problem, the Chinese room argument, and use theories of meaning. It shall finally be argued that the dimension of grounding decomposes into three sub-dimensions. And the dimension of self-learning turns out as only one of a whole range of “self-x-capacities” (based on ideas of organic computing) that span the self-x-subspace of the full AI state space. (shrink)

Researchers have postulated that deficits in cognitive control are associated with, and thus may underlie, the perseverative thinking that characterises generalised anxiety disorder. We examined associations between cognitive control and levels of spontaneous state rumination following a stressor in a sample of healthy control participants and participants with GAD. We assessed cognitive control by measuring working memory capacity, defined as the ability to maintain task-relevant information by ignoring task-irrelevant information. To this end, we used an affective version of (...) the reading span task with valenced distractors. Lower WMC in the presence of negative distractors was associated with greater state rumination in the GAD group, but not in the CTL group. These findings suggest that difficulty maintaining task-relevant information due to interference from negative distractors contributes to perseverative thinking in GAD. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the connection between stateness (and its constituent attributes) and democracy by conceiving the effective state as an independent variable and a prerequisite for the success of a well-functioning democracy. Such a conditioning relationship between the state and the regime has often been subject to being neglected among many scholars of democratization, who have not considered the state as an important explanatory or at least obstructive variable for the success of (...) democratization. This paper argues that the existence of an effective and legitimate state is essential to build a well-functioning democracy. Herein, the variable of stateness is analysed in terms of four attributes: that of monopoly on the legitimate use of force; citizenship agreement; infrastructure capacity of the state; and law enforcement capacity. (shrink)

Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters (...) for mental state attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones. (shrink)

In this essay we explain some of the problems of the Venezuelan criminal justice sub-system and, in general, the criminal law enforcement. That is to say, that which is expressed in the persecutory actions of the investigating authorities and the criminal courts, after having established in Venezuela a Carl Schmitt concept of Dual State with the purpose of eliminating “bourgeois” democracy and implanting the model of so-called Socialism of the XXI Century. In this sense, it is a question of (...) identifying the flagrant persecution and violation of human rights of those who do not have the capacity to resist the attacks emanating from the State in the abusive use of coercion and legal violence. With the Dual State want to impose an utopia by force, which leads to dystopia, due to the division and polarization of society with the dichotomous politics of friend-enemy, In a process of etiquette and "demonization" of the enemy. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has further intensified a crisis in the functions and the perception of the state. It has also revealed underlying contradictions in both mainstream and radical ideologies of the state. A desire for the state as guarantor of public welfare vies with fear of the state’s hypertrophic capacities for surveillance and control. Following a brief exploration of the intimate modern connection between plagues and the state, the article tries to map some of the (...) ways in which the state has been at stake in political and theoretical commentaries on the pandemic. Is an epidemiological politics from below, beyond the plague state, possible? Can recent emergency measures be seen as incomplete or inverted anticipations of a communist use of the state of exception? Or is the primacy of the political we are currently experiencing a mere fetish, indissociable from the rule of capital? (shrink)

Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime (...) I predict someone’s future behavior, I would at that moment also have an explanation of the behavior. I argue that advocates of both the theory theory and the simulation theory accept the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. However, there is very good reason to believe that this hypothesis is false. Just as we can predict the occurrence of some physical phenomena that we have no explanation for, we are also able to make accurate predictions of intentional behavior without having an explanation. Rather than requiring mental state attribution, I argue that the prediction of human behavior is most often accomplished by statistical induction rather than through an appeal to mental states. However, explanations are not given in these terms. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the input can (...) be compared to the output and shown to be relatively impoverished. I argue that there are robust methods of comparing input to output without measuring them quantitatively. (shrink)

In this paper, we highlight some problems for accounts of disability and enhancement that have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The reason, we contend, is that contemporary debates that seek to define, characterise or explain the normative valence of disability and enhancement do not pay sufficient attention to a wide range of cases, and the transition between one state and another. In section one, we provide seven cases that might count as disability or enhancement. We explain why (...) each case might count, and on what basis, and why it is been neglected. Each case is explained as a transition in what we call capacity space. We then argue that no definition of disability or enhancement addresses all of these cases, except for strict welfarist accounts of disability that do not rely on a depiction of any particular capacity. We argue further, however, that this is a serious deficiency of welfarist conceptions of disability. We then address objections to our account. (shrink)

Event-based prospective memory tasks require the realisation of a delayed intention at the occurrence of a specific target event. The present research investigates how performance in this kind of prospective memory task is influenced by the current affective state. By manipulating participants’ mood during intention realisation we tested two competing models of mood effects on memory (i.e., a capacity consuming account and a processing style account). Furthermore, we manipulated the valence of the target event to investigate mood-congruency effects (...) in prospective memory. No evidence was found for a mood-congruency effect, but the results showed that prospective memory performance increased with a sad mood. This effect is consistent with recent theories on mood-dependent processing-style regulation, postulating that a sad mood produces a more analytic and detailed processing style whereas a happy mood produces a more global and less detailed processing style. (shrink)

This paper pushes to the claim that the following is Descartes’s fundamental thesis: something has self-presenting states and self-presenting states only. Were he to have established this he would have revamped our worldview in essentially the manner he wished to revamp it. From this proposition one can get an argument for the substance view of the mind in Descartes’s writings.

The Farmers Market Nutrition Program (FMNP) is a federal-state partnership designed to provide fresh, locally grown produce to low-income participants at nutritional risk and expand consumer awareness and use of local produce sold at farmers markets. This paper describes the results of a collaboration initiative based on the typology of a “comprehensive, multisectorial collaboration” to support the FMNP. We report the outcomes of the partnerships that developed over three years, including increased outreach to FMNP participants and strategies to decrease (...) barriers to participation. Those partnerships that reached higher degrees of coordination or collaboration are now addressing market accessibility and market quality in new ways. Those partnerships that exhibited the highest degree of collaboration are contributing to community capacity building beyond FMNP issues per se and to larger issues affecting the agriculture community and the food security of residents. (shrink)

In light of recent successful uterus transplantations, it is reasonable to expect that womb transplants will become more commonplace in the future. If this happens, important questions emerge about who should receive the donated wombs. Some arguments have been advanced that suggest that potential recipients should be screened for their anticipated childrearing capacity, as one component of a comprehensive process for determining eligibility. The main arguments provided in support of this position have to do with the presumed responsibility of (...) the state to protect future children from harm, and with avoiding complicity for any resulting harm experienced by the child born through the transplanted uterus. The purpose of this paper is to reject this position, based on two main criticisms: (1) screening potential uterus recipients for anticipated childrearing ability, but not also screening other kinds of morally equal family builders, is unjustly discriminatory; and (2) with respect to actions performed in good faith (e.g. providing a transplantable uterus to someone for the purpose of having a child), one is not morally blameworthy for the consequences of those actions (a) that one did not intend, and (b) that were directly caused by someone else, and (c) where others are directly responsible for making sure that those consequences do not come about. These criticisms are sufficient for concluding that the state is not justified in assessing the anticipated childrearing capacity of potential uterus recipients, and this is so regardless of whether or not there is a scarcity of transplantable uteruses available. (shrink)

This paper extends a stochastic theory for buffer fill distribution for multiple “on‘ and “off‘ sources to a mobile environment. Queue fill distribution is described by a set of differential equations assuming sources alternate asynchronously between exponentially distributed periods in “on‘ and “off‘ states. This paper includes the probabilities that mobile sources have links to a given queue. The sources represent mobile user nodes, and the queue represents the capacity of a switch. This paper presents a method of analysis (...) which uses mobile parameters such as speed, call rates per unit area, cell area, and call duration and determines queue fill distribution at the ATM cell level. The analytic results are compared with simulation results. (shrink)

Severe brain injury is a leading cause of death and disability. Following severe brain injury diagnosis is difficult and errors frequently occur. Recent findings in clinical neuroscience may offer a solution. Neuroimaging has been used to detect preserved cognitive function and awareness in some patients clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state. Remarkably, neuroimaging has also been used to communicate with some vegetative patients through a series of yes/no questions. Some have speculated that, one day, this method may (...) allow severely brain-injured patients to make medical decisions. Yet, skepticism is rife, due in part to the inherent difficulty of assessing decision-making capacity through neuroimaging communication. In this thesis, I provide the first systematic analysis of this problem. I present and defend a strategy for assessing decision-making capacity in brain-injured patients who can only communicate through neuroimaging. (shrink)