Susan Sontag’s talk at the UNESCO meeting on which the French edition of Diogëne 201 was based has been replaced in this English edition of Diogenes 201 by extracts from her published work: her article ‘Looking At War’ in The New Yorker (December 2002).

Can we ever claim to understand a work of art or be objective about it? Why have cultures thought it important to separate out a group of objects and call them art? What does aesthetics contribute to our understanding of the natural landscape? Are the concepts of art and the aesthetic elitist? Addressing these and other issues in aesthetics, this important new Oxford Reader includes articles by authors ranging from Aristotle and Xie-He to Jun'ichiro Tanizaki, Michael Baxandall, and Susan (...) Sontag. It focuses on why art and a variety of aesthetics matter to us, and on how perceivers participate in and contribute to the experience of appreciating a work of art. With its multicultural and multidisciplinary scope, this volume shows how anthropology, art history, Chinese theories of painting, and other perspectives both enrich and provide alternatives to classic philosophical accounts of art and the aesthetic. (shrink)

En varios de sus trabajos, Susan Sontag trató de pensar qué podían las imágenes de y ante el sufrimiento de los otros: ¿nos ayudan a comprender o nos insensibilizaban?, ¿en qué contextos y regímenes de circulación son capaces de generar solidaridad hacia la víctima?, ¿en qué condiciones fueron producidas y recepcionadas las fotografías de torturas inflingidas a prisioneros en Vietnam —en los años setenta— e Irak —en los dos mil— y hasta qué punto esas condiciones modifican la percepción (...) social de las violaciones de los derechos humanos? El presente artículo trata de localizar, analizar y poner en valor las aportaciones de Sontag sobre las fotografías de atrocidades, en general, y de tortura en particular. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Baby with a Hand Grenade Implications of a “Causal” Medium Ethical Concerns about Photography Sontag's Critique of Arbus Some Difficulties with Sontag's Analysis The Ethics of Taking a Photograph The Ethics of Viewing a Photograph.

_Published in its entirety for the first time, a candid conversation with Susan Sontag at the height of her brilliant career_ “One of my oldest crusades is against the distinction between thought and feeling, which is really the basis of all anti-intellectual views: the heart and the head, thinking and feeling, fantasy and judgment... and I don’t believe it’s true.... I have the impression that thinking is a form of feeling and that feeling is a form of thinking.” (...) Susan Sontag, one of the most internationally renowned and controversial intellectuals of the latter half of the twentieth century, still provokes. In 1978 Jonathan Cott, a founding contributing editor of _Rolling Stone_ magazine, interviewed Sontag first in Paris and later in New York. Only a third of their twelve hours of discussion ever made it to print. Now, more than three decades later, Yale University Press is proud to publish the entire transcript of Sontag’s remarkable conversation, accompanied by Cott’s preface and recollections. Sontag’s musings and observations reveal the passionate engagement and breadth of her critical intelligence and curiosities at a moment when she was at the peak of her powers. Nearly a decade after her death, these hours of conversation offer a revelatory and indispensable look at the self-described "besotted aesthete" and "obsessed moralist." “I really believe in history, and that’s something people don’t believe in anymore. I know that what we do and think is a historical creation....We were given a vocabulary that came into existence at a particular moment. So when I go to a Patti Smith concert, I enjoy, participate, appreciate, and am tuned in better because I’ve read Nietzsche.” “There’s no incompatibility between observing the world and being tuned into this electronic, multimedia, multi-tracked, McLuhanite world and enjoying what can be enjoyed. I love rock and roll. Rock and roll changed my life....You know, to tell you the truth, I think rock and roll is the reason I got divorced. I think it was Bill Haley and the Comets and Chuck Berry that made me decide that I had to get a divorce and leave the academic world and start a new life.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Appreciating Susan SontagFred RushMuch education from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s was self-education. Although one might happen to take a university course that incorporated contemporary art and criticism, it was a rarity. More often one supplemented university fare with one's own reading, listening, and viewing of cutting-edge art, anthropology, music, philosophy, linguistics, etc. Susan Sontag was for many Americans of that time a preeminent guide in (...) this process, opening doors to some of the most interesting and influential European work in art and criticism. Sontag's essayistic output—and she was one of the supreme writers in that genre—was seminal. Any sociologist or intellectual historian of the period would have to take her work greatly into account. Her incisive takes on her subject matter were not for everyone. Although trained as a philosopher at the then epicenter of the Anglophone philosophical world, Harvard, she did not tiptoe through academic complexities and was, therefore, decidedly out of step with the philosophical temperament of that time. She strode in, proselytized for her favorites, excoriated her enemies, and left no one in the room ignorant of the fact that she had been there, dominated the conversation and, on the way out, rearranged the furniture.Sontag's views generally have not received much philosophical attention. Even those who prize her critical work have tended to sell short the early, programmatic essays like "Against Interpretation" and "On Style." Perhaps this neglect is self-wrought. Sontag is often at her best when engaged in what one might call first-order criticism, that is, criticism of particular works of art on their own terms. Her work in critical theory tends to be both abstracting and declamatory and, so, operates against her strong suit. Moreover, Sontag's theory of criticism commits her to [End Page 36] the precedence of critical practice over theorizing. Accordingly, she is led to reduce the importance of those early essays. Yet this is where the interest of philosopher will fall, if indeed it falls at all.Sontag's main concern relevant to the philosophy of literature and to aesthetic theory more broadly is what she takes to be the colonization of aesthetic and critical response by what she terms "theory." Critical response is always, to some degree theoretical of course, so her point cannot be one that is ascribed sometimes to her, i.e., that critical response is supposed to be non-theoretical tout court. An "erotics of art," the famous formula contained in the last sentence of "Against Interpretation," is after all an erotics, which was in the ancient world a genre of theoretical investigation, not erotic experience or even erotica. Criticism can be theoretical in many senses as well. By itself the term "theory" does not rule out much unless one appends to it constraints having to do with the internal structure of bodies of knowledge that either qualify or disqualify them as theories correctly so-called. Sontag seems most concerned about two aspects of theoretical accounts of art: (A) their systematicity and (B) their use of modes of interpretation that undercut the aesthetic nature of works. With regard to (B), she is wary particularly of accounts of literary value that appeal to unconscious or subterranean social forces as determinative of meanings of works. The problem with (A) is that systematicity, she claims, tends toward exclusion and reduction, destroying the particularity of individual works.These two contentions comprise the diagnostic and negative side of Sontag's programmatic work in literary theory, i.e., what is to be avoided in one's experience and judgment of art. What is to be avoided is "interpretation," but what is interpretation exactly? What is the scope of Sontag's claim against it? Do her early essays provide a stable, convincing account of the relation between theory, on the one hand, and experience and criticism, on the other? Is she caught between formalism and a more politically engaged kind of criticism? On the positive side, what kind of critical response to literature is appropriate to its aesthetic nature? Is Sontag's replacement for interpretation viable? Sontag presents her answers to the first set of questions in an unstructured... (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Erfahrung, Kommunikation und Bewältigung von Krankheit spielen Metaphern eine wichtige Rolle: Als Denkkonzepte spiegeln sie zugrundeliegende Haltungen gegenüber den durch sie beschriebenen Vorgängen wider. Susan Sontag hat mit ihrem Essay „Illness as Metaphor“ nachhaltig die moralisch kritischen Implikationen einer unreflektierten Metaphernverwendung im Umgang mit Erkrankung aufgezeigt, indem sie deren stigmatisierende und hierin zusätzlich belastende Wirkung für Erkrankte reflektiert.In der gegenwärtigen Situation der Covid-19-Pandemie trifft ein bisher unbekanntes Virus mit der Macht und Dynamik der Globalisierung auf die (...) hierauf nicht vorbereiteten spätmodernen Gegenwartsgesellschaften, die nun nach Erklärung und Sinnzuschreibung suchen. Auch hier fungieren Metaphern als Denkkonzepte und Vehikel von Interpretation. Im Rückgriff auf die Perspektive Susan Sontags und ihren Appell für einen entmystifizierten Umgang mit Krankheit geht dieser Beitrag folgenden Fragen nach: Welche Bilder werden in der Berichterstattung über CoV‑2 vermittelt? Welche Einstellung gegenüber Gesundheit und Krankheit wird mit den Metaphern transportiert, und welche Lebenshaltung liegt dieser zugrunde? Welche Einsichten für einen gesunden Umgang mit Covid-19 und Krankheit generell ergeben sich, wenn man die Pandemie aus ihren Metaphern und zugrundliegenden Denkkonzepten herausschält? (shrink)

The standard model for end‐of‐life decision‐making gives roles to two parties—the physician, who explains the medical options, and the patient, who selects from among those options. The model can be harmful not only for individuals but also for the state, if the patient's right to control her own choices is understood as a positive right of access to whatever is available.

This chapter corrects for Susan Sontag's undeserved neglect by contemporary ethical philosophers by bringing awareness to some of the unique metaethical insights born of her reflections on photographic representations of evil. I argue that Sontag's thought provides fertile ground for thinking about: (1) moral perception and its relation to moral knowledge; and (2) the epistemic and moral value of our emotional responses to the misery and suffering of others. I show that, contrary to standard moral perception theory (...) (e.g. Blum 1994), Sontag holds that we can have general moral perceptual knowledge. I then explore Sontag's idea that certain emotional responses, like sympathy and compassion, can sometimes be impertinent, in virtue of their having false or illusory content. I explain why this is so, and show the epistemic and motivational problems it poses for moral sentimentalism. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo utiliza el método de investigación del contexto histórico para situar la Nueva Sensibilidad de Sontag en el contexto histórico en el que prevalecía “la desaparición del arte”, y plantea que la Nueva Sensibilidad de Sontag es la sensibilidad acorde con las necesidades de esa época al negar “la desaparición del arte” y afirmar la posición dominante del arte visual. Su definición puede resumirse como una capacidad de percepción estética de las artes. Apela a la sensibilidad (...) pura para apreciar las artes visuales, y se dedica a cambiar la conciencia y la sensibilidad de la gente moderna. Al mismo tiempo, al comparar la Nueva Sensibilidad con la sensibilidad de Campamento propuesta por Sontag y la “nueva sensibilidad” propuesta por Marcuse, este artículo señala que la principal connotación de la Nueva Sensibilidad es hacer hincapié en la forma, descuidar el contenido y suspender la moralidad. Sin embargo, la Nueva Sensibilidad, que hace demasiado hincapié en la experiencia perceptiva e ignora la dimensión moral, tiene sus defectos inherentes, que no pueden ignorarse. Por ello, este artículo toma finalmente como ejemplo la práctica crítica de Sontag sobre Riefenstahl para explicar específicamente los defectos de la Nueva Sensibilidad y reflexionar sobre ella. Más de medio siglo después de la Nueva Crítica de Sontag, la orientación y la reflexión de la misma son propicias para replantear el significado y el valor de la misma bajo el trasfondo de un mayor desarrollo de la ciencia y la tecnología y de estilos artísticos más diversificados en la era contemporánea. (shrink)

Sontag is certainly attracted to the aesthetic she describes but not so wholeheartedly as many readers have assumed.1 One of the ironies of her career has been her reputation as an enthusiast for works toward which she actually expresses considerable ambivalence. Many of her essays include overt advocacy, but it is rarely uncomplicated or uncompromised.2 Despite her reputation for partisanship, she more typically begins her essays by recounting an experience of alienation, annoyance, uncertainty, or shock. For example, she describes (...) the "happening" as an event "designed to tease and abuse the audience"3 and speaks of the "profoundly discouraging," even "hopeless," emotions of her first days in North Vietnam. She is, therefore, often motivated by her sense of difference from the event or object she describes. But it is not her wish merely to find ways of assimilating and dominating unpleasant or alien experience; while that is certainly one of the main impulses in her work - to control apparently impossible subjects, to exhilarate in the Nietzschean will to power over the text - her will to power is always countered by a need to credit and honor the text's otherness. Sontag never finally assumes an easy familiarity with her subject but rather draws its difficult and negating otherness ever closer to herself. Her work may be understood, in a way, as a search for a text that is utterly unknowable, a text that will always elude and contradict what we may say about it, a text, in short, that cannot be contaminated by critical rhetoric. That is a quality she has recently attributed to Artaud's work: "Like Sade and Reich, Artaud is relevant and understandable, a cultural monument, as long as one mainly refers to his ideas without reading much of his work. For anyone who reads Artaud through, he remains fiercely out of reach, an unassimilable voice and presence."4 · 1. There is, to be sure, an atmosphere of iconoclasm and intellectual challenge about Sontag's criticism, but it is not especially self-congratulatory. She is only interested in difficult topics or in topics whose difficulties have been repressed, partly because that context energizes her mind and partly, as she has written of Diane Arbus, because she wants "to violate her own innocence, to undermine her sense of being privileged" · 2. The exception is some of the early reviews included in Against Interpretation, where the polemical requirements of the occasion distinguish those brief judgments from her more careful and extended pieces.· 3. Sontag, Against Interpretation , p. 267.· 4. Sontag, "Artaud," Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings , p. lix. Cary Nelson teaches critical theory at the University of Illinois. He is the author of The Incarnate Word: Literature as Verbal Space and Our Last First Poets: Vision and History in Contemporary American Poetry and Reading Criticism: The Literary Status of Critical Discourse. (shrink)

This collection uses Susan Sontag's "Notes on 'Camp'" as a foundation from which to explore current topics related to camp. It recognizes Sontag's work as significant in spurring examination of the phenomenon but also limited in its descriptive rather than philosophical, theoretical, and conceptual nature.

When Susan Sontag addresses the problem of pornography and relates it to Hegel, she is not merely describing a path in European philosophy aimed to construct a new language, but she is also committing this aim to the importance of re-reading culture. The fashion in which pornography describes reality is meaningful when we are trying to approach Hegel in his aim to construct a post-religious language that finally will make ready-to-hand life as life. Politics, and society, being two (...) essential elements to understand reality, become singularly interesting when analyzed through the gaze of Sontag in combination of Hegel’s philosophy. The conservative morals that reign over what we understand as pornography, and the cultural moment of Europe since the most progressive moments of the 19 th century, describe a fatalist landscape for the future of society and politics. Yet, the learnings from Hegel remain meaningful. In this paper I examine how a post-religious philosophy, aimed long ago by Hegel’s contribution to philosophy, can serve to the understanding of a post-pornographic society: a society that is able to learn from the contributions of Frankfurt’s school with regards to an efficient cultural tissue, and defeat the old religious morals that are inserted in the backbone of politics and philosophy still today. (shrink)

The standard model for end‐of‐life decision‐making gives roles to two parties—the physician, who explains the medical options, and the patient, who selects from among those options. The model can be harmful not only for individuals but also for the state, if the patient's right to control her own choices is understood as a positive right of access to whatever is available.

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 9 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 89-107.