The two theories of verbal cognition, namely abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna, first put forth by the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas respectively in the second half of the first millennium C.E., can be considered as being foundational as all subsequent thinkers of the Sanskritic intellectual tradition engaged with and elaborated upon these while debating the nature of language and meaning. In this paper, I focus on the first chapter of Śālikanātha’s Vākyārthamātṛkā and outline the process of anvitābhidhāna described therein. Śālikanātha explains this (...) as comprising three steps, and thereafter discusses each of these three to elaborate upon and philosophically defend this conception of how one cognizes sentential meaning. The aim of this paper is to present Śālikanātha’s three-step model, and thus demonstrate especially the distinct conception of abhidhāna for the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as complex and chronologically extended as contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa conception of abhidhāna as non-complex and instantaneous. Such an understanding of the disparate semantic contents with which the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras use the identical term abhidhāna is crucial for any correct study of their respective doctrines. (shrink)

The role of memory in one’s cognition of sentential meaning is a pivotal topic in Indian philosophical debates on the nature of language. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas claim in their doctrine of abhihitānvaya that words denote word-meanings which in turn lead one to sentential meaning, with memory playing only a limited role in this process. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas however assign memory a central role and assert that each word in a sentence denotes the connected sentential meaning. This paper is a philosophical (...) and philological study of the arguments presented by the influential Prābhākara thinker Śālikanātha in his Vākyārthamātṛkā-I in order to substantiate the role of memory as part of the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna. The VM-I commences these discussions with an objection of the Bhāṭṭa pūrvapakṣin against this Prābhākara doctrine, and thereafter proceeds to refute this objection by demonstrating the role of memory, specifically in regard to word-meaning. Śālikanātha lays out his refutation by means of several layers of intricate argumentation, and this paper attempts to follow the text closely and present cogently his philosophical reasoning. The aim of this paper is thus to not only demonstrate the early pre-empting of this Bhāṭṭa objection by Śālikanātha himself but also his own responses to this, thereby enabling one to understand with greater clarity a cornerstone of the elaborate doctrine of anvitābhidhāna. (shrink)

The Mīmāṃsā mission of disambiguating Vedic texts led the thinkers of the tradition to confront several instances of apparently conflicting Vedic commands. Consider the two cases: ‘give alms daily’ vs ‘do not give alms during ritual X’, and ‘never harm another’ vs ‘sacrifice an animal during ritual Y’. Each command in these two cases is derived from the Vedas and Mīmāṃsā authors thus attempted to resolve such cases of deontic conflict by putting forth hermeneutic solutions, without taking recourse to any (...) other epistemic source. In this paper, I present several instances of conflicting Vedic commands and indicate three distinct types of deontic conflicts as well as their corresponding solutions as identified by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. This study is based on discussions put forth in four important Mīmāṃsā texts: the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra, the Śābarabhāṣya, Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā and Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa. I explain the foundational difference between prescriptions and prohibitions for Mīmāṃsā thinkers, and thereby also discuss several technical conceptions such as paryudāsa, vikalpa, prāpti and bādha among others. In doing so, I attempt to highlight certain fundamental tenets of the vast and intricate hermeneutic framework developed within the Mīmāṃsā tradition. (shrink)