Vague notions, such as ‘generally’, ‘rarely’, ‘often’, ‘almost always’, ‘a meaningful subset of a whole’, ‘most’, etc., occur often in ordinary language and in some branches of science. We introduce modal logical systems, with generalized operators, for the precise treatment of assertions involving some versions of such vague notions. We examine modal logics, constructed in a modular fashion, with generalized operators corresponding to some versions of ‘generally’ and ‘rarely’.

Logics for ‘generally’ are intended to express some vague notions, such as ‘generally’, ‘several’, ‘many’, ‘most’, etc., by means of the new generalized quantifier ∇ and to reason about assertions with ‘generally’ . We introduce the idea of functional interpretation for ‘generally’ and show that representative functions enable elimination of ∇ and reduce consequence to classical theories. Thus, one can use proof procedures and theorem provers for classical first-order logic to reason about assertions involving ‘generally’.

Logics for generally were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions,such as generally, most, several, etc., by generalized quantifiers, ultrafilter logic being an interesting case. Here, we show that ultrafilter logic can be faithfully embedded into a first-order theory of certain functions, called coherent. We also use generic functions (akin to Skolem functions) to enable elimination of the generalized quantifier. These devices permit using methods for classical first-order logic to reason about consequence in ultrafilter logic.

We discuss the question of inclusions between positive relational terms and some of its aspects, using the form of a dialogue. Two possible approaches to the problem are emphasized: natural deduction and graph manipulations. Both provide sound and complete calculi for proving the valid inclusions, supporting nice strategies to obtain proofs in normal form, but the latter appears to present several advantages, which are discussed.

In this paper we show that the class of fork squares has a complete orthodox axiomatization in fork arrow logic (FAL). This result may be seen as an orthodox counterpart of Venema's non-orthodox axiomatization for the class of squares in arrow logic. FAL is the modal logic of fork algebras (FAs) just as arrow logic is the modal logic of relation algebras (RAs). FAs extend RAs by a binary fork operator and are axiomatized by adding three equations to RAs equational (...) axiomatization. A proper FA is an algebra of relations where the fork is induced by an injective operation coding pair formation. In contrast to RAs, FAs are representable by proper ones and their equational theory has the expressive power of full first-order logic. A square semantics (the set of arrows is U×U for some set U) for arrow logic was defined by Y. Venema. Due to the negative results about the finite axiomatizability of representable RAs, Venema provided a non-orthodox finite axiomatization for arrow logic by adding a new rule governing the applications of a difference operator. We address here the question of extending the type of relational structures to define orthodox axiomatizations for the class of squares. Given the connections between this problem and the finitization problem addressed by I. Németi, we suspect that this cannot be done by using only logical operations. The modal version of the FA equations provides an orthodox axiomatization for FAL which is complete in view of the representability of FAs. Here we review this result and carry it further to prove that this orthodox axiomatization for FAL also axiomatizes the class of fork squares. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the class of fork squares has a complete orthodox axiomatization in fork arrow logic (FAL). This result may be seen as an orthodox counterpart of Venema's non-orthodox axiomatization for the class of squares in arrow logic. FAL is the modal logic of fork algebras (FAs) just as arrow logic is the modal logic of relation algebras (RAs). FAs extend RAs by a binary fork operator and are axiomatized by adding three equations to RAs equational (...) axiomatization. A proper FA is an algebra of relations where the fork is induced by an injective operation coding pair formation. In contrast to RAs, FAs are representable by proper ones and their equational theory has the expressive power of full first-order logic. A square semantics (the set of arrows is ᵎ x ᵎ for some set ᵎ) for arrow logic was defined by Y. Venema. Due to the negative results about the finite axiomatizability of representable RAs, Venema provided a non-orthodox finite axiomatization for arrow logic by adding a new rule governing the applications of a difference operator. We address here the question of extending the type of relational structures to define orthodox axiomatizations for the class of squares. Given the connections between this problem and the finitization problem addressed by I. Németi, we suspect that this cannot be done by using only logical operations. The modal version of the FA equations provides an orthodox axiomatization for FAL which is complete in view of the representability of FAs. Here we review this result and carry it further to prove that this orthodox axiomatization for FAL also axiomatizes the class of fork squares. (shrink)

Logics for ‘generally’ were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions , which occur often in ordinary language and in science. LG’s provide a framework for distinct notions of ‘generally’: one builds a specific logic for the notion one has in mind. We introduce deductive systems, in natural deduction style, for LG’s and show that these systems are normalizable.

We consider a paradigm of applications of Logic Engineering to illustrate the information interchange among different areas of knowledge, through the formal approach to some aspects of computing. We apply the paradigm to the area of distributed systems, taking the demand for specification formalisms, treated in three areas of knowledge: modal logics, first-order logic and algebra. In doing so, we obtain transfer of intuitions and results, establishing that, as far as input/output representation is concerned, these three formalisms are equivalent.

We compare fork arrow logic, an extension of arrow logic, and its natural first-order counterpart (the correspondence language) and show that both have the same expressive power. Arrow logic is a modal logic for reasoning about arrow structures, its expressive power is limited to a bounded fragment of first-order logic. Fork arrow logic is obtained by adding to arrow logic the fork modality (related to parallelism and synchronization). As a result, fork arrow logic attains the expressive power of its first-order (...) correspondence language, so both can express the same input–output behavior of processes. (shrink)

We compare fork arrow logic, an extension of arrow logic, and its natural first-order counterpart (the correspondence language) and show that both have the same expressive power. Arrow logic is a modal logic for reasoning about arrow structures, its expressive power is limited to a bounded fragment of first-order logic. Fork arrow logic is obtained by adding to arrow logic the fork modality (related to parallelism and synchronization). As a result, fork arrow logic attains the expressive power of its first-order (...) correspondence language, so both can express the same input-output behavior of processes. (shrink)

Logics for ‘generally’ were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions, by non-standard generalized quantifiers, and to reason qualitatively about them . Filter logic is intended to address ‘most’. Here, we show that filter logic can be faithfully embedded into a classical first-order theory of certain predicates, called compatible. We also use representative predicates to enable elimination of the generalized quantifier. These devices permit using classical first-order methods to reason about consequence in filter logic and help clarifying the role of (...) such extended logics for ‘generally’. (shrink)