The aim of this study is to explore the influence of religious beliefs on the work-related attitudes of Turkish SME (small and medium-sized enterprise) owner-managers. In this research, the emergence of pious or devout business people is considered as a phenomenon, and special attention is paid to religious transformation and secularism in Turkey. Both concepts, religion and secularism, are considered within the Turkish context. For the research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 32 Turkish business people from religious and secular backgrounds, (...) respectively. The study investigates the so-called “Islamic work ethic” values and Islamic business principles from a critical perspective and argues that they do not seem to be as significant factors as predicted in the emergence of pious or devout business people in Turkey. (shrink)

Today’s societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, (...) either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to the natural logic program which explores logics in natural language. The paper offers two logics called \ \) and \ \) for dealing with inference involving simple sentences with transitive verbs and ditransitive verbs and quantified noun phrases in subject and object position. With this purpose, the relational logics are introduced and a model-theoretic proof of decidability for they are presented. In the present paper we develop algebraic semantics of (...) the logics using congruence theory. (shrink)

Frame semantics for negation on the Australian Plan accommodates many different negations, but it falls short on accommodating subminimal negation when the language contains conjunction and disjunction. In this paper, I will present a multi-relational frame semantics –multi-incompatibility frame semantics– that can accommodate subminimal negation. I will first argue that multi-incompatibility frames are in accordance with the philosophical motivations behind negation on the Australian Plan, namely its modal and exclusion-expressing nature. Then, I will prove the soundness and completeness results of (...) a subminimal logic that consists of the multi-incompatibility semantics and a proof system with operational rules that characterize subminimal negation, conjunction and disjunction. Lastly, I will prove some key correspondence theorems that relate frame conditions to certain principles that are associated with stronger negations, which will give rise to a new kite of negations that includes subminimal negation. (shrink)

This paper proposes a formalization of the class of sentences quantified by most, which is also interpreted as proportion of or majority of depending on the domain of discourse. We consider sentences of the form “Most A are B”, where A and B are plural nouns and the interpretations of A and B are infinite subsets of \. There are two widely used semantics for Most A are B: \ > C \) and \ > \dfrac{C}{2} \), where C denotes (...) the cardinality of a given finite set X. Although is more descriptive than, it also produces a considerable amount of insensitivity for certain sets. Since the quantifier most has a solid cardinal behaviour under the interpretation majority and has a slightly more statistical behaviour under the interpretation proportional of, we consider an alternative approach in deciding quantity-related statements regarding infinite sets. For this we introduce a new semantics using natural density for sentences in which interpretations of their nouns are infinite subsets of \, along with a list of the axiomatization of the concept of natural density. In other words, we take the standard definition of the semantics of most but define it as applying to finite approximations of infinite sets computed to the limit. (shrink)

Even though the strong relationship between proof-theoretic and model-theoretic notions in one’s logical theory can be shown by soundness and completeness proofs, whether we can define the model-theoretic notions by means of the inferences in a proof system is not at all trivial. For instance, provable inferences in a proof system of classical logic in the logical framework do not determine its intended models as shown by Carnap (Formalization of logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943), i.e., there are non-Boolean models (...) that satisfy its provable inferences. In the literature, this is known as the Categoricity problem or Carnap’s problem. In this paper, we will discuss the Categoricity problem (or Carnap’s problem) for three-valued logics K3 and LP. We will provide three different restrictions on admissible models that will deliver us categoricity results, some of which draw from the solutions provided for the Categoricity problem for classical logic in Belnap and Massey (Stud Log 49(1):67–82, 1990) and Bonnay and Westerståhl (Erkenntis 81(4):721–739, 2016). We will then argue that two of those solutions are philosophically well-motivated: (1) restricting the admissible models where negation is interpreted as a Strong Kleene truth-function, and (2) restricting the admissible models where a complex formula is assigned the third value when its immediate subformulas are assigned the third value. (shrink)

This article enlarges classical syllogistic logic with assertions having to do with comparisons between the sizes of sets. So it concerns a logical system whose sentences are of the following forms: Allxareyand Somexarey, There are at least as manyxasy, and There are morexthany. Herexandyrange over subsets (not elements) of a giveninfiniteset. Moreover,xandymay appear complemented (i.e., as$\bar{x}$and$\bar{y}$), with the natural meaning. We formulate a logic for our language that is based on the classical syllogistic. The main result is a soundness/completeness theorem. (...) There are efficient algorithms for proof search and model construction. (shrink)

We investigate the explanatory role of epistemic virtue in accounting for the success of science as a social institution that is characterized by predominantly epistemic ends. Several structural explanations of the epistemic success of science that commonly rule out virtue attributions to scientists are explored in reference to a case of collective epistemic vice; namely, the credibility crisis in the social and behavioral sciences. These accounts underline the social structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective success, (...) and endorse a common conclusion, namely that individual virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for science to be successful. While acknowledging that divergent motivations and behaviors might also serve the collective goals of science, our analysis of the credibility crisis shows that the presence of a significant proportion of epistemically virtuous scientists in a scientific community is a necessary condition for collective epistemic success in a scientific community. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the natural logic program which invents logics in natural language. This study presents two logics: a logical system called d R containing transitive verbs and a more expressive logical system R containing both transitive verbs and intersective adjectives. The paper offers three different set-theoretic semantics which are equivalent for the logics.

Investing in research is a long-term, risky proposition. In agriculture, it could take fifteen years or more for a research finding to show an improvement in a farmer’s field. Yet, research institutions, like other organizations it needs to be evaluated. For more than twenty years, independent panels of outside experts have evaluated each of the international research centers that the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) supports. This paper examines the evolution of this review system, outlines the key methodological (...) challenges faced, and draws lessons for others engaged in evaluating research institutions. It notes that the scope of the CGIAR reviews have been broadened over time in response to users’ concerns. Reviews now cover four dimensions of performance: research results, quality and relevance of research, vision and strategic directions, and management efficiency. The methodological challenges faced in measurement, valuation, and attribution are reviewed, along with practices found to be helpful in addressing these concerns. The paper concludes that the panel approach to institutional evaluation has served CGIAR’s needs well, and recommends it as an evaluation technique for integrating quantitative and qualitative dimensions of institutional performance. (shrink)

This thesis presents a communicative account of personhood that argues for the inseparability of the metaphysical and the practical concepts of a person. It connects these two concepts by coupling the question “what is a person” with the question "how does one become a person". It argues that participation in social interactions that are characterized by mutual recognition and giving-and-taking reasons implied by the practical concept of a person is in fact an ecological and developmental condition for an entity to (...) possess the kind of characteristics and capacities such as reflexive self-consciousness addressed by the metaphysical concept. The chief theoretical contribution of the dissertation research lies, accordingly, in demonstrating that an adequate metaphysical concept of a person has to make reference to the kind of social processes that are necessary for the emergence and development of the distinguishing attributes of persons among other moving, perceiving, desiring and cognizing agents. Methodologically, it undertakes an original philosophical analysis that is enriched by an interdisciplinary investigation of several notions and insights from semiotics, comparative and developmental psychology, cognitive science and anthropology. The main argument of the thesis is that one becomes a person through internally recreating a social, communicative process; namely, that of dialogical transformation of habits. We find the paradigmatic case of this social process in mutual persuasion. The internalization of this process in the form of an inner dialogue cultivates a social self that is in ongoing communication with the embodied, organismic self of uncritically habituated attitudes, convictions and desires. This inner dialogue can be conceived as a temporally extended process of self-persuasion, which is characterized by an ongoing strive for attaining higher degrees of self-control; that is, for achieving a more coherent alignment between our habits and the kind of person we would like to be. It starts with self-interpretation and self-evaluation, and culminates in the formation of higher-order desires that facilitate habit-change and novel habit formation in accordance with certain social, moral, aesthetical or intellectual categories and norms one comes to endorse. For this reason, self-induced, deliberate habit-change is also a process of appropriation or self-appropriation, through which we strive to cultivate habits of feeling, thinking, acting that we can deem more truly ours. The thesis demonstrates that the capacity for engaging in this kind of self-persuasion consists chiefly in the capacities for metasemiosis, perspective-taking, and for cultivating habits of reflexivity. It explicates how all these capacities have a social origin and ultimately a social function by showing that they all presuppose certain higher-order communicative patterns that arose through an evolutionary and cultural history, and develop through the internal reconstruction of these patterns as cognitive-semiotic processes. The thesis concludes that becoming a kind of being who can engage in self-persuasion, thus a person, consists ultimately in internalizing the patterns of communicative social interactions in the form of an ongoing auto-communication. (shrink)

This paper presents the content of this thematic issue of Diogenes on Asian studies in Turkey. It explains the origins of this set of papers in light of relevant scholarship, relates it to current academic work in the field, and provides a rationale for issuing a volume on Asian scholarship in Turkey.

This paper presents the content of this thematic issue of Diogenes on Asian studies in Turkey. It explains the origins of this set of papers in light of relevant scholarship, relates it to current academic work in the field, and provides a rationale for issuing a volume on Asian scholarship in Turkey.

This paper presents the content of this thematic issue of Diogenes on Asian studies in Turkey. It explains the origins of this set of papers in light of relevant scholarship, relates it to current academic work in the field, and provides a rationale for issuing a volume on Asian scholarship in Turkey.

This paper presents the content of this thematic issue of Diogenes on Asian studies in Turkey. It explains the origins of this set of papers in light of relevant scholarship, relates it to current academic work in the field, and provides a rationale for issuing a volume on Asian scholarship in Turkey.

This paper outlines the development of Asian studies in Turkey from their early years to 2022. A particular focus is put on the development of academic programs at Bogazici University and on the international academic partnerships it entailed. The author argues that the end of the Cold War, the “rise of Asia” in public opinion, the new Asia initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the global attraction due to international employment opportunities, represent multiple factors that have (...) accelerated interest in Asian Studies in Turkey. (shrink)

An expert is commonly considered to be somebody who possesses the right kind of knowledge and skills to find out true answers for questions in a domain. However, this common conception that focuses only on an individual’s knowledge and skills is not very useful to understand the epistemically interdependent nature of contemporary scientific expertise, which becomes increasingly more relevant due to the rise of large interdisciplinary research collaborations. The typical scientific expert today relies substantially on complex scientific instruments and numerous (...) other experts in forming expert judgment. Moreover, we have research collaborations where multiple scientists interact in a way that gives rise to distributed cognitive systems, which can act as a single informant. Accordingly, our concept of scientific expertise should not consist only in individual knowledge and skills, but also accommodate epistemic dependence and collective knowledge production. To this aim, this paper proposes a reconstruction of the concept of scientific expertise as informant reliability by building on the virtue-epistemological account of epistemic competences and theories of extended and distributed cognition. Considered in reference to the social epistemic function of expertise, a scientific expert should be conceived as a reliable informant in a scientific domain, which implies that when consulted on matters in that domain they assert competently, honestly, and completely. Competent expert assertion involves the epistemic responsibility to draw on nothing but the highest degree of epistemic competence relevant to the given context. Thus, being a reliable informant may require one to draw on an extended epistemic competence that goes beyond one’s individual competence, or to form supra-individual or group-informants that manifest collectively the kind of complex epistemic competence required for the investigation of certain research questions. (shrink)

The epistemic subject of collective scientific knowledge has been a matter of dispute in recent philosophy of science and epistemology. Following the distributed cognition framework, both collective-subject accounts (most notably by Knorr-Cetina, in _Epistemic Cultures_, Harvard University Press, 1999) as well as no-subject accounts of collective scientific knowledge (most notably by Giere, Social Epistemology 21:313–320, 2007; in Carruthers, Stich, Siegal (eds), _The Cognitive Basis of Science_, Cambridge University Press, 2002a) have been offered. Both strategies of accounting for collective knowledge are (...) problematic from the perspective of mainstream epistemology. Postulating genuinely collective epistemic subjects is a high-commitment strategy with little clear benefit. On the other hand, eliminating the epistemic subject radically severs the link between knowledge and knowers. Most importantly, both strategies lead to the undesirable outcome that in some cases of scientific knowledge there might be no individual knower that we can identify. I argue that distributed cognition offers us a fertile framework for analyzing complex socio-technical processes of contemporary scientific knowledge production, but scientific knowledge should nonetheless be located in individual knowers. I distinguish between the production and possession of knowledge, and argue that collective knowledge is collectively produced knowledge, not collectively possessed knowledge. I then propose an account of non-testimonial, expert scientific knowledge which allows for collectively produced knowledge to be known by individuals. (shrink)

Large research collaborations constitute an increasingly prevalent form of social organization of research activity in many scientific fields. In the last decades, the concept of distributed cognition has provided a suitable basis for thinking about collective knowledge in the philosophy of science. Karin Knorr-Cetina’s and Ronald Giere’s analyses of high energy physics experiments are the most prominent examples. Although they both conceive the processes of knowledge production in these experiments in terms of distributed cognition, their accounts regarding the epistemic subject (...) of knowledge thus produced are quite different. While Knorr-Cetina argues for an irreducibly collective subject, Giere argues for eliminating the epistemic subject and opting for using the passive voice in describing collectively produced knowledge. Neither of these views are easy to assimilate within an epistemological account, since epistemology traditionally operates within an individualist framework. They both entail that we should deny knowledge to individuals when the processes of knowledge production are distributed. I will argue that epistemology should be extended in a way that can accommodate collectively produced knowledge, but that we would have a serious problem if we deny scientific knowledge to individuals. If the members of a large collaboration cannot be said to know, we have to accept the absurd conclusion that either no one or only a supra-individual entity learns from the most successful research collaborations we have. I will argue instead for conceiving research collaborations in terms of a cognitive system that produces knowledge, which can eventually be possessed by constituent individuals when certain conditions are met. Firstly, the distributed research process should be reliable in producing scientific evidence and secondly, there should be a reliable distributed process of criticism for scrutinizing the reliability of the scientific evidence that is collectively produced. I will analyze both conditions in terms of distributed first-order and second-order justification, where I put forward a reliabilist account of justification that is compatible with epistemic dependence. I will conclude that the notion of justified epistemic dependence enables us to attribute knowledge to individuals when knowledge production is irreducibly social. (shrink)