The notion of “enaction,” as originally expounded by Varela and his colleagues, was introduced into cognitive science as part of a broad philosophical framework combining science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy. Its intention was to help the researchers in the field avoid falling prey to various dichotomies bedeviling modern philosophy and science, and serve as a “conceptual evocation” of “non-duality” or “groundlessness: an ongoing and irreducible circulation between the flux of lived experience and the search of reason for conceptual invariants, is (...) to function as conceptual evocations of this back-and-forth exchange between knowing and being. However, if this overall framework is discarded, as is often the case in contemporary accounts, enaction loses its radical impetus and becomes mellowed down to yet another version of naturalized epistemology. Implications: Taking the notion of enaction seriously implies a radical shift in our conceptions of science and knowledge, as it encompasses a theoretical and existential move away from a detached observer to embedded and engaged cognizer. Thus, our manner of thinking can no longer be considered in isolation from our manner of being, which indicates a deep interconnection between epistemology and ethics, and may entail profound changes in the definition of the aims, methods, and values of the research community: self-transformation as a consequence of, and condition for, understanding. Constructivist content: The target article advocates a critical approach to realist presuppositions in contemporary science and philosophy, and emphasizes a deep interrelation between being and knowing, between ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Francisco Varela's extensive body of work spans a wide range of subjects, making it challenging to discern their underlying connections. This issue becomes particularly acute when we compare Varela's early mathematical enquiries with his later phenomenological investigations. I argue that the 'missing link' — the common thread running through Varela's oeuvre — is the act of distinction. When talking about 'distinction', it is important to differentiate between the ready-made distinctions (distinctions as entities) and distinctions in their act of distinguishing (distinctions (...) as processes). My contention is that distinction in this second sense forms the bedrock of Varela's non-dual thought style, the aim of which was to address and supersede the challenges inherent in the dualist (modernist) thought style, especially the infamous two-pronged problem of the bifurcation and disenchantment of nature. The paper delves into Varela's explorations of the act of distinction by tracing its origins in the works of Spencer-Brown, examining its underlying philosophical implications (non-dual onto-epistemology), and exploring its connections to different aspects of his work (form dynamics, autopoiesis, and phenomenology). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the prospect of naturalizing phenomenology within the framework of Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology. In doing so, I follow two main objectives. The first is exegetical. Namely, there is a pronounced discrepancy between Varela’s earlier works on neurophenomenology and his later works on naturalizing phenomenology, with the former receiving considerable scholarly attention and the latter remaining comparatively unknown. This discrepancy is further exacerbated by the fact that, due to his untimely death, Varela failed to produce a comprehensive (...) view of naturalization, leaving us with a plethora of suggestive fragments scattered throughout his later works (some of them published posthumously). Thus, briefly recapitulating the original neurophenomenological program in Section I, I bring some of these fragments together in Section II and make an attempt at elucidating Varela’s position on the topic. My second objective is critical. Section III thus opens with a question of whether the idea of naturalizing phenomenology in the context of neurophenomenology makes sense. I argue that it does not and should therefore be discarded. The reason for this is twofold. First, a strong case could be made that the idea of naturalization is ultimately at odds with the spirit of neurophenomenology; secondly, and relatedly, Varela’s lax use of the term naturalization not only puts it at odds with the more ordinary interpretations of naturalism but also risks emptying it of any substantive content. (shrink)

The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expounded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. I argue that the two authors independently developed complementary critiques of the mechanical-behaviourist conception of life sciences, which culminated in a surprisingly similar notion of life construed as a normative (polarized) activity, i.e., an activity that is not indifferent to its own conditions of possibility. Such an alternative conception of life has far-reaching consequences for the epistemology of life sciences, (...) for it requires it to reconsider not only its object of inquiry - the nature of (the relationship between) an organism and its environment -, but also, since scientists themselves are living beings, the nature of its epistemic practices. What I call the truth of (a specific variety of) vitalism is thus reflected not only in how life is cognized, but also in how life cognizes (itself). This last point is of particular philosophical importance, as it paves the way towards a more dynamic conception of reflection (tentatively called ouroboric thought), which takes seriously that we, as cognizers of life, at the same time live the lives of cognizers. (shrink)

The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) by drawing on the resources available in Canguilhem’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. It consists of six sections. In the first and second section, I outline the so-called ‘mind-life problem’ and two diametrically opposed responses to it: life philosophy (life subsumes mind) and transcendentalism (mind subsumes life). Against this background, I flesh out Canguilhem’s ‘slantwise’ resolution, which argues that, while it is true that life feeds into mind, it (...) is equally true that mind takes up and subl(im)ates life. In the third and fourth section, I focus on the first half of the proposed solution: I start by putting forward a non-reductionist account of life grounded on the idea of vital normativity, and then go on to show how this vital dynamism translates into human cognition via praktognosia (embodied and techn(olog)ical know-how). In the fifth section I tackle the second half of the solution: by delineating the idea of symbolic behavior and ex-centric positionality I try to indicate how mind, while grounded in life, is nonetheless able to transcend it. Finally, in the last section, I suggest that this Janus-faced dynamism between life and mind also holds true for the researcher investigating these topics, and hint at the broader philosophical implication of such a view for the practice of science and philosophy. (shrink)

In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem: Varela’s thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects - notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition - have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method: We identify three dimensions of Varela’s thought: anti-realism of the “middle way”; anti-foundationalism of the circular/recursive onto-epistemology; and ethical/social implications of (...) the circularity/recursivity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela’s work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between “enaction” and “enactivism. Results: We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela’s contributions to science is at least partly linked to the three dimensions of Varela’s thought. Based on our examination we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela’s work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela’s overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently in full bloom. Implications: Reviving interest in Varela’s work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains - theoretical, empirical, and existential - where Varela’s contribution to philosophy and science could instigate prolific exchange of views. Constructivist content: All three dimensions of Varela’s philosophy have strong affinities with radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications. (shrink)

First, we argue that our contribution was not meant as a mythization of Varela’s work, but rather as a Varelian-inspired existential reconstrual of enaction. Second, we expand and elaborate on the notion of dialectics and the role of Buddhist philosophy. Third, we briefly formulate three main domains of investigation for enacting enaction.

Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski.: I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical construal of neurophenomenology. While generally sympathetic to his approach, I argue that, instead of reverting to Hegel’s “dialectics of ideas,” a more suitable candidate for the job would be Merleau-Ponty’s “dialectics of existence.”.

Since I am in general agreement with Werner’s proposal, my commentary focuses on two aspects that might expand and refine it further. The first is historical: by providing a brief account of some of the central notions from the works of Uexküll and Plessner, I indicate why a more encompassing historical and philosophical study of certain trends in philosophy of biology from the first part of the 20th century might be relevant to the topic in question. The second aspect is (...) phenomenological: I problematize Werner’s sparse and simplistic treatment of “experience,” arguing that a closer engagement with phenomenological tradition may yield results that are much more congruent with his overall line of thought. (shrink)

Upshot: Self and Other takes on an ambitious task of articulating an account of selfhood that would do justice both to the experiential and the intersubjectively constructed aspect of the self. We claim that Zahavi argues convincingly against the possibility of reducing the former to the latter, but that he needs to develop his position further in order to offer a convincing account of their interconnectedness.