Humility is increasingly recognized as an essential attribute for individuals at top management levels to build successful organizations. However, research on CEO humility has focused on how humble chief executive officers (CEOs) shape collective perceptions through their interactions and behaviors with other organizational members while overlooking CEOs’ critical role in making strategic decisions. We address this unexplored aspect of CEO humility by proposing that humble CEOs influence decision-making decentralization at the top management team (TMT) and subsequently promote an organizational ethical (...) culture. Using a sample of CEOs and TMT members from 120 small- and medium-sized enterprises, we find strong support for our hypotheses. We discuss important implications for research on CEO humility and strategic leadership. (shrink)

En la interfaz entre la historia intelectual y la sociología de la educación, el artículo aborda los usos de Antonio Gramsci efectuados por la argentina Justa Ezpeleta y la mexicana Elsie Rockwell en los años 70 y 80 en el marco de la estructuración de una etnográfica educativa crítica desde el Departamento de Investigaciones Educativas (DIE), Distrito Federal (México). Durante los años 60/70, en un contexto signado por la radicalización política y teórica, se dirimió la formación académica de Rockwell y (...) Ezpeleta. Tal contexto les permitió un acercamiento creativo al paradigma crítico y a innovadoras experiencias educativas. Ante la irrupción del golpe cívico militar de 1976 en Argentina, Ezpeleta buscará refugio en el Distrito Federal y encontrará en el DIE su lugar de trabajo. Rockwell trabajaba en la institución desde 1973, comprometida en la elaboración y seguimiento de libros de textos. Será el DIE el espacio de encuentro entre Ezpeleta y Rockwell, donde desplegarán una singular línea de investigación: la etnografía educativa crítica. Si bien esta contaba con antecedentes, las autoras establecieron una perspectiva original. Entre sus referentes teóricos, sobresalió el pensamiento de Gramsci, de amplia circulación política y académica durante los 70 y 80 en México. El artículo considera que, en la construcción de la etnografía educativa, los escritos gramscianos fueron empleados en cuatro niveles para: (a) fundamentar la perspectiva epistemológica; (b) dilucidar la historicidad del vínculo entre Estado, sociedad civil e institución escolar; (c) analizar las presencias cotidianas de las clases subalternas en la escuela; (d) cimentar un proyecto político educativo basado en la autonomía y el protagonismo popular. Si bien la recepción de Gramsci en México durante los años 70 y 80 está siendo crecientemente indagada, el plano educativo constituye una vacancia. El artículo expone resultados producidos a través de estrategias y técnicas metodológicas de corte cualitativo. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In this chapter we use methods of corpus linguistics to investigate the ways in which mathematicians describe their work as explanatory in their research papers. We analyse use of the words explain/explanation (and various related words and expressions) in a large corpus of texts containing research papers in mathematics and in physical sciences, comparing this with their use in corpora of general, day-to-day English. We find that although mathematicians do use this family of words, such use is considerably less prevalent (...) in mathematics papers than in physics papers or in general English. Furthermore, we find that the proportion with which mathematicians use expressions related to ‘explaining why’ and ‘explaining how’ is significantly different to the equivalent proportion in physics and in general English. We discuss possible accounts for these differences. (shrink)

What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti-normativism). I argue against (...) both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity. (shrink)

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

This article synthesizes the results of several interviews with argumentation scholars from across the American continents to address three questions regarding the connections in argumentation studies between North and South/Central America: “What motivated the study of argumentation in the Americas?” “What commonalities, if any, exist in argumentation studies across the Americas?” and “What should the future of argumentation studies in the Americas look like?” Using these interviews in combination with existing textual sources, the article also provides motivated suggestions for directions (...) for the future of the community in the field. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

La Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga, Ica-Perú, debido al Covid 19 se adecuó a la virtualidad implementando el aula virtual Laureasea. Esta investigación se realizó durante el semestre académico 2021-1. Objetivo: analizar de qué manera la educación virtual mejora el desempeño docente. Participaron 430 docentes de las 24 facultades respondiendo una encuesta virtual. Resultados significativos: 80% dictó una clase virtual por primera vez, 60% tenía acceso a una aula virtual, 68% ha mejorado su desempeño y 75% prefiere las clases presenciales. (...) Conclusiones: La educación virtual mejora significativamente el desempeño docente y prefieren el dictado de clases presenciales. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

One objection that has been raised for meta-ethical expressivism is that expressivists must give an account of the nature of the attitude which constitutes moral thinking, but that any expressivist account that attempts to do seems to fail. Call this objection the “moral attitude problem.” In this article I suggest a strategy for expressivists to escape this problem: I argue that the moral attitude problem is a problem that arises not only for expressivists but also for meta-ethical cognitivists, and that (...) expressivists can use the same resources used by cognitivists to escape this problem. (shrink)

Kathleen Higgins (2012) claims that emotional responses to music are mostly social constructs, derived from the cultural transmission of musical knowledge. I agree with this general idea, but question Higgins’ ethnocentric and narrow view, which reduces music mainly to the art of combining sounds to produce beauty of form and expression of emotion. Instead, I propose that the distinctive and unique behavior of active music-making evolved culturally to serve a range of adaptive functions in the social environments humans used to (...) live in before the age of playback. Consequently, emotions perceived and induced via music should be studied in such “original” contexts. (shrink)

The amount of information that is produced on a daily basis in the financial markets is vast and complex; consequently, the development of systems that simplify decision-making is an essential endeavor. In this article, several intelligent systems are proposed and tested to predict the closing price of the IBEX 35 index using more than ten years of historical data and five distinct architectures for neural networks. A multi-layer perceptron was the first step, followed by a simple recurrent neural network, a (...) gated recurrent unit network and two long-short-term memory (LSTM) networks. The results of the analyses performed on these models have demonstrated a powerful capacity for prediction. Additionally, the findings of this research point to the fact that the application of intelligent systems can simplify the decision-making process in financial markets, which is a substantial advantage. Furthermore, by comparing the predicted outcome errors between the models, the LSTM presents the lowest error with a higher computational time in the training phase. The LSTM was able to accurately forecast the closing price of the day as well as the price for the following one and two days in advance. In conclusion, the empirical results demonstrated that these models could accurately predict financial data for trading purposes and that the application of intelligent systems, such as the LSTM network, represents a promising advancement in financial technology. (shrink)

Fifteen papers of a 1992 symposium on historical themes of both a hemispheric and a universal level, including new world perceptions, African philosophy and Columbus in textbooks.

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar un análisis contextual de la direccionalidad del marxismo latinoamericano desde la muerte de José Carlos Mariátegui hasta nuestros días. Inevitablemente, este empeño tropieza con las diversas formas en que se ha manifestado el pensamiento de izquierda, con sus disímiles proyecciones, y, sobre todo, con la forma en que ha enfrentado los distintos acontecimientos históricos en el continente. En este sentido, el trabajo parte de la forma auténtica de marxismo, cuya expresión más genuina fue (...) el pensamiento de Mariàtegui,asì como los alejamientos posteriores respecto al marxismo clásico, vislumbrados preferentemente en los posicionamientos teóricos de algunas figuras en la etapa controversial del “empobrecimiento” del marxismo en América Latina(1941-1958).Se reflexiona en torno al mantenimiento de esta tradición crítica del marxismo latinoamericano y la forma que entroniza con otras tendencias de pensamiento denominadas que se ubican dentro de la perspectiva del “pensamiento crítico”. (shrink)

This book presents a clear, deep and accessible overview of the philosophical, developmental and educational foundations of Rudolf Steiner/Waldorf education--as a dynamic, adaptable, creative process for which a profound sense of the uniqueness of each child is foundational. It demystifies Steiner as a philosopher of "freehood" and discusses the threefold human being in psychology. Child development: topics covered include the 12 senses and sensory motor development, language, and inner life. Education principles covered include imitation, purposeful activity and free play; nature; (...) music and the arts; rhythm, structure, trust and security; observing and understanding children; self-development and reflection; comparison with other preschool approaches. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Dies is die erste Untersuchung, die das Gesamtwerk von Hans Jonas in den Blick nimnt. Dabei zeigt sie, warum dessen Religionsphilosophie, Naturphilosophie und Anthropologie die Konsequenzen zeiteigen, die dem Prinzip Verantwortung und besonders seiner Bioethik zu Grunde liegen. Zudem demonstriert der Verfasser,wie eine organische Naturphilosophie ein substantielles Verstandnis vom Menschem schafft, wodurch allein eine tragfahige Bioethik - mit den Problemen, die siehum Lebensbeginn und Lebensende des Menschen gruppieren - begrunder werden kannt. Eine bahnbrechende Arbeit die auf eine eigene Bioethik des (...) Verfassers hoffen lasst. (shrink)

Die sogenannte individualisierte Medizin (IM) ist in den letzten Jahren zu einem Schlagwort in Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit geworden. Wie jede technologische Neuentwicklung hat sie jedoch (potentielle) ethische Implikationen, die es zu berücksichtigen gilt, um eine angemessene Entwicklung und Anwendung individualisierter Präventions- und Therapiemaßnahmen zu ermöglichen. Allerdings steht eine ethische Bewertung der IM vor verschiedenen methodischen Herausforderungen, die sich insbesondere aus der Heterogenität des Problembereichs, begrifflicher Unklarheit sowie dem Frühstadium ihrer Entwicklung ergeben. Der vorliegende Beitrag spezifiziert zunächst den Begriff der (...) IM, um den Kontext der weiteren Überlegungen einzugrenzen. Anschließend wird eine heuristisch zu verstehende Typologie (möglicher) individual- und sozialethischer Implikationen der IM entwickelt. Sie verdeutlicht, dass die IM vorwiegend ethische Probleme aufwirft, die aus anderen biomedizinischen Bereichen bekannt sind. Welche dieser Probleme tatsächlich relevant sind, ist allerdings abhängig von der jeweils spezifischen IM-Maßnahme. Eine adäquate ethische Bewertung kann daher nur durch die Evaluation jedes einzelnen individualisierten Ansatzes erfolgen. (shrink)

Die sogenannte individualisierte Medizin (IM) ist in den letzten Jahren zu einem Schlagwort in Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit geworden. Wie jede technologische Neuentwicklung hat sie jedoch (potentielle) ethische Implikationen, die es zu berücksichtigen gilt, um eine angemessene Entwicklung und Anwendung individualisierter Präventions- und Therapiemaßnahmen zu ermöglichen. Allerdings steht eine ethische Bewertung der IM vor verschiedenen methodischen Herausforderungen, die sich insbesondere aus der Heterogenität des Problembereichs, begrifflicher Unklarheit sowie dem Frühstadium ihrer Entwicklung ergeben. Der vorliegende Beitrag spezifiziert zunächst den Begriff der (...) IM, um den Kontext der weiteren Überlegungen einzugrenzen. Anschließend wird eine heuristisch zu verstehende Typologie (möglicher) individual- und sozialethischer Implikationen der IM entwickelt. Sie verdeutlicht, dass die IM vorwiegend ethische Probleme aufwirft, die aus anderen biomedizinischen Bereichen bekannt sind. Welche dieser Probleme tatsächlich relevant sind, ist allerdings abhängig von der jeweils spezifischen IM-Maßnahme. Eine adäquate ethische Bewertung kann daher nur durch die Evaluation jedes einzelnen individualisierten Ansatzes erfolgen. (shrink)

This article focuses on the question of whether the task of the security authorities to protect public safety can justify unlawful encroachments on fundamental rights committed by them. First, the concept of security is analysed and criticised. This is followed by an analysis of the normative compatibility of the concept of security with the legal system. In particular, the legal principles and the concepts of possibility, probability and risk as standards of assessment for the justification of encroachments on fundamental rights (...) by security authorities as well as predictive policing as measures for determining the concepts are discussed. It is shown that the task of the security authorities to protect public safety cannot justify unlawful encroachments on fundamental rights in any way. (shrink)

The three ancient philosophical introductions translated in this volume flesh out our picture of what it would have been like to sit in a first-year Philosophy course in ancient Alexandria. Ammonius (AD 445-517/26) set up a new teaching programme in Alexandria with up to six introductions to the philosophy curriculum, which made it far more accessible, and encouraged its spread from Greek to other cultures. This volume's three introductory texts include one by his student Olympiodorus and one each by Olympiodorus' (...) students Elias and David. Elias' Introductions to Philosophy starts with six definitions of Philosophy, to which David adds replies to the sceptical question whether there is such a thing as Philosophy. Olympiodorus' text translated here is an Introduction to Logic, which is just one of the three introductions he wrote himself. (shrink)

In his latest book, _Ethics for Capitalists_, Joseph Heath draws on his many years of thinking about business ethics to propose, as the book’s subtitle indicates, “a systematic approach to business ethics, competition, and market failure.” He develops his argument carefully, draws on a wealth of interdisciplinary work, uses valuable and insightful examples, contrasts his views with important alternatives, and provides responses to compelling objections. In this review article, we argue that his book revises and sharpens many of Heath’s earlier (...) ideas, addressing important criticisms raised against them. We highlight that the book also offers a broad macro-level framework for market design, an explanation of how current corporate governance structures fit such a framework, and concrete responses to micro-level questions about what businesses and individuals ought to do. By doing all of this, his book shifts the scope of the “market failures approach” (MFA) from what used to be a narrow focus on the obligations of professional managers to an encompassing “ethics for capitalists” that ought to guide any economic actor within a capitalistic system. Despite the many merits of his book, we conclude by discussing some concerns we have about its scope and methodology. (shrink)

This article examines an episode of Chilean history during the days of the dictatorship of General Pinochet: Ingrid Olderock’s life and her criminal actions against people such as Alejandra Holzapfel and others. I use a secular framework for ethical evaluations of human behaviour related to armed conflicts in Latin America. In that context, I engage the following steps. First, I describe Ingrid Olderock’s life, briefly summarising some facts about her educational and political environment based on Nancy Guzman’s Ingrid Olderock: The (...) Madame of the Torture Dogs. This description is complemented by chronicles recently published by Alejandra Matus. Second, I suggest that the ‘commander’ concept (a concept arising within the ethical distinction between active and reactive actions by Gilles Deleuze) helps to assess the case at hand. Finally, I follow the main idea that human activities can be determined without having a transcendent system of values – an idea traditionally linked with Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s viewpoints, as declared by Deleuze. (shrink)

Für Aristoteles ist das Kontinuum ein potentiell Unendliches. Dieser Unendlichkeitsbegriff, den er neben dem prozessualen und aktualen einführte, wurde im Laufe der Philosophiegeschichte nicht mehr berücksichtigt. So verwenden ihn u.a. weder Kant noch Weyl in ihren Kontinuumsbetrachtungen, obwohl ihr Kontinuumsverständnis ihn geradezu nahelegt. - In dieser Arbeit werden zum einen die ontologischen Kontinuumslehren des Aristoteles und späterer Philosophen und Mathematiker behandelt, zum anderen erfährt die von Aristoteles im 6. Buch der «Physik» vorgelegte strukturelle Kontinuumsuntersuchung eine eingehende Würdigung.

It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. This essay argues (...) that no such special motivational powers are necessary. Yet, at the same time, self-control does powerfully illustrate the importance of a feature of the mind. What it illustrates, I argue, is the importance of the mental activity of attention in the control of all action. It is by appeal to this mental activity that we can dispense with special motivational powers. If we think of Humeanism as the view that there is fundamentally only one kind of motivational system and that all action is based in that system, then this essay contributes to a defense of Humeanism. On the other hand, the essay also shows that any model of agency in terms of only beliefs and desires, motivational and representational states, or preferences and credences is incomplete. A different conception of Humeanism as the view that every mental state is either motivational, representational, or a combination of them, is false. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

El desarrollo de la actividad de estudio a partir de niveles de eficiencia cada vez mayores constituye un requisito indispensable para el tránsito de los estudiantes por la Educación Superior. De igual forma representa un reto para los docentes en el diseño del proceso enseñanza- aprendizaje. En este empeño es necesario prestar atención a los métodos, procedimientos y estrategias que permitan al estudiante la adopción de una posición reflexiva e independiente en la búsqueda del conocimiento, su actualización y aplicación en (...) la diversidad de tareas de estudio que como parte de su formación integral deben realizar. En ello resulta importante el análisis de las vías que favorecen un mejor funcionamiento de la memoria como proceso cognoscitivo fundamental. El presente artículo ofrece elementos teóricos y metodológicos esenciales que pueden servir de guía a docentes y estudiantes en la regulación y autorregulación de los procesos mnémicos desde la perspectiva del estudio eficiente, aspectos que no siempre son valorados en correspondencia con los aportes teóricos existentes. The development of the studying activity, based on ever growing efficiency levels, constitutes an indispensable requirement for the students' passing through higher education. Likewise, this fact represents a challenge for the professors to teach the students how to study. In doing so, it is necessary to pay attention to methods, procedures and strategies that allow the students to take a reflexive and independent position while searching for knowledge, its updating and application in the diversity of studying tasks which as a part of its integral formation the students have to accomplish. It is of uppermost importance the analysis of the ways that favor a better functioning of memory as a fundamental cognitive process. This article offers essential theoretical and methodological elements which may be guidelines to professors and students for regulating and self- regulating the memory processes from an efficient study perspective, which are not always valued in correspondence to the existing theoretical outcomes on the field. (shrink)

Firm managers play an important role in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. Education is emerging as the key factor in developing a sense of moral responsibility amongst the business students who will eventually become company managers and decision makers. The aim of this research is, thus, twofold. First, to analyze the existence of a direct positive correlation between university students’ perception of CSR and its impact on business performance; and second, to examine the extent to which two (...) factors (advantages brought by CSR and responsibilities toward stakeholders) act as mediation variables in the aforementioned correlation. The analysis was performed with a sample of 390 business‐related university students. Amongst the potential contributions made by this study we can highlight the possibility of knowing future managers’ way of thinking and of knowing the aspects where educational centers might improve their CSR teaching. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another (...) element of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that consideration of alternative claims, theories, or worldviews is necessary for a proper or sound critical assessment of a claim or set of claims. However, an understanding of interpretation and beliefs as inherently holistic suggests that interpretation already involves the recogllition of alternatives, and that therefore assessment also necessarily involves their comparison. Starting from this idea, it will be argued that presuppositions can be regarded as limits to the range of alternatives that are considered by the (...) author of the claims, as seen by an interpreter making the assessment. However, a result of this consists in the fact that these assumptions can only be found in the conversational interaction between the author’s and the interpreter’s broader belief systems. Some implications for a conversational form of criticality will also be derived from here. (shrink)

Tocqueville, como todos los grandes clásicos, es inagotable. A man for all seasons, como lo prueba su reciente éxito en China y Japón, dos países y dos sistemas políticos tan alejados de la historia europea y del modelo democrático que él describió que le hubiera parecido sorprendente que le utilizaran como referencia. Ser un clásico inagotable con solo dos obras de obligada lectura es un logro del que pocos pueden vanagloriarse. Quizá Hobbes, quizá John Locke, dos de los autores que (...) menciona Lucien Jaume en el primer artículo de este monográfico que presentamos en la revista Araucaria. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

The issue of what constitutes a valid logical inference is a difficult question. At a minimum, we believe a permissible step in a proof must provide the reader with rational grounds to believe that the new step is a logically necessary consequence of previous assertions. However, this begs the question of what constitutes these rational grounds. Formalist accounts typically describe valid rules of inferences as those that can be found by applying one of the explicit rules of inference in the (...) formal system in which the proof is couched. However, philosophers of mathematics find such a description unhelpful because many inferences in the proofs that mathematicians actually produce cannot be expressed in a formal language, at least not without seriously distorting the semantic content of the inference (e.g., Larvor, 2012). In this chapter, we investigate mathematicians’ perceptions of a particular kind of inference in a particular setting. Specifically, we shed light on what types of graphical inferences mathematicians find permissible in a real analysis proof. Following Larvor (in press), we examine mathematicians’ reactions to metrical graphical inferences (i.e., inferences whose validity depends on the accuracy of the graph that was drawn and whose validity can be changed by minor deformations) and nonmetrical graphical inferences (i.e., inferences whose validity does not depend on a the accuracy of the graph and whose validity is not vulnerable to local deformations). The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, we demonstrate that most mathematicians reject metrical graphical inferences as impermissible in a real analysis proof. Second, we show that many mathematicians regard nonmetrical graphical inferences as permissible in a real analysis proofs. Third, we illustrate how mathematicians collectively disagree on the permissibility of nonmetrical inferences. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Mathematical explanations are poorly understood. Although mathematicians seem to regularly suggest that some proofs are explanatory whereas others are not, none of the philosophical accounts of what such claims mean has become widely accepted. In this paper we explore Wilkenfeld’s suggestion that explanations are those sorts of things that generate understanding. By considering a basic model of human cognitive architecture, we suggest that existing accounts of mathematical explanation are all derivable consequences of Wilkenfeld’s ‘functional explanation’ proposal. We therefore argue that (...) the explanatory criteria offered by earlier accounts can all be thought of as features that make it more likely that a mathematical proof will generate understanding. On the functional account, features such as characterising properties, unification, and salience correlate with explanatoriness, but they do not define explanatoriness. (shrink)

John L. Austin estableció desde su teoría de los actos de habla, que la persuasión es un acto perlocucionario, es decir, uno de los efectos producido por un hablante sobre otro mediante un discurso. Aristóteles ya había definido la retórica como la facultad de considerar en cada caso lo que cabe para persuadir. Aquí nos proponemos mostrar que para Aristóteles la persuasión se produce, ciertamente, por el discurso, pero que las pasiones también son necesarias para producirla. Si esto es así, (...) ellas deben poder expresarse mediante el lenguaje discursivo. Con el fin de demostrar lo anterior, vamos a proceder de la siguiente manera: Primero se señala la conexión que se establece entre persuasión y opinión, y de ésta con la palabra. Segundo, dado lo anterior, se precisa que además de que el hombre se comunica -algo que también hacen los animales-, también se expresa mediante el lenguaje discursivo. Finalmente, haremos la siguiente consideración: si mediante las pasiones se producen cambios en el cuerpo, y ellas mismas son sentidas por el alma, entonces, sobre ellas el hombre también podría construir enunciados. (shrink)

En el libro II de la Retórica se encuentra un estudio sobre las pasiones, las cuales, como bien lo afirma Aristóteles, influyen en la formación del juicio y por tanto en la toma de decisiones; esto hace pensar en su posible incidencia en la conformación de las comunidades humanas, lo cual puede ser inicialmente abordado desde los vínculos que una retórica de las pasiones tiene con la política y con la ética. En la parte final de este artículo se muestra (...) la cercanía que puede existir entre el término de pasión utilizado por Aristóteles, y el sentimiento moral de P. Strawson y E. Tugendhat, con el fin de iniciar una reflexión sobre el valor que la retórica de las pasiones de Aristóteles puede tener en los estudios contemporáneos. (shrink)