Adapting critical methods from such wide-ranging fields as anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, biology, and other sciences, Schapiro appraises fundamental semantic terms such as "organic style," "pictorial style", "field and vehicle," and "form and content"; he elucidates eclipsed intent in a well-known text by Freud on Leonardo da Vinci, in another by Heidegger on Vincent van Gogh.

Feeling like doing something is not the same as deciding to do it. When you feel like doing something, you are still free to decide to do it or not. You are having an inclination to do it, but you are not thereby determined to do it. I call this the moment of drama. This book is about what you are faced with, in this moment. How should you relate to the inclinations you “have,” given that you are free to (...) “act on” them or not? To answer this question, we need an account of what sort of thing we are relating to, in this moment. But here we find a genuine philosophical problem. Our inclinations are forms of motivation, with respect to which we are distinctively passive. To be motivated is to be self-moved. But how can we be passive in relation to our own self-movement? Is our relation to our inclinations like that of rider to horse? Or is it like our relation to our own, spontaneous judgments or perceptions? I lay out three constraints on any theory of inclination, and I argue that familiar theories fail to meet them, because they make being inclined to φ‎ too similar or dissimilar to φ‎-ing. I then put forward the “inner animal” view, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you is not. In this moment, your will is “at a crossroads.” You can humanize your inclination, or dehumanize yourself. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard has had a profound influence on moral philosophy over the past forty years. Through her writing and teaching she has developed a distinctive, rigorous, and historically informed way of thinking about ethics, agency, and the normative dimension of human life more generally. The twelve original essays in this volume are written in her honor on the occasion of her retirement from teaching. They engage questions that recur in her work: Why are we obligated to do what morality (...) demands? What features of our nature make us subject to moral obligation? What does it mean to be autonomous and responsible for what we do? What do we owe to nonhuman animals? Contributors include Stephen Darwall, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Barbara Herman, Richard Moran, Japa Pallikkathayil, Faviola Rivera-Castro, T.M. Scanlon, Tamar Schapiro, Sharon Street, David Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, and David Velleman. These essays shed light on Korsgaard's own views while staking out provocative new positions on the topics that feature centrally in her own work. (shrink)

In this paper I try to undermine complacency with a predominant conception of desire, for the sake of refocusing attention on a philosophical problem. The predominant conception holds that to have a desire is to occupy an evaluative outlook, a perspective from which the agent 'sees' the world in practically salient terms. I argue that it is not clear what this theory is a theory of, because the concept of desire at its center is deeply ambiguous. Understood as a theory (...) of desire in what I call the "placeholder" sense, the evaluative outlook theory is at bottom a theory of action explanation. So construed, its claim is relatively uncontroversial, and falls far short of being a full theory of action explanation. Understood as a theory of desire in what I call the "substantive" sense, it does not even go so far as to acknowledge the central problem such a theory has to answer. That problem is how we can be passive (in a particular sense) with respect to our own motivation. (shrink)

There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.

The utilitarian conception, which I call “action as production,” holds that action is a way of making use of the world, conceived as a causal mechanism. According to the rational intuitionist conception, which I call “action as assertion,” action is a way of acknowledging the value in the world, conceived as a realm of status. On the Kantian constructivist conception, which I call “action as participation,” action is a way of making the world, qua causal mechanism, come to count as (...) a realm of status. My rather limited aim in this paper is to identify three substantively different answers the question of how action relates an agent to the world, regarded as a context of action. (shrink)

In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...) show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. (shrink)

Adapting critical methods from such wide-ranging fields as anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, biology, and other sciences, Schapiro appraises fundamental semantic terms such as "organic style," "pictorial style", "field and vehicle," and "form and content"; he elucidates eclipsed intent in a well-known text by Freud on Leonardo da Vinci, in another by Heidegger on Vincent van Gogh.

A task of any moral theory is to account for both the rigidity and the flexibility of moral rules. Utilitarianism faces the problem of building rigidity into a framework that tends towards objectionable flexibility. Kantianism faces the problem of building flexibility into a framework that tends towards objectionable rigidity. I offer an argument on this front on behalf of Kantians. I show how Kantians can maintain that actions are right and wrong "in themselves," while still maintaining that such actions can (...) be corrupted under certain "nonideal" circumstances. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWith over 560 citations reported on Google Scholar by April 2018, a publication by Juslin and Gabrielsson presented evidence supporting performers’ abilities to communicate, with hig...

This chapter is about philosophical method. The Kantian method in the theory of agency is often characterized as a “first-person” method. But what does this mean? I motivate this question by showing how Kantians and most non-Kantians routinely fail to communicate when debating each other about the nature of human agency. I trace this failure to a more fundamental difference in philosophical method, one that tends to go unacknowledged. Most non-Kantian theories of agency, including belief/desire theories and their variants, address (...) the question, “What happens when someone acts?” Kant’s theory, I claim, addresses the question, “What am I doing insofar as I am acting?” As long as this difference remains unarticulated and unexplained, Kantian and non-Kantian theorists of agency will continue to talk past one another. (shrink)

Drawing on parallels in Hutcheson and Hume, I raise two worries about Bratman’s theory of shared agency. First, has Bratman captured the interpersonal character of shared agency? Second, has he captured its practical character? By “its practical character,” I mean the sense in which shared agency is something we can undertake under that description, and not just a condition we might happen to find ourselves in? I argue that Bratman’s theory falls short of answering this second worry. The source of (...) the shortcoming, I argue, is a fundamental methodological commitment that structures his action theory as a whole. This is the commitment to regard the concepts of action and shared action as empirical concepts, rather than as practical concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I develop an analogy between an interpersonal hierarchy and an intrapersonal hierarchy. The analogy is between the authority of adults over children, and the authority of our willing selves over our wanting selves. The analogy allows us to see how each hierarchy is rooted in an asymmetry that is natural and not merely conventional.

In His first essay, The Unity of Picasso's Art, Schapiro dismantles this apparent paradox by finding unity through hidden associations among seemingly disparate works and unsuspected ties to Picasso's personal experiences.".

El artículo expone el contexto de la última dictadura militar en la Argentina, y el posterior camino en el juzgamiento de los crímenes de lesa humanidad que tuvieron lugar en ese período. Se describe cómo se utilizaron las leyes amnistías e indulto en el caso argentino, y se analiza la incompatibilidad de estos mecanismos en el juzgamiento de delitos de lesa humanidad, en virtud de los compromisos y obligaciones internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos de suscriptos por los Estados. (...) Además, se estudia el rol de las víctimas y el concepto de reparación, un elemento primordial en este tipo de procesos y en particular en el derecho penal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Another Bioethics Commission?Renie Schapiro (bio)Ever Since the Ill-Fated Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee (BEAC) ended almost before it began a few years ago, bioethicists and the members of Congress who take an interest in them have wondered whether a governmental commission is still a feasible way to address bioethics issues.The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in the 1970s, and the President's (...) Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in the early 1980s, have generally received high marks for their work. But since the expiration of the President's Commission in 1983, no federal body has been able to sustain the momentum.Tempers around the abortion issue couldn't be tamed enough even to elect a board chairman for the BEAC, or for the body to begin studying the issues. From its inception, abortion politics threatened to dog its work.Both the National Commission and the President's Commission studied issues touching on the abortion question. The President's Commission reported on genetic screening. The National Commission looked at fetal research. Both were able to produce respected reports that largely steered clear of the abortion acrimony.But that was then. The question facing policy makers inside the Beltway is how we can learn from the past experiences to make some new body work now. The question extends far beyond the abortion issue, of course.When certain people in Washington start asking questions, the answer usually comes by way of a study. Sometimes, as in this case, more than one study.In the March 1992 issue, this Journal reported on an Institute of Medicine study on ethics commissions. That study is still underway. It is scheduled to be completed in January 1994.More recently, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an arm of Congress, also took on the issue. The OTA project is intended to be a quicker, more confined study. It began last fall and a final report is expected later this month.The primary force behind the OTA study is Senator Mark Hatfield. In a September 8, 1992 letter, co-signed by Senators Edward Kennedy and Dennis DeConcini, he asked OTA to prepare a background report to assist Congress in [End Page 77] "determining what is the best approach to explaining policy problems with biomedical and ethical dimensions."The letter noted: "As the 21st Century approaches, Congress will face policy dilemmas for which an informed decision can only be made through understanding not just the legal or economic dimensions of the questions, but the ethical considerations as well."Hatfield's interest in bioethics issues over the past few years has centered largely on biotechnology, and particularly patent rights. He had planned to introduce legislation to put a moratorium on patenting of genetically altered organisms, which according to Hatfield staffer Douglas Pahl caused a "firestorm" in the biotechnology community.As a result, Kennedy and DeConcini said they would hold hearings on the issue if Hatfield would withdraw the amendment. The three agreed to request a short-term OTA report on possible governmental structures for dealing with bioethics issues and a longer report looking at patenting issues.In their letter, the three senators asked OTA to prepare a history of bioethics in public policy. Referring specifically to the past commissions, they asked, "What lessons can we learn from each of these—or similar—entities? What worked, or did not work, and why?" The request also asked OTA to examine international institutions.In response to the request, OTA held a workshop entitled "Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy" on December 4, 1992. It brought together 15 people who had participated in commissions—from local to international—as well as observers of these bodies and health professionals who used their products.1According to project director Robyn Nishimi, the workshop was meant to be a free-wheeling discussion. Although there was no total consensus, the focus of the discussion tended to be on how to make a commission function effectively, rather than on whether there should be one. That workshop will be part of a report of about 40-60 pages OTA hopes to... (shrink)

Towards Justice and Virtue is Onora O’Neill’s most developed account thus far of her distinctive approach to moral and political philosophy. Readers who are already familiar with O’Neill’s articles and her two previous books will appreciate the way it brings together in one sustained and rigorous argument the various themes which have occupied her attention over the years. Those who are new to O’Neill’s work will find in it a lucid, accessible, and provocative challenge to contemporary ethical theories.

In these brief comments, I explore some ambiguities concerning John Deigh's notion of empathy in relation to morality and justice. First, does Deigh conceive of empathy as a morally neutral capacity that can be used for good or bad purposes or, rather, as a capacity that presupposes a moral orientation? I look to his previous work and find evidence supporting both readings. I suggest that the right way to understand empathy is as a moral notion. Empathy is the product of (...) an activity—the activity of empathizing. This activity in turn presupposes a certain moral orientation: one that involves placing a certain kind of value on others. I then ask whether Deigh equates empathy with the sense of justice. I do not believe he does, but still he does not say much about the relation between them. I suggest that while the two are not the same, and while there can be tension between them, they ultimately stem from the same basic moral orientation, one that at least vaguely resembles the morality of cooperation. (shrink)