The philosophical investigation of consciousness has a long-standing history in both Indian and Western thought. The conceptual models and analyses that have emerged in one cultural framework may be profitably reviewed in the light of another. In this context, a study of the notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is not only important as a focus on a remarkable achievement in the context of Western thought, but is also useful for an appreciation of the concern with (...) this question in the Indian philosophical tradition, and especially in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta of Ādi Śamkara. The starting point for this paper is the belief that phenomenology has a recognizably common face for both these traditions. This paper investigates the possibility of a parallel notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the Advaita Vedānta of Śamkara, with particular emphasis on Husserl’s ‘Transcendental I’ and Śamkara’s ‘Witness Consciousness’ (Sākshi Caitanya). In the process, it explores the phenomenological relevance of the concept of consciousness in Indian philosophy, with special reference to the concept of pure consciousness as one of the essential criteria for any sound theory of knowledge. It more importantly highlights the Advaitic understanding of pure consciousness as one of the major contributions to the field of comparative philosophy that forms a vantage point for cross-cultural comparison. While pointing to significant differences in their respective approaches to understanding the nature of consciousness, the exploration finally unveils the common thesis for both Śamkara and Husserl that ‘pure consciousness’ is essentially foundational, evidencing and absolute for any epistemic act. (shrink)

This commentary is a response to ‘More than Skin Deep’ by Shelley M. Park, and a development of our own 2020 paper ‘The Whiteness of AI’. We aim to explain how representations of AI can be varied in one sense, whilst not being diverse. We argue that Whiteness’s claim to universal humanity permits a broad range of roles to White humans and White-presenting machines, whilst assigning a much narrower range of stereotypical roles to people of colour. Because the attributes of (...) AI in the popular imagination, such as intelligence, power and passing as human, are associated by the White racial frame with Whiteness, AI is cast predominantly as White. Following Sparrow, we suggest this presents a dilemma for those creating or representing AI. We discuss three possible solutions: avoiding anthropomorphisation, explicitly critiquing racial role-typing, and representing powerful AI as non-White. (shrink)

Treatise on the fundamentals of Sankhya philosophy with commentary.

Yashastilaka by Somadeva, composed in ce 959, is a Jaina religious romance written in Sanskrit prose and verse. It is notable as an encyclopaedic record of literary, socio-political, religious and philosophical data that throws light on the cultural history of the Deccan in early medieval India. This volume presents a critical study of the work, providing a comprehensive picture of the life and thought of the time of Somadeva. It begins with a discussion on Somadeva and his age and gives (...) a synopsis of Yashastilaka. it examines the Yashastilaka as a prose and a religious romance, a socio-political record and as an anthology of Sanskrit verse. The book discusses various philosophical doctrines in Indian thought. With many detailed references and footnotes, it reveals the Yashastilaka as a work that expounds the cardinal teachings of Jainism. It throws light on Jaina dogmatics, religious poetry, moral and religious stories, and myths and legends in the process of examining the work. The volume also has supplementary notes incorporating the results of studies on Somadeva's relations with the Vemulavada Calukyas and the locality in which he wrote his masterpiece. (shrink)

В монографии дано теоретическое обоснование концепции свободы и права в трудах выдающегося философа И. Канта. Показана значимость наследия И. Канта для дальнейшего развития теоретической мысли в области юридической науки и действующего законодательства.

The article is devoted to the S. Gogotskomu, outstanding Ukrainian philosopher. Proceedings Gogotskogo played a crucial role in spreading the philosophy of I. Kant in Ukraine.

Za „ojca” filozoficznej kategorii „godności”, która legła u podstaw kategorii prawnej, uznawany jest powszechnie Immanuel Kant. Przypomnieć jednak trzeba, że w bardzo podobny sposób, choć w zasadniczo odmiennym kontekście systemowym, charakteryzował godność Tomasz z Akwinu, pół tysiąca lat wcześniej, uznając ją za fundament bycia osobą. Stąd najistotniejszym i centralnym elementem, tytułowej, klasycznej koncepcji człowieka jest koncepcja godności. Akwinata jest autorem bodaj najbardziej rozbudowanej koncepcji osoby w tradycji filozofii klasycznej. Co więcej zmierzać będę do wykazania, że jego koncepcja lepiej nadaje się (...) do teoretycznego ugruntowania praw człowieka niż koncepcja Kanta. Rekonstruując propozycję Kanta ograniczam się, zasadniczo rzecz biorąc, do analizy Uzasadnienia metafizyki moralności. Interesować będą mnie zagadnienia podstawowe, przede wszystkim – wynikające z różnicy kontekstów systemowych – różnice w pojmowaniu bycia celem samym w sobie. W perspektywie ontologicznej koncentrować się będę na powiązaniu godności z indywidualnością; w perspektywie antropologicznej – na tym, jakiego typu działania stanowią o doskonałości człowieka, jakie działania (czym określone) realizują człowieka jako cel sam w sobie. W szczególności interesować się będę miejscem rozumu i woli w określaniu treści działań (w perspektywie kantowskiej będzie to pytanie o określenie treści powinności; w perspektywie Tomasza – pytanie o treść realizowanego dobra). Zasadnicze pytanie, które leży u podłoża podjętej problematyki antropologicznej, jest pytaniem o to, na ile dla pojmowania godności istotne jest uznanie woli jako w sposób wolny współokreślającej treść powinności (Kant) lub dobra (Akwinata), a na ile woli jedynie podążającej za poznaną powinnością lub poznanym dobrem. Zmierzać będę do uzasadnienia tezy, że koncepcja Akwinaty w ugruntowaniu godności akcentuje wprost indywidualność opartą na wyborze czegoś, co nie jest jednoznacznie treściowo obiektywnie zdeterminowane i co wykracza poza to, co powszechne, poza to, co gatunkowe; natomiast koncepcja Kanta godność wiąże przede wszystkim z tym, co powszechne, gatunkowe i zapoznaje doniosłość indywidualności dla pojmowania godności. (shrink)

       As is appropriate for an introductory text, Douglas Burnham’s book opens with a chapter providing general background information on Kant, a systematic overview of the whole Critical philosophy, a sketch of the basic issues dealt with in the third Critique, and an explanation of the overall structure of Kant’s book. Here and throughout Burnham’s book each section ends with a helpful summary, with diagrams and other convenient “lists†being supplied along the way for (...) added clarity. For the most part, these summaries are reliable. The author’s interpretations, however, occasionally suffer from some rather unfortunate mistakes. For example, when contrasting the categories with the principles (p.14), Burnham cites the principle of non-contradiction as the primary example; yet Kant’s expressed reason for mentioning this “principle†in A150- 3/B189-93 is to contrast it with the principles that function as applications of the categories. Likewise, while Burnham’s catalogue of the four “parts of sensibility†(pp.13-14), composed by grouping imagination (reproductive and productive) together with sensation and pure intuition, makes for an intriguing interpretation, especially as applied to the third Critique, he does not inform his (unknowing) student reader that the position he presents is far from being expressed so unambiguously in Kant’s text.        The main content of Burnham’s book is divided into five chapters that follow a more or less predictable – though sometimes rather idiosyncratic – order. Chapter 1 explains three of the four “moments†of beauty, but does so in a manner that wholly neglects Kant’s own understanding of their architectonic unity. Burnham discusses the second moment (universality) first, the first moment (disinterestedness) second, and the fourth moment (necessity) third! Moreover, he then devotes the entirety of Chapter 2 to a discussion of the third moment (purposiveness).. (shrink)

The author rejects the opinion that Kant’s views on mathematics lend in any interesting sense support to constructivism, understood as the thesis that the truth conditions of mathematical propositions consist in the existence of their constructive proofs or in the possibility of proving them constructively. Kant’s insistence on the role of intuitive construction in mathematics is here interpreted as a thesis concerning mathematical concepts, not mathematical objects, and therefore not in any sense implying that the objects of mathematical cognition cannot (...) be interpreted classically. (shrink)

Artykuł stara się podać argumenty za hipotezą, że pijar litewski ks. Kazimierz Narbutt był filozofem, który miał zaszczyt jako pierwszy na wschodzie, a być może w całej Europie, krytykować przedkrytyczne poglądy Immanuela Kanta. W 1765 roku, w swoim wykładzie filozofii w Kolegium Pijarów w Dąbrowicy Narbut krytykuje pojęcie substancji zaproponowane przez „metafizyka Cantziusa”. Osobą wskazaną jako „Cantzius” mógł być albo Immanuel Kant, albo teolog Gottlieb Izrael Canz. W artykule zostały podane dwa argumenty dotyczące stanowiska Steponasa Tunaitisa: osobą, która została (...) określona przez Narbuta, nie mógł być Canz, ponieważ wyrażany przez niego pogląd był reprezentatywny dla teologii Wolffiańskiej. To stanowisko filozoficzne było zbliżone do samego Narbuta, jego koncepcja istoty substancji jest taka sama, jak szkoły Wolffa. Canz nie mógł dostarczyć pojęcia substancji, które byłoby sprzeczne z poglądem szkoły Wolffa. Drugi argument, odnosi się do głównej tezy Kanta zawartej w jego pracy z 1755 pt. Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidato można przypisać „metafizykowi Cantziusowi” jeśli chodzi o istotę, atrybuty i cele Boga, które zostały zakwestionowane przez Narbuta. To jednocześnie pozwala nam uznać, że Narbut zapoznał się bezpośrednio lub pośrednio z wyżej wymienionym dziełem Kanta. Osoba, o której mowa w tekście Narbuta, to nikt oprócz Kanta, który zajmował się w tym czasie zagadnieniami metafizycznymi. (shrink)

Author: Kupś Tomasz Title: IMMANUEL KANT’S EXPLANATION OF THE TEXT OF THE BIBLE (Immanuela Kanta wykładnia tekstu Biblii) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 59-70 Keywords: KANT, BIBLE, SCRIPTURE, HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article consists of two parts. The first is the historical reconstruction of the fortunes of Kant’s private copy of the Scripture. The book was lost during the Second World War and (...) the information about Kant’s notes made on its margins come only from commentators’ studies. The second part contains a short comparison of the main assumptions and rules of moral interpretation of the Scripture’s text. The rules can be traced in two works of Kant: Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone and The Conflicts of the Faculties. (shrink)

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache. - Dt. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Fragen und Perspektiven des Transzendentalismus.

The paper deals with Kant’s writing Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester, 1765–1766. It aims to analyse the text on two levels. The first concentrates on the systematic character of the writing in Kant’s overall heritage. The second aim of the paper is to point out the importance of the writing to Kant’s philosophy of culture and his pedagogical theory.

The article is an attempt not only to refer again, but also interpret some pivotal elements of the concept of sublimity presented in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Kant presented a source interpretation of the category referring to sublime phenomena of nature or simple works of art, but such delineating of the field of interest was caused by the epistemological aims of the third Critique. In this presentation I would like to widen Kant’s interpretation of the conception and add some references (...) of the sense of freedom to the content of psychological character. This problems are a subject of intensive research among Torun aestheticians. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the earliest reception and the first interpretative attempts of Kant’s philosophy on Polish lands; it also gives an outline of the first Polish Kantians, who had the opportunity to meet the Königsberg philosopher. Two of them deserve particular attention: Józef Bychowiec and Krzysztof Celestyn Mrongowiusz. Who both attended Kant’s lectures and were the first Polish experts at his philosophy and translators of his works. Other Polish thinkers, such as Jan Śniadecki or Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski, whose (...) knowledge of Kant was narrowed to his works, are also mentioned in the article. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present the views of the Russian philosopher Leonard Alexandrovich Kalinnikov on Kant’s philosophy. This article demonstrates one of the important aspects thinks Kaliningrad resident, namely the rules interpretation system of Kant. The article consists of three parts, the first presents a brief biography of the Russian thinker, the second presents ten rules, without which the thoughts of Kalinnikov can not do any decent system researcher Kant, the third contains conclusions. This reception is based (...) on an earlier esoteric-teleological assumption about the whole system. Kant’s System, according to Kalinnikov, must be reconstructed and presented on the basis of three Critiques, which organically contain internal rules for their interpretation. As a final of the nine principles of interpretation, Kalinnikov proposes one universal principle of the unity of the world. This principle consists in the monistic reading of the question about human, which is intended to encapsulate the system in its entirety as a world of phenomena, things-in-themselves, and their human mediator. (shrink)

The paper aims at presenting Dowgird’s attitude toward various topics in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant – its main objective is to specify and characterise those of Dowgird’s convictions which are of a direct relevance to the issues posed within transcendental idealism. The paper delivers the most important information concerning Dowgird’s life, a general outline of his philosophical conceptions against the background of Polish Enlightenment philosophy, and – in the main part – an articulation of these elements in Dowgird’s philosophy (...) which stand in a clear opposition to Kant’s views. The main aim of analyses presented in the paper is to justify the thesis that Dowgird’s attitude toward Kant’s philosophy was a complex, highly critical one, though different from that of other Polish philosophers of the nineteenth century. Dowgird’s uniqueness lies in the fact, first, that his analyses of Kant’s theories – in comparison with efforts of his Enlightenment contemporaries – were much more substantial, very scrupulous and exceptionally sophisticated, and second, that many of the problems discussed by Kant were approved by Dowgird as rightful philosophical issues. (shrink)

[Heidegger’s “always still an interpretation” of Kant].

"Traditional interpretations of Kantian idea of autonomy – based on the classical texts such as Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten – stress basically one point: action is autonomous only when an agent obeys the law. In this paper, the author tries to introduce an interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy, which covers a wider perspective, resulting in the idea of “radical autonomy”. Re-reading classical texts of Kant in connection with Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (...) and Tugendlehre I try to show, that Kant’s conception of autonomy also allows for acting, that is not determined by the law (i.e. categorical imperative). Roughly, to be radically autonomous you do not have to be necessarily moral (there are other conditions that make your autonomy valid). This paper adopts reasons of „historicistic enlightment” (Schnädelbach), which is rather contrary to the general anti-historicistic context of Kant’s philosophy. Although this approach seems to be against the Kantian „metaphysical hipotheque” (e.g.: pure Faktum der Vernunft, absolute justification/Grundlegung of morality), it provides a (re)interpretation that allows to defend the broadened idea of autonomy. And this ‘radical autonomy’ shows some explanatory attractiveness of Kant’s ethical theory in the contemporary critical horizon of historicism. ". (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order (...) to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept. (shrink)

The article is trying to present reception not as such, but as a problem which reception is for historian of philosophy. It is clearly visible in the process of formation on neo-Kantianism, which programme distance themselves from any orthodoxy. As a consequence there is a need of treating a neo-philosophy as original and one-off phenomenon and not a renewal of old philosophy. As an example can serve a dead dog motif present at Hegel and Jacobi related to Spinoza.

From Fichte to Kant and back. Several considerations on Marek J. Siemek’s concept of transcendentalism: The basic interpretation claim presented in Marek J. Siemek’s book is that Kant created a completely new level of philosophical reflection, for which the epistemological question remains characteristic. This question — in contrast to the epistemic questions posed before Kant — neither solely focuses on the problem of the ontic structure of the reality nor it does on the cognitive conditions which enable a subject to (...) get to know the latter. The epistemological question deals with the very relationship that occurs between the cognition and the reality and constitutes both the ontological and cognitive conditions of knowledge. According to Siemek, Kant developed a transcendental perspective, but only Fichte was able to fully develop it, while Kant dealt with interweaving epistemic and epistemological threads. However, one can defend the thesis that Kantian solutions, on the one hand, are much more strongly situated on the epistemological level of reflection than Siemek was ready to admit, and on the other hand, they offer a weaker model of transcendentalism which — in contrast to the stronger Fichte’s model — explores only the impassable limits of transcendental reflection. (shrink)

Hersz Bad (1869–1942) was Kazimierz Twardowski’s student and belonged to the first generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School members. He specialized in the history of philosophy and led a number of remarkable analyses concerning Kant’s philosophy. At the example of his work one may see, how the methodological postulates of the Lvov Warsaw School were fulfilled at the field of historical philosophical investigations. The goal of the paper is to present Bad’s main achievements and to evaluate their meaning from the point (...) of view of the current state of research of Kant’s philosophy. To be reviewed in detail are Bad’s remarks concerning the scientific status of the so called Kant-Laplace Theory as well as the validity of its name. (shrink)

The article presents the views of Benedict Bornstein, formulated in his early writings, such as The Pre-established Transcendental Harmony as the Foundation of Kant’s Theory and The Basic Problem of Kant’s Theory of Cognition. These views pertain to the Kantian dualism of concepts and intuitions and they are presented against the background of the contemporary debate about the contents of perceptual experience. Recognizing the rightness of Bornstein’s claim about the non-conceptual character of the Kantian intuitions, I criticize Bornstein’s solution to (...) the problem of dualism, which necessitates an appeal to the conception of transcendental harmony, established by an act of God’s will. (shrink)

Referat stanowi próbę rekonstrukcji poglądów moralnych i etycznych Krzysztofa Celestyna Mrongowiusza, skrystalizowanych w okresie pobytu w Królewcu, gdzie był studentem tamtejszej Albertyny i uczniem Kanta. Ważnym składnikiem duchowej formacji młodego Mrongowiusza stał się religijny nurt pietyzmu, wywierający w ówczesnych czasach jeszcze znaczny wpływ na atmosferę życia umysłowego zarówno Królewca jak i Albertyny. Wpływ ten widoczny jest także w późniejszych głoszonych przez pastora Mrongowiusza kazaniach. Natomiast fakt dokonanego u schyłku życia przekładu na język polski i publikacji w Gdańsku notatek z (...) królewieckich wykładów wydanych jako „Rozprawa filozoficzna o religii i moralności” Kanta świadczy o wierności gdańskiego kaznodziei wobec nauki moralnej swego najsłynniejszego nauczyciela i zamiarze przekazania jej rodakom jako rodzaj duchowego testamentu. (shrink)

In the article, I engage with H.G.Gadamer’s reading of Kant’s aesthetic theory. Gadamer accused Kant of subjectivizing the aesthetic experience so that it would be reduced to the free play of the cognitive faculties of the subject. Consequently, the ethical dimension of aesthetic experience that played such an important role in the preceding tradition of European humanism has been lost. Yet, this charge of Gadamer is not quite right. The connection between the experience of beauty and ethics has been maintained (...) by Kant, but it has assumed a different form. The free, disinterested beauty of the objects of nature, on his account, harmonizes with the disinterested experience of the moral law. Similarly, the dependent beauty of the work of art appeals to the ethical dimension of the human being. As a result of this, the connection between aesthetics and ethics not only has not been severed by Kant, but it has also assumed an entirely new, radical form. (shrink)

HOW TO PERSUADE KANT TO LIE? THE APORIES OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE Some critical interpreters of Kant’s ethics accuse it for not corresponding to our common moral convictions. Kant claims that we are not allowed to lie to a murderer at the door even when he wants to kill his victim being our friend hidden by us. In this paper I argue against the opinion that there is a sufficient justification for this restriction in Kant’s ethics. If we reconsider the central (...) point of Kant’s moral theory, which is categorical imperative, we will find several arguments for accepting lying in some cases. What is more, in extreme situations we are obliged to lie, for example when it is the only way to save the innocent victim’s life. Thus, one can suggest that Kant interpreted his own theory in a wrong way. In conclusion, I advocate for the view that, after all, Kant’s theory remains in agreement with the common moral intuitions. (shrink)

The article concerns one of the principal and most important concepts of Kant’s philosophy, namely the concept of postulate. Kant’s understanding of this term differs from the previous tradition. For Kant, postulates are originally subjective propositions necessarily supposed as objective ones. Otherwise, systematic theoretical cognition and compliance with the moral law become impossible. However, this peculiarity of Kant’s terminology is often ignored, which causes misunderstanding of the role and functions of Kant’s doctrine of postulates as a whole.

U članku se ispituje Kantova prosvjetiteljska koncepcija metafizike kao znanosti koju valja držati slobodnom od ideoloških predrasuda i izvanracionalnih kognitivnih resursa te je ustanoviti pod uvjetima javnog, intersubjektivno važećeg diskursa. Analiziram Kantovu vlastitu interpretaciju njegove transcendentalne filozofije kao “metafizike metafizike” i zastupam ekstenzionalni djelomični identitet kritike metafizike i metafizike koja je tako učinjena mogućom. Posebice identificiram “buduću metafiziku”, koju je Kant zamislio kao “metafiziku prirode općenito” ili “fiziologiju čistog uma”, koju je Kant bio zacrtao, ali je sam nikada nije proveo (...) i koju ne treba brkati s “metafizikom materijalne prirode” koju je Kant izložio u svojim Metafizičkim načelima prirodne znanosti . Nadalje pokazujem kako je kod Kanta “ograničenje” razuma i njegovih čistih pojmova na osjetilno zrenje kompenzirano “ograničavanjem” osjetilnosti i njenih formalnih uvjeta na pojave, uz isključenje “praznog prostora” onog neosjetilnog. Oslanjajući se na Kantovo razlikovanje “ograničenja” i “granice” , utvrđujem točnu poziciju kritičke metafizike “na granici” osjetilnog svijeta i razumskog svijeta. Zaključno tvrdim da je “buduća metafizika koja će biti moguća kao znanost” za Kanta ograničena na transcendentalnu filozofiju, uz isključenje teoretske spoznaje nadosjetilnoga, koja je time zauvijek predana predmetnom području praktički zasnovanoga racionalnog, ali ne-znanstvenog vjerovanja ili vjere .The essay examines Kant’s Enlightenment conception of metaphysics as a science to be kept free of ideological prejudice and extrarational cognitive resources and to be established under the conditions of public, intersubjectively valid discourse. I analyze Kant’s self-interpretation of his transcendental philosophy as “metaphysics of metaphysics” and argue for the extensional partial identity of the critique of metaphysics and the metaphysics so rendered possible. In particular, I identify the “future metaphysics” envisioned by Kant as the “metaphysics of nature in general” or the “physiology of pure reason,” which was projected by Kant but never carried out by himself and is not to be confused with the “metaphysics of material nature” presented by Kant in his Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science . I further show how in Kant the “restriction” of the understanding and its pure concepts to sensible intuition is counterbalanced by the “bounding” of sensibility and its formal conditions to the appearances, at the exclusion of the “empty space” of the non-sensory. In drawing on Kant’s distinction between “limit” and “boundary” , I establish the precise position of critical metaphysics “on the boundary” of the world of sense and the world of the understanding. In concluding, I argue that for Kant a “future metaphysics that will be possible as science” is restricted to transcendental philosophy, at the exclusion of the theoretical cognition of the supersensible, which is thereby delegated forever to the object domain of practically based rational but non-scientific belief or faith. (shrink)