This is a new release of the original 1946 edition.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of (...) an External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

G. E. Moore was a central figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Along with Russell and Wittgenstein, he pioneered analytic philosophy, and his Principia Ethica shaped the contours of twentieth-century ethics. Indeed, until the publication of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, no single book in moral philosophy was to equal Principia's influence. Unfortunately, however, Principia Ethica has so dominated critical discussions of Moore's work that even experts on his moral philosophy have tended to ignore his Ethics, which he published (...) eight years later. But Ethics is Moore's only other book on moral philosophy, and one of only a handful of post-Principia publications dealing with ethics. Its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of his moral philosophy. The republication of Ethics thus rounds out our understanding of Moore's ethical thought. But the book's value goes beyond its historical or scholarly interest. A short but philosophically rich text, Ethics stands independent of Principia and repays careful study in its own right. By raising a number of fundamental questions in ethics, questions that remain live today, by proffering clear, credible, and often innovative answers to them, and by doing so with a philosophical skill that is still impressive, Moore's short book is a minor classic. Almost a century after its original publication, it still amply rewards those who read it.This new edition of Moore's Ethics includes his essay 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy' as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

G. E. Moore was a central figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Along with Russell and Wittgenstein, he pioneered analytic philosophy, and his Principia Ethica shaped the contours of twentieth-century ethics. Indeed, until the publication of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, no single book in moral philosophy was to equal Principia's influence. Unfortunately, however, Principia Ethica has so dominated critical discussions of Moore's work that even experts on his moral philosophy have tended to ignore his Ethics, which he published (...) eight years later. But Ethics is Moore's only other book on moral philosophy, and one of only a handful of post-Principia publications dealing with ethics. Its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of his moral philosophy. The republication of Ethics thus rounds out our understanding of Moore's ethical thought. But the book's value goes beyond its historical or scholarly interest. A short but philosophically rich text, Ethics stands independent of Principia and repays careful study in its own right. By raising a number of fundamental questions in ethics, questions that remain live today, by proffering clear, credible, and often innovative answers to them, and by doing so with a philosophical skill that is still impressive, Moore's short book is a minor classic. Almost a century after its original publication, it still amply rewards those who read it.This new edition of Moore's Ethics includes his essay 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy' as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

What gave rise to Ernst Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory in 1908? According to the usual interpretation, Zermelo was motivated by the set-theoretic paradoxes. This paper argues that Zermelo was primarily motivated, not by the paradoxes, but by the controversy surrounding his 1904 proof that every set can be wellordered, and especially by a desire to preserve his Axiom of Choice from its numerous critics. Here Zermelo's concern for the foundations of mathematics diverged from Bertrand Russell's on the one (...) hand and from Felix Hausdorff's on the other. (shrink)

Introductory paragraph from unpublished review.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of (...) an External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This volume shows Russell in transition from a neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosopher to an analytic philosopher of the first rank. During this period his research centred on writing The Principles of Mathematics where he drew together previously unpublished drafts. These shed light on Russell's paradox. This material will alter previous accounts of how he discovered his paradox and the related paradox of the largest cardinal. The volume also includes a previously unpublished draft of an early attempt to solve (...) his paradox, as well as the earliest known version of his generalised relation arithmetic. It contains three articles which have never previously been published in English. (shrink)

This volume of Bertrand Russell's _Collected Papers_ finds Russell focused on writing _Principia Mathematica_ during 1905–08. Eight previously unpublished papers shed light on his different versions of a substitutional theory of logic, with its elimination of classes and relations, during 1905-06. A recurring issue for him was whether a type hierarchy had to be part of a substitutional theory. In mid-1907 he began writing up the final version of _Principia_, now using a ramified theory of types, and eleven (...) unpublished drafts from 1907-08 deal with this. Numerous letters show his thoughts on the process. The volume's 80-page introduction covers the evolution of his logic from 1896 until 1909, when volume I of _Principia _went to the printer. (shrink)

Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons undertook an inquiry into the lessons that might be learned from the banking crisis. Paul Moore, head of group regulatory risk at Halifax Bank of Scotland during 2002–2005, provided evidence of his experience of questioning HBOS policies which resulted in his dismissal from HBOS. The problems that surfaced at HBOS during the financial crisis were so serious that it was forced to merge with Lloyds (...) TSB, another UK bank, to form the Lloyds Banking Group in which the government took a significant stake. Moore’s evidence to the Treasury Committee revealed that long before the financial crisis, he had raised major concerns with the management of HBOS and with the Financial Services Authority, the UK financial services regulator. Moore’s evidence led to the submission of further disclosures, replies and rejoinders as evidence to the Treasury Committee. Moore’s case is therefore of considerable interest to researchers of whistleblowing because it is a rare instance of high-level whistleblowing, the details of which subsequently entered the public domain. The information revealed in evidence to the Treasury Committee sheds light on the process of whistleblowing in the context of the governance and regulation of a major UK bank that subsequently had to be rescued by government intervention during the financial crisis. The paper makes a contribution to the wider literature on whistleblowing, and to a greater understanding of aspects of the financial crisis. (shrink)

The original 1907 text of James' Pragmatism is accompanied with a series of critical essays from scholars including Moore and Russell. In the introduction Olin evaluates the strength of the criticisms made against James.

This volume presents a selection of the most important writings in the debate on the nature of meaning and reference which started one hundred years ago with Frege's classic essay "On Sense and Reference." Contributors include Bertrand Russell, P.F. Strawson, W.V. Quine, Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke, David Wiggins, and Gareth Evans. The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a wide variety (...) of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. (shrink)

The present article is the second in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article are Skinner’s academic and research experiences between 1928, when he entered graduate school at Harvard, and the late 1930s, when he had assumed his first academic position. The article also examines the intellectual climate that emerged during the second quarter of the twentieth century, which is the (...) context out of which radical behaviorism developed as a unique position. Overall, the views for which Skinner is recognized were significantly influenced by such figures as Francis Bacon, Percy Bridgman, William Crozier, Jacques Loeb, Ernst Mach, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson. (shrink)

These notes of G. E. Moore's lectures for the three terms of 1934-1935 were compiled by Alice Ambrose, then Student of Newnham College, and Margaret Macdonald, then Fellow of Girton College. The lectures cover a wealth of interrelated topics, and provide instances of the analyses which made Moore «the father of the analytic school.» Since his analyses of such concepts as material objects, sense data, and truth rest on the ordinary use of expressions for these concepts, «ordinary language» (...) philosophers found in him their champion. Moore examines the views of Broad, Russell, F. P. Ramsey, W. E. Johnson, and John Wisdom. (shrink)

The present article is the first in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism. The series seeks to identify milestones in the development of Skinner’s position, as well as assess the impact of particular factors and events on Skinner himself. Of special interest in this article are the biographical details of Skinner’s life between June, 1926, when he received his undergraduate degree, and September, 1928, when he entered graduate school. The article (...) also examines the intellectual climate at the start of the second quarter of the twentieth century that led Skinner to become interested in the empirical study of behavior. Overall, Skinner’s views during this period were significantly influenced by such literary figures in the modernist tradition as H.G. Wells and Sinclair Lewis; and such scientific/philosophical figures as Francis Bacon, Jacques Loeb, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein and certain of his friends and followers have offered an interesting answer to the question of the relation “one fact [must] have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other”. The answer in brief, as Russell puts it, is that, “in order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must … be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact”. Wittgenstein himself (...) in the Tractatus usually denominates this common element as logical structure. The sentence is said to picture its fact; it reflects, mirrors, shows or exhibits by means of its own structure the structure of the fact it is about. Critics and interpreters generally agree with Russell's broad characterization of the theory but disagree greatly as to the exact nature of this postulated common structure. Consequently, the evaluation of the theory which this paper proposes to make must include an examination of its several alternative interpretations. (shrink)

AA 180& 'What has to be accepted, the given, is, so one could say, forms of life'. (PI p 226) Compare with Nietzsche. Nietzsche works out a theory of demoralisation. Understanding of the logic of language games makes a difference to those one will play. Compare Heraclitus. The form of life as the will, prana, that which determines whatever it is that is said or believed. The language is merely the medium. Yet this is not something to be set up (...) as a metaphysical theory. It is too particular, and any motive for demolishing it is likely to be sufficient to do so. There is no one way which is true over and above all others. To be able to talk on this plane we need a kind of higher logic. There are those who are desperate to discover the one explanation which is in a sense true. For them, an philosophy which focus on the nature of explanation itself, and thus dissolves the problem will appear irrelevant. Henceforth what is needed is not philosophical statements but logical tools. What we do with these tools is not the business of philosophy. 'one wonders what philosophy would have been like in Britain and the United States if it had not been for the accident of Wittgenstein, for he might not have been on the scene at all…. I meant that he became known to the world of philosophy through the very special circumstances of making a strong impression on Bertrand Russell, and being accepted into the world of philosophy through the bold initiative of Cambridge. Nature is wasteful, and if one wants to get something exceptionally good, one must take great risks about having a great deal that is simply wild. I am sure that both Russell and Cambridge were right to adopt such a policy. Cambridge is possibly the only university in the world that would have touched Wittgenstein at any price. Had it not been for Cambridge, and had it not been for Russell, - and some people would hold that he made an error of judgement- almost certainly nothing more would have been heard of Wittgenstein'.. (shrink)