The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

Johann Wilhelm Andreas Pfaff (1774-1835) był obiecującym niemieckim matematykiem i astronomem, należącym do bogatej w tradycje akademickie rodziny Pfaffów – miał dwóch starszych powszechnie znanych braci. Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia życie najmłodszego z Pfaffów – od czasu jego studiów teologicznych w Getyndze do okresu działalności w Uniwersytecie Erlangeńskim. Krocząc śladami Klaudiusza Ptolemeusza i Johanna Keplera, Johann Wilhelm Andreas Pfaff usiłował promować astrologię w pierwszych dekadach XIX wieku. Jego wysiłki umocnienia astrologii jako pełnoprawnej dyscypliny akademickiej, zamiast oczekiwanego skutku, spotkały się z opozycją, (...) drwiną i marginalizacją samego Pfaffa w ówczesnej społeczności akademickiej. Jednakże jego osobisty dramat powinno się umiejscowić w szerokim kontekście nurtu tzw. Naturphilosophie – romantycznego ruchu myślowego, niezwykle popularnego w kręgach intelektualnych ówczesnych krajów niemieckich (także w państwach skandynawskich). (shrink)

The paper presents philosophical views which have been propagated in the first decade of the 20 th -century by Austrian experimental physicist Franz-Serafin Exner. According to Exner all apparently deterministic laws are only a kind of the macroscopic limit of the indeterministic random events and processes in nature. The paper attempts to show whether Exner’s ideas have influenced the views on randomness and probability developed by renowned Polish physicist Marian Smoluchowski who belonged to informal circle of Exner’s students and assistants.

In the paper the idea of the well-known anti-realistic argument from the so-called pessimistic meta-induction is considered. It is ascertained - contrarily to the widespread belief - that Larry Laudan is not the author of the argument, however he has noticed many of its essential aspects, especially the problem of historical continuity between changing scientific theories. It seems that as the author of the argument should be regarded rather Hilary Putnam. A similar idea of pessimistic meta-induction was already anticipated in (...) the work of Henri Poincaré. The paper finishes with conclusion, that scientific realism as a philosophical position has to take into account both the problem of the empirical success of scientific theories and the problem of continuity between them. (shrink)

W swojej ogromnej spuściźnie piśmienniczej Karl Rahner nie pominął zagadnienia istnienia rozumnych istot pozaziemskich. Są to jednak wypowiedzi nieliczne, fragmentaryczne i rozproszone. Pomimo tego dają one wyrazisty i oryginalny obraz filozoficzno-teologiczny tego zagadnienia. Kwestię potencjalnych inteligencji pozaziemskich Rahner przedstawia na tle metafizycznego ujęcia kosmosu jako nieustannie stającej się i autotranscendującej rzeczywistości. W jego opinii kosmos w swoich prawach fizycznych i zgodnie z celowym zamysłem jego Stwórcy zorientowany jest nie tyle w stronę człowieka, lecz podmiotów cielesno-duchowych. W tej perspektywie realna staje (...) się możliwość powstania także innych, oprócz człowieka, istot rozumnych. Z punktu widzenia teologii są one według Rahnera tak samo otwarte na samoudzielającego się Boga-Trójcy w Logosie-Chrystusie-Zbawcy jak ludzie. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the views of the Jesuit Stanisław Dunin–Borkowski (1864–1934) about Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity. These days, Dunin–Borkowski is a rather obscure figure despite rising to fame in the interwar period as an outstanding expert in the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Thus, the secondary aim of this article is to remind ourselves of this somewhat forgotten scholar. As a researcher, writer, and pedagogue, Dunin–Borkowski was interested in numerous fields of knowledge. Among these (...) were the natural sciences, including physics and the influence that new physical theories had on philosophical thought. This present study therefore fills a gap in the existing research about how Polish philosophers received Einstein’s theories. The example of Dunin–Borkowski also serves as a basis for discussing some of the fundamental problems of neo-scholasticism in receiving new mathematicised scientific theories. (shrink)

Book review: Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton and Natural Philosophy, Reaktion Books, London 2018, ss. 268.

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

The author presents Leszek Kołakowski from the perspective of his private acquaintanceship, lasting for about 47 years, as a witty man and a workaholic. L. Kołakowski never formed a classic “school”, but there is something all his disciples share: a thesis, key to understanding his ideas, which holds that “THERE IS MORE THAN ONE CORRECT OPINION IN THE HUMANITIES”, i.e. we will ALWAYS have opinions for and against, which goes against any dogmatism, wherever it may appear; this also bears consequences (...) in diagnosing the socio-political reality past and present. (shrink)

In this article we consider linear isomorphisms over the field of rational numbers between the linear spaces ℝ2 and ℝ. We prove that if f is such an isomorphism, then the image by f of the unit disk is a strictly nonmeasurable subset of the real line, which has different properties than classical non-measurable subsets of reals. We shall also consider the question whether all images of bounded measurable subsets of the plane via a such mapping are non-measurable.

In this paper the notion of unifier is extended to the infinite set case. The proof of existence of the most general unifier of any infinite, unifiable set of types (terms) is presented. Learning procedure, based on infinite set unification, is described.

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality and, in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. Our first objection is that, contrary to econometric linear models, her quasi-linear models do not allow for the unique estimation of parameters. We next argue that although, as Cartwright proves, Reichenbach's screening-off condition has only limited validity, her generalized condition is not empirically applicable. Finally, we show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible.

We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality, and in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. We show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible. Finally, we argue that her models are not adequate for EPR-phenomena, since they ignore modal and spatiotemporal aspects inherent in their setup.

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

In 1968 the authors of the so-called Harvard Report, proposed the recognition of an irreversible coma as a new criterion for death. The proposal was accepted by the medical, legal, religious and political circles in spite of the lack of any explanation why the irreversible coma combined with the absence of brainstem reflexes, including the respiratory reflex might be equated to death. Such an explanation was formulated in the President’s Commission Report published in 1981. This document stated, that the brain (...) is the central integrator of the body, therefore the destruction of the brain results in the lack of that integration and the death of the organism. Therefore, according to that document, the so-called “brain dead” patients are really, biologically dead; strictly speaking they are not any more biological organisms but collections of organs and tissues. Their death was masked by the use of the medical equipment, but it was a real, biological death. Thus, the explanation given by the President’s Commission Report constituted a biological rationale for the new concept of death, known as “brain death.” However, after the long discussion, this rationale was refuted because of the evidence given by many medical authorities, that the bodies of the “brain dead” and “brainstem dead” patients are alive. In the context of the discussion about the neurological criteria for death, some authors follow the idea of Plato, that human being is the soul or mind, and the body does not belong to the human essence. Therefore, the loss of consciousness, which may be identified with the mind, constitutes the loss of personhood and may be interpreted as human death. The other group stresses the Aristotelian and Thomistic concept that the body belongs to the essence of every living creature, including human. Therefore, as long as the body is alive, the human being is alive and we cannot call the given patient dead even if he is deeply comatose. Moreover, in spite of the opinions dominating in the mass-media, these patients should be considered not only alive but also may be conscious to some degree and their state can be reversible. Their brains are lacking the electrical functions, but the neuronal tissue is alive and that state is reversible for at least first 48 hours since the onset of coma; this phenomenon is called “global ischemic penumbra” and is responsible for the regularly happening events interpreted as miracles, when some of the “brain dead” or “brainstem dead” patients turn to be alive and come back to normal life. Therefore, the neurological criteria of death are still lacking generally accepted scientific basis and should not be used in medicine and in the legal systems as a basis for diagnosing comatose/having no brainstem reflexes/apneic patients dead. (shrink)

There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct (...) the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea. (shrink)

Who, whom, why and how? -- The subject between extremes -- Genesis: the Socratic-Platonic deception or the irrepressible need for immortality -- Modern man: the adventures of Robinson Crusoe -- The scientific foundations of modern man -- The evolution of modern man, Nietzsche's moustache, the fittest man and the man without qualities: the four pillars of modern man -- Evolution and zoodicy: the animality of modern man -- Modernity as false consciousness -- Technology and the mind, God-machine, the individual vs. (...) Facebook -- That which returns -- The death of death and late-modern man. (shrink)