This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves sp...

This article challenges three widespread assumptions about Kant’s argument for the antithesis of the Second Antinomy. The first assumption is that this argument consists of an argument for the claim that “[no] composite thing in the world consists of simple parts”, and a logically independent argument for the claim that “nothing simple exists anywhere in the world”. The second assumption is that when Kant argues that “[no] composite thing in the world consists of simple parts”, he is making a claim (...) about the mereological structure of spatially extended things in particular, as opposed to a claim about the mereological structure of things in general. And the third assumption is that Kant’s argument for this part of the antithesis is based on a claim about the relationship between the size of the extension of a composite thing and the sizes of the extensions of the things of which this composite thing consists. (shrink)

The subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction that this sort of scepticism is false. This article explains and assesses a (...) number of possible responses to this objection. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1010-1025, December 2021.

The Bibliotheca Britannica is one of the most remarkable examples of bibliographical scholarship in the English Language. This scarce work of reference continues to be an invaluable resource for scholars and librarians who wish to identify early printed materials covering a wide range of disciplines. Routledge is pleased to make this important source of information more widely available. Published in 1824, it is estimated to include more than 200,000 books, pamphlets and periodicals printed from 1450 to the early nineteenth century. (...) The Bibliotheca is divided into four large-format volumes which are presented as a boxed set. The first and second volumes contain an alphabetical listing of over 40,000 authors and their biographical details. Full length titles of works, date and place of publication, and information on translations and subsequent editions are provided for each author. The entries covering the earliest printed texts contain details of British and foreign printers. Volumes three and four provide an encyclopedic index to volumes one and two. The works are listed within 30,000 subject areas, in chronological order of publication. Subjects, authors and titles are fully cross-referenced using an ingenious indexing system. Robert Watt devoted 25 years of his life to the Bibliotheca's compilation. He was born in 1774 and studied classical languages and philosophy at Glasgow University. Later he became a student of anatomy and theology at Edinburgh, and practised as a doctor. His interest in the history of medicine led him to begin compiling the Bibliography, which he extended to include works on law, history, language, philosophy, science, technology, travel and geography, and classical literature. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been puzzled by Kant's decision to insert the Refutation of Idealism into the second edition of the first Critique at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate. This article proposes a solution to the puzzle. It defends an explanation for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism that is plausibly expressed by Kant's claim at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate that the Refutation of Idealism is ‘here in its right place’ because (...) ‘[a] powerful objection against these rules for proving existence indirectly is made by idealism’. According to this explanation, the Refutation of Idealism is Kant's response to the objection that the Second Postulate must be false since otherwise idealism is true. This article also considers and rejects a number of alternative explanations for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism. (shrink)