The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.

I present the mismatch problem for Act Consequentialism, and I critically evaluate some popular solutions before offering my own solution to a specific version of the problem. The mismatch problem arises for Act Consequentialism when a group could have done better, but no individual in the group had an alternative with a better outcome. In such cases, the theory delivers mismatched verdicts: it condemns what the group does, but it cannot condemn any of the individual acts. In the first chapter (...) of the dissertation, I explain exactly how this problem works. In the next four chapters, I identify a variety of cases that give rise to the mismatch problem, and I explain why the most popular strategies for modifying Act Consequentialism do not get around it. In the final chapter, I introduce a novel taxonomy of problem cases, and I introduce a 'cautious' version of Act Consequentialism that doesn't encounter the mismatch problem for a certain class of case. (shrink)