This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non-conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious (...) state attributions only for those entities that typically display the simple features identified in the AGENCY model (eyes, distinctive motion, interaction) and took longer to deny conscious states to those entities. (shrink)

Recovering Reason: Essays in Honor of Thomas L. Pangle is a collection of essays composed by students and friends of Thomas L. Pangle to honor his seminal work and outstanding guidance in the study of political philosophy. These essays examine both Socrates' and modern political philosophers' attempts to answer the question of the right life for human beings, as those attempts are introduced and elaborated in the work of thinkers from Homer and Thucydides to Nietzsche and Charles Taylor.

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".

In the Minos orOn Law Socrates asks a nameless companion out of the blue, “What is law for us?” knowing full well, it seems, that the companion himself will not be able to give a satisfactory answer. Why on earth, then, would Socrates bother to ask the question of the companion—a man clearly more ignorant than himself? The mystery only deepens when the companion mishears and misunderstands Socrates’ decisive contribution to the conversation and Socrates doesn’t even bother to set him (...) straight. Rather, he uses the definition of law the companion mistakenly thinks he heard to lead him, via the companion’s own opinions, to a position that Socrates does not himself hold. In this chapter, Goldberg hopes to uncover the deep philosophical reasons for Socrates’ procedure in conducting so strange a conversation. (shrink)