If pragmatism, hitherto, has been content with elaborating theories of meaning and of truth, but has neglected epistemology, there are good reasons for that neglect. For one thing, much of the accepted vocabulary of epistemological discussion begs the questions under discussion. Again, much epistemology is simply an oblique metaphysics, and not an empirical investigation of knowledge, and hence throws no light on knowing as we practice it. But another reason for this neglect lies in the very simplicity of an experimental (...) theory of knowing. Its charms are not enhanced by undulating draperies of dialectic,' nor warded by the numerological incantations of a symbolic logic, nor made elusive by recondite reference to relativity physics. Nevertheless, it is to the exposition of this elementary doctrine that I mean now to proceed. And I shall do so simply, and with seeming dogmatism, by taking the categories of field, focus, and perspective, and working them for all they are worth in an experimental epistemology... (shrink)