Gilligan's understanding of moral reasoning as a kind of perception has its roots in the conception of moral experience espoused by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. A clear understanding of that conception, however, reveals grave difficulties with Gilligan's descriptions of the care perspective and justice perspective. In particular, we can see that the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive once we recognize that attention does not require attachment and that impartiality does not require detachment.

Most theories of moral agency, whether philosophical or psychological in emphasis, tend to conceive of either character or outlook as fundamental. That is, they take moral agency to consist either in the possession of certain traits of character or virtues or else in the ability to comprehend and act according to certain types of rules or standards. This dissertation is an attempt to reconcile the two conceptions of moral agency by giving a developmental account of the way in which character (...) and outlook begin in unity and gradually diverge as the moral agent matures. Key to this account are extended discussions of the psychological theories of moral development given by Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, and John Rawls. Although these theories together provide a satisfactory explanation of how outlook develops after a person has acquired a basic set of moral concepts, they do not satisfactorily explain the initial formation of moral concepts. That failure results in an impoverished conception of the mature moral agent, a conception which fails to appreciate the richness and variety of moral life, especially in regard to the types of motivational influence to which the mature moral agent is susceptible. Nonetheless, I maintain that these theories of moral development are satisfactory insofar as they show how a person's early moral concepts are partially displaced by later, more sophisticated concepts which make up a mature agent's outlook, but they are displaced only as far as the justification of behavior is concerned; the more primitive concepts, which initially constitute an agent's character and outlook together, continue to have a significant motivational influence that is essential for mature moral agency. (shrink)

Richard Kyte offers a handbook for navigating the challenges of todays business world using proven and accessible methods for thinking through complicated problems on ones own, reaching consensus within groups, and communicating controversial decisions to others. By using real-life examples and case studies, providing discussion questions and additional resources at the conclusion of each chapter, Kyte demonstrates the way a virtuous office culture can yield ethical decision making.

Collects four years' worth of editorials Richard Kyte has written for the La Crosse Tribune on the topic of the ethical life.

Teaching ethics is always challenging, and it is especially challenging in a pluralistic society. One reason is that the participants in an ethical dispute frequently have different fundamental interests and perspectives, and they may not be fully aware of the extent to which they have, or share, or fail to share certain interests. It is a difficult task simply to sort out the various interests, both conscious and subconscious, that participants in a dispute bring to a table. And, partly because (...) that is such a difficult task, we tend to forget that there are other causes of ethical disagreement, and that one particularly troublesome cause is the different level of commitment people may have to using words to settle ethical disputes in the first place. (shrink)