La philosophie de Souriau a pour objet ce qu’il appelle les existences virtuelles, un mode d’existence fragile et précaire qui concerne tout processus d’instauration. Ces virtualités sont en état d’abaliété, elles existent « en et par autre chose », de manière relationnelle et indéterminée. Ces particularités ontologiques posent un problème de connaissance : celui de connaître de telles singularités, aussi appelées « âmes ». De nouveaux outils, issus de l’esthétique, accompagnent la connaissance. La fiction et la dramatisation viennent jouer un (...) rôle épistémique. Les êtres de fiction, qui existent selon un mode spécifique d’existence, font naître un sentiment esthétique, qui devient la base créatrice de la philosophie et de la connaissance. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo identify the ethical challenges associated with the development and implementation of new tuberculosis drugs and diagnostics.MethodsTwenty-three semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted between December 2015 and September 2016 with programme administrators, healthcare workers, advocates, policymakers, and funders based in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Interviews were analysed using thematic analysis.ResultsDivergent interests and responsibilities, coupled with power imbalances, are a primary source of ethical challenges; the uncertain risk profiles of new drugs present an additional one. Although this challenge can be partially mitigated (...) through stringent pharmacovigilance, respondents highlighted that high-burden countries tend to lack the resources to facilitate safe implementation. Increased advocacy and community engagement are considered an ethical imperative for future TB development and implementation.ConclusionsThis project helps identify some of the ethical challenges of new TB technologies. It demonstrates that investigating ethical challenges through qualitative research is one way to apprehend the difficulty of implementing new TB technologies. Addressing this difficulty will require that those in positions of power reconsider their interests in relation to disempowered communities.Policy implicationsEfforts to build consensus regarding what values should underpin the global governance of TB research, prevention, and care are essential to facilitate the ethical implementation of new TB technologies. (shrink)

This paper delves into the work of Clive L. Spash, a British radical ecological economist well-known in his field who currently holds a professorship at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. We start with an examination of the principles of his “social ecological economics.” We then critically evaluate his attack on economic growth and his perspective on the standard economic models of climate change. Lastly, we explore his approach to science as a theoretical pursuit and his policy recommendations. The (...) first version of this paper was given as a keynote lecture at the 7th Austrian Economics Meeting Europe, May 12-13, 2023, Université Catholique de l’Ouest, Angers, France, and a second version at the Summer University in Political Economy, July 20-22, 2023, Aix-Marseille University, France. I wish to thank the organizers of these conferences, and also the anonymous referees whose remarks have been taken into account to improve the paper. (shrink)

Peu à peu, tandis que Virgile achève la description ethnographique de la ruche, un glissement s’opère dans son propos : il célèbre d’abord la chasteté des abeilles, et le renouvellement de l’espèce par une miraculeuse génération spontanée ; il explique ensuite leur admirable organisation sociale par un lien privilégié avec la divinité, puisque les abeilles posséderaient une « parcelle d’intelligence divine » ; après ce bref aperçu d’une mystique panthéiste, i...

In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.

This paper investigates how and when pairs of terms such as “local–global” and “im Kleinen–im Grossen” began to be used by mathematicians as explicit reflexive categories. A first phase of automatic search led to the delineation of the relevant corpus, and to the identification of the period from 1898 to 1918 as that of emergence. The emergence appears to have been, from the very start, both transdisciplinary (function theory, calculus of variations, differential geometry) and international, although the AMS-Göttingen connection played (...) a specific part. First used as an expository and didactic tool (e.g. by Osgood), it soon played a crucial part in the creation of new mathematical concepts (e.g. in Hahn’s work), in the shaping of research agendas (e.g. Blaschke’s global differential geometry), and in Weyl’s axiomatic foundation of the manifold concept. We finally turn to France, where in the 1910s, in the wake of Poincaré’s work, Hadamard began to promote a research agenda in terms of “passage du local au general.”. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the (re-)conceptualisation of responsible innovation by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role of consumers in the innovation process. After a discussion of the philosophical foundations and ethical implications of this approach, which bears an explanatory potential that has not been adequately considered in previous discussions of responsible innovation, we present a first step towards capturing the important but often neglected role of consumers in innovation processes (including responsible innovation): We propose an agent-based (...) model that incorporates a multidimensional space of characteristics in which new products or services are represented by more than the mere aspect of price and quality. Instead, innovations are denoted by a large set of characteristics, including also negative or harmful ones. The model is used to illustrate that consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality – even if considered in a simple manner – indeed play a crucial role in the creation and diffusion of responsible innovation which can and should be used for further work in this field and for possible extensions of the model. (shrink)

La notion d'espace sonore est devenue de plus en plus prégnante dans le domaine musical, plus particulièrement dans la musique électroacoustique. Mais comment la définir? Cette simple interrogation, dont la réponse semble évidente soulève cependant, lorsqu'elle est approfondie, une multitude d'ambiguïtés, sources de nouvelles réflexions. Comment l'écoute appréhende-t-elle l'espace? Comment s'immerge-t- elle en lui? Qu'appréhende-t-on lorsqu'on écoute? Et finalement, qu'est-ce qu'un son? Quelles en sont les limites spatiales et temporelles? Lorsque l'écoute se confronte à l'espace sonore, où se situe la (...) frontière entre perception et imagination? Tout au long du présent ouvrage, l'auteur essaie de mettre en évidence l'empreinte effective de l'écoute dans la structuration de l'espace. Il tente de montrer, en s'appuyant sur les théories esthétiques, pourquoi l'espace n'est pas pris en compte par les pensées sur la musique avant le XXe siècle. A partir de cette observation et des dernières recherches phénoménologiques de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, il met en lumière le rôle essentiel du corps de l'auditeur dans notre perception de l'espace. Ensuite, il témoigne de la façon dont les compositeurs, à partir de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle et jusqu'à aujourd'hui, n'ont cessé de développer une implication active de l'écoute, ce qui a progressivement favorisé l'émergence d'un espace musical dynamique et mouvant. Puis, au terme de sa réflexion, à l'aide des travaux sur l'énaction du neurobiologiste Francisco J. Varela, Renaud Meric s'emploie à reconstruire le lien esthétique étroit entre l'espace, l'écoute et l'imagination, lien encore peu examiné, pourtant fondamental pour comprendre notre relation complexe à la musique. (shrink)

Depuis son retour, j’étais rongé. J’abrégeais les conversations, évitais son regard. Malgré tous mes efforts pour paraître naturel, pour faire comme si de rien n’était, je sentais bien, piètre comédien, que chaque phrase sonnait faux, que chaque geste suintait la culpabilité. Dans ses yeux, la perplexité initiale fit bien vite place au soupçon, et ma feinte bonne humeur fut démantelée sans coup férir par d’éloquents silences, froids appels à cesser toute mascarade. Enferré comme je l’étais, a..

La quatrième Géorgique n’est pas le simple entrelacs d’une didactique et d’une esthétique délicate et raffinée. Un troisième fil complique et parachève la tresse : la description ethnographique de la vie des abeilles. Il n’est plus question de conseiller l’apprenti apiculteur ; Virgile change de registre, et rend compte scrupuleusement de l’organisation sociale de la ruche. On a pu parler à ce propos de « communiste monarchique » : les abe...

Comment se représenter sa propre vie ? Comment se figurer le déroulé des ans, tracer la ligne qui passe par tous les points saillants de notre mémoire et englobe les plages d’oubli qui nous firent, elles aussi, ce que nous sommes ? Plusieurs formes, plusieurs « patrons » sont à notre disposition. En premier lieu, le biologique : le compte des années superpose les visions d’un corps en croissance, puis en déclin, les mutations successives qui l’affectent, les marques qui s’y (...) inscrivent. S’y aj.. (shrink)

La première partie du livre IV met apparemment en œuvre le programme didactique des Géorgiques, Virgile multipliant les conseils à l’apiculteur, quant au choix du lieu pour la ruche, à la sélection des espèces, aux aliments à mettre à disposition, à la récolte du miel, mais surtout aux précautions à prendre pour éloigner les abeilles des nombreux dangers potentiels qui les menacent, qu’il s’agisse du climat trop rigoureux ou de prédateu...

Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by invoking excuses (as opposed to justifications)? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? While a number of theorists have denied it in passing, the question remains radically underexplored. -/- In this article (in its penultimate draft version), I seek to identify the main metaphysical and moral objections to state excuses, and (...) begin to investigate their strength. I work from the ecumenical assumption that general understandings of modern states as group moral agents proper or as mere fictional points of imputation for individual behaviour are both plausible, and that the question of state excuses should be asked in terms of both paradigms. Issues addressed include: the lack of state consciousness/affect, the nature and relevance of developmental and executive defects in group agents, the value of state interests and how interests relate to plausible claims of excuses, the shortfall of responsibility argument for group responsibility and its interface with state excuses, the symbolic and consequential (dis)value that state excuses may have, as well as concerns that states are entities that should live up to outstandingly high virtuous standards of impartiality and equanimity. -/- I conclude that even if the range of excuses available to states does not overlap neatly with excuses available to ordinary individuals, some excuses may still be morally available to states. More generally, I emphasize the need for a systematic discussion of group excuses writ large, and of their relationship with the wider question of when group entities may legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for wrongdoing. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon an (...) implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace. (shrink)

Historically, all societies have used comparison to analyze cultural difference through the interaction of religion, power, and translation. When comparison is a self-reflective practice, it can be seen as a form of comparatism. Many scholars are concerned in one way or another with the practice and methods of comparison, and the need for a cognitively robust relativism is an integral part of a mature historical self-placement. This volume looks at how different theories and practices of writing and interpretation have developed (...) at different times in different cultures and reconsiders the specificities of modern comparative approaches within a variety of comparative moments. The idea is to reconsider the specificities, the obstacles, and the possibilities of modern comparative approaches in history and anthropology through a variety of earlier and parallel comparative horizons. Particular attention is given to the exceptional role of Athens and Jerusalem in shaping the Western understanding of cultural difference. (shrink)

Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extralegally in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and ultimately contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.

Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extra-legally, in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen, and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and, ultimately, contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.

This is a review essay of Gardner, John. 2007, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288 pp.

In this paper, I aim to reconsider MacIntyre’s notion of an educated public. In particular, I aim to do so in light of his recent elucidation of the role of philosophical education in rejecting, or at least challenging, predominant and shared cultural assumptions. I begin by outlining MacIntyre’s original case for an educated public as found in The Idea of an Educated Public. I then briefly consider and respond to three prominent criticisms of MacIntyre’s original explication of the notion. In (...) responding to these criticisms, it will be made clear that subtle shifts in MacIntyre’s subsequent treatments of the notion reduces the dependency of such a public’s existence on the university. I conclude by arguing that the development in MacIntyre’s articulation of the necessary conditions for an educated public when considered in conjunction with his recent defence of the conditions for an ‘adequate philosophical education’ provides his philosophy of education with the conceptual resources needed to break free of a final difficulty which MacIntyre himself has articulated. Specifically, I contend that the four stages of an adequate philosophical education MacIntyre outlines are such that they need not be restricted to implementation in formal educational institutions such as the university. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of ‘public emergency’ and of some of its radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.

In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against it by (...) building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing. (shrink)

Historical work on the emergence of sheaf theory has mainly concentrated on the topological origins of sheaf cohomology in the period from 1945 to 1950 and on subsequent developments. However, a shift of emphasis both in time-scale and disciplinary context can help gain new insight into the emergence of the sheaf concept. This paper concentrates on Henri Cartan’s work in the theory of analytic functions of several complex variables and the strikingly different roles it played at two stages of the (...) emergence of sheaf theory: the definition of a new structure and formulation of a new research programme in 1940–1944; the unexpected integration into sheaf cohomology in 1951–1952. In order to bring this two-stage structural transition into perspective, we will concentrate more specifically on a family of problems, the so-called Cousin problems, from Poincaré (1883) to Cartan. This medium-term narrative provides insight into two more general issues in the history of contemporary mathematics. First, we will focus on the use of problems in theory-making. Second, the history of the design of structures in geometrically flavoured contexts—such as for the sheaf and fibre-bundle structures—which will help provide a more comprehensive view of the structuralist moment, a moment whose algebraic component has so far been the main focus for historical work. (shrink)