The last decade has witnessed the beginnings of a remarkable convergence of Husserlian phenonenology and analytic philosophy of language, and the present volumes provide original and important texts of the phenomenological philosophy of language. Powerfully influenced by the writings of the early Husserl, Reinach fashioned Husserl’s ideas into a rigorous analytical methodology of his own, which he applied in particular to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge, and to the philosophies of law and psychology. The central role of (...) the concept of state of affairs in Reinach’s philosophy will bring to mind immediately the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reinach’s most significant contribution, however, is contained in his The a priori foundations of civil law (1913), above all in the detailed analysis of the a priori structure of the act of promising. This amounts to an elaborate phenomenological theory of speech acts which anticipates, and in some respects goes beyond, the later theories of Austin and Searle. The present edition is in two volumes. Volume 1, which includes a biographical and thematic introduction by the editors, contains critical editions of those pieces published by Reinach himself. Volume II is a collection of all those items in Reinach’s surviving Nachlass which are in publishable form, including a number of important pieces not hitherto obtainable on such themes as ethical predicates, speech acts (“soziale Akte”), perception and the theory of number, together with a comprehensive sketch of the problems in the theory of knowledge, logic and ethics. Appended to this is a text-critical apparatus which also contains extensive discussions of the origins and sources of the materials in question. (shrink)

Distinguishes two senses of 'judgment' on the one hand as meaning a state of 'conviction' or 'belief', and on the other hand as meaning an act of 'affirmation' or 'assertion'. Certainly conviction and assertion stand in close relation to each other, but they delineate two heterogeneous logical spheres, and thereby divide the total field of the theory of judgment into two neighbouring but separate sub-fields. Once this is done it is shown to have implications for our understanding especially of the (...) phenomenon of negation, and of the distinction between negation as affirmation of a negative state of affairs, and negation as act of contradicting the judgment someone else has made. (shrink)

Cette traduction inedite de l'oeuvre principale d'Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) apporte des contributions fondamentales a divers champs de la connaissance. Disciple de Husserl, Reinach propose une interpretation du monde social qui engage la phenomenologie sur le terrain des actes sociaux et des experiences individuelles qui les accompagnent, afin d'isoler les structures a priori qui sont au principe meme du droit positif. Le travail de Reinach s'inscrit egalement dans un champ d'analyse philosophique et linguistique centre sur les enonces dits performatifs, baptises tels (...) par Austin quelques decennies plustard. (shrink)

Includes both German and English texts of "The Basic Concepts of Ethics", "The Basic Features of Ethics", "Reflection: Its Ethical and Legal Significance", with an introduction by James Smith.

Adolf Reinach was a German phenomenologist and legal theorist. This is a previously-unpublished translation of Reinach’s 1905 dissertation for his PhD earned under Theodor Lipps at the University of Munich, which was published as “Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht” , and reprinted in Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe [Collected Works: Critical Edition], Karl Schuhmann & Barry Smith, eds., 2 vols. , pp. 1–43.

O texto a seguir corresponde ao §3, pp. 705–718, do livro “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts” (“Os Fundamentos a priori do Direito Civil”), originalmente publicado em 1913 no Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, pp. 685–847. A numeração inserida entre colchetes no corpo do texto, destacada em negrito, refere-se à paginação desta edição. As palavras destacadas em negrito pelos tradutores remetem a um glossário que acompanha a presente tradução. Os itálicos, porém, são do próprio Reinach. A marca de intercalação (...) “ ” foi usada para introduzir expressões que estão apenas implícitas no texto original. Existem ainda as seguintes reedições desse livro: 1921 Gesammelte Schriften. Halle, Niemeyer, pp. 166–350. 1953 Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Munich: Kose t, 215 pp. 1989 Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1: Die Werke. Munique: Philosophia, 1989, pp. 141–278. (shrink)

English summary: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) was one of the most outstanding disciples of Husserl. In contrast to the idealistic phenomenology of transcendental constitution developed and expounded by Husserl in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, he endeavored to develop and establish the principles of a realistic phenomenology. This volume makes it possible to access the theoretical side of his thought, presenting both published and posthumous texts. French text. French description: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) fut l'un des disciples les plus remarquables de (...) Husserl, dont il fut le collegue a Gottingen, et l'un des plus notables representants de la phenomenologie munichoise avec Johannes Daubert. A l'encontre de la phenomenologie idealiste de la constitution transcendantale elaboree puis exposee par Husserl dans les Idees directrices de 1913, il suivit la voie frayee par les Recherches logiques pour developper et fixer les principes d'une phenomenologie realiste. Le foyer principal en est le concept d'etat de choses (Sachverhalt), correlat objectuel du jugement dont il tente de caracteriser le statut ontologique et d'elucider le mode de donation a la conscience--a savoir l'acte de visee et l'evidence. La methode en est exclusivement l'intuition des essences--consideree comme un passage de la realite effective a la pure possibilite -, a l'exclusion de toute reduction conduisant a la sphere transcendantale. Enfin, il procede a une desubjectivation de la notion kantienne d'a priori, qu'il arrache aux structures de la subjectivite pour l'ancrer dans les etats de choses eidetiques. Il contribue ainsi a situer la phenomenologie vis-a-vis de la philosophie medievale et des premices de la philosophie analytique, lui assignant une place dans une lignee qui part de Gregoire de Rimini pour aboutir a Meinong, Frege et Russell. Le present volume, Phenomenologie realiste, est un recueil visant a rendre accessible aux lecteurs francais le versant theoretique de sa pensee, et se compose a la fois de textes publies et posthumes--presentes ici dans un ordre thematique, et non chronologique. (shrink)

I have not set myself the task of telling you what Phenomenology is. Rather, I would like to try to think with you in the phenomenological manner. To talk about phenomenology is the most useless thing in the world so long as that is lacking which alone can give any talk concrete fullness and intuitiveness: the phenomenological way of seeing and the phenomenological attitude. For the essential point is this, that phenomenology is not a matter of a system of philosophical (...) propositions and truths - a system of propositions in which all who call themselves "Phenomenologists" must believe, and which I could here prove to you - but rather it is a method of philosophizing which is required by the problems of philosophy: one which is very different from the manner of viewing and verifying in life, and which is even more different from the way in which one does and must work in most of the sciences. And so today my aim is to touch upon a series of philosophical problems with you, in the hope that, at this or that point, it will become clear to you what the peculiarity of the phenomenological attitude is. Only then is the basis for further discussions given. (shrink)