RésuméLes doctrines vitalistes ou panpsychistes ont représenté longtemps le courant central de la pensée philosophique, et même scientifique. L'atomisme mécaniste n'était qu'une philosophie d'amateur, inutilisable scientifiquement. L'avènement de la mécanique galiléenne a interverti momentanément les rôles.Mais aujourd'hui, I'avèement de la microphysique permet de donner un sens précis au panpsychisme. Toutes les individualités, de la molécule à l'organisme, ont un caractère domanial. Elles ne fonctionnent pas, elles se forment, se comportent, agissent selon des thèmes. Or, ces propriétés sont celles du « (...) champ de conscience ». Ma conscience actuelle ne fait qu'un avec mon domaine d'espace. Le caractère « mien » de ma conscience signifie qu'elle est « ici » Le caractère « sien » d'une conscience autre signifie qu'elle est « ailleurs ». La pensée, distincte de la conscience actuelle, correspond à des thémes non localisables. La biologie et la physique contemporaines tendent à devenir psychobiologie et psychophysique.ZusammenfassungDie vitalistischen oder panpsychischen Lehren stellten lange die zentrale Stromung des philosophischen, ja auch des wissenschaftlichen Denkens dar. Die mechanistische Atomlehre war nur eine Liebhaberphilosophie, wissenschaftlich nicht venvertbar. Das Aufkommen des galileischen Mechanismus hat die Rollen eine Zeitlang vertauscht.Heutzutage erlaubt aber das Aufkommen der Mikrophysik, dem Panpsychismus einen bestimmten Sinn zu verleihen. Sämtliche Individualitäten, vom Molekül bis zum Organismus besitzen einen bezirkgebundenen Charakter. Sie funktionieren nicht, sie bilden sich, betragen sich, handeln nach gewissen Themen. Nun sind diese Eigenschaften aber die des « Bewusstseinsumfangs ». Mein gegenwärtiges Bewusstsein ist eins mit dem Raum, der mein Bezirk ist. Die Bestimmung « mein » meines Bewusstseins bedeutet, dass es « hier » ist. Die Bestimmung « sein » eines anderen Bewusstseins bedeutet, dass es « woanders » ist. Das vom gegenwärtigen Bewusstsein zu unterscheidende Denken entspricht nicht lokalisierbaren Themen. Die Biologie und die Physik der Gegenwart streben danach, zur Psychobiologie und Psychophysik zu werden.The vitalist and panpsychist doctrines have long represented the main stream of philosophical and even scientific thought. Mechanical atomism was only an amateurish philosophy, with no scientific utility. The appearance of the Galilean mechanics has momentarily reversed the positions.But the appearance today of microphysics enables one to give a precise meaning to panpsychism. All individualities, from the molecule up to the organism, have a domanial character. They do not function, they form themselves, behave and act, in accordance with themes. These properties are those of the « field of consciousness. » My actual consciousness is one with my space domain. The « my » element of my consciousness means that it is « here. » The « his » element of someone else's consciousness means that it is « elsewhere. » Thought, as distinct from actual consciousness corresponds to unlocalizable themes. Contemporary biology and physics tend to become psychobiology and psychophysics. (shrink)

Fessard, G. Jeanne Hersch, genèse d'une œuvre.--Muralt, A. de. Phénoménologie et métaphysique.--Philonenko, A. Leibniz et le platonisme.--Christoff, D. Représentation et décision dans la temporalité selon Kant.--Tilliette, X. De l'illusion au savoir, la philosophie.--Widmer, G. Variations kierkegaardiennes sur l'édifiant.--Dufour-Kowalska, G. L'imagination maîtresse de vérité.--Leyvraz, J.-P. Des noms.--Piguet, J.-C. Liberté esthétique et liberté éthique.--Schaerer, R. Le philosophe entre oui et non.--Scheurer, P.-B. Vues nouvelles sur la science du temps et l'histoire.--Starobinski, J. La littérature et l'irrationnel.--Aron, R. De la libéralisation.--Werner, E. La digue (...) et la vie.--Cottier, G. La fascination du vide, éléments pour un diagnostic. (shrink)

Treating mathematical science as a distinct cultural entity subject to environmental factors which influence its evolution, the author examines the creation and development of its major concepts since early times.

The question of the ethical life is arguably one of the most compelling, and urgent, questions of our time. As Peter Singer, among others, has pointed out, almost 10 million children die each year due to poverty, some of whom would not die if the amount of aid that we now offer increases significantly. As Singer has also pointed out, the exploitation of human beings and other animals is a major ethical and practical concern. There can be little reasonable doubt (...) that pain and suffering abound, in the world today, due to many causes such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation and destruction and anthropocentrism among others, just as there can be little reasonable doubt that some of the pain and suffering is preventable. So, what does it mean to live ethically today? Does it mean taking the point of view of the universe, as Sidgwick put it, memorably, rather than a narrow anthropocentric or speciesist view? Does it mean living in accordance with duties or obligations, or in light of recognised virtues, or with the minimisation of pain and suffering primarily in mind? Does it entail a consideration of the interests of other species and a rejection of the principle of the sanctity of human life? Does it mean not eating animals when other healthy alternatives are available, especially when those animals have been treated in ways that are inconsistent with their interests, whatever they may be? Does it mean taking active steps to reduce poverty on our part on a day to day basis? Is ethics exhausted in some sense today? And if we could reach some consensus on these questions, what difference would the ethical life make? Some argue that speciesism and the exploitation of human beings and other animals might diminish; that pain and suffering, especially gratuitous pain and suffering, would decrease, or at the very least, not increase; or that we will become more aware of the limitations of things such as "the traditional ethic of the sanctity of life", as Singer calls it. Some argue that the ethical life is closely related to a life of relationships, reflection and deliberation, all of which deepen our understanding and enrich us personally. Others argue that the ethical life is closely related to our search for a meaningful life - that the ethical life can help us to find meaning in a world in which "meaning", defined broadly, can seem elusive, enigmatic or unsubstantial. These and related issues and questions are explored in this collection, which illustrates the relevance, vitality and dynamism of ethics today. (shrink)

Raymond Aron (1905-1983) gehört unzweifelhaft zu den grossen politischen Denkern des 20. Jahrhunderts. Als Professor fuer politische Soziologie an der Sorbonne hat er die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts ebenso begleitet und kommentiert wie als Leitartikler fuer die Tageszeitung Le Figaro oder das Nachrichtenmagazin L'Express. Er verband auf vorbildliche Weise die Rolle des politischen Beobachters mit derjenigen des Gelehrten, dessen Werk - trotz seiner Verankerung in der eigenen Zeit - bis heute nichts von seiner Bedeutung und Strahlkraft eingebuesst hat. Obwohl (...) Aron lange Zeit in Deutschland grösseres Ansehen genossen hat als in seinem Heimatland Frankreich, gibt es bisher keine Veröffentlichung, die als Einfuehrung in sein Gesamtwerk dienen kann.Mit diesem Band erschliessen Historiker, Philosophen, Politikwissenschaftler und Theologen einen interdisziplinären Zugang zu Arons politischem Denken. Die Themen reichen dabei von der Theorie der Internationen Beziehungen ueber die Ideologiekritik und die Analyse der modernen Industriegesellschaften bis zur Geschichte der politischen Philosophie. Der Band lädt dazu ein, das Werk eines der Hauptvertreter der langen Tradition des politischen Liberalismus mit Blick auf das 21. Jahrhundert neu zu lesen. (shrink)

Buch 1. Geschichte des Materialismus bis auf Kant.--Buch 2. Geschichte des Materialismus seit Kant.

Des Herrn Doct. und Prof. Joachim Langens, oder, Der Theologischen Facultaet zu Halle Anmerckungen über des Herrn Hoff-Raths und Professor Christian Wolffens Metaphysicam ... nebst beygefügter Hr. Hoff-R. und Prof. Christian Wolffens gründlicher Antwort -- Herrn D. Joh. Francisci Buddei S.S. Theol. P.P.O. zu Jena Bedencken über die Wolffianische Philosophie, mit Anmerckungen erläutert von Christian Wolffen.

This work describes the concept of bond order. It shows that covalent bond energy is correlated to bond order. Simple expressions which included bond order are introduced to calculate bond energies of homo-nuclear and hetero-nuclear bonds. Calculated values of bond energies are compared with literature values and show there is very good agreement between and calculated and experimental values in the vast majority of cases. Bond order reveals the strength of a bond and shows the number of bonds in both (...) homo-nuclear and hetero-nuclear covalent bonds. (shrink)

Reevaluates the ideas of the German general, shows how his writings have been misinterpreted, and applies Clausewitzian theory to twentieth century political history.

Philosophy is one of the most intimidating and difficult of disciplines, as any of its students can attest. This book is an important entry in a distinctive new series from Routledge: "The Great Philosophers." Breaking down obstacles to understanding the ideas of history's greatest thinkers, these brief, accessible, and affordable volumes offer essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition from Plato to Wittgenstein.In just 64 pages, each author, a specialist on his subject, places the philosopher and his (...) ideas into historical perspective. Each volume explains, in simple terms, the basic concepts, enriching the narrative through the effective use of biographical detail. And instead of attempting to explain the philosopher's entire intellectual history, which can be daunting, this series takes one central theme in each philosopher's work, using it to unfold the philosopher's thoughts. (shrink)

Raymond Durgnat here examines literally hundreds of films in an effort to isolate universals of the language of films and to loft their poetics to an articulate level.

Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, (...) the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported. (shrink)

This edition focuses on Aron's lifelong attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge and action and to understand the dialectical relationship between history ...

Why should science be so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws' relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with (...) the laws. It is argued that the laws form the only non-trivially "stable" set, where "stability" is invariance under a certain range of counterfactual suppositions not itself defined by reference to the laws. It is then explained why science should be so interested in identifying a non-trivially "stable" set: because of stability's relation to the best set of "inductive strategies". (shrink)

Acknowledged as perhaps _the_ masterpiece of materialist criticism in the English language, this omnibus ranges over British literary history from George Eliot to George Orwell to inquire about the complex ways economic reality shapes the imagination.

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

Why should science be so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws’ relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with (...) the laws. It is argued that the laws form the only non-trivially “stable” set, where “stability” is invariance under a certain range of counterfactual suppositions not itself defined by reference to the laws. It is then explained why science should be so interested in identifying a non-trivially “stable” set: because of stability’s relation to the best set of “inductive strategies”. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was (...) severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-. (shrink)

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

This paper explores the trade-off between cognitive effort and cognitive effects during immediate metaphor comprehension. We specifically evaluate the fundamental claim of relevance theory that metaphor understanding, like all utterance interpretation, is constrained by the presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 270): the ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it, and the ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences. One important implication (...) of optimal relevance is that listeners follow a path of least effort and stop processing at the first interpretation that satisfies their expectation of relevance. They do this by trying to minimize cognitive effort while maximizing cognitive effects. Some relevance theory scholars suggest that metaphors should require additional cognitive effort to be understood, and that in return they yield more cognitive effects than does literal speech. Others claim that metaphors may be understood quickly, as soon as people infer enough effects for the speaker's utterance to meet their expectation of optimal relevance. Our analysis of the experimental evidence suggests that there is no systematic relationship between cognitive effort and cognitive effects in metaphor comprehension. We conclude that relevance theory need not make any general predictions about the effort needed to comprehend metaphors. Nevertheless, relevance theory is consistent with many of the findings in psycholinguistics on metaphor understanding, and can account for aspects of metaphor understanding that no other theory can explain. (shrink)

This paper explores the trade-off between cognitive effort and cognitive effects during immediate metaphor comprehension. We specifically evaluate the fundamental claim of relevance theory that metaphor understanding, like all utterance interpretation, is constrained by the presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 270): the ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to process it, and the ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences. One important implication (...) of optimal relevance is that listeners follow a path of least effort and stop processing at the first interpretation that satisfies their expectation of relevance. They do this by trying to minimize cognitive effort while maximizing cognitive effects. Some relevance theory scholars suggest that metaphors should require additional cognitive effort to be understood, and that in return they yield more cognitive effects than does literal speech. Others claim that metaphors may be understood quickly, as soon as people infer enough effects for the speaker’s utterance to meet their expectation of optimal relevance. Our analysis of the experimental evidence suggests that there is no systematic relationship between cognitive effort and cognitive effects in metaphor comprehension. We conclude that relevance theory need not make any general predictions about the effort needed to comprehend metaphors. Nevertheless, relevance theory is consistent with many of the findings in psycholinguistics on metaphor understanding, and can account for aspects of metaphor understanding that no other theory can explain. (shrink)

CHAPTER I CLAUDE FLEURY AND HIS CAREER Claude Fleury (-), an educator, historian , jurist, cleric, royal tutor, and immortel of the ...

Recipient of Choice Magazine's 1996 Outstanding Academic Book Award Author Raymond Morrow outlines and recounts the development of the major tenets of critical theory, exemplifying them through the works of two of their most influential, recent adherents: Jürgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens. Beginning with a comprehensive yet meticulous explication of critical theory and its history, the author next discusses it within the context of a research program; his work concludes with an examination of empirical methods. Emphasizing the connections between (...) critical theory, empirical research, and social science methodology, Morrow's volume offers refreshing insights on traditional and current material. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive study of the English word 'or', and the logical operators variously proposed to present its meaning. Although there are indisputably disjunctive uses of or in English, it is a mistake to suppose that logical disjunction represents its core meaning. 'Or' is descended from the Anglo-Saxon word meaning second, a form which survives in such expressions as "every other day." Its disjunctive uses arise through metalinguistic applications of an intermediate adverbial meaning which is conjunctive rather than disjunctive (...) in character. These conjunctive uses have puzzled philosophers and logicians, and have been discussed extensively under such headings as "free choice permission." This study examines the textbook myths that have clouded our understanding of how or and other "logical" vocabulary comes to have something approaching its logical meaning in natural languages. It considers the various historical conceptions of disjunction and its place in logic from the Stoics to the present day. (shrink)

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

Raymond Callahan's lively study exposes the alarming lengths to which school administrators went, particularly in the period from 1910 to 1930, in sacrificing educational goals to the demands of business procedures.

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)